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The Monterrey Consensus, adopted by the 2002 International Confer-ence on Financing for Development, highlighted in its paragraph 45
“the vital role that multilateral and regional development banks continue to
play in serving the development needs of developing countries and countries
with economies in transition.” It went on to note, “They should contribute
to providing an adequate supply of finance to countries that are challenged
by poverty, follow sound economic policies and may lack adequate access to
capital markets. They should also mitigate the impact of excessive volatility
of financial markets. Strengthened regional development banks and sub-
regional financial institutions add flexible financial support to national and
regional development efforts, enhancing ownership and overall efficiency.
They also serve as a vital source of knowledge and expertise on economic
growth and development for their developing member countries.” Despite
this call, however, relatively little progress has been made since Monterrey in
enhancing the role that regional financial arrangements play in the interna-
tional financial system.
The failure to devote attention to this issue is attested to by the absence of
any book or report providing a comparative evaluation of the experience
vii
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with regional financial cooperation in different parts of the world. This book
seeks to fill this serious gap in the existing literature. Experiences in this area
can be clustered into two groups: development financing; and mechanisms
for macroeconomic cooperation and related financial arrangements (liquid-
ity financing during balance-of-payments crises). Although our central aim is
to explore the ways in which regional cooperation can promote the interests
of developing countries, we will use Western Europe’s experiences with
regional financial cooperation as a benchmark for that exploration.
The experiences reviewed in this book indicate that regional cooperation
can be a very effective means of surmounting the difficulties posed by the
shortfall in the financial services provided by the current international finan-
cial architecture. Nonetheless, the scope of these institutions’ operations is
still limited and they have yet to be recognized as central elements in the
international financial architecture. We hope that this book will spark a
broader interest in initiatives in this area and indeed bring them to the cen-
ter of the current discussion on South-South cooperation.
We are deeply grateful to the Ford Foundation for providing the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean with
the support it needed to undertake this project.
José Luis Machinea José Antonio Ocampo
Executive Secretary Under-Secretary-General for
Economic Commission for Economic and Social Affairs
Latin America and the Caribbean of the United Nations
viii foreword
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The period following the 1997 Asian crisis generated an extensive discussionon the international financial architecture. The debate made clear that
there is an undersupply of services by international financial institutions that has
become more glaring as a result of the growing economic linkages created by the
current globalization process. The associated “global public goods” that are
being undersupplied include adequate mechanisms for preventing and managing
financial crises, as well as for guaranteeing global macroeconomic and financial
stability. The debate also underscored the fact that private international capital
markets provide finance to developing countries in a highly procyclical way,
effectively reducing the room for maneuver of developing countries to undertake
countercyclical macroeconomic policies. Finally, the debate emphasized that
international capital markets squeeze out many developing countries, particu-
larly the poorest among them, from private global capital markets.
The possible role of regional institutions in providing these services was
underestimated in the debate on how to improve global financial arrangements.
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It was, indeed, absent in major northern reports1 and from the views of inter-
national financial reform coming from the Bretton Woods institutions (for exam-
ple, in the reports on international reform presented by the International
Monetary Fund [IMF] to the Interim Committee and its successor, the Inter-
national Monetary and Financial Committee). It was also given at best a passing
reference in major academic analyses of reforms of the international financial
architecture.2 There was even open opposition to regional arrangements, par-
ticularly to the 1997 Japanese proposal to create an Asian Monetary Fund,
although this idea was revived in 2000 in the form of the Chiang Mai Initiative
among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, plus
China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
There were obviously exceptions to this rule. Among the many reports, that of
the United Nations stands out for its defense of the potential role of regional
financial arrangements in an improved international financial architecture.3
Strong defenses of regional financial arrangements were also made by Percy Mistry,
José Antonio Ocampo, and the Emerging Markets Eminent Persons Group con-
vened by the Ford Foundation.4 Regional and subregional development banks
have been given greater attention.5 As already pointed out, after the crisis Asia
took the most important steps forward,6 while the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) provided a strong defense of the role
of regional financial arrangements in Latin America and the Caribbean.7
The lack of adequate attention to regional financial arrangements was sur-
prising in at least three ways. First, it is evident to all observers that the new
wave of globalization is also one of “open regionalism.” Second, postwar West-
ern Europe is widely recognized as a successful example of regional financial
cooperation, which in the financial area encompasses a history that extends
from the creation of the European Payments Union and the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB) in the 1950s to a series of arrangements for macroeconomic
coordination and cooperation that eventually led to the current monetary union
among most members of the European Union. Third, regional development
banks have been recognized as an important part of the world institutional land-
2 josé antonio ocampo
1. See, for example, Council on Foreign Relations (1999) and Meltzer and others (2000).
2. Eichengreen (1999); Kenen (2001).
3. United Nations (1999).
4. See Mistry (1999); Ocampo (1999, 2002, 2003); and Ford Foundation (2001).
5. See Bezanson and Sagasti (2000); Culpeper (1997); Birdsall (2001); and Sagasti, Bezanson,
and Prada (2005).
6. See Park and Wang (2000).
7. See United Nations, ECLAC (2002a) and Agosin (2001)
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experiences and challenges 3
scape since the 1960s. In the developing world, there are also several experiences
with “developing-country-owned” multilateral development banks,8 regional
payments agreements, at least one successful reserve fund, and a few monetary
unions. These experiences coincide in several ways with those of regional and
subregional trade agreements, with undoubtedly a mixed history in both cases.9
Reflecting the lack of adequate attention to this issue, there is no book or
report that makes a comparative evaluation of experience with regional financial
arrangements. This book aims to fill this important gap. The different forms of
financial cooperation are clustered into two groups: (1) development financing,
the area where there is more extensive experience, including novel ideas, such as
the Asian initiatives to strengthen regional bond markets, and (2) mechanisms 
for macroeconomic and related financial cooperation (liquidity financing during
balance-of-payments crises), which include mechanisms of policy dialogue and
peer review, and more elaborate systems of macroeconomic surveillance and pol-
icy consultation or coordination; reserve funds and swap arrangements among
central banks; and, in the most developed form, monetary unions. Two additional
forms of cooperation that belong to the second cluster are regional payments
agreements and cooperation in the area of prudential regulation and supervision
of domestic financial systems. This study makes only passing reference to them. It
should be emphasized that, although our central aim is to explore the potential
service that regional financial cooperation can make to developing countries, the
experience with such cooperation in Western Europe is used as a benchmark.
This chapter provides an overview of a set of relevant experiences with both
forms of regional cooperation and links the comparative evaluation of these expe-
riences with the broader debate on international financial reform. In this regard, it
looks not only at the advantages of regional financial cooperation in comparison
with global arrangements, but also at its revealed shortfalls and, equally important,
at the possible complementarities between regional and global institutions. The
chapter is organized into six sections, the first of which is this introduction. The
next two sections provide the case for regional financial arrangements and analyze
some of the challenges they face. The fourth and fifth sections look at major expe-
riences with regional cooperation in the areas of development financing and
macroeconomic cooperation respectively. The last draws some conclusions.
8. This chapter uses the term “developing-country-owned” to denote multilateral development
banks that do not have any capital from industrialized countries (although they may have capital
from relatively rich oil-producing countries).
9. See the analysis of the different experiences of regional cooperation in the series of books
published by the Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD) in the 1990s. See, in particular,
Mistry (1996) and Teunissen (1998).
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The Case for Regional Financial Institutions
Several arguments can be made for a more active use of regional financial
arrangements to strengthen the international financial architecture. This chapter
groups them into four major arguments.10 The first relates to the fact that, as
already pointed out, the current globalization process is also one of open region-
alism. Intraregional trade and investment flows have deepened as a result of
both policy and market-driven processes of regional integration.11 This process
is, of course, uneven, being clearly stronger in Western Europe, East Asia, and
North America and much weaker in other parts of the world, particularly South
Asia. However, even in regions that have lagged behind, a web of regional initia-
tives has played an important role in reshaping the world economic system since
the early 1990s. In addition, since the 1980s the contagion effects of financial
crises have also had important regional dimensions. As a result of all these pro-
cesses, macroeconomic linkages among countries and the externalities generated
by national macroeconomic policies on neighbors have increased.
A stronger case can thus be made than in the past for policies and institutions
that build regional defenses against financial crises and explicitly internalize the
effects of domestic macroeconomic and financial policies on regional partners.
In this regard, regional reserve funds and swap arrangements can serve as a first
line of defense against crises. In turn, macroeconomic dialogue or stronger
forms of regional surveillance and policy consultation could internalize, at least
partially, the externalities that national macroeconomic policies have on regional
partners. Furthermore, the effectiveness of national macroeconomic policies
may be enhanced (or reduced) by the credibility generated by the willingness (or
refusal) of regional partners to support a specific country.12 A complementary
argument is that, in a world where the room for maneuver of national macro-
economic policies has become more limited, the regional arena has become cru-
cial for exercising what remains of macroeconomic policy autonomy. On the
contrary, macroeconomic policies that take into account only domestic consid-
erations (as has been traditional in IMF programs) may be said to contribute to
4 josé antonio ocampo
10. See complementary arguments in Culpeper’s contribution to this volume. He differentiates
between cooperative motives and the need to remedy the incomplete set of international institutions.
11. The first refers to the web of regional, subregional, and bilateral trade agreements that have
generated the “spaghetti bowl” of current trade agreements. The second is used in the analysis of
East Asia to refer to a process that was largely driven by investment and trade in intermediate
goods for the production of manufactures for the world market—following the “flying geese” pat-
tern that has been reshaped in recent decades by the irruption of China into global markets.
12. Mistry (1999).
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the contraction of regional trade and to encourage competitive devaluations that
effectively compound contagion.
Growing regional linkages also mean that there is a role for regional develop-
ment banks or other mechanisms to support investments in regional infrastructure
and other “regional public goods.” Indeed, the limited financing for “regional
public goods” in current development cooperation has led Birdsall to claim that
the underfunding of regionalism is one of the major problems of current inter-
national arrangements.13 Classical risk-pooling arguments also enhance the
potential role of regional and subregional development banks. An advantage of
all these mechanisms is that information asymmetries may be smaller at the
regional level, and that the mix of peer pressure and the strong sense of owner-
ship of regional institutions may reduce the risks that these development banks
face, and have positive effects on investment and the financial development of
members of a regional club.
Similar arguments can be made for cooperation in developing the financial
infrastructure to support domestic financial development and to expand regio-
nal capital markets. Regional mechanisms can also play a role in supporting
national systems for the prudential regulation and supervision of domestic
financial systems, including the adaptation of international standards to regional
conditions, or even in setting special regional norms (for example, in the devel-
oping world, on maturity and currency mismatches in the portfolios of financial
institutions). In all of these areas, regional cooperation can help to reduce learn-
ing costs and help countries share the experience of institutional development.
According to the second argument, the heterogeneity of the international
community implies that world and regional institutions can play complementary
roles, following the principle of subsidiarity that has been central to European
integration. The need to fill the gaps in the world’s current highly incomplete
international financial architecture makes this role even more important, as Roy
Culpeper argues in this volume.14 Furthermore, some of the services provided
by international institutions may be subject to diseconomies of scale, and it is
unclear whether others have large enough economies of scale to justify single
international institutions in specific areas. In particular, regional and sub-
regional institutions may be better placed to capture and respond to specific
regional needs and demands. The diverse portfolios of existing multilateral
development banks are tailored to the specific needs of countries in the regions
13. See Birdsall (2006).
14. See also Sakakibara (2003).
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where they operate, and they are also capable of operating successfully on very
different scales.
In the same vein, macroeconomic surveillance and consultation at the world
level are necessary to guarantee policy coherence among major countries, but
they are inefficient for managing the externalities generated by macroeconomic
policies on neighbors in the developing world (or even within Western Europe).
Thus, while the IMF should play a central role in macroeconomic policy coor-
dination at the global level,15 there is plenty of room for regional and sub-
regional processes of a similar nature. Also, although regional and international
contagion implies that the role of the IMF should be to manage the largest
balance-of-payments crises, regional funds could actually provide full support to
small and medium-sized countries during crises.16 Indeed, the rising concentra-
tion of balance-of-payments support on a few countries indicates that there may
be biases in the response of global financial institutions according to the size of
countries.17 Thus, an argument can be made for a division of labor in the provi-
sion of financing between world and regional organizations, with the latter
assuming a greater role in the support of smaller countries.
The third is an argument for competition, particularly in the supply of ser-
vices to small and medium-sized countries. Owing to their small size, the power
of these countries to negotiate with large organizations is very limited, and their
most important defense is therefore competition in the provision of financial
services. For these countries, access to a broader menu of alternatives with which
to finance development or to manage a crisis may be relatively more important
than the “global public goods” that the largest international organizations pro-
vide (such as global macroeconomic stability). Furthermore, since they can
assume they have little or no influence on the provision of those “global public
goods,” they are prone to take the attitude of “free riders” toward them. This
implies that, aside from the case for complementarity between global and re-
gional financial institutions, competition between the two sets of organizations
in the provision of development bank services, liquidity financing, or technical
support is the best arrangement for small and medium-sized countries.
The final argument in favor of regional arrangements is of a political economy
order, and may be called the “federalist” argument. In this regard the essential issue
is that regional and subregional institutions enjoy a greater sense of ownership
because member states feel that they have a stronger voice in these organizations.
6 josé antonio ocampo
15. See United Nations (2005).
16. See, for example, the estimates of Agosin (2001) for Latin America.
17. See Griffith-Jones, Ocampo, and Cailloux (1999); and Ocampo (2002).
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This creates a special relationship between them and member countries, which
in the case of financial institutions may generate a strong “preferred-creditor sta-
tus.” The preferred-creditor status may, in turn, reduce the risks that regional and
subregional development banks and reserve funds face, further encouraging the
virtues of risk pooling.
One element of this argument is that, no matter what arrangements are
adopted at the world level, the voice of small and medium-sized countries in
global institutions is unlikely to be strong. The inadequate representation of
developing countries in existing financial arrangements, an issue that was under-
scored at the International Conference on Financing for Development, held in
Monterrey, Mexico, in 2002,18 and the even greater informal concentration of
power in international financial institutions, contributes to this view. This
means that, within the global order, the smaller countries will be able to make
their voice heard (or heard much more clearly) only if it takes the form of a
regional voice. In fact, a paradox of the global system is that global rules are
most important for small countries, even though it is precisely they that have
the least influence over the formulation and defense of such rules. This problem
can only be solved if the smaller countries organize themselves and if regional
institutions are truly made part of a broader international order.
The foregoing discussion implies that, although there is a strong case for
greater international macroeconomic and financial cooperation, it is unclear
whether the increasing supply of services from the associated institutions should
come from a few world organizations. Rather, in some cases the organizational
structure should be one of networks of institutions providing the required services
on a complementary basis, and in others it should function as a system of compet-
itive organizations. The provision of services required for financial crisis preven-
tion and resolution should probably be closer to the first model, whereas in the
realm of development finance, competition should be the basic rule (and in fact
should include competition with private agents as well). But purity in the model’s
structure is probably not the more desirable characteristic: it may be better for
parts of the networks to compete against one another (for example, regional
reserve funds or swap arrangements versus the IMF in the provision of liquidity
financing) and for rival organizations to cooperate in other cases.
This implies that the International Monetary Fund of the future should be
better viewed as the apex of a network of regional and subregional reserve funds
and swap arrangements.19 Indeed, such a structure would be more akin to that
18. United Nations (2002).
19. See United Nations (1999); and Ocampo (1999, 2002, 2003).
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of the European Central Bank or the United States Federal Reserve system than
to its current centralized structure. To encourage the development of regional
reserve funds, incentives could be created giving them automatic access to IMF
financing or a share in the allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs) propor-
tional to their paid-in resources, or both—in other words, contributions to
common reserve funds could be treated as equivalent to IMF quotas. As already
noted, regional reserve funds or swap arrangements could provide not only most
of the exceptional financing for smaller countries within a region, but also part
of the financing for larger countries, and they could also serve to deter (at least
partly) would-be speculators from attacking the currencies of individual coun-
tries within a region.
This model should be extended to the provision of macroeconomic surveil-
lance and consultation, as well as to the surveillance of national systems of pru-
dential regulation and supervision, and to developing the infrastructure for
domestic and regional capital markets. This would complement, rather than
replace, regular IMF surveillance and IMF/World Bank support to financial
development. In the area of development financing, subregional development
banks can play a significant role as a mechanism for pooling the risks of groups
of developing countries, also allowing them to make more aggressive use of
opportunities provided by private capital markets.
An institutional framework such as this would have two positive features.
First, it would bring more stability to the world economy by providing essential
services that can hardly be provided by a few international institutions, owing
both to the heterogeneity of the international community and to the dynamic
processes of open regionalism that are under way. Second, from the point of view
of the equilibrium of world relations, it could be more balanced than a system
based on a few world organizations. It could also increase the commitment of
small countries to abide by rules that contribute to world and regional stability.
The Challenges Facing Regional Arrangements
Regional financial cooperation also faces significant challenges, which must not
be underestimated. They relate to the viability and long-term sustainability of
the arrangements that are created, and involve three major issues: the capacity of
a given group of developing countries to supply the relevant financial services;
the need to guarantee that strong regional institutions are developed; and an
equitable distribution of the benefits of regional integration.
Culpeper’s contribution to this volume poses the first of these issues as the
need to match the demands from developing countries with their capacity to
8 josé antonio ocampo
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supply the associated financial services. In this regard, he argues that the presence
of industrial or emerging-market economies within a region is crucial for success-
ful financial cooperation, as they provide a rapidly growing pool of savings and
greater creditworthiness. In this sense, regional cooperation may be unable, by
itself, to meet the resource needs of the poorest countries, whether they are of a
short- or long-term nature. This is particularly true when such funds must be
provided with a larger, or even a full, grant component to avoid building an
unsustainable debt dynamic, as has been underscored in recent years. However,
not all the potential services of regional financial institutions require additional
funding (some forms of macroeconomic cooperation do not), and some may
actually reduce the need for external funds (reserve pooling) or allow countries to
reduce the costs of accessing private capital markets (risk pooling).
In any case, for large-scale funding, partnerships with donor countries seem
to be inescapable for low-income countries for the foreseeable future. The term
of the partnership must be adequate, however, and could include channeling
cooperation through regional institutions in ways that do not undermine devel-
oping countries’ “ownership” of the regional arrangement. Indeed, this was the
experience of Western Europe during the years of postwar reconstruction char-
acterized by a “dollar shortage.”20 The channeling of Marshall Plan aid through
the European Payments Union is a successful example of external financial sup-
port channeled through a regional institution.
For middle-income or “emerging” countries, the demand for regional finan-
cial cooperation will depend, in part, on how deep regional trade and financial
integration are. The constraints on supplying effective services may also be
important, but will differ in nature from those faced by low-income countries.
The main problem lies in providing short-term liquidity financing to cope with
capital account shocks, particularly if external funds are supplied in a procyclical
manner to all countries in a region and there are significant factors of “regional
contagion.” However, cooperation from neighbors during crises may actually be
highly effective, as evidenced by the successful support of France by Germany
during the European currency crisis of 1992, or China’s support for Hong Kong
SAR during the Asian crisis.21 Although of a more limited nature, the successful
experience of the Latin American Reserve Fund (which, despite its name, contin-
ues to be essentially an Andean arrangement, with Costa Rica as the additional
member) in supporting member countries during the Latin American debt crisis
of the 1980s, and during the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, shows that, despite
20. Triffin (1957).
21. Mistry (1999).
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contagion, all members of a region can benefit from the supply of liquidity
financing by regional institutions (see Daniel Titelman’s contribution to this vol-
ume). As the experience of the Latin American Reserve Fund indicates, the
demand for funds by different countries does not coincide exactly in time. This
facilitates the functioning of reserve funds and helps them to mitigate contagion.
On the contrary, lack of support or, worse still, an explicit attempt by other
countries in a region to differentiate themselves from a regional partner under-
going crisis, may reduce the effectiveness of any adjustment policies that this
country undertakes and end up increasing contagion.
Although “ownership” provides a strong case for regional arrangements, it
also has its downside. The essential problem is that regional and subregional
institutions may be weak in the face of pressures from some of their individual
members, particularly the more powerful among them. Therefore, the virtues of
ownership can only be realized when matched by strong institution building,
which is ultimately what will determine the effectiveness of regional cooperation
arrangements. Political considerations play the dominant role in the process of
institution building—and indeed, regional integration is always a political
process and its weakness a sign of a lack of political will to build strong regional
institutions.22
The history of European cooperation provides a clue about the long-term
nature and complexities of this process. According to Charles Wyplosz (in this
volume), since regional integration involves continuous erosion of national
sovereignty—or, put in a more positive way, a transfer of sovereignty from the
nation-state to regional institutions—it requires building confidence in regional
institutions, which takes place only gradually. Each step in this process implies
an uneasy compromise between integrationist and nationalist forces, and the lat-
ter may lead to reversals in the road to integration, implying that it is not a lin-
ear process.23 Although it is essential to have clear vision and objectives, a
master plan is neither necessary nor useful. To quote Wyplosz: “Integration has
always been characterized by a process of muddling through, taking two steps
forward and one step back, with deep and lingering divergences as to what the
end objective should be. But each integration step has made the next one more
likely. Success in one area emboldened political leaders to contemplate another
even bolder project in another area. More crucially perhaps, each important step
has been matched by some additional institutional buildup, which has provided
10 josé antonio ocampo
22. Teunissen (1998).
23. The associated complexities have recently manifested themselves, among other areas, in the
Stability and Growth Pact. In this case, however, as recent debates have underscored, the inappro-
priateness of the Maastricht rules are a key part of the problem.
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the backbone for further moves. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of
the early creation of institutions to support the integration process, no matter
how imperfect those institutions are.”
Powerful countries may prefer weak regional institutions, to allow them to
exercise more influence over them. The struggle for regional influence among
major regional powers may also become an obstacle to strong institution building.
This seems to have underlain some of the problems facing the design of strong
regional macroeconomic arrangements in East Asia in recent years, and is evident
in other processes, such as the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). The way a
power struggle among major players is settled, and whether it results in strong or
weak regional institutions, will be critical for smaller members of a regional or
subregional club, which clearly benefit from strong regional institutions in their
relations with large regional players.
Historical and cultural affinity may help institution building, as Culpeper
argues in his chapter, but the story is mixed in this regard. European integration
took place despite diversity, whereas Latin American integration has advanced
slowly regardless of affinity. Political motivations are obviously behind the inte-
gration efforts in these two regions, and clearly have been stronger in Western
Europe, as well as in building up the network of Arab and Islamic financial
institutions and in the history of regional development banks. The breakdown
of the regional arrangements inherited from the colonial past is quite a common
historical phenomenon, as evidenced by both Spanish America in the nine-
teenth century and the end of colonialism in Africa and Asia in the second half
of the twentieth century. It can perhaps be argued that national institution-
building almost always comes at the cost of regional integration, and in many
cases involves confrontation with neighbors. Some arrangements that have sur-
vived decolonization have sometimes had a troubled history, even when sup-
ported by an industrial country, as macroeconomic cooperation among the
francophone countries in West Africa indicates.
The distribution of the benefits of integration is one of the crucial issues in
the design of institutions appropriate for a given integration process. Owing to
agglomeration economies, the benefits from trade integration may accrue dispro-
portionately to larger and higher-income countries. So there is no presumption
that trade integration will facilitate convergence in real incomes within regions.24
Most integration processes include provisions to facilitate an equitable distri-
bution of their benefits. In trade integration, they commonly include preferen-
tial rules of varying types: slower liberalization, the possibility of maintaining
24. Mistry (1996).
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higher levels of protection or subsidies, and exceptions to some rules. This prac-
tice has been extended to World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements and,
to a lesser extent, to bilateral trade agreements. In more elaborate integration
processes, they also include special development financing facilities and, in a few
instances, fiscal transfers to the weaker countries or regions. Western Europe
again represents the best model in both areas. In the past, some integration
processes in Africa and Latin America also included industry-sharing agree-
ments, under which weaker partners were allocated certain industries, but these
arrangements usually failed and were abandoned. Freer labor mobility may also
be seen as an adjustment mechanism that allows weaker countries or regions to
adapt to the effects of integration. However, although it is generally seen as an
essential element of full integration, it is unlikely to be considered a rule for the
equitable sharing of its benefits.
In sum, the development of a dense institutional network of regional and
subregional institutions in development finance and macroeconomic coopera-
tion faces three major challenges: matching demand with supply capacities; a
clear long-term commitment to institution building; and an equitable distribu-
tion of the benefits of integration. These issues are interrelated: supply capacities
are not exogenously given, as they are largely created through a gradual process
of institution building; and strong institutions are unlikely to be accepted by
weaker partners unless they perceive that there is an equitable distribution of the
benefits of integration.
Development Financing
Regional development financing arrangements have followed three basic mod-
els. The oldest and best-developed model is multilateral development banks and
related multilateral financial institutions. These institutions are present in all
regions, although with different coverage, structures, and priorities. A second
model, which is mainly used by the European Union, is fiscal transfers with
explicit redistributive regional objectives. A third and more novel model is the
development of regional bond markets; the most important initiatives in this
regard have come from East Asia.
The regional development banks (discussed by Francisco Sagasti and Fernando
Prada in this volume) are the oldest of the first group of institutions: the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB); the Asian Development Bank (AsDB); the
African Development Bank (AfDB); and the European Investment Bank (EIB).
Strong political motivations led to their creation in the 1950s and 1960s. The first
two institutions may be viewed as the result of cold war politics, while the third is
12 josé antonio ocampo
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the daughter of decolonization. EIB was born, in turn, out of two basic objectives
of European integration: to support lagging regions and thus an equitable integra-
tion process; and to finance the investment in the infrastructure of integration—
“regional public goods” in current terminology (see in this regard the chapter by
Stephany Griffith-Jones, Alfred Steinherr, and Ana Teresa Fuzzo de Lima in this
volume). To these we should add the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), which was established in 1991 and is the daughter of
post–cold war politics.
With the exception of the EIB, which is made up entirely of industrial-country
members, all of which can borrow from the institution, the regional banks
include a division between developing country borrowers and nonborrowing
industrial-country members. Borrowing members are a majority in AfDB and
slightly over half of the capital of IDB, but are a minority in AsDB and particu-
larly in EBRD. This structure was adopted only late (in 1982) by the African
Development Bank, which was initially a strictly African institution, but was
forced to converge with the structure of other regional development banks
because of its financial difficulties.
This capital structure allows developing countries to benefit from the excellent
credit rating of the industrial-country members. It is amplified by the practice of
maintaining a large ratio of subscribed to paid-in capital, which may be seen as a
huge guarantee fund for the credit operations of these institutions. This may be
understood as a cross-subsidy from countries with good to weaker credit ratings. It
may also be seen, however, as a correction of a market failure: the overestimation of
risk in private capital markets, particularly during periods of bust in private financ-
ing. The better lending conditions, as well as the willingness of these institutions to
finance countries under difficult circumstances—that is, during crises—tend to
reinforce their preferred-creditor status. This becomes a “self-fulfilling prophecy”
in terms of portfolio quality, and in this sense can also be considered a correction
of market failures: low risk margins are justified by the fact that loan losses are min-
imal, but this reinforces the willingness of debtors to keep a good credit history
with these institutions. The requirement that first-class guarantees be maintained
(from governments or private banks) further reinforces credit quality, whereas the
lack of retail services reduces the staff required and thus intermediation costs.25
The most elaborate system of multilateral financial institutions that are
strictly “developing-country-owned” is that of the Arab and Islamic world. As
Georges Corm describes in this volume, the origin of these institutions lies in
25. For a further analysis of these issues, see the two chapters by Sagasti and Prada and
Griffith-Jones, Steinherr, and Fuzzo de Lima in this volume. See also Birdsall (2001).
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the regional solidarity generated by the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and, in eco-
nomic terms, in the sudden increase in resources of Arab oil-exporting coun-
tries in the 1970s. Most of these institutions started to operate in the 1970s,
although one of them, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
(AFESD), had been created in 1968. With the partial exception of the Islamic
Development Bank, which includes some major non-oil-exporting countries as
shareholders, these institutions essentially operate as mechanisms for transfer-
ring resources from the oil-rich countries of the region to poorer regional mem-
bers, as well as to other developing countries, particularly in the Islamic world
and Africa. Thus they complement the specific national cooperation extended
by the oil-rich countries. This feature also implies that lending by these institu-
tions is highly dependent on the oil price. This reduces the countercyclical role
that financing by multilateral development banks should play.26 The sharp
upturn in oil prices since 2000 has led, however, to a small increase in funding,
relative to the oil boom of the 1970s; thus financing by these institutions
remains today significantly below the levels reached in the second half of the
1970s and early 1980s. They have also made suboptimal use of the opportuni-
ties to tap global or national capital markets.
The largest of these multilateral institutions in terms of cumulative commit-
ments is the Islamic Development Bank, which also has the largest membership
and the largest interregional coverage of its lending operations. It is followed by
the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, which provides soft
lending operations for Arab League countries, largely for infrastructure projects.
In turn, the Arab Monetary Fund focuses its activities on financing inter-Arab
trade. Although smaller in size, the Arab Fund for the Development of Africa
channels funds to the African continent. Other institutions provide equity capi-
tal and insurance coverage for inter-Arab investment. The main beneficiaries of
this network of institutions are the middle- and low-income Arab countries,
which have received on average about three-fifths of the financing that has been
available from the institutions since 1970. Indeed, some of these countries, par-
ticularly in the Middle East, have received more funds from these institutions
than from countries in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (DAC/OECD).
Integration efforts in sub-Saharan Africa have also led to the design of some
development banks and other financial institutions. These institutions were set
up by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the
failed (but now revived) East African Community—although its financial
14 josé antonio ocampo
26. See Ocampo (2002); and United Nations (2005, chap. 5).
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branch, the East African Development Bank, survived that process. To these
must be added the trade financing facilities set up more recently by the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). However, as Culpeper
argues in this volume, their performance has been modest at best. Nonetheless,
their existence creates the possibility of using them more actively in the future as
instruments of regional development.27
Latin America and the Caribbean undoubtedly provide the best example of a
well-developed network of subregional financial institutions, which include
three major banks: the Andean Development Corporation (CAF, Corporación
Andina de Fomento), the Central American Bank for Economic Integration
(CABEI), and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) (see the chapter by
Titelman in this volume).28 These institutions were created in the 1960s to sup-
port the subregional integration processes and thus service the small and
medium-sized countries of the region, which are the main participants in those
integration processes. The Central American and Caribbean banks have the
same structure as the regional development banks, and thus include both bor-
rowing and nonborrowing countries; nevertheless, some of the nonborrowing
countries are the larger Latin American countries in the vicinity of Central
America, which are also part of the Caribbean basin.
The Andean Development Corporation is unique in being exclusively owned
by developing countries (Spain joined in recent years, but is also a potential bor-
rower). It is the most dynamic of all these institutions, and in recent years its
loans to the Andean countries have actually surpassed joint lending to these
countries by the IDB and the World Bank. Its membership has also gradually
increased to near that of a regional development bank. This dynamic institution
is, indeed, the best example of risk pooling in the developing world: it holds
investment-grade status, regardless of the fact that none of the Andean countries
does. The meager loan losses experienced by the Andean Development Corpo-
ration, despite the troubled macroeconomic history of most of its members, also
demonstrate the strong preferred-creditor status of this institution with its
members. The Caribbean Development Bank is a smaller but also very dynamic
institution in the subregion. The history of the Central American Bank for Eco-
nomic Integration is more mixed. It experienced a severe crisis in the 1980s as a
27. See a full inventory of these institutions in United Nations, Economic Commission for
Africa (ECA) (2004, chap. 6). Some of these institutions have cofinancing arrangements with the
African and the Islamic development banks.
28. A fourth small institution, FONPLATA (Fondo Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca
del Plata), finances projects for the development of the Plata River basin.
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result of the arrears of one of its members, Nicaragua, but recovered in the latter
part of that decade and has expanded again since the 1990s.
There are crucial regional differences in the roles played by different types of
multilateral development banks in the various regions (see table 1-1). As dis-
cussed, the expansion of regional development banks has focused primarily on
the middle-income countries, where their combined net flows surpass those of
the World Bank. In the Middle East and North Africa, the Arab and Islamic
institutions are also an important financing source. In Latin America and the
Caribbean, IDB lending surpasses the World Bank’s by a large margin, and the
subregional banks also play an important role where they operate. Indeed, as
table 1-1 indicates, the subregional banks make the largest contribution, relative
to gross domestic product (GDP), in the small and medium-sized countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean, followed by the Middle East and North
Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are highly dependent on the World
Bank/IDA (International Development Association). East Asia falls somewhere
in between, with the World Bank lending slightly more than the AsDB and,
as in South Asia, with a relative absence of developing-country-owned financial
institutions. The EIB is the dominant institution in Europe, even when we
leave aside the old members of the European Union (EU-15 in the table). In the
transition economies, however, both the World Bank and the EBRD play an
important role.
The greater weight of poorer borrowing members in different regions, and the
support provided through different financial institutions by nonborrowing indus-
trial countries, is also reflected in the relative share of concessional lending and
grants. Thus concessional lending is particularly important for AfDB (44 percent
of total lending), the World Bank/IDA (40 percent), and the AsDB (27 percent);
the IDB also has a concessional fund for special operations that amounts to 7 per-
cent of total lending.29
Given the fact that only limited concessional lending can be provided by insti-
tutions entirely owned by developing countries, poor countries are likely to con-
tinue to be dependent on official development assistance (ODA) provided by
industrial countries and to a certain extent intermediated by multilateral develop-
ment banks. This coincides with the arguments put forward by Culpeper and the
above analysis of the constraints on regional cooperation in the poorest coun-
tries. The strong presence of developing country–owned financial institutions in
the Arab and Islamic countries and in several subregions of sub-Saharan Africa,
as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean, reflects a mix of cultural affinity
16 josé antonio ocampo
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and political motivation, while their absence in South and East Asia reflects the
lack of these factors.30
The difference in the portfolios of the various multilateral development
banks reflects not only their specific strategies, but also their adaptation to the
diversity of demands and financial needs of the developing world and the transi-
tion economies. Thus while the IDB has focused increasingly on social spend-
ing, subregional banks in Latin America and the Caribbean give greater weight
to infrastructure and production sector lending.31 Both the AfDB and the
AsDB give more emphasis to infrastructure than the IDB does. The heavy focus
on infrastructure lending is also typical of Arab institutions. Financing intra-
regional trade is also a mandate of some institutions, particularly the Arab Mon-
etary Fund. Although many institutions have private sector lending facilities,
which have tended to grow over time, this is the focus of EBRD activities (see
the contributions of Corm, Sagasti and Prada, and Titelman in this volume).
According to Sagasti and Prada, this diversity in the portfolios of these institu-
tions is “in line with the general idea behind the creation of regional and sub-
regional institutions: they play specific and localized roles, which are not always
covered adequately by global or even by regional institutions.”
The combination of collective-action problems in regional processes, in the
absence of supranational institutions, indicates how important the regional and
subregional development banks can be in supporting regional strategies. They
can provide a coordination mechanism for member countries to plan and
finance the provision of regional infrastructure. This is an incipient activity in
most of the developing world but one that has been receiving increasing atten-
tion from some regional and subregional banks.32 These institutions also have the
ability to provide a regional public good essential for development: the trans-
mission and utilization of region-specific knowledge. That ability puts them in a
position to help countries in their respective regions to design specific policies
20 josé antonio ocampo
30. Nonetheless, South Asia set up a modest development fund in 1991. See United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (United Nations, ESCAP) (2004,
chap. 6), which provides a full inventory of regional cooperation mechanisms in South and 
East Asia. United Nations, ESCAP (2005) also proposed the creation of an Asian Investment Bank.
31. As Sagasti and Prada argue in this volume, the trend in lending by regional development
banks has involved reduced support for the productive sector through state-owned financial insti-
tutions, but has been partially offset by operations with private banks and the development of
domestic capital markets, which are classified as “financial infrastructure.”
32. This is the case with the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South
America (Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana, IIRSA) and
the Plan Puebla-Panama (involving Mexico and Central America).
10101-01_Ch01_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:05 PM  Page 20
experiences and challenges 21
appropriate to the countries’ economic needs and political constraints.33 None-
theless, there is still very little financing of “regional public goods” in most of
the institutions serving developing countries (1 percent or less for the AfDB,
AsDB, and IDB), as well as in ODA in general.34 This is in sharp contrast with
the experience of the European Investment Bank, which has had regional infra-
structure as one of its major mandates since its creation.
Indeed, as was pointed out at the beginning of this section, the EIB, the
largest multilateral development bank in the world, is probably the best example
of an institution designed to help compensate for regional disparities and to sup-
port the development of regional infrastructure. In recent decades, it has also
been increasingly used for major extraregional initiatives of the European Union,
such as projects in the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries and the
Mediterranean region, as well as the liberalization processes of the former social-
ist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Another reason for creating this
institution in the 1950s was to correct market failures, since currencies were not
fully convertible and international private capital markets had not fully recovered
from the collapse of the 1930s, but it has continued to grow in recent decades,
despite full capital account convertibility and booming global financial markets.
The chapter by Stephany Griffith-Jones, Alfred Steinherr and Ana Teresa
Fuzzo de Lima in this volume provides some clues about the strengths of this
institution in a region with significant financial development. Some of the rea-
sons are: (1) the implicit subsidy and better access to finance by poorer countries
in the region, which fulfills one of its historical mandates; (2) its signaling role to
private lenders, which helps to correct another type of market failure (informa-
tion asymmetries) and may be particularly important for infrastructure invest-
ment, one of its major lending activities; (3) the capacity to internalize the risks
of offering long-term lending at fixed rates (which, nonetheless, as the authors
argue, can be more costly to a borrower than floating interest rate loans of simi-
lar maturity); and (4) its capacity to be very competitive in its pricing, which
makes it a desirable source of borrowing even by large private banks in the case
of “global loans” for financing small and medium-sized enterprises. On the con-
trary, correcting market failures associated with large risks in innovative sectors
has not been one of the main activities of the EIB. In the recent past, this has led
to the creation of the European Investment Fund—of which it is the largest
shareholder—to provide guarantees, take equity participation, and support venture
33. See Birdsall and Rojas-Suarez (2004).
34. See Birdsall (2006).
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capital funds. However, on the whole, this institution continues to be risk averse,
which is indeed a salient feature of multilateral development banks.
The creation of EIB as an instrument of European integration was matched
from the beginning by fiscal transfers to poorer regions and specific sectors (par-
ticularly agriculture). This implied an explicit acknowledgment that integration
would not achieve the aim of helping different parts of an integrating region to
converge in their development levels, in the absence of an explicit policy to
achieve this purpose—a policy that came to be labeled “cohesion policy.” The
focus on lagging regions rather than countries has also provided a source of sup-
port from major countries to this policy, because even rich countries may have
lagging regions. These fiscal redistributive mechanisms (structural and cohesion
funds) were further reinforced at every major step in the history of European
integration. So they were extended as a result of the northern expansion of the
European Community in the 1970s, particularly when the relatively poorer
Southern European countries were incorporated in the 1980s. The 1990s saw,
in turn, the design of more generous pre-accession funding for Central Euro-
pean countries. Although regional and even global trade integration processes
have generally recognized the asymmetries of its member states, fiscal transfers
have rarely been tried outside Europe; in fact, they were only used, rather unsuc-
cessfully, in the early postcolonial experience of the East African Community.
The historical dearth of regional financial cooperation in South and East Asia
has been amply compensated for in recent years by a series of initiatives in the
area of development financing, as well as in monetary cooperation. The major
reason was the traumatic experience of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis.
These initiatives also reflect a sense of frustration with the slow speed and even,
in many areas, the international financial system’s complete lack of reform to
enable it to face the problems that became evident during the Asian crisis, as
well as a critical view of the policies implemented by the global financial institu-
tions for managing the crisis.35
Although there have been proposals to create an Asian Investment Bank
along the lines of the EIB,36 the major initiatives under implementation relate
to support for the development of national and regional bond markets. The
basic rationale for these initiatives is the sense that over-reliance on short-term
foreign currency loans was a major factor in the East Asian crisis. Since the cri-
sis, another important factor has been the large current account surpluses and
international reserves accumulated by economies in the region. International
22 josé antonio ocampo
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36. See United Nations, ESCAP (2005).
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reserves, as well as private funds, are to a large extent invested in the deeper
bond markets of the industrialized countries, some of which are recycled back
into the region by foreign financial intermediaries. According to this view, the
development of deeper national and regional bond markets would help to short-
circuit this intermediation through world financial centers outside Asia. There-
fore, the development of bond markets will be both a development and a
crisis-prevention instrument, helping in the latter case to reduce the maturity
and currency mismatches in the portfolios of private agents that were at the
heart of the East Asian crisis.
The various initiatives, reviewed by Yung Chul Park, Jae Ha Park, Julia
Leung, and Kanit Sangsubhan in their contribution to this volume, have taken
place in different regional forums and are of two different types.37 The first are of
an institutional nature and aim to develop appropriate infrastructure for the
functioning of either national or regional bond markets, particularly for bonds
denominated in the local currencies of the economies of the region. This in-
cludes the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative for developing
securitization and credit-guarantee markets by means of policy dialogue and the
provision of expert advice and panel visits to the economies concerned. In a simi-
lar vein, the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea) initiative
focuses on facilitating market access by several public and private sector agents,
and on improving the institutional infrastructure, including regional clearing and
settlement mechanisms, credit-guarantee and hedging facilities, the development
of national and regional credit rating agencies, and the dissemination of informa-
tion on Asian bond markets. In a complementary manner, the various working
groups convened under this initiative will aim to improve the harmonization of
financial standards, regulatory systems, and tax treatment of financial assets
throughout the region.
The second type of initiative, launched by the eleven members of the Execu-
tives’ Meeting of East Asia–Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP), has focused on
developing specific funds, the Asian Bond Funds (ABFs).38 ABF 1, announced in
June 2003, was composed of U.S. dollar-denominated bonds issued by sovereign
and quasi-sovereign issuers of the eight emerging economies of EMEAP.
Although this first action represented a milestone in central bank cooperation, it
was limited in size (to U.S.$1 billion), and more particularly, it did not support
the development of local-currency-denominated bonds. So a second fund (ABF 2)
37. See also United Nations, ESCAP (2004, 2005).
38. The eleven members of EMEAP are Australia, China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
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was launched in December 2004, with an initial amount of U.S.$2 billion, to
invest in local-currency-denominated bonds of the EMEAP emerging economies,
and to help create a convenient and cost-effective instrument fund and a new
asset class for regional and institutional investors. As argued by Yung Chul Park
and his coauthors, this new initiative has helped to introduce a new asset class
(exchange-traded bond funds) and a new family of bond indexes; it has helped to
remove some of the barriers to cross-border capital flows; and it has contributed
to the adoption of new standards and to greater market transparency. All these
effects, which largely relate to developing the associated regional financial infra-
structure, indicate that this initiative is complementary to the above-mentioned
approach that focuses directly on developing the regional financial infrastructure.
Macroeconomic Cooperation
Contrary to the rich historical experience in the area of development financing,
particularly with multilateral development banks, there is a dearth of experi-
ences in the area of macroeconomic cooperation in the developing world. How-
ever, several initiatives have been launched in this area in recent years. They
sometimes match regional trade initiatives that have resulted from the dynamic
process of “open regionalism” currently under way, and attempt to replicate in
some ways the experience of European monetary integration. Some of the exist-
ing arrangements, as well as new initiatives, show the potentialities of this form
of cooperation in the developing world, but also their limitations. As the
attempts to replicate European trade integration in the past have had mixed suc-
cess in the developing world, the more recent attempts to replicate European
macroeconomic cooperation follow a similar mixed pattern. Furthermore,
regional trade integration is more limited in the developing world than in
Europe—although it has been growing rapidly in some regions, particularly in
East Asia. There are, however, two additional rationales for macroeconomic
cooperation in the developing world, particularly in emerging economies: to
build stronger walls of defense against financial crises; and to avoid distorting
competition among export-oriented economies.39
The links between trade and macroeconomic cooperation are, of course, at
the heart of the formation of the European Union. As Wyplosz argues in this
volume, this feature has been accompanied by two other major characteristics.
The first is the emphasis on building strong institutions, albeit in a gradual and
pragmatic way. The second is the clear subordination of macroeconomic coop-
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eration to the objective of trade integration. The major objective of macro-
economic cooperation has thus been exchange rate stability, which has been seen
as the only way to create a level playing field for intraregional trade. In particular,
real exchange rate stability has been the implicit target of such cooperation.
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods parities, this has implied the
negotiation of regional arrangements (the snake, followed by the European Mon-
etary System) to stabilize exchange rate parities, which finally led to European
Monetary Union (EMU). Until the launch of EMU, these arrangements not
only left room for limited flexibility (variable over time), but also involved a large
number of nominal exchange rate adjustments, which used purchasing power
parity criteria to determine the level of adjustment for achieving a desirable real
target. These readjustments were fully symmetrical, thus involving both strong
and weaker currencies at different moments. The choice of bilateral parities was
collective, and was in fact based on consensus. Although the deutschmark gradu-
ally emerged as the anchor/central currency, this feature was not part of the
system of cooperation to stabilize the exchange rates, and indeed was only con-
solidated de facto in the late 1980s. In turn, the defense of agreed parities
implied the unprecedented commitment, if necessary, to defend the agreed pari-
ties with unlimited interventions by both countries whose bilateral rates were
pushed to the declared margin of fluctuation. This rule implied that no explicit
reserve pooling was necessary.
The commitment to exchange rate stability implied that capital mobility was
entirely subordinated to that objective. This meant that capital controls were in
place for decades, and were reestablished when necessary. Therefore, whereas
current account convertibility came early (in 1958, coinciding with the launch of
the Common Market), capital account liberalization came late, and was part of a
gradual process that did not culminate in the collective removal of capital con-
trols until 1990. This was soon followed by a major crisis in 1992. It thus
became clear that exchange rate stability required a full-fledged movement
toward monetary union. This was combined with the Stability and Growth Pact,
which established explicit fiscal rules and convergence criteria. Although the
principle that monetary integration must be accompanied by fiscal discipline is
widely accepted, the rationale of the specific rules adopted in the Maastricht
Treaty (which target the current fiscal deficit rather than a structural deficit or,
better still, debt sustainability), as well as the mechanisms of enforcement (which
are intrusive into national sovereignty, but for the same reason weak in practice),
have become a subject of heated debate in recent years.
Wyplosz’s summary of the sequence followed by the European Union and its
implications for similar arrangements in the developing world today is sharp
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and simple: “Regional trade integration, exchange rate stability and institution-
building came first, capital mobility and monetary union came later. A key
question is whether this sequencing can be modified and whether the pace can
be accelerated. The answer is that both are quite unlikely.” This answer is, of
course, critical, and refers both to the potential benefits of macroeconomic
cooperation and to current debates on capital account liberalization.
Indeed, the classical case for optimum currency areas assumes not only a simi-
larity among participating countries, but also a high level of economic integra-
tion among participating countries.40 Accordingly, one of the major benefits of
currency union is that it encourages intraregional trade by eliminating one of the
“taxes” on trade: the uncertainties associated with exchange rate volatility. An
additional argument is that it acts as an external disciplining agent on individual
members and, to the extent that one of the members is a strong economy, it
allows others to “borrow credibility.”
Capital account liberalization continues to be a topic of heated debate. Its
costs in terms of macroeconomic volatility are by now widely recognized.41 On
this basis, many analysts claim that capital account liberalization is undesirable
for the developing world, and that some form of capital account controls or reg-
ulations should be the rule rather than the exception.42 In terms of the debate
on regional cooperation, this means that capital account liberalization should
be, at best, the end rather than the beginning of a process of macroeconomic
cooperation. This was, in fact, the route followed by the European Union—
a long route indeed, taking more than three decades to complete the transition.
It is also the sequence between trade and capital account liberalization recom-
mended by McKinnon.43 However, given the pervasiveness of global capital
markets and related financial innovations, and the fact that several countries
have already liberalized their capital accounts, new questions arise about the
appropriateness of classical sequencing issues and even about the rationale for
currency unions. In particular, and following the defense of polar exchange rate
regimes, it has been argued that a developing country with full capital account
liberalization that is not willing to adopt a fully flexible exchange rate may find
26 josé antonio ocampo
40. See Mundell (1961); and McKinnon (1963). The classical criteria proposed by Mundell
and McKinnon include a large share of intraregional trade and synchronized business cycles, which
assume a substantial degree of economic integration. They also indicate that a common currency
area is more attractive for smaller countries and when factor markets are more flexible.
41. See, for example, Prasad and others (2003).
42. See, for example, Stiglitz and others (2006).
43. McKinnon (1979).
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it more desirable to dollarize or euroize than to form a currency union with
other developing countries.
Although the developing world’s experience with monetary unions has been
neither abundant nor successful, European monetary integration has sparked
some initiatives for forming monetary unions in the developing world. The ini-
tiative taken by the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council stands out in
this regard.44 The members of the Caribbean Community are also formally
committed to a monetary union but have not made much progress in that
direction. As with other developing countries where independence was not
gained until after World War II, the formation of a monetary union among
these countries would in a sense be a return to the monetary arrangements of
the past, where these countries shared a common currency (in the Caribbean,
until the early 1960s), although they are now managed by the countries them-
selves and perhaps do not have the strict currency-board characteristics of the
colonial arrangements.
Even more than monetary unions, the European experience has encouraged
looser forms of macroeconomic dialogue or more elaborate consultations in the
developing countries, including the adoption of Maastricht-type criteria in the con-
text of several integration processes.45 However, unless the adoption of these cri-
teria leads to regular surveillance, as well as to consultation processes that help
to internalize the effects of macroeconomic policies on regional partners, their
credibility and rationale may be totally lost. In the developing world it is also
necessary to strike a balance between targets and a certain degree of policy flexi-
bility, which is essential for economies subject to large shocks. However, the
right balance is difficult to achieve.
As discussed, the 1997 crisis led, in East Asia, to the adoption of the Chiang
Mai Initiative, aimed at building a strong pillar of regional balance-of-payments
support as a crisis-prevention device. Preexisting arrangements in this area were
the Latin American Reserve Fund and the ASEAN Swap Arrangement.
One way to view these different initiatives is that they break up macro-
economic cooperation into its basic components: macroeconomic policy dia-
logue and eventual policy surveillance and consultation; liquidity support during
crises; and exchange rate coordination. Furthermore, given the frequency of
shocks faced by developing countries, they generally eliminate (or, at least, signif-
icantly postpone in time) the desirability of the third component—which, as we
44. International Monetary Fund (1973).
45. See, for example, United Nations, ECA (2004, chap. 6) in relation to sub-Saharan Africa,
and United Nations, ECLAC (2002b, chap. 5) in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean.
10101-01_Ch01_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:05 PM  Page 27
have seen, was the major objective of European macroeconomic cooperation. It
should be added that clearinghouses for intraregional trade are a weaker form of
macroeconomic cooperation, which is closely tied to trade integration. They also
bring specific benefits during crises: by reducing the need for foreign exchange to
settle intraregional transactions they may help to mitigate the effects of crises on
intraregional trade and the multiplier effects on macroeconomic activity. There
are several experiences of this type in the developing world, some of which have
been functioning for several decades; a few have faced difficulties owing to the
accumulation of arrears by some members during balance-of-payments crises.46
However, we shall not examine their experience here.
The history of common currency areas in sub-Saharan Africa shows how dif-
ficult these arrangements can be in the developing world, even when they have
the strong backing of an industrial country.47 The monetary arrangements
among the former British colonies collapsed soon after independence, but a
franc zone survived in Western Africa with strong French backing. It is orga-
nized into two currency unions: the West African Economic and Monetary
Union (WAEMU), and the Central African Economic and Monetary Union.48
The larger Economic Community of West African States, comprising the first
group of countries plus some others, set an agenda that adopted a monetary
cooperation program, aimed at a single currency, but its achievements have
been limited to improving intraregional payments.49 In 2000, five of its mem-
bers agreed to create a West African Monetary Zone, and to merge this zone
with the West African Economic and Monetary Union.50 However, the conver-
gence process has been slow and the deadline for merging this zone with the
existing monetary union (December 2005) was postponed until December
2009. In recent decades, initiatives in East and South Africa have focused on
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46. In Central America, for example, Nicaraguan arrears led, in the early 1980s, to the accu-
mulation of large debts with other countries in the subregion, as well as to the suspension of lend-
ing by the Central American Monetary Stabilization Fund of the Central American Bank for
Economic Integration.
47. See the chapters by Ernest Aryeetey and Roy Culpeper in this volume, as well as Honohan
and Lane (2000).
48. The first includes Benin, Burkina-Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Togo,
and Senegal. The second encompasses Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Repub-
lic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Guinea dropped out of the franc zone upon inde-
pendence, and Mali dropped out for a while. Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea are new
members that joined the corresponding arrangement in 1997 and 1985, respectively.
49. The other members are Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Niger,
Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.
50. The members are Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.
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trade integration and shied away from establishing major initiatives in the area
of macroeconomic cooperation. To these we should add the Rand Monetary
Area, which dates back to 1910 and was established formally as a monetary area
in 1974 and a common monetary area in 1986.51
The former franc (now euro) zone captured for its member states some of the
classical benefits of a monetary union. In particular, price stability has been
greater for these countries than for neighbors in their region. However, the
monetary union worked as a weak external mechanism of restraint. Although
the central banks were freed by statute from fiscal pressure, they were forced to
support commercial banks that had lent to fiscal authorities. This factor,
together with other domestic and external factors, led to a banking crisis in the
1980s. Many of the institutions involved were joint ventures between national
governments and major French-based banks. The recapitalization of these banks
led to the eventual collapse of the system, which was formally recognized in the
50 percent devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994.52 The devaluation
was matched by other reforms to strengthen the monetary union and deepen
financial cooperation. Although the devaluation facilitated the recovery of eco-
nomic growth in the following years, the political crisis of the largest member of
WAEMU, Côte d’Ivoire, generated fresh macroeconomic problems in the early
2000s; the crisis was compounded by a broader lack of compliance with the
agreed fiscal targets by members of the monetary union.53
This story showed the limits not only of monetary union as a mechanism of
restraint, but also of the benefits of rules-based macroeconomic policy.54 Also,
as Culpeper claims in this volume, the hard peg of the CFA franc to the French
franc, and now to the euro, reduces the zone’s capacity to absorb external shocks
and effectively externalizes authority for short-term financing to the French
Treasury. The fluctuations of the exchange rate of, first, the French franc and,
in recent years, the euro, have also been transmitted to these countries and, in
fact, the strength of the French franc was a factor behind the conditions that led
to the 1994 devaluation.
51. The Rand Monetary Area encompasses South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland. Botswana
withdrew in 1974 before the monetary area was formed. There is also the very ambitious (and
probably unrealistic) project of forming a single continental currency area by 2025, which is
enshrined in the African Monetary Cooperation Program.
52. The CFA franc is the common currency of fourteen African countries that are members of
the franc zone.
53. See Boogaerde and Tsangarides (2005).
54. See Honohan and Lane (2000).
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In light of this experience and other problems facing sub-Saharan Africa,
Ernest Aryeetey and Honohan and Lane suggest that the focus of cooperation
among these countries should probably shift to the development of financial
markets, aimed at overcoming the thinness and illiquidity of African capital mar-
kets, including possibly the regionalization of banking and capital-market devel-
opment.55 Other arrangements, such as liquidity financing to avoid regional
contagion, seem less important in sub-Saharan Africa, given the absence of sig-
nificant contagion in the region during past crises, but may become more impor-
tant in the future.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union
(ECCU) may be considered one of the few success stories of its kind in the dev-
eloping world.56 It involves very small economies with a well-developed domes-
tic banking system and an important offshore financial sector. Its history goes
back to the British Caribbean Currency Board and operates as a quasi-currency
board with large effective reserve cover. Its peg to the British pound was shifted
to the U.S. dollar in 1976. However, it has faced some challenges associated
with the rapid growth of public sector debts during the slowdown of the early
2000s, poor compliance with the agreed fiscal rules, and some weakness in its
banking, regulatory, and supervisory framework.57
As previously mentioned, in 1990 members of the broader Caribbean Com-
munity made a commitment to create a monetary union as part of the develop-
ment of a single market and economy. However, no concrete steps have been
taken in that direction (and, it should be added, the commitment to build a sin-
gle market and economy has also been postponed on several occasions).58 In
fact, divergence among the exchange rate regimes and deviation from the agreed
convergence criteria continue to characterize this subregion.
Latin America has shied away from similar efforts but, in the 1990s, adopted
mechanisms for macroeconomic policy dialogue in the context of its three major
integration processes: Mercosur, the Andean Community, and the Central
American Common Market.59 Maastricht-type criteria for economic conver-
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56. This currency union includes Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, as well as two dependent territories of the
United Kingdom (Anguilla and Montserrat).
57. IMF (2004).
58. It can be argued that, given the very different commodity shocks that these countries face,
the Caribbean Community (Caricom) may not even be an optimal currency area. Worrel (2003)
advocates a currency union, but based on arguments that justify fixed exchange rates rather than a
common currency.
59. United Nations, ECLAC (2002b, chap. 5).
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gence have been agreed for these processes. In their contribution to this volume,
José Luis Machinea and Guillermo Rozenwurcel analyze the rationale for these
efforts. Although intraregional trade is still limited and integration of domestic
financial markets is virtually nil, macroeconomic linkages associated with global
financial shocks have been significant during the past quarter-century. They
have been reflected in macroeconomic adjustments that have had major spill-
overs onto neighbors, either through the contractionary effects of adjustment
policies or through exchange rate variations. This creates a strong case for policy
dialogue and eventual coordination of macroeconomic policies. A major incen-
tive for such coordination is, however, absent: the ability to “borrow credibility”
from neighbors. Rather, the attempt of neighbors to differentiate themselves
from countries facing a crisis, as was typical of Mercosur in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, contributed to the further loss of credibility by the authorities.
Based on the European and Latin American experience, Machinea and
Rozenwurcel argue that the exchange of information and periodic technical
meetings involved in integration processes help to build knowledge and mutual
trust.60 Nonetheless, the transition to more explicit coordination mechanisms,
which would help to internalize the effects of macroeconomic policies on neigh-
bors, is a difficult task in the Latin American context. These authors argue, fur-
thermore, that in developing countries the agreed macroeconomic convergence
criteria should include, in addition to fiscal objectives (the fiscal deficit, prefer-
ably set as the structural stance, and the public sector debt ratio), external sector
targets, particularly for the current account deficit and the short-term external
debt. Striking a balance between compliance with explicit targets and the degree
of policy flexibility that is required in economies subject to large shocks is, how-
ever, an important challenge. Some degree of exchange rate stabilization would
be desirable, particularly smoothing short-term swings, which may require active
use of capital account regulations, particularly on short-term capital flows. In this
area, according to these authors, at least two further objectives should be agreed:
the harmonization of the exchange rate regimes, and the principle that countries
should consult with one another concerning possible courses of action to follow
in crisis situations.
The existence of regional reserve funds can serve as an important incentive
for macroeconomic coordination. In this regard, the experience of the Latin
American Reserve Fund, analyzed by Daniel Titelman in this volume, demon-
strates the possibilities of using this type of mechanism, which has been widely
underutilized in the developing world. It shows that even a modest fund can
60. See also Ghymers (2005).
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make essential contributions to the balance-of-payments financing of develop-
ing countries. Since 1978 this fund has provided such financing to member
states, equivalent to 60 percent of that of the IMF, benefiting in particular its
smallest members, Bolivia and Ecuador. Its financing was clearly countercycli-
cal, and its preferred-creditor status has been reflected in its healthy portfolio,
even in the face of two major crises in the region, when some member countries
accumulated arrears in their public sector obligations. It also shows that the fear
that “soft conditionality” would result in major losses by an institution provid-
ing emergency liquidity financing is exaggerated. Such funds can help manage
trade shocks and even, to a limited extent, abrupt reversals of capital flows.
Indeed, Agosin has estimated that, during recent decades, even a relatively mod-
est fund, equivalent to 15 percent of Latin America’s international reserves,
could have provided financing to cope with capital outflows equivalent to the
entire short-term debts of all the countries except Mexico.61
The most ambitious project of this kind is the Chiang Mai Initiative, agreed
in 2000 by the ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
The agreed mechanism is the negotiation of bilateral swap arrangements among
the central banks of the member countries. To do this, it built on the modest
ASEAN Swap Arrangement, which had been created in 1977. Aside from li-
quidity financing, the mechanism has provided an instrument of policy dia-
logue, and an appropriate surveillance mechanism is currently being designed.
Strong regional monitoring and surveillance is deemed essential by net contrib-
utors to liquidity financing to guarantee that its lending is protected; this condi-
tion is deemed particularly important by Japan.
As Yung Chul Park argues in his contribution to this volume, this arrange-
ment builds on two essential lessons from the Asian crisis: that in the face of
capital account crises, policy coordination, or at least a regional policy dialogue,
is essential in preventing contagion, and that the countries need ample access to
liquidity to thwart the speculative attacks that characterize contemporary capital
account crises. The capacity of regional partners to provide such financing is
reflected in the fact that the funds provided by the IMF to Indonesia, the
Republic of Korea, and Thailand during the crisis (U.S.$111.7 billion) were
only a fraction of the international reserves held by the members of the Chiang
Mai Initiative at the time (about U.S.$700 billion), and a very small fraction of
the reserves accumulated by these countries since the Asian crisis (U.S.$2.5 tril-
lion at the end of 2005). As noted above, this initiative is also a sign of East
Asia’s frustration with the speed of reform of the international financial system.
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The mechanism entitles countries to a disbursement of up to 20 percent of
the maximum amount of drawings from the bilateral swaps without an IMF
program. This limit, agreed to in May 2005, was an increase over the 10 per-
cent originally set. When this limit is reached, the country would thus be placed
under an IMF program. This implies that regional liquidity financing is com-
plementary to that of the IMF in a more explicit way than in the case of the
Latin American Reserve Fund. These bilateral arrangements, which added up to
U.S.$71.5 billion in February 2006, could eventually be multilateralized.
Indeed, a step in that direction was also agreed in May 2005, when it was
decided that the swap activation would be based on a collective decisionmaking
process, the details of which must be agreed. The mechanism has not yet been
utilized, and indeed, the buoyant conditions of the member countries in recent
years, including the accumulation of record levels of “self-defense” in the form
of large international reserves, may have slowed the pace of action. According to
Park, the major stumbling blocks in the process seem to be the weak institu-
tional arrangements that have been established and the unsettled leadership
among the two major economic powers in the region.
The recent decision to multilateralize the swap arrangement could lead to
some form of reserve pooling, which could be used to back a common reserve
currency. If a strong surveillance mechanism is put in place, using this mecha-
nism of liquidity, financing could be detached from an IMF program. Also, the
policy dialogue could eventually evolve into a more formal system of policy
coordination, including the establishment of mechanisms to stabilize the bilat-
eral exchange rates of the member countries, even though the members of the
initiative have not yet expressed their desire to do so. If these steps are taken,
and the membership of the initiative is expanded to include other countries that
have requested membership (including India), the system could eventually
evolve into a full-fledged Asian monetary system.62 It must be added that this is
more likely if the issue of the Asian countries’ voice and participation in the
IMF is not solved in an acceptable manner.
As the previous discussion indicates, designing an adequate monitoring and
surveillance process is key to ambitious efforts in macroeconomic cooperation.
In this area, four mechanisms have been agreed in Asia since the 1997 crisis. One
of these was abandoned (the Manila Framework Group, adopted in the context
of APEC), and another is still in its infancy (the South Asian process). The
ASEAN Surveillance Process, adopted in 1998, is the most advanced. It has put
in place a peer review mechanism for national policies, based on a Surveillance
62. Rana (2005).
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Report prepared by the ASEAN Secretariat, and the ASEAN Economic Out-
look, prepared by the Asian Development Bank. However, neither this mecha-
nism nor the less structured ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue
(which is now integrated into the Chiang Mai Initiative) qualifies as an effective
surveillance process. This has been attributed to the overemphasis on consensus
and noninterference in the peer review, at the expense of frank and in-depth pol-
icy discussions. So, although there is now an adequate supply of forums for pol-
icy dialogue (those mentioned above, plus the dialogues among central banks), a
full-fledged monitoring and surveillance process is still not in place.63
Conclusions
This chapter argues that the international financial architecture would be
strengthened if it were to rely not on a few specialized world organizations, but
rather on a network of institutions that provide the services expected from such
an architecture (liquidity and development financing, macroeconomic surveil-
lance and consultation, peer review of prudential regulation). An institutional
framework such as this would have two positive features. First, it might help to
bring more stability to the world economy by providing essential services that
can hardly be provided by a few international institutions, particularly in the
face of a dynamic process of open regionalism. Second, from the point of view
of the equilibrium of world relations, it would be more balanced than a system
based on a few world organizations.
The chapter sets out four arguments in favor of a strong role for regional and
subregional cooperation in the international financial system: the growing link-
ages generated by the open regionalism characterizing the current globalization
process; the complementary role that world and regional institutions play in a
heterogeneous international community, and in a world that still lacks a fully
developed international financial architecture; the case for competition in the
supply of services to small and medium-sized countries; and the strong sense of
ownership that regional institutions have, and their capacity to serve as channels
for better articulating the voice of smaller countries. At the same time, it is
argued that such arrangements face three major challenges: developing the capac-
ity to match the demand for financial support with their supply capacities, which
restricts the capacity of the poorer developing countries to create viable regional
financial institutions; making a strong long-term commitment to institution
building, a basic lesson of European cooperation in this area; and putting
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together arrangements that would guarantee an equitable distribution of the
benefits of integration. These issues are interrelated, since supply capacities and
equitable integration are not exogenously given because they are largely created
through a gradual process of institution building.
The experiences of regional financial cooperation are clustered in two groups:
development financing; and mechanisms for macroeconomic cooperation and
related financial arrangements (liquidity financing during balance-of-payments
crises).
The best-developed form of cooperation is that of multilateral development
banks. The network of regional and subregional institutions of this type has
shown the advantages of diversity, particularly in their capacity to adapt to the
demands of specific regions. However, they have advanced only marginally out-
side Europe, to support the provision of “regional public goods.” Whereas the
most developed network is that of the regional development banks, the most
elaborate set of “developing-country-owned” financial institutions is that of the
Arab and Islamic world, with the network of subregional development banks in
the Latin American and Caribbean region coming next. At least one institution,
the Andean Development Corporation, shows that it is possible for a set of non-
investment-grade developing countries to build an investment-grade institution.
Most institutions of this type have a very strong financial structure, which is
associated, at least partially, with their preferred-creditor status. Only a few have
faced difficulties throughout their history (the African Development Bank and
the Central American Bank for Economic Integration). The history of the
African Development Bank shows, however, how hard it is to create dynamic
development financing institutions for the poorest countries without backing
from industrial nations—and, even with such backing, demonstrates the diffi-
culties faced by these institutions in building strong loan portfolios in struc-
turally weak development contexts. The Arab institutions have a different sort
of problem: excessive dependence of available finance on oil prices, which reduces
their capacity to operate as a countercyclical device.
Two other mechanisms of development financing have been available in a
few regional processes. Fiscal transfers to the poorer members of a regional
group are used exclusively by the European Union, having been tried unsuccess-
fully in only one integration process in the developing world. In recent years,
East Asia has launched a third model of cooperation in the area of development
finance, which focuses on bond markets. This novel form of cooperation aims
to deepen local and regional financial development through joint actions to
design the appropriate financial infrastructure and by launching specific bond
funds that become investment vehicles for central banks in the region.
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Contrary to the rich historical experience in the area of development financ-
ing, there is a dearth of experiences in the area of macroeconomic cooperation
in the developing world. This is, however, an area where several initiatives have
been launched in recent years, in many cases aiming to replicate European
arrangements. The links between trade and macroeconomic cooperation are, of
course, at the heart of the formation of the European Union. Certainly trade
links are weaker in the developing world—although they have been growing
rapidly in some regions, particularly in East Asia. However, two additional
rationales for macroeconomic cooperation are present in the developing world:
building stronger walls of defense against global financial shocks, and avoiding
distorting competition among export-oriented economies. Aside from the role
of the links between intraregional trade and macroeconomic cooperation, Euro-
pean integration brings two additional lessons for the developing world: the
emphasis on building strong institutions in a gradual and pragmatic way, and
the subordination of capital mobility to other macroeconomic objectives of
regional cooperation.
The experience with macroeconomic cooperation in the developing world gen-
erally breaks up such cooperation into its different components: policy dialogue,
monitoring, and surveillance; liquidity support during crises; and exchange rate
coordination. The third objective, which has, of course, been central to Euro-
pean cooperation, is generally left aside, except in the few experiences with
monetary unions, which have not usually been very successful. The most com-
mon recent initiatives have thus taken the form of macroeconomic dialogue and
consultations based on Maastricht-type convergence criteria; and, even in the
best example of its kind—the ASEAN surveillance arrangement—they have not
evolved into effective surveillance processes. However, unless the adoption of
convergence criteria and dialogue among authorities evolve into regular consul-
tations, and eventually into effective coordination processes, their credibility
and rationale may be lost. Furthermore, for the developing world, the balance
between targets and a certain degree of policy flexibility required in economies
subject to shocks is a difficult one to strike.
In the area of liquidity financing, the experience of the Latin American
Reserve Fund illustrates the possibilities of using such mechanisms, which have
been widely underutilized in the developing world. It shows that even a modest
fund can make essential contributions to balance-of-payments financing of
developing countries. In turn, the 1997 crisis led in Asia to the adoption of the
Chiang Mai Initiative, aimed at building a strong pillar of regional balance-
of-payments support as a crisis-prevention device. The recent multilateralization
of bilateral swap arrangements could eventually lead to some form of reserve
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pooling. The basic weakness of the Chiang Mai Initiative has been its slowness
to take strong institutional shape.
All in all, these experiences indicate that regional cooperation can be very
effective in reducing the inadequate supply of financial services that the current
international financial architecture provides. Nonetheless, these institutions
remain limited in scope and are not recognized as central to the international
financial architecture. In this regard, we argue that the International Monetary
Fund of the future should be viewed as the apex of a network of regional and
subregional reserve funds and swap arrangements—that is, a structure more
akin to that of the European Central Bank or the United States Federal Reserve
system than to its current centralized structure. In turn, competition among
global, regional, and subregional institutions is probably the best arrangement
in this area. And above all, in an era when developing countries have made a call
for greater South-South cooperation, financial cooperation should be placed at
the top of the agenda.
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The international financial crises of the 1990s and early years of the twenty-first century initiated the beginnings of reform to the global financial sys-
tem. These focused principally on remedying the financial fragility of emerging
market economies, the principal victims of financial instability. In contrast,
there have been no real reforms aimed at preventing or constraining financial
instability at its core, for example by fundamentally restructuring the Bretton
Woods institutions, or by rewriting the rules of the game for global financial
markets. In the meantime, the urge to reform has lost political impetus among
the G-7, the key players on the reform agenda, with the recovery from the global
financial turmoil of 1997–98, which had significantly abated by 1999.
The ensuing financial crises in Turkey and Argentina remained fairly contained
to those countries. The absence of contagion seemed to signal that the inter-
national financial system, at least for the time being, had become more resilient,
vindicating those who advocated a minimalist reform agenda limited to the vul-
nerable financial periphery, rather than the center of the global system. This was
little comfort to Turkey or Argentina, or to other developing countries that, for
whatever reason, might encounter crippling financial shocks in the future.
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Meanwhile, official development assistance (ODA) continues to be inadequate,
although there has been a significant turnaround since the cutbacks of the 1990s.
At the time of this writing, projections by the OECD Development Assistance
Committee (DAC) indicate that ODA from OECD donors will increase from a
little under U.S.$80 billion in 2004 to almost U.S.$130 billion by 2010. Aid to
Africa in this period is forecast to double from U.S.$25 billion to U.S.$50 bil-
lion. Moreover, a number of donors outside the DAC are increasing their aid
volumes—for example, the ten new members of the European Union and China
(China announced a U.S.$10 billion program for infrastructure, technical coop-
eration, and debt relief at the United Nations Summit in 2005). The projected
expansion in ODA is the largest since the formation of the DAC in 1960,
although as a proportion of gross national income the level of 0.36 percent pro-
jected for 2010 is only slightly above the 0.33 percent recorded in the early
1990s and well below the record levels of 0.5 percent in the 1960s. These figures
need to be treated with caution, since increasing pressures on public budgets in
OECD countries may make rapid increases in aid spending difficult to sustain.
Last but not least, in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in March 2005,
the major donors committed to improving the way aid is delivered.1
If restructuring the global financial architecture has been ruled out for the
foreseeable future, it is important to seek alternatives. Some experts, including
the Emerging Markets Eminent Persons’ Group, recommend building or rein-
forcing regional institutions mandated with preventing or mitigating crises for
countries in their regions.2 To this objective could be added the achievement of
longer-term development objectives. That is the focus of this chapter. Drawing
on the relevant precedents in both the developed and the developing world, as
well as on the shortcomings of the current system for developing countries, the
chapter addresses the following questions:
—What organizational and institutional characteristics contribute to regional
financial organizations’ playing an effective role?
—What are the key financial constraints faced by different groups of devel-
oping countries with respect to short-term financing and longer-term financing?
—To what extent can regional organizations play a key role in financial crisis
prevention and management?
—How can regional financial organizations help bridge the large resource
gap required for longer-term growth and development?
1. Manning (2005).
2. Emerging Markets Eminent Persons’ Group (2001).
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The next section provides some historical context, particularly for developing
countries’ experience with regional financial cooperation. The third section exam-
ines the rationale for regional financial cooperation, relating it to the rationale of
broader or deeper regional economic cooperation and to reforming the global
financial architecture. The fourth section undertakes a brief survey of regional
organizations in two continents—Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa—
to draw some lessons about the extent to which such organizations can help to
meet the financial needs of developing countries. The final section examines the
potential and pitfalls of regional financial cooperation in the broader agenda of
reforming the global financial architecture.
Background
Regional financial cooperation among developing countries is not new. How-
ever, until very recently such cooperation was primarily aimed at longer-term
economic objectives of growth, development, and integration and was best
exemplified by a number of regional and subregional development banks.3 It is
worth noting that, in at least one instance, the aspiration to such long-term
regional development cooperation predates both Bretton Woods and Europe’s
postwar initiatives on regional economic cooperation. The earliest attempt to
create an inter-American bank took place at the Inter-American Conference in
Washington, D.C., in 1890, when Latin American countries attempted, but
failed, to persuade the United States to participate in their project for regional
cooperation. Fifty years later, a convention to establish an inter-American bank
was actually signed by the United Sates but abandoned during World War II.
The latter proposal, four years before the Bretton Woods conference, was devel-
oped in part by U.S. officials such as economist Harry Dexter White, and
helped shape the subsequent creation of the World Bank.4
The Inter-American Development Bank was ultimately born in 1959. Along
with the Asian Development Bank (whose operations began in 1966), and the
much later European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD),
which came into being in 1991, the creation of these regional development
banks (RDBs) owed much to the cold war. The first two came into being largely
because the United States saw in them an economic bulwark against the spread
42 roy culpeper
3. Several subregional banks, such as the Caribbean Development Bank and the Central Amer-
ican Bank for Economic Integration, are discussed further below. Here the discussion is restricted
to the continental regional banks.
4. Culpeper (1997).
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of communism in Latin America and Asia, while the EBRD quickly material-
ized after the fall of the Berlin Wall to assist Soviet bloc countries of Europe and
Central Asia in their transition to capitalist democracies. In contrast, the African
Development Bank (created at almost the same time as its Asian counterpart)
illustrated a fundamentally different history and political dynamic, discussed
further below.
Here, two aspects of the RDBs as vehicles for regional cooperation are
emphasized. First, notwithstanding their strong identification with, and owner-
ship by, their developing-country members, until recently the membership of
nonborrowing countries has remained critical to their capacities as financial
intermediaries. Second, in practice, regional cooperation has meant cooperat-
ing to promote the overall flow of resources to individual regional member
countries, rather than fostering greater economic integration in the region.
Regional Ownership versus Nonregional Control
The fundamental purpose of the RDBs, much like that of the World Bank, was
to foster long-term economic and social development through investment in
infrastructure, the productive sectors, and the social sectors. The United States
and other leading industrial nations accepted some overlap in the mandates of the
RDBs and the World Bank, reflecting an acknowledgment that the overall supply
of long-term development finance was inadequate. But it also reflected their
acceptance that new regional institutions could give their developing-country
members what the World Bank would likely never give because of the permanent
voting majority OECD members enjoy at the bank: a greater sense of developing-
country ownership and control. This consideration, although never explicit, was a
key factor in the Western powers’ political struggle against communism.
Greater ownership of RDBs by regional developing-country members has not,
however, led to radically different policies, operational programs, or conditional-
ity from those of the World Bank.5 Notwithstanding the voting majority held
collectively by the Latin American borrowing members of the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), effective control over major policy issues has been
exercised by its largest minority shareholder, the United States. And at the Asian
Development Bank, developing-country members never did have a formal vot-
ing majority.6 In any event, effective control by industrial-country members in
the RDBs springs not from their voting position but from the fact that their
5. Kapur and Webb (1994).
6. A voting majority was held by regional member countries, which included Japan, Australia,
and New Zealand (Kappagoda, 1996).
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cooperation is vital to ensure resource mobilization through successive capital
increases and replenishments, without which the RDBs would enjoy no growth
in their lending program.7
The history of the African Development Bank (AfDB) illustrates how critical
industrial-country membership can be to a regional bank’s ability to mobilize
resources. Unlike the other RDBs, the AfDB was not a by-product of cold-war
power politics. On the contrary, it was the manifestation of African countries,
newly independent from colonialism, seeking to be free of alignment with the
cold-war superpowers. Without explicit sponsorship by the industrial countries,
the AfDB reflected African countries’ aspirations to blaze a specifically African
path to development. For almost two decades, maintaining the “African charac-
ter” of the bank required that eligibility for membership be restricted to Afri-
can countries. By 1980 it became apparent that the bank’s ability to mobilize
resources was highly limited by this formula. Nonconcessional lending by multi-
lateral development banks is heavily dependent on their access to key capital
markets in the North, which in turn is secured by the capital subscriptions of
highly creditworthy members—in other words, by the membership of industrial
countries.8 And concessional lending has always been wholly dependent on
funds provided by donor countries.
The AfDB was in fact able to establish a concessional lending affiliate, the
African Development Fund (AfDF), in 1973, without any formal donor-country
membership in the bank per se. Moreover, an attempt was made to preserve the
bank’s “African character” in the fund as well, by insisting on voting parity
between donors and African members. However, the magnitude of the conces-
sional resources raised by the AfDF paled in comparison with the concessional
affiliates of the Inter-American and Asian Development Banks, in which it was
clear from the outset that donor members were in control. After much debate, the
African bank’s membership was ultimately “opened” in 1982 to nonregional—
that is, developed-country—members in Europe and North America. However,
the principle of maintaining an African voting majority in the bank (and parity
in the fund) persisted, although in the case of the bank the African majority has
subsequently drifted down through successive capital replenishment negotiations,
at the insistence of the nonregional members.9
7. Culpeper (1997).
8. By the 1990s this had changed—the Andean Development Corporation (Corporación And-
ina de Fomento, CAF) illustrated that a regional bank whose membership was exclusive to devel-
oping-country borrowers could mobilize its resources solely on the strength of its borrowing
members. The experience of the CAF is elaborated below.
9. English and Mule (1996).
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Regional Integration
The RDBs were all created with support for regional integration as an objective,
which was reaffirmed over the decade of the 1990s. Despite this fact, they have
tended to operationalize this part of their mandate only to a negligible extent if
the proportion of their lending portfolio allocated to regional integration projects
is taken as the key indicator. For example, at the IDB, loans for regional integra-
tion constitute only 2 percent of authorizations, which amount to $8 billion
annually, while regional technical cooperation amounts to only $12 million annu-
ally.10 However, this indicator may not fully capture the RDBs’ efforts to facilitate
greater regional integration and cooperation. The IDB was extremely active in the
1990s, along with the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC),
in the Hemispheric Summit Process, providing technical and financial support for
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations. For its part, the AsDB
has become involved in regional economic and financial surveillance, to comple-
ment surveillance at national and global levels. And the AfDB, analogously to its
counterpart in the Americas, is centrally involved with the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)
in pan-African cooperation initiatives such as the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) and the creation of the African Union.11
To conclude, the RDBs should be viewed as highly successful regional coop-
eration initiatives in mobilizing financial resources for their members’ national
development efforts. However, this judgment must be qualified by the fact that,
until recently, industrial-country membership has been vital to augmenting their
lending capacity, and the fact that, again until recently, they have not been par-
ticularly successful at enhancing cooperation among members, either by means
of economic integration initiatives or coordinating development strategies. In
the latter case, change has been facilitated by a new approach to regionalism.
Put bluntly, the “old regionalism” of the 1950s and 1960s (the RDBs being
exemplars) was characterized by groups of countries looking inward, motivated
by a desire to substitute for the lack of multilateral liberalization or to facilitate
holding aloof from what liberalization there was (such as the proposal for a
Latin American free-trade area), or both. The “new regionalism,” in contrast, is
outward-looking, motivated by a desire to facilitate entrance into a more glob-
ally liberalized multilateral trading and investment system. Such regionalism is
10. The AsDB, however, has allocated a more considerable part of its lending portfolio to
multicountry regional projects such as the Greater Mekong Subregion Initiative.
11. Devlin and Castro (2002).
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characterized by greater liberalization on the part of smaller than larger coun-
tries and by the quest for “deep integration,” whereby participating countries go
well beyond border measures to harmonize or adjust various economic policies
(the European Union, the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement, and
the North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA] are examples).12
After the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, however, the promise of the
new outward-looking regionalism became a little tarnished. Capital account
liberalization—particularly when adopted prematurely, as it was in many coun-
tries, as part of a wider package of economic liberalization measures—left many
vulnerable to massive financial shocks. The benefits of greater access to goods and
long-term capital markets were dramatically offset, at least in the short run, by
massive, crisis-induced capital flight and the domestic instability it precipitated.
Furthermore, remedial measures implemented by the international financial insti-
tutions (IFIs) (and supported by the G-7 countries) came under considerable criti-
cism for being procyclical,13 and for making a bad situation significantly worse.14
Asian countries themselves were particularly critical both of the diagnosis and
of the prescriptions applied by the G-7 and the IFIs to the region. Accordingly,
soon after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 there were proposals
from Japan for a regional monetary fund that received a positive response from a
number of East Asian countries. At the time, the idea was opposed by the United
States, European countries, and the International Monetary Fund.15 However,
the idea resurfaced in May 2000 at the Asian Development Bank meetings held
in Chiang Mai, Thailand. This gave birth to the Chiang Mai Initiative among
the ASEAN+3 countries (the ASEAN nations plus China, Japan, and the Repub-
lic of Korea). While this initiative began essentially as a network of bilateral swap
arrangements, with informal surveillance arrangements, further discussion among
the participants may lead to a multilateralization of the arrangements and the cre-
ation of a regional monetary fund.
The Rationale for Regional Financial Cooperation
Regional financial cooperation can be motivated by larger political objectives
as well as by narrower economic goals. Such political motives range from the
12. Ethier (1998). As Bhagwati (1998) pointed out, however, a regional trade agreement on the
lines of NAFTA was not an aspect of the “East Asian miracle,” or necessary to its emphasis of out-
ward orientation through export promotion.
13. See Ocampo (2003).
14. See, for example, Stiglitz (2002).
15. See Park (2001).
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need to facilitate conflict resolution or avoidance or mitigation between neigh-
boring states, to aspirations for greater political integration or even union. The
European Union, the preeminent example of politically motivated regional
cooperation, has traveled from one end of this spectrum, in the search for a
durable peace at the end of World War II, to the other end today, with mone-
tary union and closely coordinated economic and social policies. Ever-increasing
financial cooperation in the European Union project is just a part of a much
larger agenda of economic and political harmonization and integration and,
after half a century, it is still a work in progress. The deeper motives of political
integration may be present in other parts of the world to the same degree as in
Europe, but if they are, most are at a much earlier stage in the process. How-
ever, proposals for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, an African Union,
and cooperative arrangements such as ASEAN and the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Asia are all suggestive of regional proj-
ects in which political motivations are indeed present. Conceivably, over time
(and bearing in mind the evolution of the European Union over five decades)
the political objectives associated with such initiatives could become more
ambitious.
Moreover, political and economic motives are often intertwined and difficult
to separate. Purely economic motives are no doubt undermined by historical
enmity, mistrust, or political grievances among neighboring countries, simply
because the transaction costs involved in negotiation and cooperation are likely to
be higher in such circumstances. Put positively, economic motives are likely to be
reinforced where political relationships between regional members are already
strong and the desire for even closer relationships is growing.
That being said, there are several economic reasons for greater regional finan-
cial cooperation. There would seem to be two broad rationales: cooperative or
self-help motives, and the need to remedy incomplete international institutions.
The cooperative rationale is straightforward. When countries of a region
cooperate financially, they help to fill gaps caused by incomplete markets;
increase external financing for various purposes; meet external development
financing resource gaps generally; and exploit economies of scale. There are a
number of ways they can do this:
—By pooling their risks, they can gain access on better terms to capital mar-
kets or donors than if they attempted to approach markets and donors separately.
Regional or subregional development banks, in effect, play this role through
financial intermediation.
—By forming trade payments settlement systems, they can reduce the trans-
action costs of regional trade.
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—By pooling foreign exchange reserves, they can reduce their individual
reserve holdings and associated quasi-fiscal costs.
—By harmonizing policies and institutions in the financial sector and creat-
ing regional institutions, and instituting regional monitoring and surveillance to
provide early warnings of countries likely to experience financial trouble, they
can deepen regional capital markets, attract more foreign direct investment or
attract it on better terms, and reduce the threat of regional contagion.
The “incomplete institutions” rationale deserves somewhat more explana-
tion. As mentioned, global institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund tend to be most responsive to the demands of their
major shareholders—the G-7 countries—and also to the needs of the largest
developing countries, which have significant voice and voting power in the
institutions and constitute an important part of their lending portfolio (and
hence their balance sheets) and greater systemic importance with respect to
global financial crises. The global institutions do not serve the world’s smaller
and poorer countries particularly well, and this group of countries has a mar-
ginal role in the global institutions’ governance.16 Regional arrangements there-
fore help to complete the global financial architecture in the following ways:
—By providing an institutional space, complementary to the global institu-
tions, in which the voice and voting power of smaller and poorer countries is
greater, along with a greater sense of regional ownership.
—By taking a more efficacious approach to conditionality. Global institu-
tions are more inclined to impose conditionality; regional organizations in con-
trast are more able to rely on peer pressure to adopt policy reforms.
—At the same time, by providing some competition to the global institutions,
generating more attention to the problems of the smaller and poorer countries.
—By focusing on providing international public goods that are regional
rather than global in nature; and consistent with the principle of subsidiarity, by
basing the arrangement in the region concerned with regional members as key
players.
—By providing a source of countercyclical financing, to offset the procycli-
cality of private financing and official financing from the global institutions.
There is clearly a rationale for greater regional financial cooperation in general
terms. But as a practical matter, different developing countries and regions face
vastly differing needs, opportunities, and constraints. Therefore it is useful to dis-
tinguish among groups of developing countries in order to discern the potential
benefits from regional financial cooperation for different groups and regions.
16. Ocampo (2002).
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Per capita income provides one basis for differentiating among groups of
developing countries. Another basis is the degree of access to international capital
markets. It seems useful to distinguish between two groups at opposite ends of the
income spectrum—the poorest and the emerging market countries. The former
could be identified with the least-developed countries (as defined by the United
Nations)—countries that are extremely poor and are heavily dependent on for-
eign assistance on grant or concessional terms. Hereinafter, this group is referred
to as the least developed countries (LDCs). The second group consists of emerg-
ing market and transition countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America.
This group consists predominantly of middle-income countries, but would also
include India (a low-income country with growing access to capital markets), as
well as China. This group is referred to below as emerging market economies
(EMEs). Between these two is a group of small low- and middle-income coun-
tries (SMCs), which are neither among the poorest nor among the emerging mar-
ket countries, since they have limited access to international capital markets.
These groups differ in their financing needs, whether for short-term financing
or medium- to long-term financing. Short-term financing is required to meet
emergencies and respond to crises; medium- to long-term financing is required
for investment, capacity building, and other constituents of sustainable develop-
ment. Income levels also determine creditworthiness. Combined with the classi-
fication of developing countries by income group, this yields a “financing needs
matrix” (see table 2-1).
Least developed countries’ short-term financing needs reflect their aid and
commodity dependence and their greater vulnerability to natural disasters. Many
of these needs are largely unmet, particularly in failed states. This group is gener-
ally not creditworthy for commercial financing on market terms. That is why they
tend to be heavily dependent on the grant or concessional ODA from bilateral
and multilateral aid agencies. Traditionally, such agencies have rendered project
assistance and technical cooperation to support infrastructure, social investment,
and productive sector investment. Recently, some agencies have begun a transi-
tion to program-based assistance in the form of sector or budget support.
However, there is considerable evidence that ODA and other official flows
are procyclical, or serve to reinforce rather than dampen external shocks; there-
fore LDCs have unmet needs for countercyclical support.17 Debt restructuring
is a medium- to long-term need because the underlying problem is debt sustain-
ability (that is, reducing debt overhangs to levels compatible with growth and
development) rather than short-term liquidity financing. Finally, while on a
17. UNCTAD (2000, Part II, chap. 5).
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global basis most private foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to middle-
income countries, it is also true that the FDI that has flowed to a number of
least-developed countries is very significant as a proportion of GDP and in its
domestic impact. The likelihood is that such FDI will constitute a growing pro-
portion of net resource inflows for such countries in the future. The fact is,
however, that few LDCs have the monitoring or management capability even to
maintain up-to-date, detailed data on the size and nature of such inflows.18
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In contrast, emerging market countries’ short-term needs arise more from their
integration into, and shocks emanating from, international capital markets. (Some
countries still suffer from commodity price shocks but, given a far lower level of
dependence on commodity exports and greater degree of export diversification,
the effects are far less devastating than those felt by the poorest countries.) Since
the Asian financial crisis, much of the debate about short-term crisis prevention
and mitigation, along with the argument that more could be done through
regional cooperation, has been focused on this group. Debt restructuring is gener-
ally a short-term liquidity issue rather than a longer-term sustainability issue for
this group. Finally, there is also an unmet need for trade finance to put this group
of countries at less of a disadvantage to their industrial-country competitors.
With regard to longer-term needs, emerging market countries have much in
common with the poorest countries but face more choices in meeting them.
There is greater scope for domestic resource mobilization through financial
intermediation, taxation, duty collection, and public sector borrowing, and for a
significant portion of investment, particularly for the productive sectors, to take
place through private markets. However, particularly in those countries where
domestic savings rates are low, investment needs must be met by accessing inter-
national capital markets. In particularly short supply (as in least developed
countries) is medium-term countercyclical financing, since available financing
(official as well as private) tends to be procyclical.
Between these two groups are the smaller low- and middle-income countries,
which tend to have many of the same financing needs as the poorest countries
and some of the capabilities of emerging market countries. Thus they are able to
absorb some semi-concessional financing and more forms of private foreign
investment than LDCs. Some countries in this group are eligible for heavily
indebted poor-country (HIPC) debt relief (such as Bolivia, Nicaragua, and
Honduras) and require medium-term debt restructuring.
Finally, casual observation suggests that the least developed countries face the
greatest unmet needs, and that short-term needs tend to be more unmet than
longer-term needs. In table 2-1, the greatest unmet needs are listed in the top
left-hand corner. Moving down and to the right in the table, rising per capita
income and greater access to capital markets gives middle-income and emerging
markets more choices, either through official financing or through the markets.
This taxonomy of developing-country categories and their needs must now
be applied to the geographic, historical, and cultural realities of the developing
world. By definition, the membership of regional organizations is determined
by geography. A large majority of the LDCs are in Africa; and a large majority
of African countries are LDCs. It follows that regional organizations in Africa
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must inevitably contend with the challenges and demands of LDCs, which are
among the most difficult in the developing world.
There are also important cultural and linguistic differences between the pre-
dominantly Arab states of the north and those of sub-Saharan Africa; and in
sub-Saharan Africa, between those in which French, English, or Portuguese is
an official language. There is, in addition, considerable diversity among indige-
nous languages both between and within countries. Other sources of cultural
heterogeneity are rooted in religion. It is important to note that such diversity is
not an obstacle to regional cooperation, as the case of European integration
demonstrates. However, it does represent an important challenge to cooperation
at a number of levels, from the negotiation of cooperation agreements to the
structure and functioning of regional organizations: where they are located,
their working languages, and so on.
In contrast to Africa, LDCs are virtually nonexistent in Latin America (with
the exception of Haiti). Accordingly, in Latin America the demands faced by
regional organizations are principally those of the EMEs and SMCs. Without
minimizing those demands, it is fair to consider them more tractable than those
of the LDCs, so that the regional organizations in Latin America face less formi-
dable challenges than their counterparts in Africa.
Moreover, culturally and linguistically, as the descriptor “Latin” suggests, the
region is less heterogeneous than other parts of the developing world (this may
explain why some of the earliest attempts at regional cooperation were made in
Latin America). Spanish is the official language of most countries and the lingua
franca of the region: this undoubtedly facilitates cooperation at a practical level.
In Asia, LDCs are more numerous (they include Afghanistan, Bangladesh,
Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Nepal, and Yemen, plus several Pacific
and Indian Ocean island states) but constitute a small portion of the region’s total
population, which is heavily weighted by China and India. There are as well a
number of SMCs in Asia. At the same time, Asia is also home to Japan, the
world’s second largest developed economy, and other countries or city-states that
are either developed (Singapore and Hong Kong SAR; plus Australia and New
Zealand if these are considered part of Asia) or advanced middle-income countries
(the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, and Malaysia). More gener-
ally, the Asian continent’s size, huge population, and enormous cultural diversity,
not to mention historical frictions going back many centuries, have militated
against regional cooperation until very recently.
In contrast to Africa, however, it may be said that Asia’s diversity also offers
crucial strengths. In particular, the presence of industrial and emerging market
countries provides the region with a rapidly growing pool of savings and greater
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creditworthiness. For obvious reasons, this is a significant advantage for regional
financial cooperation. In Africa, there are no countries similar to Japan, Australia,
the Republic of Korea, or Taiwan Province of China, with capital surpluses, deep
financial markets, or large foreign exchange reserves.
The last point suggests that the rationale of regional financial cooperation
viewed from the demand side, that is, with the needs of ultimate beneficiaries in
mind, should be complemented by a “supply-side” perspective. Unless regional
organizations are viable and sustainable over the long term, it is at best hypo-
thetical to argue that there should be more of them, or that the emphasis on
improving the international architecture should be on strengthening existing
regional organizations rather than the global institutions.
One way of assessing the potential viability of regional financial organizations
stems from the relationship between their balance sheets and the financial capac-
ity of regional member states. For nonconcessional lending, a healthy balance
sheet implies, on the liability side, a strong net equity position, and on the asset
side, loans that are well-performing (or few nonperforming or doubtful loans). In
turn, a strong net equity position typically means that the organization’s mem-
bership includes a number of very creditworthy countries (or creditors with pro-
tracted current account surpluses), while a portfolio of well-performing loans
usually implies that borrowers service their loans fully and on schedule. For con-
cessional lending, there should be some aid donors able to provide low-interest
repayable credits, or grants, to eligible members.
In Africa, “very creditworthy countries” able to provide either a strong equity
position or concessional development resources are conspicuously absent. Asia,
in contrast, includes a number of very creditworthy countries, and among these,
some significant aid donors. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Latin
America is an intermediate case, in that the region features no significant aid
donors or capital surplus countries. However, notwithstanding Argentina’s
default and subsequent restructuring of its international obligations, Latin
American emerging market countries are increasingly creditworthy as inter-
national borrowers, a fact that provides strength to the asset portfolios of lenders
to the region.
Table 2-2 summarizes the opportunities and challenges facing the three
major continental regions of the developing world. It suggests that in Africa the
challenges confronting regional financial cooperation are the greatest, on both
the demand and the supply side. Asia has considerable advantages on the supply
side in its accumulation of a growing share of the world’s savings. Latin America
does not face the exigencies of Africa on the demand side, but neither does it
have Asia’s advantages on the supply side. However, cultural affinities in Latin
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America likely provide more “political glue” to the project of regional financial
cooperation than exists on the other two continents.
Regional Financial Cooperation: Lessons from Current Experience
If the above is accepted as a useful conceptual framework, what lessons can be
drawn from the experience of regional financial organizations, going beyond the
regional development banks? What role do they play in meeting the needs of
the three groups of countries? This question is addressed here via a brief survey
of regional institutions on two continents—Africa and Latin America and the
Caribbean.
Africa
Thirty-four, or almost three-quarters, of the world’s forty-eight least-developed
countries are in sub-Saharan Africa, which can be thought of as a least-developed
region or a group of such regions. The African Development Bank Group (par-
ticularly its concessional affiliate, the African Development Fund) is the princi-
pal regional institution providing medium- to long-term development finance.
However, the mandate of the African Development Bank Group covers the
whole continent, including the countries of North Africa and the Republic of
South Africa. There are a number of subregional organizations, including the
following. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
comprising sixteen members in West Africa, was created in 1975 to promote
intraregional trade.19 The ECOWAS treaty also calls for joint infrastructural
Table 2-2. Financial Opportunities and Challenges by Region































19. Its members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Togo, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.
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development, harmonized approaches to industrialization, and the improve-
ment of regional competitiveness; these are the objectives of its affiliated finan-
cial organizations, the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, the
ECOWAS Regional Investment Bank, and the ECOWAS Fund for Coopera-
tion, Compensation and Development. The fund has agreements with the
African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank to cofinance
projects. There is also a private regional investment bank, Ecobank Trans-
national Inc., based in Togo. Achievements in all these areas have been modest,
although there has been some progress in infrastructure.20 In December 2000,
five countries (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone) agreed to
create the West African Monetary Zone with a common currency and central
bank and to merge this zone with the Western African Economic and Monetary
Union by the year 2005. However, this timetable did not prove feasible. In May
2005, heads of state and government of the five countries reaffirmed their com-
mitment to a second monetary zone and to full West African monetary union,
but agreed to postpone the date of attainment until December 2009. To that
end, they also agreed to an implementation plan that included the formation of
a customs union and a single economic space among the five countries to
express political commitment to the regional monetary integration process.
The CFA franc zone (CFAF zone) is the longest-standing example of regional
financial cooperation among a group of LDCs, dating back to 1948. The CFA
franc is a common currency fixed via a “hard peg” to the euro (before 1999, to
the French franc), which effectively externalizes authority for short-term financ-
ing to the French Treasury. Moreover, the hard peg reduces the zone’s capacity
to absorb external shocks, which is further complicated by the substantially dif-
ferent needs and capacities of its fourteen members in its two zones in West and
Central Africa.21 Therefore because of the nature of its external peg and other
features, the regional common currency per se cannot be said to have resolved
the zone’s needs for short-term financing to meet commodity price fluctuations
or natural disasters such as drought and desertification, or financing for longer-
term development. Indeed, it could even be argued that, rather than leveraging
20. Rwegasira (1996).
21. The two zones are the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), compris-
ing Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo; and the
Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMU), comprising Cameroon, the
Central African Republic, Congo, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Most observers would
agree that the CFA franc zone is so large and heterogeneous that it does not constitute an optimal
currency area in Mundell’s sense. De Macedo, Cohen, and Reisen (2001) argue that regional coop-
eration is actually easier between countries with partly flexible, “intermediate” exchange rate
regimes rather than “corner regimes” of hard pegs or complete flexibility.
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additional resources for regional members, the rigidities of the CFAF zone
(including the recent adoption of a Convergence, Stability, Growth, and Solidar-
ity Pact modeled on that of the Eurozone) hamper its flexibility. However, its
proponents argue that the requirements of an externally backed common cur-
rency have resulted in monetary and fiscal discipline, which in turn have served
to strengthen the region’s growth performance. In addition, members have
agreed to a single banking supervisory authority (a “Banking Commission”) in
each of the two subregions, as well as setting up common accounting and pru-
dential standards throughout the zone, which may contribute to making the
region more attractive to foreign investment, reducing the problems of informa-
tion asymmetry, and with it the threat of financial contagion.22 Members of the
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or, in French, Union
Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine, UEMOA) adopted a customs union
and common external tariff in 2000. Progress toward regional integration in the
Central African Economic and Monetary Union (CAEMU or, in French, Com-
munauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale, CEMAC) has been
slower.23
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an association of
fourteen states of central and southern Africa.24 Before 1992, when South Africa
joined what was previously the Southern African Development Coordination
Conference (SADCC), its main objective was to promote regional integration
through investment and sector coordination driven primarily by donor funding.
This group now provides a forum and a framework within which to coordinate
policies and facilitate greater regional integration (on political issues such as secu-
rity and defense, and the strengthening of democracy and human rights, as well
as on the regional economy). SADC is phasing in a free-trade area in 2008.
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, formerly
the Preferential Trading Area, or PTA) comprises seventeen members including
many members of SADC.25 Its fundamental objective is to promote intra-
regional trade through trade liberalization. It established a free-trade area among
nine members in 2000 and is working toward a customs union in 2008. (A sub-
group, the East African Community, comprising Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda,
formed a customs union with a common external tariff that came into effect in
22. Strauss-Kahn (2003).
23. International Monetary Fund (2002).
24. Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
25. Angola, Burundi, Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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2005.) As part of this larger objective, COMESA has established three financial
facilities, the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA
Bank), created to establish a trade financing window, unique in sub-Saharan
Africa; the COMESA Clearing House to facilitate the settlement of trade pay-
ments among members; and the PTA Reinsurance Company (ZEP-RE), estab-
lished to develop the insurance and reinsurance industry in the region.
Strengthening macroeconomic coordination is also an objective of the COMESA
treaty, but little has been done in this regard.26
Certain features stand out from this brief survey of African regional organiza-
tions. First, apart from the CFA franc zone, regional trade is the principal objective
rather than financial cooperation. To a lesser extent, regional integration through
investment has been a motivation. In the case of the CFAF zone, regional trade
and integration, including financial and macroeconomic harmonization, have
been by-products facilitated by the common currency. Second, achievements
have generally been modest, reflecting the stark challenges facing all member
countries and the difficulties of coordinating policies in such circumstances. The
level of intraregional trade is somewhat higher in the CFAF zone than in other
regional blocs, but is still far from dominating the direction of trade as a whole,
which continues to be strongly oriented toward Europe. This outcome is not sur-
prising, given the low degree of complementarity in the region’s trade and pro-
duction structure. Third, notwithstanding some innovative attempts at financial
cooperation (such as the PTA Bank in COMESA to facilitate trade financing), it
is clear that such initiatives have not gone far in sub-Saharan Africa toward meet-
ing the region’s needs for short- and longer-term finance. Finally, criticisms of
the CFAF zone suggest that regional economic cooperation may be a two-edged
sword. While it may be intended to increase the interest and confidence of out-
side investors, an unintended consequence of overly stringent standards of har-
monization may be to hamper growth. Such criticisms are important given
various proposals for new common currencies (see below).
Perhaps it is the limited success of such regional efforts that led African lead-
ers in 2002 to launch the New Partnership for African Development, an initia-
tive that explicitly invited donors to support African-led efforts, whether for
infrastructure investment, regional security, or the transition to democracy.27
However, at the same time African leaders also agreed to a timetable for the cre-
ation of the African Union (AU) to replace the Organization for African Unity.
26. Rwegasira (1996); IMF (2002).
27. Mistry (1996), explaining the failure of structural reforms in Africa, argued for a more
regional approach to investment coordination and cooperation, trade integration, and institutional
development.
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The AU, which came into force in 2001, will ultimately have power over eco-
nomic, political, social, and judicial issues on the continent. It will eventually
develop a common currency, a continental parliament, and a court of justice
and is modeled on the European Union rather than on NAFTA or FTAA.
These developments, which have occasioned both optimism and skepticism,
reaffirm the importance of political factors underlying regional cooperation.
Latin America and the Caribbean
The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region includes groups of both EME
and SMC subregions (the only LDC in the hemisphere being Haiti). Two exam-
ples of regional financial cooperation among SMCs and one among a hetero-
geneous group of EMEs and SMCs serve to illustrate some potentials and pitfalls.
The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), established
in 1960, is a subregional bank based in Honduras, serving that country and four
others—Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, which in the frame-
work of this paper all constitute SMCs. There are also four nonborrowing
“regional” members, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Taiwan Province of
China, all of which are EMEs. Its mission is to promote the progress and the
integration of the isthmus by fostering equitable, environmentally friendly eco-
nomic growth. To that end, it supports public and private programs and projects
that generate productive employment and contribute to improving productivity
and competitiveness, as well as to raising the human development indexes of the
region. Over the four decades of its existence, CABEI has proved itself to be a
useful regional nonconcessional financial intermediary for both public sector
investment and, increasingly over the past decade, private sector investment,
including investment in small and medium-sized enterprises. However, it encoun-
tered financial problems because of the accumulation of high external debt and
arrears by Nicaragua in the 1980s, part of which were due to its neighbors and to
CABEI itself. This issue was compounded by the HIPC debt-relief initiative in
the late 1990s, because two of its borrowing members (Nicaragua and Honduras)
became eligible for relief. Without adequate compensation (for example through
donor trust funds established under HIPC), the prescribed debt relief could have
impaired one-half of the net worth of CABEI.
The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) was established in 1970 to promote
economic growth and integration among the countries of the Commonwealth
Caribbean, particularly the less-developed members. It currently has twenty-five
members, including three nonborrowing regional members (Colombia, Mexico,
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and five nonregionals (Canada, China,
Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom). Like CABEI, it has acted as a finan-
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cial intermediary to mobilize nonconcessional financing. Unlike CABEI, it also
has a concessional window supported by a small group of bilateral donors. A
review of CDB undertaken in 1995 concluded that CDB is a highly effective
lender to smaller countries (many of which are island micro-states), based on its
portfolio of successful project loans and sound management practices. Its success,
relative to CABEI, rests in part on its ability to access concessional funds for
its lenders, which cannot sustain high levels of debt. An innovative agreement
between CDB and the World Bank in 1990 resulted in CDB’s “retailing” World
Bank concessional funds to the micro-states of the eastern Caribbean.28
The Andean Development Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento,
or CAF) began its operations in 1970 in Caracas. Its principal shareholders are
members of the Andean community: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It also has seven extraregional shareholders
(Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago),
as well as twenty-two private banks from the Andean region (a unique character-
istic of subregional development banks). Thus CAF membership comprises
both EMEs (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela) and SMCs, all exclusively from the LAC region. (Spain also became
a member in recent years, with a small share and the same standing as other
members, and thus with the ability to borrow from CAF). Its mission is to pro-
mote sustainable development and regional integration in both the public and
private sectors of Latin America and the Caribbean. CAF approvals to its five
Andean members (U.S.$18.7 billion, 1990–99) considerably exceed those of the
IDB ($14.4 billion) and the World Bank ($10.2 billion) and, while its bond rat-
ing is lower than those of the IDB and World Bank (S&P: AAA), it is higher
than any other Latin American issuer (for example, Chile’s S&P rating is “A–”
while that of CAF is “A”).29 Its lending portfolio is concentrated in its Andean
members, and 72 percent consists of infrastructure projects. CAF performance
is all the more remarkable because one of its Andean borrowers, Bolivia, is a
debt-distressed HIPC country, while another, Ecuador, experienced severe
financial distress in 2003 and, like CABEI (but in contrast to CDB), it does not
have a concessional lending window.
The experience of CAF proves that it is possible for a subregional financial
institution to operate very successfully, without any industrial-country shareholders
28. Hardy (1995).
29. Financially its return on assets (1.9 percent) and equity (7.0 percent) outperforms the IDB
(1.0 percent and 5.0 percent, respectively) and World Bank (0.7 percent and 5.6 percent). See
Quintela (2000).
10101-02_Ch02_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:05 PM  Page 59
60 roy culpeper
and without recourse to concessional funding. Indeed, it has done so on a scale
comparable to that of the world’s principal IFIs, despite the serious economic
problems afflicting some of its key borrowing members—problems that have
caused serious difficulties for CABEI. Factors explaining the comparative success
of CAF likely include judicious management and the sectoral composition of the
borrowing portfolio, with its heavy emphasis on public sector infrastructure. All
three organizations include regional integration among their principal objectives
but, like their IFI peers, this does not seem to translate into a significant portion
of their lending portfolios. Finally, while all three meet some their respective
regions’ needs for long-term capital, none of them are particularly well placed to
meet needs for short-term assistance—for example, in the face of natural disasters.
Other regional organizations worth mentioning briefly include:30 (1) the Reci-
procal Payments and Credits Agreement of the Latin American Integration Asso-
ciation (ALADI), an arrangement dating back to the 1960 Montevideo Treaty,
to settle trade-related payments among Latin American countries. After growing
rapidly in the 1980s to the point of processing 90 percent of intraregional import
payments, the proportion processed by ALADI dwindled to 10 percent by 1999,
partly because of the development of financial technology, de facto dollarization,
and more flexible exchange rates, which reduced the advantages of the ALADI
settlement system;31 and (2) the Latin American Reserve Fund (Fondo Latino-
americano de Reservas, FLAR), a reserve-pooling arrangement initiated by the
Andean countries in 1978 (Costa Rica has subsequently joined). FLAR current
subscribed capital is U.S.$2.1 billion; its fundamental objective is to support the
balance of payments of member countries by granting or guaranteeing loans. The
ability to play this role effectively may be circumscribed both by relatively limited
FLAR resources and by its (thus far) limited membership (the five Andean coun-
tries plus Costa Rica).32 In the event of regional contagion spreading from a par-
ticular member’s financial crisis, there would be simultaneous demands for
balance-of-payments support that FLAR could not meet.33
Compared to Africa (and perhaps Asia as well, which is not surveyed here), the
Latin American and Caribbean region seems well served by subregional organiza-
tions, despite the setbacks suffered by CABEI on account of the Nicaraguan
arrears and the HIPC initiative. In large part this is due to the greater economic
strength of countries in LAC, which include several EMEs. The CAF has broken
30. The list could also include FONPLATA, a subregional bank.
31. Chang (2000).
32. FLAR capital of $2.1 billion is clearly meager in comparison with the bilateral swap
arrangements under the Chiang Mai Initiative of $32.5 billion.
33. Chang (2000).
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new ground among regional financial institutions by virtue of both the overall
volume of its operations and its success on a number of indicators. And the FLAR
predates the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) as a regional monetary fund, even if its
resources are still modest. The FLAR and CMI initiatives could well learn from
each other—for example, FLAR could supplement its resources with bilateral
swap agreements,34 and the CMI could learn from the FLAR experience with
reserve pooling. Finally, the “retailing” arrangement between the World Bank
and CDB could be replicated in a number of other subregional banks as a way of
efficiently channeling resources to the world’s smaller and poorer countries.
Conclusion: Regional Organizations 
in the Global Financial Architecture
Notwithstanding the important and innovative financial contributions of regional
organizations such as CAF, the fact remains that a number of key financial needs
of their developing-country members likely remain unmet. This is particularly the
case for all the financing requirements of the poorest countries and some smaller
and lower-income countries, and for the shorter-term financing requirements of
poorer and emerging countries alike. These are discussed in turn, with a mind to
the role of regional organizations in filling the gap.
Longer-Term Resource Needs of the Poorest Countries
Following the pledges of the international community made at the 2002 Inter-
national Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey and during 2005,
the year of the Millennium Review Summit, it seems that there could be significant
increases of about $50 billion in ODA in the years up to 2010. While welcome,
this will still fall short of the amount required to help meet the millennium devel-
opment goals (MDGs), which would require an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.44 percent
in 2006, rather than the 0.30 percent currently projected for that year; even the
0.36 percent projected for 2010 falls short.35 Moreover, calculations by the United
Nations Millennium Project suggest that an ODA/gross national income (GNI)
ratio of at least 0.54 percent would be necessary to help meet the MDGs. Given
that backdrop, what can regional organizations or initiatives do to fill the gap?
34. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2002).
35. Report to the Secretary-General of the High-Level Panel on Financing for Development
(United Nations A/55/1000, June 26, 2001); United Nations General Assembly, “Implementation
of and follow-up to commitments and agreements made at the International Conference on Finan-
cing for Development” (United Nations A/58/216, August 5, 2003), paragraphs 115–21. See also
Manning (2005), and the United Nations Millennium Project, “Why 0.7 percent matters for the
Millennium Development Goals” (www.unmillenniumproject.org/involved/action07.htm.
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There are two possible answers. The first looks outward, principally to
donors for resources, by facilitating aid flows through collective regional efforts.
The obvious example here is NEPAD, an initiative of African leaders aimed at
catalyzing aid and other resource flows to Africa. Through collective commit-
ments to undertake economic and governance reforms, monitored through an
African peer-review system, the objective is to increase the confidence of donors
and private foreign investors that the economic and political climate is con-
ducive to development, and therefore that aid will be more effective and private
investment more productive and profitable.
An offshoot of the NEPAD initiative involves the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (ECA) and the OECD Development Assistance Com-
mittee’s own peer-review system, through ECA participation in the reviews
scheduled regularly for each donor member of DAC. Indeed, there is a paucity
of mechanisms in the aid architecture to ensure that donors meet their pledges
and stated commitments, in contrast to the host of mechanisms to ensure that
developing-country recipients meet theirs.36 While a few recipient countries are
developing mechanisms to monitor the commitments and behavior of their
entire family of donors, perhaps regional organizations (for example, the East
African Community) could collectively arrange for independent monitoring
and review of donors. The aim would be to identify and build on best practice
as well as to remedy unacceptable practices of those donors.
The second answer to meeting the needs of the poorest countries looks
inward, to the possibility of mobilizing more resources domestically. Regional
organizations can help deepen financial markets; develop the financial sector
through capacity building of banking and nonbanking institutions and human
skills; and help create or improve the regulatory and supervisory infrastructure.
Regional cooperation may be particularly useful in setting up stock markets on a
regional rather than a national basis, since, for poorer countries, local equity
markets tend to be very thin. There could be cost advantages (by economizing
on administrative and supervisory overhead) and benefits for local and foreign
portfolio investors in the form of greater choice and market liquidity. In addi-
tion, regional public bond markets, combined with integrated financial pay-
ments systems, might effectively reduce the risk of contagion of financial crises
by facilitating a coordinated monetary policy response and reducing the possi-
bility of temporary failure of trade finance. Some regional institutions are
already engaged in such an agenda, as evidenced by the financial reforms of the
36. Independent Monitoring Group (2002).
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WAEMU (Western) subregion of the CFA franc zone and the ECOWAS pro-
posal for a second monetary zone. While the objective of mobilizing more re-
sources from the savings of the poorest countries is ambitious—and some may
even regard it as naïve or utopian—the fact remains that the “East Asian miracle”
involved, to a large extent, poor countries with high savings rates (considerably in
excess of those common in sub-Saharan Africa) and a reasonably efficient finan-
cial sector.37
However, an important caveat must be added. Regional rules and institu-
tions should be designed, first and foremost, with regional needs in mind. To
the extent that such rules and institutions reduce the scope for action on fis-
cal, monetary, financial sector, or exchange rate policies, as seems to be the
case at least for some countries in the CFA franc zone and elsewhere in sub-
Saharan Africa, they could hinder rather than help domestic investment and
growth.38
In conclusion, meeting the needs of the poorest countries for resources—
whether long-term or short—is the most demanding of all development chal-
lenges. It would be unrealistic to expect that regional cooperation, by itself,
would help to bridge the enormous gap between availability and needs. None-
theless, there may be ways in which regional cooperation can be a catalyst for
greater or more effective aid and private flows or help to deepen local financial
markets and increase the scope for domestic resource mobilization.
Bridging the Gap for Short-Term Financing
Most of the attention in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis has dwelt on
short-term measures to prevent or manage crises. While the 1998 proposal for
an Asian Monetary Fund met with opposition from the IMF and some G-7
members, the 2000 Chiang Mai Initiative has been widely endorsed, despite lin-
gering misgivings.
In the meantime, as a result of the 1997–98 crisis, Asian countries (includ-
ing China, Hong Kong SAR, the Republic of Korea, India, Singapore, and
Taiwan Province of China) have accumulated a large stock of foreign ex-
change reserves, estimated to be in excess of $2.5 trillion by June 2005. These
resources give countries of the region a considerable war chest with which to
fight speculative attacks. In that light, CMI bilateral swap and other arrangements
37. It is also true that economies such as the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China
benefited from large resource transfers from bilateral donors, particularly the United States.
38. Gottschalk (2003).
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amounting to $36.5 billion in late 2004 scarcely tap this pool of reserves,
although the CMI is viewed as a mechanism that will grow incrementally over
time.39
The promise of the CMI as a regional mechanism for coping with financial
instability (like the success of CAF in Latin America in attracting longer-term
financing) illustrates an obvious fact about emerging market economies: their
higher per capita incomes and their aggregate market size endow them with sig-
nificant resources and access to capital. Given continued growth among such
countries, it seems likely that such regional mechanisms, without industrial-
country membership in some cases, will play an increasing role in meeting their
short-term financing needs.
The much more difficult challenge is meeting the short-term financing needs
of the poorer countries (including the LDCs and smaller lower-middle-income
countries) in the face of natural disasters, declining and volatile commodity
prices, and postconflict reconstruction.
For most of these needs, international mechanisms and the involvement of
donors seem imperative. In the specific case of commodity-dependent countries,
past approaches to stabilizing prices and protecting against shocks, including
international commodity agreements, have experienced, at best, mixed success.
There may be scope for subregional initiatives, however, in the areas of research
and development, and quality control and assurance, to enhance supply capabili-
ties, particularly to meet the increasingly stringent standards of consumers and
buyers and to facilitate the production and export of higher-value-added prod-
ucts. Such activities could be financed through the Common Fund for Com-
modities (CFC).40
There may be scope for South-South cooperation as well in this area.41 For
example, developing countries with national stabilization funds for particular
commodities (for example, Chile’s Copper Stabilization Fund) could provide
assistance (again funded through the CFC) to heavily commodity-dependent
regions in creating similar funds on a regional basis, pooling revenues from the
key commodities exported by member countries. Diversifying such funds to
include revenues from more than one commodity would also serve as a stabiliz-
39. The Economist, September 15, 2005 (www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=
4401162). For CMI bilateral swap arrangements as of November 2004, see www.aric.adb.org/
pdf/ProgressReportontheCMI10Nov04.pdf.
40. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2002).
41. Helleiner (1999).
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ing force, assuming that different commodities are subject to somewhat differ-
ent supply and demand cycles.
An Overall Balance
Finally, let us return to the questions posed at the outset of this paper with some
tentative answers:
—What organizational and institutional characteristics contribute to regional
financial organizations’ playing an effective role?
It seems clear that regional groups comprising, or dominated by, emerging
market countries are more effective because of their economic strength, deep
financial markets, and readier access to markets. Put otherwise, they have signifi-
cant domestic resources and some bargaining power in the global economy.
Regional financial organizations in Asia and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America,
enjoy these advantages. In addition, Asia is home to some donor countries able to
provide concessional or grant financing to poorer countries in the region. Africa,
comprising the poorest and lower-income countries, faces much graver difficulties
in seeking a greater role for regional financial cooperation. To remedy these short-
comings, Africa must include nonregional donor or industrial countries in the
membership of regional organizations, which can obviously raise other problems.
—What are the key financial constraints faced by different groups of devel-
oping countries with respect to short-term financing and longer-term financing?
The poorest and smaller countries face challenges across the entire spectrum—
whether for short-term or longer-term purposes. All countries, including emerg-
ing market countries, face greater challenges in mobilizing short-term financing
than longer-term financing, although in the case of the latter there seems greater
likelihood that EMEs will be able to organize regionally along the lines of the
Chiang Mai Initiative.
—To what extent can regional organizations play a key role in financial crisis
prevention and management?
It is too soon to tell whether the Chiang Mai Initiative is up to the task of
preventing or mitigating crises in East Asia. However, it could be argued that, as
the CMI grows in scope, and the longer the region is spared further financial
crises, the more effective CMI will be in making the region speculation-proof.
As for poorer and smaller low-income countries, considerably more thought and
discussion is needed to develop regional mechanisms to address their acute
needs, whether for natural or manmade calamities, or for capital account, com-
modity, or aid shocks.
—How can regional financial organizations help bridge the large resource
gap required for longer-term growth and development?
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For the poorest and smaller countries, partnerships with donor countries seem
inescapable for the foreseeable future. However, it seems important that the
terms of the partnership be right for the developing countries. An excessively
restrictive policy framework, ostensibly to appease donors, may constrain growth
and development potential. For the emerging market countries, the experience of
the CAF suggests that regional organizations can be very adept at mobilizing
long-term development financing, provided the membership is appropriate (with
prominent EME membership); portfolio composition and astute management
are likely also key factors.
Clearly, more research is needed on the potential of regional financial organi-
zations in order to reach a comprehensive assessment of their effectiveness, or
prescriptions to improve their performance, including a better division of labor
with the global organizations. However, it also seems clear that they can con-
tribute significantly to the global financial architecture in meeting the particular
needs of developing countries from very different parts of the world, facing con-
siderably different opportunities and challenges.
References
Bhagwati, J. 1998. “Regionalism and Multilateralism: WTO, Mercosur et al.” Paper presented to
the Argentine Bankers’ Convention, May. www.columbia.edu/∼jb38/papers/Argen98.PDF.
Braga de Macedo, J., D. Cohen, and H. Reisen, eds. 2001. Don’t Fix, Don’t Float. Paris:
OECD Development Centre Studies.
Chang, R. 2000. “Regional Monetary Arrangements for Developing Countries.” Rutgers
University. www.g24.org/chang.pdf.
Culpeper, R. 1997. Titans or Behemoths? The Multilateral Development Banks. Boulder: Colo.:
Lynne Rienner.
Devlin, R., and L. Castro. 2002. “Regional Banks and Regionalism: A New Frontier for
Development Financing.” Buenos Aires: Inter-American Development Bank.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 2002. Growth
with Stability: Financing for Development in the New International Context. Santiago:
ECLAC Books.
Emerging Markets Eminent Persons’ Group. 2001. “Rebuilding the International Financial
Architecture.” Seoul: Institute for Global Economics (October).
English, P., and H. Mule. 1996. The African Development Bank. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Ethier, W. 1998. “The New Regionalism.” Economic Journal 108 (July): 1149–61.
Gottschalk, R. 2003. “The Macroeconomic Policy Content of PRSPs: How Much Pro-
Growth, How Much Pro-Poor?” Paper prepared for the North-South Institute Project on
PRSPs and Poverty, Ottawa, October.
Hardy, C. 1995. The Caribbean Development Bank. Volume 3 of The Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner and the North-South Institute.
Helleiner, G. 1999. “Small Countries and the New World Financial Architecture.” Capítulos,
Latin America in the International Financial Crisis 56 (May/August).
10101-02_Ch02_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:05 PM  Page 66
reforming the global financial architecture 67
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2002. Survey: Supplement. September.
Independent Monitoring Group. 2002. Enhancing Aid Relationships in Tanzania: Report of the
Independent Monitoring Group. Dar es Salaam: Economic and Social Research Foundation.
Kappagoda, N. 1996. The Asian Development Bank. Volume 2 of The Multilateral Develop-
ment Banks. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner and the North-South Institute.
Kapur, D., and R. Webb. 1994. “The Evolution of the Multilateral Development Banks.” In
International Monetary and Financial Issues for the 1990s. Volume 4, Special issue. New
York: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Manning, R. 2005. “Statement to the Seventy-Second Meeting of the World Bank-IMF
Development Committee.” Washington, September 25, Document DC/S/2005-0064.
Martin, M., with C. Rose-Innes. 2004. “Private Capital Flows to Low-Income Countries:
Perception and Reality.” In Canadian Development Report 2004, Chapter 2. Ottawa:
North-South Institute.
Mistry, P. 1996. “Regional Dimensions of Structural Adjustment in Southern Africa.” In
Regionalism and the Global Economy: The Case of Africa, edited by J. J. Teunissen. The
Hague: FONDAD.
Ocampo, J. A. 2002. “The Role of Regional Institutions.” In A Regional Approach to Finan-
cial Crisis Prevention: Lessons from Europe and Initiatives in Asia, Latin America and Africa,
edited by J. J. Teunissen. The Hague: Forum on Debt and Development (FONDAD).
———. 2003. “Capital-Account and Counter-Cyclical Prudential Regulations in Developing
Countries.” In From Capital Surges to Drought: Seeking Stability for Emerging Economies,
edited by R. Ffrench-Davis and S. Griffith-Jones. London: Palgrave/Macmillan.
Park, Y. C. 2001. “Beyond the Chiang Mai Initiative: Rationale and Need for a Regional
Monetary Arrangement in East Asia.” Korea University. www.g24.org/ychp0904.pdf.
Quintela, C. 2000. “Corporación Andina de Fomento: Thirty Years Financing Sustainable
Development.” Presentation, Rio de Janeiro, September 25.
Rwegasira, D. 1996. “Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa: Experiences, Chal-
lenges and Opportunities.” In Toward Autonomous Development in Africa, edited by 
R. Culpeper and C. McAskie. Ottawa: North-South Institute.
Stiglitz, J. 2002. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton.
Strauss-Kahn, M. O. 2003. “Regional Currency Areas: A Few Lessons from the Eurosystem
and the CFA Franc Zone.” In Regional Currency Areas and the Use of Foreign Currencies,
BIS Papers (Basel) 17 (May): 42–58.
Teunissen, J. J., ed. 2002. A Regional Approach to Financial Crisis Prevention: Lessons from
Europe and Initiatives in Asia, Latin America and Africa. The Hague: FONDAD.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2000. The Least
Developed Countries 2000 Report. Geneva: United Nations.
———. 2002. The Least Developed Countries 2002 Report: Escaping the Poverty Trap. Geneva:
United Nations.
10101-02_Ch02_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:05 PM  Page 67
68
This chapter compares the roles played by regional and subregional multi-lateral development banks (MDBs) in development financing and attempts
to integrate fragmented data and information from a variety of sources.
Development financing institutions are situated at the intersection of the
international development system and the international financial system. While
there are several entities that straddle both systems, the MDBs occupy a unique
place because of their specific characteristics and because they interact with
most of the actors in both systems. Multilateral development banks are inter-
national financial intermediaries whose shareholders include both developing
countries that borrow from them and developed countries that do not. They
mobilize resources from private capital markets and from official sources to
make loans on better-than-market terms, provide technical assistance and pol-
icy advice for economic and social development, and offer a range of comple-
mentary services to developing countries and to the international development
community.
The MDB “model” is perhaps one of the most useful institutional innovations
in development finance of the past six decades and, on the whole, these institu-
tions have a reasonably positive track record. Neither private sources nor bilateral
agencies could have leveraged financial resources so efficiently. Moreover, there
Regional Development Banks: 
A Comparative Perspective
francisco sagasti and fernando prada
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are no other institutions capable of providing a comparable range of products and
services to their member countries, including financial resource mobilization,
capacity building, institutional development, knowledge brokering, and the pro-
vision of international public goods.1
MDBs must preserve a delicate balance among the three main functions they
perform: financial resource mobilization with the aim of providing financial re-
sources to developing countries through regular and concessional loans; capacity
building, institutional development, and knowledge brokering through technical
assistance, grants, policy dialogue, dissemination of best practice and research
support; and helping to provide regional and global public goods that cannot be
fully provided by national institutions. Not all MDBs are involved in these
functions to the same extent, but collectively they cover all of them. There is an
inherent tension between the financing and development functions of the
MDBs, a tension that has been there since these institutions were created. They
serve, on the one hand, as financial intermediaries, and on the other, as devel-
opment agencies. Performing this delicate balancing act has become much
more difficult in recent years, primarily because of the increasing number of
issues that MDBs are required to address, the criticisms that have been leveled
against them (especially the World Bank), and the debt service problems faced
by many of their low-income borrowers. Moreover, in addition to their financ-
ing and development roles, these institutions are being asked to play a service
role in the provision of regional and global public goods. Although regional and
subregional institutions are not as important as the World Bank in the provi-
sion and financing of such goods, there is evidence that they are taking a more
active role in the provision of regional public goods, and this applies in particu-
lar to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (AsDB).2
Nevertheless, financial resource mobilization can be considered to be the
primus inter pares of these three functions. Providing loans to borrowing mem-
ber countries is an essential condition for the existence of an MDB, and neither
of their other two functions could be performed without preserving their finan-
cial integrity and technical capacity to make loans.
1. See, in this regard, Bezanson and Sagasti (2000), Sagasti and Bezanson (2001), and Sagasti
(2004).
2. Estevadeordal, Frantz, and Nguyen (2004). In late 2004, the IDB launched a new initiative
to support the provision of regional public goods. It will allocate at least U.S.$10 million annually
for this purpose during the next three years. Resources are being allocated through an open compe-
tition for proposals.
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An Overview of the Regional and Subregional Development Banks
There are more than twenty institutions that qualify as MDBs according to the
broad definition of multilateral development banks being used in this chapter.
MDBs can be differentiated according to size, number, and characteristics of their
shareholders, type of borrowers (public or private, income levels), geographic
scope (global, regional, subregional), and by the sectors or activities they cover.
Most studies of MDBs have focused on the World Bank, the oldest and largest of
the MDBs, and on the regional development banks (Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, Asian Development Bank [AsDB], African Development Bank
[AfDB], and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD]),
which come next in size and membership, and which were established during the
1950s and 1960s (with the exception of the EBRD, which was established in
1991). However, there are also many smaller MDBs (“subregionals”) and inter-
national funds and institutions that can be considered multilateral development
banks based on the characteristics of their operations (see table 3-1).3
The level of resources provided by MDBs to developing countries is lower
than the direct foreign investment (U.S.$137 billion in 2003), remittances
(U.S.$93 billion), and bilateral assistance (U.S.$49.5 billion) they receive. In
addition, the share of MDBs in total net flows from multilateral sources varies
across regions and levels of income. Net flows from regional development
banks (RDBs) to developing countries were U.S.$66.7 billion during the period
1991–2002, nearly 30 percent of total net flows from multilateral sources
(table 3-2). Excluding from this total the flows from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which are mainly short term, RDBs provide more than 40 percent
of total long- and medium-term net flows to developing countries from multi-
lateral sources.
70 francisco sagasti and fernando prada
3. The European Investment Bank has been placed in the category of subregional development
banks, even though it is very large and might belong in a category of its own. It operates in a wide
variety of countries, including some relatively advanced European and transition countries, as well
as in many developing countries. Other institutions, such as the Latin American Reserve Fund and
the Arab Monetary Fund, provide short-term financial assistance to their member countries and
therefore have not been considered here as MDBs; their functions are more like those of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF). The Latin American Export Bank (BLADEX) is another special
case. It focuses on trade transactions (export credit) and on capital market operations (guarantees).
BLADEX has not been classified as an MDB because of its shareholding composition: of its 39.3 mil-
lion shares, 16.1 percent are Class A (shares that can only be issued to Latin American Central
Banks or banks in which the state or some government agency is the majority shareholder), 10.4 per-
cent are Class B (issued to banks or financial institutions), and 73.5 percent are Class E (issued to
any person whether a natural person or a legal entity).
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There are important regional differences in the role that RDBs play in devel-
opment financing. In Latin America, net flows from the IDB have steadily and
significantly expanded, rising from U.S.$5.2 billion in 1991–94 to U.S.$15.9 bil-
lion in 1999–2002, and have surpassed by far those from the World Bank
(U.S.$1.3 and U.S.$7.3 billion, respectively, in the same periods). RDB net flows
are also higher than those of the World Bank in the region comprising the Mid-
dle East and North Africa (U.S.$3 billion from RDBs compared with U.S.$1 bil-
lion from the World Bank in the period 1991–2002), although financial flows
from multilateral sources are not as large in that region as in Latin America.
The growth in financing from RDBs has occurred primarily in middle-
income countries, where their net flows surpassed those of the World Bank:
U.S.$42.5 billion compared with U.S.$40 billion for the period 1991–2002. If
IMF flows to these countries are excluded, RDBs account for more than 50 per-
cent of net multilateral flows. Lower-middle-income countries have received
U.S.$7.2 billion from the World Bank and U.S.$12.3 billion from RDBs. Upper-
middle-income countries received U.S.$30 billion from RDBs in the same
period, although for this group of countries World Bank net flows were higher
than those of RDBs (U.S.$33 billion). In contrast, low-income economies are
heavily dependent on the World Bank, which accounted for 53 percent of total
net multilateral flows (U.S.$41 billion in the period 1991–2002). The situation
is similar for highly indebted poor countries (HIPC), where the World Bank
contributed 64 percent of total net multilateral flows.
Evolution and Current Situation of the Regional 
and Subregional Development Banks
Financial Instruments and Services
The MDBs have product lines that include regular loans at below-market rates of
interest;4 concessional loans at very low rates of interest with long repayment
periods; relatively small amounts of grant financing for technical assistance; train-
4. Some borrowing countries with very good credit ratings can obtain financing from inter-
national capital markets at lower rates than those offered by the MDBs, but these countries have also
resorted to MDB financing in exceptional cases of distress. For example, the World Bank provided
the Republic of Korea with a total of U.S.$8.6 billion in IBRD regular loans and U.S.$120 million
in IDA soft credits through the years, with the last loan occurring in December 1994, before the
Republic of Korea “graduated” and became ineligible for World Bank financing. Nevertheless, in
the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis, the Republic of Korea returned to borrow from the World
Bank and received a U.S.$3 billion loan as part of a U.S.$57 billion package provided by various
international financial institutions and bilateral agencies.
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Table 3-2. Regional Development Banks: Net Flows by Region, 1991–2002
Billions of U.S. dollars
Total Relative share,  
1999– 1991– 1991–2002
Multilateral  financing sources a 1991–94 1995–98 2002 2002 (percent)
All developing countries
World Bank 25.42 31.51 23.95 80.87 35.7
IMF 7.48 35.36 20.62 63.46 28.0
Other 6.62 8.55 0.16 15.33 6.8
RDBs 20.53 24.65 21.55 66.73 29.5
Regions
East Asia and Pacific
World Bank 7.13 8.12 3.46 18.71 46.0
IMF −0.61 12.65 −2.11 9.93 24.4
Other 0.13 0.30 0.08 0.51 1.3
RDBs 3.11 5.30 3.15 11.55 28.4
Europe and Central Asia
World Bank 3.17 9.47 7.02 19.66 33.6
IMF 9.98 16.57 6.90 33.45 57.2
Other 3.50 −1.29 0.12 2.33 4.0
RDBs 0.35 1.94 0.71 2.99 5.1
Latin America and the Caribbean
World Bank −1.29 3.46 5.10 7.27 11.3
IMF −4.79 9.54 15.83 20.58 32.0
Other 0.64 6.04 −1.64 5.04 7.8
RDBs 5.17 10.24 15.93 31.34 48.8
Middle East and North Africa
World Bank 1.15 0.29 −0.37 1.07 10.7
IMF 0.09 1.10 −0.60 0.59 5.8
Other 1.41 2.94 1.03 5.38 53.5
RDBs 2.27 0.99 −0.26 3.01 29.9
South Asia
World Bank 8.07 3.94 2.14 14.15 61.3
IMF 1.71 −4.33 0.02 −2.61 −11.3
Other −0.01 0.24 0.28 0.51 2.2
RDBs 5.09 4.43 1.53 11.05 47.8
Sub-Saharan Africa
World Bank 7.18 6.23 6.60 20.01 67.0
IMF 1.11 −0.17 0.59 1.53 5.1
Other 0.94 0.33 0.28 1.55 5.2
RDBs 4.55 1.74 0.49 6.79 22.7
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ing and capacity-building activities; risk mitigation and management instru-
ments (such as guarantees, equity participation and capital market operations
to enhance private investment); debt management and debt reduction instruments;
and additional mechanisms such as the convening of consultative groups to
mobilize resources from other financial sources and the issuing of bonds in local
currencies to strengthen the capital markets of developing countries. Table 3-3
presents a list of these financial mechanisms and their subtypes, including some
innovative proposals that have not yet been fully implemented.5
Income level
Low income
World Bank 17.04 12.42 11.46 40.92 52.5
IMF 1.88 6.97 0.97 9.82 12.6
Other 1.30 1.11 0.62 3.02 3.9
RDBs 10.74 8.01 5.47 24.23 31.1
Middle income
World Bank 8.38 19.08 12.49 39.95 26.9
IMF 5.60 28.39 19.65 53.64 36.1
Other 5.33 7.45 −0.47 12.31 8.3
RDBs 9.79 16.63 16.08 42.50 28.6
Heavily indebted poor countries
World Bank 7.63 8.30 9.47 25.39 64.0
IMF 0.31 1.10 0.98 2.39 6.0
Other 0.99 0.95 0.88 2.82 7.1
RDBs 3.97 2.82 2.26 9.05 22.8
Source: World Bank (2004).
a. Other multilateral sources are export credit and rescheduling operations with the Paris Club.
Table 3-2. (continued)
Billions of U.S. dollars
Total Relative share,  
1999– 1991– 1991–2002
Multilateral  financing sources a 1991–94 1995–98 2002 2002 (percent)
5. The World Bank has been an important source of innovative financial instruments for devel-
oping countries, and these instruments have generally been rapidly emulated by RDBs and, to a
lesser extent, by SRDBs. For example, regional development banks initially offered loans only
through their regular windows, but established concessional windows during the 1970s after the
International Development Association (IDA) was created. Similarly, the surge in private sector
operations through the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was promptly emu-
lated by the RDBs during the 1990s.
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Table 3-3. MDB Financing Instruments and Their Degree of Use
Financing Degree

















a. This column classifies the use of these instruments as follows:
* Proposed.
+ Being designed and tested.
++ In limited use (in some cases on a pilot scale).
+++ In moderate use (focus on certain countries and sectors).
++++ In extended and widespread use.
Project, program, and sector loans for the public and private
sectors
Structural adjustment loans and balance-of-payments support
Emergency recovery loans (in case of disaster or unexpected
events)
Loans to financial intermediaries (for example, development
finance corporations)
Prearranged fast-disbursement loans conditional on
previous performance
Project, program, sector, and structural adjustment loans to
the public sector
Temporary funds for countries with special needs (postconflict
reconstruction, sudden deterioration of external conditions)
Assistance to public institutions for specific programs and
projects
Technical cooperation, capacity-building, and institutional
development grants
Emergency operations to deal with natural or manmade
disasters
Total, partial, and rolling guarantees (political, contractual,
regulatory, credit, foreign exchange risks)
Financing for currency- and interest-hedging operations
Equity participation and quasi-equity (common shares,
preferred stock, C loans)
Other instruments to promote private investment and
trade: export credits, securitization, leasing, syndication,
underwriting, trade insurance
Funds for multilateral debt reduction (HIPC Initiative)
Debt reduction loans (for example, for buying back existing
debt, debt service reduction)
Funds for clearing arrears with multilateral development banks
Soft loan buy-down mechanisms
Mobilization of resources from bilateral and other
multilateral sources (consultative groups)
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Regular loans are medium- or long-term loans, which constitute the main
activity of the banks. They include: (1) project and program loans for the public
and private sectors, the most frequent type of loans; (2) structural adjustment
loans and balance-of-payments support, usually disbursed in tranches, subject to
the implementation of agreed policy reforms and certain targets; (3) emergency
recovery loans extended in cases of disaster or unexpected events; (4) loans to
financial intermediaries, such as development finance corporations, and estab-
lishment of apex funds for microfinance; and (5) prearranged fast-disbursement
loans conditional on previous performance, available to borrowers deemed credit-
worthy. Regional development banks and, to a lesser extent, subregional devel-
opment banks (SRDBs) also have soft loan windows available to their poorest
member countries. These include low-interest long-term concessional loans with
an extended grace period for public sector investment projects and programs, for
sectoral and structural policy reforms, for emergencies and postconflict recon-
struction, and for budget support through a common pool of resources.
The World Bank disbursed an annual average of U.S.$17.7 billion during the
period 2000–03, of which regular International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) loans accounted for 66 percent and International Develop-
ment Association (IDA) soft credits for 34 percent.6 As shown in table 3-3, RDBs
disbursed almost U.S.$19 billion and SRDBs more than U.S.$12 billion in the
same period. Although the figures may vary because data from some SRDBs and
MDB-like funds are reported in different currencies, it seems clear that regional
and subregional institutions have been mobilizing large amounts of resources,
surpassing those from the World Bank in several cases. The figures in table 3-3
corroborate this in the case of net flows, especially in the Latin American region.7
Table 3-4 indicates the relative importance of various types of financing instru-
ments in each institution. The emphasis placed on certain types of operations by
6. During this time, the World Bank committed U.S.$17.3 billion. The level of financing grew
in 2004 to U.S.$20.1 billion, mainly as a result of the increase of IDA commitments to nearly
U.S.$10 billion, up from an annual average of U.S.$7.3 billion in the period 2000–03.
7. The data would need to be standardized in order also to compare net flows from SRDBs,
which are poorly reflected in most statistical databases. For example, the World Bank’s Global
Development Finance does not include these flows. On the other hand, the OECD Creditor
Reporting System includes some information about the CDB and IFAD and aggregate informa-
tion on the Arab Funds (AFESD; the Kuwait, Saudi, and Abu Dhabi Funds, ABEDA; the OPEC
Fund, and IsDB). It indicates that the CDB disbursed U.S.$0.55 billion in the period 2000–02
and had U.S.$0.42 billion in net flows; that IFAD disbursed U.S.$0.84 billion in the same period
and had U.S.$0.46 billion in net flows; and that the Arab Funds disbursed U.S.$0.89 billion and
had U.S.$0.32 billion in net flows. (For the full names of organizations abbreviated in this note,
see table 3-1.)
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regional and subregional institutions reflects the diversity of financial needs. Insti-
tutions serving the African region are more focused on concessional loans and
grants, for example. The AfDB and ABEDA have a higher proportion of these
instruments than institutions operating in Central Asia and Europe, which are
more focused on private sector activities. These differences between RDBs also
apply at the subregional level. For example, the Caribbean Development Bank
(CDB) operates in some of the poorest Caribbean countries and has a larger pro-
portion of concessional lending than the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration (CABEI), which has a clear mandate to improve intraregional trade
(this is reflected in its higher proportion of trade finance and infrastructure opera-
tions). The ADC (Andean Development Corporation) and FONPLATA (Fondo
Financiero para el Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata; in English, Financial Fund
for Development of the Plata River Basin), operating mainly in middle-income
countries, have specialized in other types of operations, such as infrastructure
projects for regional integration and for improving competitiveness. These activi-
ties are in line with the general idea behind the creation of regional and sub-
regional institutions: they play specific and localized roles, which are not always
covered adequately by global or even by regional institutions.8
Some characteristics of the RDBs and SRDBs merit highlighting. First, the
level of resource mobilization does not clearly differentiate RDBs from SRDBs.
Some subregional institutions such as the Andean Development Corporation
and the European Investment Bank (EIB) have disbursed more resources than
regional institutions, and their close relations with international capital markets
allow them to tap financial markets with relative ease. Although very few of its
sovereign shareholders have an investment-grade rating for their debt, the ADC
has been a preferred borrower in international markets, raising U.S.$1.3 billion
in 2003 and U.S.$3.2 billion in 2002. It has an investment-grade rating of
A/A2 by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, and the entrance of Spain as a share-
holder, together with the fact that nonaccruing loans were less than 0.2 percent
of its loan portfolio, have helped to secure this favorable rating. The EIB pro-
vides resources to developing, transition, and developed countries, although
during the period 2000–02 its operations in developing countries accounted for
only 19 percent of its total operations, which averaged U.S.$24.5 billion.
8. During the mid-1950s and the 1960s, the World Bank financed mainly infrastructure proj-
ects (75 percent of its total portfolio). The creation of the first RDB, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, in 1959, can be seen partly as a reaction by Latin American countries to World Bank
lending policies that gave little attention to the social and agriculture sectors (which represented
only 3 percent of the World Bank’s portfolio). In the first ten years of IDB operations, these sectors
received almost 50 percent of total IDB disbursements (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, 1997).
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Another special feature of some MDBs, closely related to their participation in
private sector projects, is their capacity to cofinance projects by mobilizing funds
from bilateral agencies, other multilateral institutions, or the private sector. Again,
the heterogeneity of the available financial information is notable, although the
figures provided by the RDBs are slightly more reliable. For example, the IDB
and the AsDB committed U.S.$1.87 and U.S.$2.19 billion per year, respectively,
to private sector projects during the period 2000–03, and they have leveraged
about 35 percent and 48 percent, respectively, in additional resources. The
EBRD, with private sector loans averaging U.S.$3.2 billion per year, mobilized
U.S.$5.82 billion from various sources during the period 1999–2003. The
instruments used to achieve this are quite diverse and include syndicated loans,
grants, and concessional loans from other multilateral sources, guarantees, and pri-
vate sector contributions. Guarantees appear to be the next step toward enhancing
the capacity of regional institutions to leverage additional financing,9 mainly
from private sources and possibly focusing on infrastructure projects. The total
number of guarantee operations during the period 2001–03 by the IBRD, the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), the Islamic Development
Bank (IsDB), the IDB, and the AsDB was 124, of which fifty-two were infra-
structure projects. The value of the guarantees was U.S.$4.9 billion, with infra-
structure projects accounting for U.S.$2.8 billion.10
Participation in equity is another way to leverage resources and enhance the
impact of regional institutions. In these operations, the MDBs risk a small amount
of their own capital and buy shares in specific companies (equity investment) or in
financial institutions. For example, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
generally subscribes to between 5 percent and 20 percent of a project’s equity, but
never more than 35 percent, and it is never the single largest shareholder in a proj-
ect. The AsDB will only risk 25 percent of a project’s cost or U.S.$50 million for
each project, whichever is less (equivalent to less than 0.22 percent of AsDB paid-
in capital and reserves in 2003); the EBRD only the lesser of 35 percent of the
long-term capital of the obligor or 5 percent of EBRD paid-in capital and reserves
(equivalent to about U.S.$225 million for each project); and the IDB only the
lesser of 25 percent of project cost (or 40 percent for small countries) or U.S.$75 mil-
lion (equivalent to 0.38 percent of IDB paid-in capital and reserves in 2003).
When it comes time to withdraw from the project, these institutions divest their
holdings by selling shares in the capital markets through a public offering.
9. These activities mainly involve RDBs, though it is worth noting that the Andean Develop-
ment Corporation is one of the most active subregional users of guarantees.
10. Raymond (2004).
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Portfolios and Specializations of the Regional Development Banks11
The sectoral composition of the MDBs’ portfolio and its evolution over time is a
good indicator of the degree of institutional specialization. As the MDBs have
grown and matured, they have become involved in more complex development
sectors and projects in which the participation of the private sector or other finan-
cial institutions is less probable. The MDBs have better mechanisms for managing
risks, and they have accumulated experience in these relatively more difficult and
uncertain operations. This evolution has coincided with a progressively higher
involvement of the largest banks in the “soft” areas of development—education,
health, institutional reform, technical cooperation, microfinance, and others—
and with a reduction in the size of their investments in infrastructure and produc-
tive sector projects, which are less complex in terms of financial arrangements,
risk, and estimation of returns.12
Figure 3-1 shows the evolution of the regional development banks in this
regard. The RDBs have expanded their operations in all sectors over the past
three decades—with the sole exception of the IDB Fund for Special Operations.
The sector involvement of the RDBs has followed two main patterns. First,
increasing importance has been accorded to the social sectors, mainly related to
public financial support for social development and governance reforms during
the 1990s and early 2000s. Second, there has been a progressive reduction of
their involvement in the productive sectors and a corresponding increase in
financing for other types of activities, including financing for the private sector,
regional public goods, debt relief, support to nongovernmental organizations
11. The data in this section come from the OECD Creditor Reporting System, which has
complete information from 1971 to 2002. Data for “the 2000s” therefore refer to the period from
2000 to 2002.
12. For example, the IBRD went from devoting 95 percent of its portfolio to infrastructure
during the 1950s and 1960s to devoting 42 percent to the infrastructure and productive sectors
and 10 percent to the social sectors during the 1970s. During the 1980s, social sector allocations
rose to 18 percent, while the infrastructure and the productive sector remained at 35 percent,
and structural adjustment (support for public finances and balance of payments) grew rapidly to
9 percent of the total portfolio. During the 1990s and in the period 2000–02, support for the
productive sectors fell to only 5 percent, while funding for infrastructure, social sectors, and sec-
tor adjustment reached 35 percent, 30 percent, and 20 percent, respectively. The IDA, too, has
moved from strong support for the productive sector (more than 45 percent) and infrastructure
(25 percent) during the 1970s and 1980s to greater involvement in the social sectors during the
1990s and since the start of the new millennium (40 percent), allocating less than 10 percent to
the productive sector, 20 percent to infrastructure, and 10 percent to structural adjustment
operations.
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(NGOs), and the development of capital markets. However, each bank has had
a different pattern of expansion, for both the regular and concessional windows.
The share of social sector operations has expanded rapidly in most RDBs,
with the sole exception of the African Development Bank.13 Investment in social
sector projects in areas such as health, education, and housing; social invest-
ment; and protection and rehabilitation after natural disasters has accounted for
most of the social sector portfolio expansion of RDBs. These activities accounted
for U.S.$1.1 billion per year on average during the 1970s and 1980s, but rose to
U.S.$3.1 billion during the 1990s and 2000s. However, part of this growth is
explained by the involvement of RDBs in state reform, social policies, and eco-
nomic reforms, which also include large programs of public sector adjust-
ment, budget support, and pension reforms.14 These activities accounted for
U.S.$1.5 billion per year on average during the 1990s and in the early years of
the 2000s. In contrast, investment in this field was almost nil during the 1970s
and the 1980s.15
RDB support for the productive sector as a percentage of the total RDB
portfolio diminished during the 1990s and early 2000s from its 1970–80 levels.
This took place as the public sector in many developing countries progressively
reduced its direct participation in these activities through state-owned enter-
prises. Figure 3-1 shows that the sharpest reductions occurred at the AsDB
(from 35 percent of the total portfolio on average during the 1970s and 1980s to
8 percent in the following decades) and at the IDB (from 32 percent to 9 percent
in the same period).
However, this reduction of support for the productive sector through state-
owned financial intermediaries has been compensated for to a certain extent by
the introduction of new financial instruments that directly support private sec-
tor investments. These include operations with private banks and the develop-
ment of domestic capital markets, which fall under the category of “financial
infrastructure,” according to the OECD classification scheme. This category
comprises support for financial restructuring, financial intermediation, apex
13. This is explained mainly by the reduction of AfDB support for major water supply projects
in Algeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Morocco, and Nigeria, which started during the
1980s and mid-1990s with the construction of dams, canals, and water facilities. The projects in
these four countries represented 52 percent of total investment in the social sectors (U.S.$1.3 bil-
lion) during this period.
14. According to OECD statistics, most of the financial support for institutional reform is clas-
sified as social sector investment; “government and civil society,” one of the highest-growth areas
during the 1990s and early 2000s, is included here.
15. The AfDF added U.S.$0.86 billion for these types of programs during the period
1990–2002, the AsDB and the AsDF U.S.$3.1 billion each, and the IDB group U.S.$12.1 billion.
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funds for the formal and informal sectors, and capacity building for the man-
agement of new financial instruments, among other activities.16
Financial infrastructure operations have rapidly become a major component of
RDB portfolios and are especially important at the AsDB (U.S.$7.2 billion, or
13.1 percent of the total portfolio during the period 1990–2002). However, these
activities have been highly concentrated; for example, the U.S.$3.6 billion com-
mitted to the financial sector program in 1997 was largely directed to the Repub-
lic of Korea in the wake of the Asian crisis. In the case of the AfDB, financial
market support represented 4.4 percent of the total portfolio during the period
1990–2002 (U.S.$1.4 billion), while at the IDB this figure was 3.3 percent
(U.S.$2.3 billion). The AfDB concentrated its operations in Egypt, Morocco,
South Africa, and Tunisia (U.S.$1.1 billion), while the IDB focused on Argentina
and Mexico (U.S.$1.6 billion).
Along with financial sector and capital market support, the RDBs entered into
new development financing fields during the 1990s. One of the most important
has been the provision of regional public goods, especially those related to regional
transport, energy and communication infrastructure, and environmental pro-
grams. Using a methodology devised by Te Velde, Morrissey, and Hewitt, and
employing OECD data, Ferroni has estimated that RDB commitments to inter-
national public goods (IPGs) amounted to at least one-third of total multilateral
IPG funding during the 1990s in all regions.17 This would mean that the IDB
invested almost U.S.$2.2 billion, or 3.9 percent of its total portfolio, during the
1990s; the AsDB about U.S.$3.8 billion, or 8.2 percent; and the AfDB group
nearly U.S.$1.6 billion, or 8.8 percent of its loans in this period. Initiatives such as
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the Initiative for the
Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America, and the Plan Puebla-
Panama will certainly increase this proportion, and this will probably be a field for
RDB expansion in the future.
Regular and Concessional Windows: Graduation Policies
Because of the nature of the eligibility criteria applied by development banks,
over time there has been a high level of correlation between the use of regular or
16. For example, the IsDB played a key role in supporting the banking industry and in devel-
oping capital markets in the Islamic countries during the 1990s. This was accomplished through
entities such as the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
(AAOIFI), the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), the Islamic Financial Services Board
(IFSB), the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), the Liquidity Management Center
(LMC), and the General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (GCIBFI).
17. See Ferroni (2002); for the methodology, see Te Velde, Morrissey, and Hewitt (2002).
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concessional loans and the per capita income levels of RDB borrowers. As a coun-
try increases its income level, it eventually “graduates” from concessional to regu-
lar loans. Table 3-5 presents the annual average disbursed to countries according
their income category.18 It can be seen that the AfDB disbursed U.S.$105.5 mil-
lion on average to each middle-income country borrower during the early 2000s,
but only U.S.$29.9 million to low-income ones, while the African Development
Fund (AfDF) disbursed U.S.$30.3 million to low-income countries and had no
operations in middle-income countries. The IDB and its (concessional) Fund for
Special Operations followed the same pattern. In the case of the AsDB group,
both the regular and soft loan windows disbursed more resources to low-income
countries. This pattern can be explained by the presence of large low-income bor-
Table 3-5. RDB Resource Allocation by Income Level a
Annual average per country in each income category, in millions of U.S. dollars
Donor Income groupb 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
AfDB Low 4.8 16.5 18.9 29.9
Middle 2.5 50.2 75.4 105.5
AfDF Low 3.5 17.8 14.5 30.3
Middle 3.0 5.7 3.4 0
AsDB Low 25.8 181.1 564.3 447.9
Middle 24.8 136.9 89.7 46.0
AsDF Low 28.9 76.8 48.0 69.3
Middle 10.5 29.9 22.3 27.5
IDB Low 19.8 13.1 30.1 40.5
Middle 53.0 138.6 242.6 296.8
IDB Special Fund (FSO) Low 29.7 14.7 48.6 130.6
Middle 24.5 31.3 21.5 65.4
a. The amount indicated is the annual average received by countries in each income category. Being an
average, the figure therefore also reflects the number of countries that received resources from each window.
b. The OECD income classification may differ from the classification criteria applied by each institution.
The categories correspond to the OECD classification, where “Low” comprises LDCs (least-developed
countries) and OLICs (other low-income countries); and “Medium” comprises LMICs (lower-middle-
income countries) and UMICs (upper-middle-income countries).
18. The number of borrowing members has been variable owing to an increase in member
countries and to their “graduation” or prioritization. For example, the AfDB lent to forty-five
countries during the 1970s and 1980s, but to only thirteen countries during the 1990s and early
2000s, and the IDB Fund for Special Operations reduced the scale of its operations from twenty-
one countries in the 1970s to only eight countries during the 1990s. The AsDB introduced new
graduation policies during the 1990s.
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rowers such as China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam, which receive
loans from both the regular and the concessional windows.
These findings are consistent with the graduation policies established by each
institution. The AfDB group has a three-tier classification system to determine
eligibility for each window, which is compatible with the World Bank’s classifi-
cation system (based on income category and debt sustainability). Under these
criteria, thirteen African countries were eligible to borrow only from the regular
(AfDB) window at the end of 2002, two members were eligible to borrow from
both the regular and the concessional (AfDF) windows, and thirty-eight mem-
bers were eligible to borrow only from the AfDF.
The AsDB changed its graduation policies in 1997 and now applies a two-
stage process, classifying the countries first by income category and then assess-
ing their debt repayment capacity. This is done using indicators such as debt
sustainability, private capital inflows, gross domestic saving rate, country size,
categorization as an HIPC, volatility of export growth, main external financing
sources, access to IDA credits, and whether sovereign borrowing by the country
is rated by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.19
The IDB has a four-tier country classification system (A, B, C, or D) to deter-
mine the eligibility of its members for assistance from its three windows: the Fund
for Special Operations (FSO), which provides concessional loans; the Intermediate
Financing Facility (IFF), whose lending terms are between those of the regular and
concessional windows; and ordinary capital (OC), which provides regular loans.20
The poorest borrowing countries (Group D) are the only ones with access to soft
loans from the FSO, although they may also be eligible for loans from the ordi-
nary capital or regular window. The IDB management decides whether to extend
regular loans to FSO-eligible countries on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
creditworthiness considerations. Countries in Groups C and D are eligible to
19. AsDB has a four-tier country classification: Group A receives concessional resources from the
AsDF only; Group B1 from the AsDF, with limited amounts of ordinary capital resources (the regu-
lar or AsDB window); Group B2 from the AsDB, with limited amounts of AsDF resources; and
Group C from the regular or ordinary capital resources of the AsDB. In 2003, cost-sharing limits for
project loans were 80 percent for Group A, 75 percent for Group B1, 70 percent for Group B2, and
65 percent for Group C. Government contributions to technical assistance must be at least 15 percent
of total costs for A countries, 20 percent for B1 and B2 countries, and 30 percent for C countries.
20. The four-tier category is based on the size of a nation’s economy. The IDB finances a per-
centage of the total costs of a project according to the following classification: For group A countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), the IDB finances only 
60 percent of the project; for group B (Chile, Colombia, and Peru), 70 percent; for group C
(Bahamas, Barbados, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay),
80 percent; and for group D (Belize, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay), 90 percent.
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borrow from the IFF, with priority given to countries that are not eligible for
FSO resources. Groups A and B can borrow only from ordinary capital or regu-
lar resources.21
The EBRD has different criteria for graduation and eligibility, since it does
not have a concessional window. This policy derives from the EBRD’s charter
mandate of advancing transition toward market-oriented economies. The EBRD
concept of graduation rests on three principles: (1) transition impact, defined as
the effect of a project on the economy or society; (2) additionality, defined as the
effect of the EBRD’s catalyzing additional resources; and (3) sound banking—
that is, assurance that the bank’s investment is secure. These principles are used
to define a phased graduation approach across market segments within a country.
As a country advances, it will have fewer and fewer segments in which the princi-
ples of transition and additionality are met. Eventually, the country will graduate
from EBRD operations entirely and secure access to international capital markets
and other private sources of financing.
There are important differences between the RDBs in terms of sector alloca-
tions and income categories (see table 3-6). For example, while the regular win-
dow of the AfDB allocated 36 percent of its total portfolio to infrastructure in
middle-income countries during the period 2000–02, the soft loan window allo-
cated a similar amount to the social sectors in low-income countries. At the IDB,
both the regular and soft loan windows allocated almost 57 percent of their total
portfolios to the social sectors. The AsDB seems to be the most pro-poor of the
regional development banks: on average, 87 percent of its total operations,
including both regular and concessional windows, are oriented toward low-
income countries (primarily China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Vietnam).
The AsDB allocates 52 percent of its total portfolio to infrastructure projects in
low-income economies, while the AsDF utilizes 55 percent of its total portfolio
for social sector and infrastructure projects in low-income countries.
Financial Standing of the Regional Development Banks
As indicated earlier, MDBs obtain funds for their regular loan windows from bor-
rowings in the international capital markets and for their concessional loans from
contributions by donors through periodic replenishments, which are comple-
mented by resources from their net income. As a result of their preferred-creditor
21. In 1999 the IDB introduced a more rigorous method of determining eligibility. The
grouping divides countries in Groups I and II, based on their GNP per capita in 1997. On the
basis of their lower per capita income, the bank aims to channel 35 percent of its lending volume
to Group II countries and the rest to Group I countries.
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status in relation to private lenders and their low gearing ratios in comparison
with those of private financial institutions, the MDBs enjoy a high standing in the
eyes of bond rating agencies, and this allows them to raise funds on favorable
terms in international capital markets for their regular windows. Donor confi-
dence in the effectiveness of MDB operations allows them periodically to raise
nonreimbursable contributions from donor countries to continue operating their
concessional loan windows, which constitute a large grant component.
Providing loans and a variety of financial and nonfinancial services to member
countries requires a combination of market trust, strong donor commitment,
and a high degree of institutional credibility. The evolution of MDB flows to
developing countries, the introduction of more complex financial instruments,
and the participation of these institutions in new development activities has only
been possible because of their sound financial standing, and preserving the finan-
cial integrity of MDBs is an essential condition for their continued existence.
Table 3-7 presents a number of indicators that make it possible to compare the
financial and administrative situations of the regional banks and the World Bank
for 2002. Three issues are worth highlighting. First is the relationship between
the size of the banks and their net income, administrative costs, staff, and the
countries they serve. The AfDB is the smallest of the regional banks in terms of
these indicators, even though it lends to fifty-three countries. In contrast, the
IDB lends to twenty-six countries, but its total disbursements are about five times
higher than those of the AfDB. The principal reason for this difference is that
thirty-eight African countries, which are among the poorest and most severely
indebted in the world, are eligible for concessional lending provided by the AfDF.
Second, in terms of average project size—calculated by dividing total commit-
ments by the total number of projects approved—there is a significant divergence
between the AfDB and the other banks. While the average project sizes for the
AsDB, the World Bank, and the IDB are U.S.$79.94 million, U.S.$77.14 mil-
lion, and U.S.$53 million, respectively, the AfDB average project size was only
U.S.$23.5 million. This may be partly explained by the fact that the World Bank,
the IDB, and the AsDB provide rather large loans to countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, China, and India.
Third, there are different degrees of decentralization among the MDBs. The
AsDB is the most centralized of the banks, with only fifty-six members of its
staff (15 percent) in country or regional offices. In contrast, the World Bank, as
part of its Strategic Compact, has undertaken a major expansion of field-based
activities. As of June 2003, it had approximately 3,000 staff (34 percent of its
total staff) working in over 100 country offices. The IDB had 543 (28 percent)
in its country offices, out of a total staff of 1,912.
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A key aspect in the comparison of MDBs is the relationship between capital,
equity, and level of disbursements, which is an important indicator of the finan-
cial strength of multilateral development banks. Discussions about MDB capital
adequacy have emphasized the very conservative “one-to-one gearing ratio,”
according to which the outstanding loans of MDBs cannot exceed their total capi-
tal (which includes paid-in and callable capital, as well as reserves). They have also
focused on the “risk-bearing capital ratio” (RBCR), which is considered a more
adequate measure of financial strength. All MDBs have a ratio lower than 4,
about half the average for the private sector (table 3-8), which indicates that the
MDBs are managed quite prudently from a financial point of view. Another
Table 3-7. MDBs: Financial and Administrative Indicators, 2002a
Billions of U.S. dollars unless otherwise indicated
World 
Bank Af DB IDB AsDB EBRD
Financial indicators
Authorized capital 189.57 29.24 100.95 47.29 22.49
Callable 178.09 26.34 96.61 43.90 16.58
Paid-in 11.48 2.90 4.34 3.25 5.91
Total commitments 18.51 2.77 4.55 5.68 4.43
Commitments from 
concessional window 7.28 1.31 0.41 1.63 . . .
Total disbursements 18.94 1.42 5.84 4.20 2.73
Disbursements from 
concessional window 2.80 0.74 0.31 1.14 . . .
Net income 5.34 0.31 0.71 0.98 0.54
Administrative indicators
Administrative expenditure 1.04 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.18
Average size of projects 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.04
Total staff 8,800 1,259 1,912 2,220 907
Number of regional/
country offices 100 6 28 25 27
Number of staff in 
regional offices 3,000 56 543 321 237
Number of countries eligible
for borrowing 142 53 26 35 27
Number of nonborrowing 
member countries 39 24 20 28 33
Source: Data for the World Bank were obtained from the Annual Report 2003; for the rest of the
MDBs, data were obtained from 2002 annual reports.
a. Exchange rates for 2002: 1 unit of account = U.S.$1.35952; 1 U.S.$ = 0.88 euro.
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Table 3-8. Risk-Bearing Capital Ratio (RBCR) of the MDBs a
Millions of U.S. dollars, except where noted
Loans 
Multilateral outstanding Retained RBCR RBCR
development banks net of LLP Paid-in earnings 2003 2000
World Bank group 111,762 11,748 27,031 2.88 3.82
Regional development banks
Inter-American Development 50,471 4,340 9,622 3.61 4.10
Bank Group
African Development 7,642 3,239 2,271 1.39 2.01
Bank Group
Asian Development Bank 25,398 3,657 9,025 2.00 2.38
Group




European Investment Bankb 247,600 7,500 13,641 11.74 10.97
Central American Bank for 2,483 371 759 2.20 2.36
Economic Integration
Caribbean Development Bank 512 155 257 1.24 1.09
Andean Development 6,387 1,319 887 2.90 2.91
Corporation
Nordic Investment Bankb 10,552 404 1,235 6.44 n.a
Islamic Development Bank 990 3,942 1,685 0.18 n.a
Group
East African Development 103 37 10 2.20 n.a
Bank
Arab Bank for Economic 560 1,500 131 0.34 n.a
Development in Africa
North American 14 405 16 0.03 0.02
Development Bank
Other MDB-like funds
Nordic Development Fundb 387 573 42 0.63 n.a
Arab Fund for Economic and 5,402 2,188 4,884 0.76 0.68
Social Development
FONPLATA 221 46 325 0.60 0.59
Source: Financial statements of the institutions.
n.a. Not available.
a. Ratio between loans outstanding net of loan loss provisions (LLP) and the sum of paid-in plus
retained earnings at the end of the fiscal year.
b. In millions of euros.
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indicator used by rating agencies is the ratio of equity capital plus callable capital
from AAA or AA shareholders divided by total risk assets (defined as loans to
borrowing countries with ratings below investment grade).22 As a consequence of
their conservative financial practices, most MDBs, and particularly the World
Bank, have consistently obtained the highest rating for their bond issues.23
A rather low risk-bearing capital ratio could indicate in some cases that the
institution has not fully used its capacity to lend. Subregional banks such as the
NADB (North American Development Bank), which have recently initiated
their operations, have done so mainly with preinvestment grants and small pilot
projects. FONPLATA has increased its level of lending for transport infrastruc-
ture during the 1990s, though its level of reserves could allow it to play a larger
role in the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South
America (Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Surameri-
cana, IIRSA) during the coming years. However, there are some banks operating
in the Arab region and with Islamic countries that have had large levels of reserves
and paid-in capital for some time, but have not significantly increased their lend-
ing levels. For example, the IsDB has levels of reserves and paid-in capital compa-
rable to those of the AfDB, but its outstanding loans are only one-eighth of those
of the latter. This could be a consequence of the limited absorptive capacity of its
borrowing members, but also suggests that the IsDB has the potential to signifi-
cantly expand operations in the future, possibly introducing new financial mech-
anisms or even initiating operations in other countries and regions. This could
also be the situation of the EBRD, whose high level of paid-in capital allows it to
have a highly favorable risk-bearing capital ratio and, from a purely financial per-
spective, would enable it to increase its lending operations significantly.24
22. This ratio should be maintained above 100 percent to be considered adequate. Current
practice requires that reserves be increased when borrowing by a member might put the institution
at risk of moving into nonaccrual status, which would imply increasing the share of net income
allocated to reserves.
23. In contrast, the AfDB experienced severe financial difficulties and undertook a major reor-
ganization during the second half of the 1990s. Total loan and grant approvals came to a peak in
1991, at U.S.$3.45 billion, and after that, the fund ran dry. In August 1995, Standard & Poor’s
lowered the bank’s credit rating from AAA to AA+, because of the “increasing politicization” of the
bank’s corporate governance and management. The downgrade made it more expensive for the
bank to borrow money on international markets. After a long period of institutional reforms, dur-
ing which it was pledged U.S.$2.6 billion in a seventh replenishment and U.S.$3.4 billion in an
eighth replenishment, the AfDB’s credit rating was upgraded by S&P to AAA on July 25, 2003.
24. The EBRD’s president, Jean Lemierre, indicated in its 2003 Annual Report that the bank
is in a transition period. During the next few years, the EBRD will take more risks and will enter
into new areas, such as helping to reduce intraregional disparities in borrowing countries, provid-
ing more support to small and medium-sized enterprises and making more aggressive use of risk
mitigation instruments.
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Other MDBs operate more like private sector institutions and are backed up by
strong donors. This is the case of the EIB, which has allocated 85 percent of its
portfolio to the private sector and directs a large proportion of its loans to devel-
oped countries. As a result of this special situation, it has the highest risk-bearing
capital ratio of all the MDBs. Similarly, the NIB lends a significant part of its port-
folio to private companies from Nordic countries (nearly 80 percent) to promote
foreign direct investment, not only in developing countries, but also in Europe.
Loan Conditions and Costs
The World Bank regularly compares the average costs of RDB operations, using
their spreads over LIBOR-based (London interbank offered rate) sovereign
loans (see table 3-9). In general, the AsDB offers the most favorable terms for
developing countries (around 35 basis points), which is consistent with the fact
that it has the lowest institutional administrative costs and the highest average
project size (see table 3-7). Nevertheless, all MDBs have rather low spreads,
with the exception of the EBRD, which charges the highest rate and does not
grant waivers or interest rate reductions as the other MDBs do. Although the
AfDB has the least favorable financial indicators among the RDBs, its spread
(56 basis points) is on the low side.
RDB concessional loans are provided on quite favorable terms. IDB/FSO
loans have a twenty-five- to forty-year maturity and a five- to ten-year grace
period, with an average annual rate of interest below 2 percent. AsDF loans
have a thirty-two-year maturity (or twenty-four-year maturity in the case of fast-
disbursing program loans) and an eight-year grace period, with 1 percent inter-
est charge during the grace period and 1.5 percent during the amortization
period. The AfDF lends at a zero interest rate, with a service charge of 0.75 per-
cent per annum, a commitment fee of 0.50 percent, and a fifty-year repayment
period, including a ten-year grace period.
The relatively better conditions granted by the AfDB are explained by chang-
ing conditions in the replenishment processes of the last decade, which have
taken place on a three-year basis. Partly encouraged by the better financial
results of the AfDB Group, donor countries are pledging more resources to the
poorest countries in Africa through the bank’s soft loan window. The last three
replenishments—AfDF VII (1996–99), AfDF VIII (1999–2002), and AfDF IX
(2002–05)—have spanned the crisis years of the bank and also its years of major
reform and renewal. However, this reform did not quickly translate into
larger replenishments of the AfDF. In fact, the fund experienced a dramatic
decline of over 45 percent during the period 1996–98 and has not yet ret-
urned to the level achieved in 1991–93. The real value (in 2002 U.S. dollars)
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Table 3-9. Comparative Sovereign MDB Loan Charges
LIBOR-based U.S. dollar loans as of June 30, 2004 (basis points)a
IBRD
VSLsb FSLsc IDB Af DB AsDB EBRD
Interest spread
Contractual spread 75 75 30d 50 60d 100
Risk premium . . . 5 50e . . . . . . . . .
Benefit of sub-LIBORf funding cost −31 −30 −34 −15 −35 . . .
Waivers −25 −25 . . . . . . −20g . . .
Net spread over LIBOR (I) 19 25 46 35 5 100
Charges
Commitment charge 75 85h 25 75 75i 50
Waiver −50 −50 . . . −50 . . . . . .
Net commitment fee 25 35 25 25 75 50
Spread equivalent of 17 22 17 17 30 34
commitment feej (II)
Front-end fee
Contractual front-end fee 100 100 0 0k 100 100
Waiver . . . . . . . . . . . . −100 . . .
Net front-end fee 100 100 0 0 0 100
Spread equivalent of 20 20 0 0 0 20
front-end feej (III)
Total spread equivalent 56 67 63 52 35 154
over LIBOR (I + II + III)
Source: World Bank.
. . . Negligible.
a. Numbers may not add to totals because of rounding.
b. Variable spread loan.
c. Fixed spread loan.
d. This is a variable spread.
e. Represents premium for interest rate cap.
f. The IBRD average cost margin (sub-LIBOR spread) shown is for VSL rate settings from January 15,
2004, through July 14, 2004. Sub-LIBOR spreads for IDB and AfDB shown are the current sub-LIBOR
spreads for the U.S. dollar. The sub-LIBOR spread for ADB represents rebate for the first six months of 2004.
g. ADB will waive 20 basic points on its public sector loans outstanding from July 1, 2004 through
June 30, 2005.
h. For the first four years, an additional commitment charge risk premium of 10 basis points is
charged on the undisbursed amount over and above the contractual commitment charge.
i. The commitment charge is applicable to the following proportion of the loan amount, less the
cumulative disbursements: 15 percent in the first year, 45 percent in the second year, 85 percent in the
third year, and 100 percent in the fourth year and beyond.
j. Spread equivalent computations for commitment charge and front-end fee use an evenly distributed dis-
bursement profile of eight years. Repayment terms used are as follows: final maturity: seventeen years; grace
period: five years; level repayment of principal. Disbursement profiles and payment terms vary across MDBs
and hence spread equivalent charges would vary based on the disbursement profile and payment terms used.
k. In February 2001, the AfDB Board passed a resolution authorizing the bank’s management to
impose a front-end fee of up to 50 basis points if the financial condition of the bank warrants it.
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of AfDF VI (1991–93) is estimated at U.S.$1.95 billion and that of AfDF IX
at U.S.$1.91 billion. The AsDF IX replenishment will cover the period 2005
to 2008; the twenty-eight members of the AsDB have pledged their contribu-
tions and reached agreement on a U.S.$7 billion replenishment.
Following guidelines established in 1995 at the time of the negotiations for
the eighth general capital increase of the IDB, the last replenishment of its con-
cessional window, the Fund for Special Operations, was agreed in December
1998. Board members managed to strike an elaborate set of compromises that
were closely related to the negotiations on how to fund IDB participation in the
HIPC Initiative. These agreements stipulated, among other things, that nonbor-
rowing countries would make additional contributions to cover the cost of IDB
participation and to fund the U.S.$136 million for the FSO agreed at the time of
the eighth general capital increase. It was also agreed that resources from the
bank’s net income would not be used to pay for its participation in HIPC and
that any shortfall in nonborrowing country contributions to the FSO would be
covered by periodic transfers from IDB net income up to the end of 2004. There
are no plans for future replenishments of the FSO, since only five countries qual-
ify for operations from this window.
The Political Economy of Multilateral Development Banks
In general, RDBs and SRDBs are very heterogeneous, not only in the countries
and regions they serve, but in allocations and financial instruments, size and
financial strength, specialization, selectivity, costs charged to their borrowers, and
strategies for leveraging resources, among other characteristics. The complexity
and heterogeneity of these institutions is related to the interaction between their
stakeholders and constituencies and their relative power—what may be called the
“political economy” of the RDBs. The arena where, in the final analysis, key
political economy issues are settled is the management of net income, in which
the banks determine how their net income (what would be called profits in pri-
vate financial institutions) will be allocated among competing uses: bolstering
reserves, providing grants, and reducing the cost of borrowing, according to the
outcomes of the interaction processes between their diverse stakeholders and
constituencies, especially their sovereign shareholders.
Changing Constituencies and Multiplicity of MDB Stakeholders
At any given time, MDBs are subject to a multiplicity of competing pressures
that shape their behavior and performance. These institutions are a natural
point of convergence for demands from many different actors whose preferences
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and interactions help define the characteristics, orientation, and personality of
each MDB. Moreover, these actors and their power relations change over time as
some old ones fade out and new ones emerge and as their agendas and demands
shift and evolve.
MDBs are owned by their government shareholders and have to respond to
their political agendas and expressed preferences. Shareholder perceptions are
influenced by a variety of domestic constituencies, particularly in the developed
member countries, where many groups have the capacity to exert pressure on
their government representatives to the MDB boards and, in some cases, directly
influence senior management at these institutions. In regional and subregional
MDBs, relations between shareholders and their constituencies are less complex
than in the World Bank, which must contend with the greater heterogeneity of
the international community at the global level. Regional and subregional orga-
nizations should be able, at least in principle, to do a better job of accommo-
dating the interests of smaller countries, give them more participation in
decisionmaking, and allow them to enjoy a greater sense of ownership.
Other development financing institutions, including the World Bank, other
MDBs, and bilateral agencies, heavily influence the operations of RDBs. This
takes place in the field and in specific sectors, where these institutions often
have different approaches to development issues and where pressures to improve
development effectiveness and coordination are increasing. Joint projects, co-
financing, technical cooperation between MDBs, and cross financing are other
expressions of the complex relations between these institutions.25
Financial market investors seek an appropriate balance between risk and
return. Those that purchase MDB bonds accept relatively lower returns because
of the very low risk of default on these bonds. The financial strength of MDBs,
their preferred-creditor status, and the support of nonborrowing shareholders
allow them to enjoy a most favorable treatment from bond rating agencies. They
compete with private corporations, sovereign borrowers, and other financial
institutions to attract capital, but in general have a privileged position as bond
issuers in international capital markets. At the same time, joint operations with
private firms and corporations are a growing segment of many MDB portfolios,
which allows them to cofinance projects and to leverage and channel additional
resources to their member countries. These complex competition-collaboration
interactions impose new demands on the MDBs and require efforts to harmo-
nize the diverse interests of capital market investors and other stakeholders.
25. For example, the IDB often has provided funds to subregional institutions. CABEI, ADC,
and FONPLATA are among the institutions eligible for IDB loans.
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Other constituencies whose influence over the MDBs has been growing
include academic institutions, which continuously generate new approaches to
development issues and have placed many issues on the agenda of the MDBs,
including the provision of global public goods, gender considerations, environ-
mental concerns, and human rights, among others; socially and environmentally
concerned private sector firms, many of which are interested in forging partner-
ships with MDBs; and private foundations, trade associations, and professional
bodies that focus on issues such as social capital formation, environmental stew-
ardship, community development, and corporate social responsibility.
In a growing number of situations, MDBs are being challenged to accommo-
date an increasingly wide variety of diverging and often conflicting interests,
particularly those of NGOs and other advocacy groups. MDBs have opened
numerous avenues of consultation with these organizations and have attempted
to respond to their views and concerns. However, several single-issue NGOs
remain implacably confrontational, escalating demands at the slightest signal
that their initial concerns may be addressed. The absence of clear rules and pro-
cedures to ensure the public accountability of NGOs makes it especially difficult
to find common ground between such groups and other MDB stakeholders.
Nevertheless, a number of MDB-NGO committees set up during the 1990s
have collaborated to address some of the shortcomings of the banks’ operations,
particularly in areas that have an impact on human rights and environmental
issues. The challenge for the senior management and executive boards of these
institutions, which are also important MDB constituencies, is to distinguish
legitimate concerns amidst a cacophony of discordant voices and vociferous
demands.
However, in spite of this growing diversification of constituencies, the “own-
ers” and most powerful constituencies of the MDBs are their shareholders. They
ultimately decide what MDBs do, define the maneuvering room for their man-
agement, and determine how they will evolve. Table 3-10 lists the main share-
holders in twelve of these institutions, differentiating between borrowing and
nonborrowing members. In general, borrowing members in subregional devel-
opment banks have greater voting power than those in regional development
banks. The relatively better position of borrowing countries in the AfDB can be
explained by the fact that nonregional members were not admitted until 1982,
which means that the bank was entirely owned by its developing country mem-
bers during its first eighteen years. The United States is the largest shareholder
in all of the MDBs in which it participates, with the exception of the African
Development Bank, where Nigeria has a larger share. For example, the United
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Table 3-10. Voting Power in Selected MDBs, 2003 or Last Year for Which Information
Is Availablea
Percent
Voting power Main shareholders

















































Brazil, Argentina (10.8 each),
Mexico (5.8)
Nigeria (9.0), Egypt (5.1), 
Libya (3.7)
China (5.53), India (5.44),
Indonesia (4.72), Republic of
Korea (4.39)
Russia (4.06)
Germany, France, Italy, 
UK (16.28 each)
Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua (10.20 each)
Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago (17.45 each)
Peru, Colombia, Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela 
(26 each)
Kuwait (6.86), United Arab
Emirates (7.76), 
Turkey (8.65), Egypt (9.48),
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States has a dominant position in the IDB, where it holds 31 percent of the
shares, but in fact has much greater decisionmaking power than this percentage
suggests.26
Net Income Management
The growing and conflicting pressures faced by MDBs find clear expression in
the management of their net income. Achieving an appropriate balance among
the three main functions of MDBs involves difficult decisions on the size and the
allocation of net income. First, there is the need to use net income to increase
reserves and strengthen their financial position and risk-bearing capacity. Sec-
ond, a shift to more complex operations and engagements with stakeholders
requires more and better-trained staff, as well as a larger presence in the field,
both of which increase administrative expenses and reduce the margin left after
subtracting these from operating income (less interest paid and related charges)
in order to determine net income. Third, a portion of net income is used to
Table 3-10. (continued)
Percent
Voting power Main shareholders






Source: Financial statements of the various institutions compiled and elaborated by the authors.
a. When information about voting power was not available, it was calculated as a percentage of the share sub-




Saudi Arabia (20.8), 
Libya (14.23), Kuwait
(13.13), Iraq (12.58), United
Arab Emirates (10.94)
USA and Mexico (50 each)
Argentina, Brazil (33.3), Bolivia,
Paraguay, Uruguay (11.1 each)
26. Strand (2003) argues that even though the United States has 31 percent of the shares and
of voting power in the IDB, in effect it has 76 percent of the “effective voting power,” which is cal-
culated using “power indices” that consider a variety of voting scenarios by possible voting coali-
tions and other ways of influencing the final outcomes of voting processes. This would mean that
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fund the banks’ soft loan windows and for grants to cover the cost of providing
public goods and to finance special operations (such as emergency relief), both
of which increase administrative expenditures. Finally, some MDBs use part of
their net income to cover the costs of their participation in debt cancellation
under the HIPC Initiative.
The two main sources of income for MDBs are loan portfolios and the man-
agement of liquid assets, although some MDBs have also generated small amounts
of income from charges for nonlending services to their members and other clients
(see table 3-11). Income from loans can be raised in only two ways. First, the vol-
ume of lending may be increased, but this may lead to pressures to lend more than
would be strictly appropriate. Second, loan charges may be increased, but this may
make the MDBs noncompetitive with capital markets for countries with access to
them—especially when transaction costs to borrowers (delays, conditionality) are
factored in. Without adequate safeguards, any of these options may lead to a dete-
rioration of the loan portfolio, primarily because loans to less creditworthy bor-
rowers may represent a higher proportion of loan assets and because countries that
would be better credit risks may elect not to borrow from MDBs.
Investment income from the management of liquid assets can be raised by
increasing the resources at the disposal of the MDBs for short-term investment in
capital markets, and by assuming higher market risks in the expectation of obtain-
ing higher returns. However, this source of income is rather volatile and subject
to capital market swings, which makes it unreliable. It cannot be counted upon
at times of international financial crisis, which is presumably when it would be
most needed. The option of increasing loan charges to augment operating and
Table 3-11. MDB Gross Income from Loans and from Investments
Billions of U.S. dollars
2002 2003
Institution Loans Investment Loans Investment
World Bank 6.89 0.73 5.72 0.41
IDB (OC) 2.63 0.32 2.71 0.30
IDB (FSO) 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.02
AsDB 1.70 0.33 1.38 0.30
AsDF 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.15
AfDB 0.39 0.07 0.32 0.10
AfDF 0.09 0.02 0.07 0.03
Source: Financial statements of the various institutions, compiled and elaborated by the authors.
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net income has been adopted by some MDBs.27 This is closely related to the
question of “graduation” of borrowing countries and has problematic aspects, not
least of which is that there is a limit to such increases if the MDBs wish to remain
relevant to all their shareholders. For example, governments in high- and middle-
income developing countries with access to private sources of finance may prefer
to borrow in capital markets, thus reducing the demand for MDB loans, which
in turn would have a negative impact on the quality of MDB portfolios.
Each MDB has taken a different approach to the management of net income
(see table 3-12). These approaches are influenced by differences in power rela-
tions and interests among major shareholders, which have pressed for different
allocations of net income to reserves, transfers to concessional lending windows,
the provision of grants, and reductions in loan charges. The World Bank is fac-
ing pressures to allocate more resources to the International Development Asso-
ciation, its soft loan window, and to increase the proportion of grants provided
through IDA to its poorest member countries. In addition, in 2004 it also allo-
cated U.S.$80 million to the Trust Fund for Gaza and the West Bank and
U.S.$25 million for the recently created Low-Income Countries Under Stress
(LICUS) Implementation Trust Fund.28
The RDBs have used net income primarily to bolster reserves in order to
strengthen their financial position. The IDB and the EBRD use more than 
90 percent of their net income for this purpose, although the former has also used
net income to cover the cost of its participation in the HIPC Initiative and to
make up for any shortfall in member country contributions to the FSO, its conces-
sional window (U.S.$27.2 million in 2003). The AfDB and the AsDB have a
more complex pattern of net income allocation. The former has used, on average,
more than U.S.$70 million in the past three years (25 percent of net income) to
finance a variety of regional initiatives and to contribute to its soft loan window
(the AfDF). The AsDB has allocated almost 30 percent of its net income to its soft
window (the AsDF) and to technical assistance programs for member countries.
27. In the case of the IDB, in the first half of 2003 it set its lending spread at 0.5 percent. The
inspection and supervision fee and credit commission were each set at 0.5 percent, reflecting partial
waivers of 0.5 percent and 0.25 percent, respectively. For the second half of 2003 the bank applied
the new standard ordinary capital loan charges established by the new capital adequacy policy—
that is, a lending spread of 0.3 percent, a credit commission of 0.25 percent, and no charge for
inspection and supervision. For 2003 the Board of Directors of the AsDB approved a waiver of 
50 percent of the front-end fee for loans approved in 2003 to public sector borrowers. The effect of
this waiver was to reduce net income by U.S.$3 million.
28. The World Bank’s net income increased from U.S.$1.2 billion in 1998 to U.S.$3.4 billion
in 2003 owing to increases in investment income, and fell to U.S.$1.2 in 2004 because of a reduc-
tion in loan income and because of loss provisions.
10101-03_Ch03_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:06 PM  Page 102
regional development banks 103
The SRDBs have also emphasized the use of net income to strengthen their
financial position. The charters of some organizations, for example CABEI and
FONPLATA, specify that net income must be allocated only to the general
reserve. Others, such as the IsDB and ADC, must allocate part or all of their net
income to the general reserve until the amount in that reserve reaches a certain
threshold expressed as a percentage of subscribed capital—25 percent in the case
of the IsDB and 50 percent in the case of the ADC.
Concluding Remarks
This chapter describes the main characteristics of the family of multilateral
development banks, focusing on the regional development banks and, to a lesser
extent, on the subregional development banks. It shows that these institutions
play a key role in development finance and that they fill a niche that has not
been adequately covered by global institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, and certainly not by private sector financing
entities. They provide a unique combination of financial resource mobilization,
capacity building and institutional development, and provision of regional and
subregional public goods. No other international institution performs these
three sets of functions as they do.
Because of the relative maturity of the World Bank’s portfolio, at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first century RDBs and SRDBs are providing higher net
financial flows to their borrowers, and subregional institutions are in a better
position to do so than regional development banks. At the same time, a sort of
de facto division of labor has evolved among these institutions in the financial
instruments they use, the services they provide, the countries they serve, and the
sectors and activities they focus on. Yet in spite of their heterogeneity, all MDBs
share a key concern: preserving their financial strength and high standing in
international capital markets, where they place bonds to fund regular lending
operations, and in the main donor countries that fund their soft loan windows.
The growing interactions between the various MDBs, and between these insti-
tutions and other entities involved in development finance (bilateral agencies,
international institutions, foreign investors, private banks, investment funds,
foundations, and individuals sending remittances, among others), are creating in
some regions (especially Latin America and, to a lesser extent, Africa and the Mid-
dle East) multiple networks of financial institutions that are involved in increas-
ingly complex operations to support the development efforts of member
countries. This has led to the emergence of a large variety of stakeholders and con-
stituencies, a change that is making the governance of multilateral development
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banks a rather difficult proposition, although in the case of SRDBs, the smaller
number of member countries simplifies these problems to a significant extent.
Multilateral development banks in general, and regional and subregional
development banks in particular, have proved to be a most useful institutional
innovation for supporting the development efforts of their member countries. If
they did not exist, it would be necessary to invent them. Yet much remains to
be done before their emerging complementarity-cooperation-rivalry interactions
evolve toward the creation of a veritable “system” of MDBs at the global level
and in some specific regions.
References
Bezanson, K., and F. Sagasti. 2000. A Foresight and Policy Study of Multilateral Development
Banks. Institute of Development Studies, Sussex University, for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Sweden.
Estevadeordal, A., B. Frantz, and T. R. Nguyen, eds. 2004. Regional Public Goods: From The-
ory to Practice. Washington: Inter-American Development Bank.
Ferroni, M. 2002. Regional Public Goods: The Comparative Edge of Regional Development
Banks. Prepared for the conference “Financing for Development: Regional Challenges and
the Regional Development Banks” at the Institute for International Economics, Washing-
ton, February 19.
Kapur, D., J. Lewis, and R. Webb. 1997. The World Bank: Its First Half Century. Vol. 1: His-
tory. Brookings.
Raymond, P. 2004. “Comparative Review of IFI Risk Mitigation Instruments.” Presentation
at Water Week: Diving into Implementation, Washington, World Bank, February 25,
2004.
Sagasti, F. 2004. “La banca multilateral de desarrollo en América Latina.” In Gobernabilidad
e Integración Financiera: Ámbito Global y Regional, edited by J. A. Ocampo and A. Uthoff.
Santiago: Libros de la CEPAL.
Sagasti, F., and K. Bezanson. 2001. Financing and Providing Global Public Goods Expectations
and Prospects. Development Financing 2000, Study 2001: 2. Institute of Development
Studies, University of Sussex, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden.
Strand, J. 2003. “Measuring Voting Power in an International Institution: The United States
and the Inter-American Development Bank.” Economic Governance (Springer Verlag) 4:
19–36.
Te Velde, D. W., O. Morrissey, and A. Hewitt. 2002. “Allocating Aid to International Public
Goods.” In International Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement, and Financing, M. Ferroni
and A. Mody, eds. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic.
World Bank. 2004. Global Development Finance 2004: Harnessing Cyclical Gains for Develop-
ment. Washington.
10101-03_Ch03_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:06 PM  Page 106
Regional arrangements generally remain controversial. They are sometimesseen as a threat to multilateralism, and multilateralism is, in principle, first
best. The argument for multilateralism and against regionalism is best developed
for trade arrangements: regional agreements have a trade-creating effect within
the region but also a trade-diverting effect in the rest of the world, and for that
reason could quite possibly reduce overall welfare. Yet the threat is not substanti-
ated by historical developments over the past decades. Baldwin develops a con-
vincing domino theory according to which regional trade arrangements prompt
multilateral arrangements as those left out face additional incentives to reach
multilateral agreements that they were resisting beforehand.1 The domino theory
is dynamic; trade diversion is static.
Applying the general presumption against regionalism in the matter of exchange
rate arrangements is even more misleading. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) was created to promote multilateralism in exchange rate arrangements largely
in reaction to the self-destructive wave of beggar-thy-neighbor devaluations during
the interwar period. This is why the IMF and many countries are unhappy with
regional arrangements. Yet a number of factors ought to be taken into account.
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First, there is no international monetary system, not since the end of the
Bretton Woods system. Every country is free to choose the arrangement that it
deems most desirable, without having to make sure that it fits other countries.
True, the Articles of Agreement of the IMF ban exchange market manipulations
of the beggar-thy-neighbor type, but there is no rule that prevents regional
agreements. Regional arrangements do not impair a nonexisting system.
Second, existing regional arrangements do not encourage collectively nega-
tive behavior toward nonmembers. The euro floats freely, as does the East
Caribbean dollar. The CFA franc is tied to the euro. It is very unclear how third
parties can be hurt by such arrangements. Trade blocs have not been found to
create adverse trade diversion, and currency blocs are even less likely to do so.
Third, a direct impact of regional arrangements is to reduce the risk of cur-
rency crises, which often have unpredictable contagious effects. For instance,
European currencies used to be regularly buffeted by speculative attacks; this is
now history with the advent of the monetary union, which, so far at least, has
not led to exchange rate instability elsewhere. Preventing contagious crises is
one of the most urgent tasks of the international monetary “system” and re-
gional arrangements are arguably the most efficient response.
The recent interest in regional exchange rate arrangements has been stimu-
lated by the “hollowing-out view,” sometimes also called the “two-corner solu-
tion.” This view holds that there is no workable middle ground between
floating and hard pegs (currency boards or the adoption of a foreign currency).
It predicts that traditional fixed exchange rate regimes are doomed in a world of
unfettered capital flows. According to this view, countries that wish to limit
exchange rate flexibility have to go all the way to hard pegs. The regional coun-
terpart to a hard peg is a monetary union.
The creation of the euro has also contributed to the rising popularity of
regional arrangements. Up until its birth in 1999, the euro project was often
greeted with suspicion and warnings of impending disaster.2 At the time of this
writing, six years later, predictions that the arrangement is doomed can still be
heard, but they sound increasingly hollow. The truth is that the euro has been a
stunning success. Gone are the days of speculative attacks and wide inflation dif-
ferentials in Europe. The debate on whether the European Central Bank (ECB)
is performing well is vigorous, as it should be. To be sure, it is imperfect, as has
historically been the case with almost all new federal institutions. Some populist
European politicians blame the euro for every difficulty, and their criticisms
often fall on sympathetic ears, but their arguments are weak and unfounded.
108 charles wyplosz
2. See Feldstein (1997).
10101-04_Ch04_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:06 PM  Page 108
regional exchange rate arrangements 109
Regional monetary unions can work, as do other regional arrangements, such as
Europe’s previous exchange rate mechanism.
Yet it would be equally misleading to believe that the European example can
be easily transferred elsewhere. Over the past fifty years, Europe has achieved a
remarkable degree of economic and financial integration. Twenty-five countries
now share a single market for goods and services, and twelve countries have
adopted a common currency, the euro. Over the next decade, a few more coun-
tries will join the single market and ten more countries could adopt the euro.
This process is also being matched, to some degree, by political integration, with
efforts under way to align foreign policies and internal security. Not all is perfect,
though, and formidable challenges remain on the agenda, if only to improve the
existing governance structure initially designed for the first six countries that
formed the European Community in 1958.3 Yet, the depth and breadth of the
arrangement is unprecedented, and it brings together countries that were often at
war with each other over the past thousand years. War is unthinkable today, and
it is precisely the desire to avoid it that has underpinned the effort and the readi-
ness to give up significant elements of national sovereignty.
The thesis of this chapter is that Europe’s story carries a number of impor-
tant lessons but also several warnings. For instance, it argues that the commit-
ment to fixed exchange rates has always taken precedence over capital mobility.
Exchange rate stability has been seen as a precondition for trade integration,
the only way of establishing a level playing field for international competi-
tion. The decision to adopt a common currency came very late, much as cap-
ital mobility was restrained for decades, and it was reached only after a high
degree of trade integration had been achieved, accompanied by the establish-
ment of powerful supporting institutions. Put differently, regional trade integra-
tion, exchange rate stability, and institution building came first, capital mobility
and monetary union came later. A key question is whether this sequencing can
be modified and whether the pace can be accelerated. The answer is that both
are quite unlikely.
The following section examines the reasons why small open or would-be
open economies care about exchange rate stability and how stability can be
achieved. It reviews how Europe has dealt with this issue. It emphasizes that
choosing an exchange regime must go hand in hand with the choice of a capital
mobility regime. The following sections then describe in detail the gradual
hardening of exchange rate arrangements in Europe and examine the lessons of
that experience.
3. These countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
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Figure 4-1. Official IMF and de Facto Exchange Rate Regimes
Percent of all countries
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The Logic of Soft Pegs
Regime Choice
Despite its appeal, the hollowing-out hypothesis is not proving valid in practice, at
least not yet. A few well-known cases of adoption of hard pegs in the 1990s (cur-
rency boards in Argentina, Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania; dollarization in
Ecuador and El Salvador) do not signal mass migration to hard pegs. Many coun-
tries have announced that they will let their currency float freely, but these
announcements have not always been followed by concrete action. Figure 4-1
shows the official exchange rate regime reported to the IMF and the actual regime
found to exist by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger.4 The figure reveals that the pro-
portion of pegged exchange rate regimes has declined between 1980 and 2000,
with an equal increase in freely floating regimes. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
confirm the decreasing popularity of pegged regimes but find that migration has
taken place toward intermediate regimes (crawls, managed floats). Much the same
picture emerges from the classification by Reinhart and Rogoff, who use a very
different procedure to identify exchange regimes.5
4. See Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002).
5. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
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The evidence against the hollowing-out hypothesis is of considerable impor-
tance. This hypothesis is based on the entirely correct view that when capital is
freely mobile pegged regimes are unstable, unless the use of monetary policy is
purely and simply abandoned and all efforts are directed toward upholding the
peg. But in this case, the peg becomes a hard one; there is no sustainable midway.
In fact, the evidence seems to suggest that many countries do not wish to move
to the extremes. They exhibit both “fear of floating”6 and “fear of pegging.”
Resistance to adopting formal pegs is explained by the loss of monetary inde-
pendence and by the risk of inviting speculative attacks. Resistance to freely float-
ing is explained by the high degree of volatility that exchange rates then display.
Central to the hollowing-out hypothesis, therefore, is the view that full capi-
tal mobility is the natural evolution. What the evidence shows, however, is that
most developing countries are reluctant to remove all restrictions on capital
mobility, following the approach of most developed countries. It was not until
the late 1980s that full capital mobility became the norm among developed
countries. As is argued below, this is what led to the adoption of the euro.
Put differently, the choice of an exchange rate regime cannot be dissociated
from the capital mobility regime. The hollowing-out hypothesis, a reincarnation
of what used to be called the “impossible trinity,” can be restated as follows: if a
country opts for a regime of full capital mobility, the only sustainable exchange
rate regimes are the extreme ones—hard pegs or free floating. If a country opts
for a high degree of exchange stability, it must restrict capital mobility.
Forms of Exchange Rate Stability
Exchange rate stability does not necessarily mean a peg. Bretton Woods–style
fixed-but-adjustable pegs with fluctuation bands represent one way of achieving
a degree of stability, but they are not the only way. In the presence of high but
moderate inflation, pegs require recurrent depreciations, which can take the
form of crawling pegs with various adjustment frequencies. A close substitute is
a managed float, whereby the authorities allow the exchange rate to depreciate
over time if need be, but limit the range of fluctuation around the trend.
This view of exchange rate stability focuses on the behavior of the exchange
rate—an important policy consideration, but not the only one that matters.
Equally important is the commitment aspect. A peg announcement, whether it
concerns a fixed-but-adjustable rate or a crawling band, commits the authorities
in two ways. First, monetary policy must be constrained. This constraint can be
relaxed somewhat by delinking domestic financial markets from international
6. See Calvo and Reinhart (2000).
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conditions through limits on capital mobility, but the effectiveness of such capi-
tal controls is limited. Second, announcing a band of fluctuation, no matter how
wide it is, means that its hedges are open to speculative pressure. When the
exchange rate comes close to any hedge, the situation usually becomes untenable.
Thus a peg announcement carries with it an implicit invitation to speculation.
Capital controls offer some protection; indeed, this is where they are effective, for
they provide some breathing room in the midst of a currency crisis.7
The managed float is the increasingly popular regime. It seems to offer the
best of all worlds, allowing the authorities to limit short-run fluctuations while
accommodating long-run trends and removing the commitment that invites
speculative attacks. This view is misleading, however. Markets are good at spot-
ting the implicit strategy and they will test the implicit limits of fluctuations. If
there are no such limits, or if they are fuzzy, the stabilization effect is lost. If the
authorities do enforce limits, the difference with explicit bands is cosmetic.
Much the same applies to the width of the fluctuation bands. Narrow bands
impose a tight constraint on monetary policy; wide bands produce an effect that
differs little from that of a free float, except that they will occasionally be subject
to speculative pressure.
In the end, there is no free lunch: restricting the volatility of the exchange
rate can only be achieved by subjecting monetary policy to fairly strict con-
straints. There are various ways of achieving this aim; they all require discipline.
This is why a peg, of one form or another, is sometimes referred to as an anchor.
As such, it is a desirable tool, comparable to other monetary policy rules, such as
inflation targeting or money growth rules. For small open economies, this may
be the best rule, as the next section argues.
Why Exchange Rate Stability Matters: The Case of Europe
There are several reasons for wanting to limit exchange rate variability. The
most commonly cited reasons are a quest for stability for trade purposes, a strat-
egy of importing monetary discipline, and a lack of sufficiently deep financial
and exchange markets. This section argues that, in Europe, the key motivation
was trade.
Financial and exchange markets were shallow in Europe in the 1950s. After
the move to current account convertibility in 1958, capital account restrictions
remained widespread, partly motivated by the belief that this would help make
7. This statement relates only to the usefulness of controls during speculative attacks. There is a
huge body of literature on the usefulness of capital controls and on their distortionary impact.
Most of it is extremely critical of capital controls because they entail high costs and few benefits.
Rogoff (2002) offers one such sober assessment.
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Norway 1984 . . .
Portugal n.a. 1992
Spain 1966 1992
Sweden 1983 . . .
Switzerland 1975 1980
United Kingdom 1971 1979
Sources: Exchange controls from Bakker (1996), p. 220; credit ceilings from Cottarelli and others
(1986), unpublished appendix.
n.a. Not available.
. . . Not applicable.
the fixed exchange rate system work. By the late 1970s, Europe had deep enough
markets to operate reasonably efficient exchange markets, yet capital restrictions
remained widespread. The United Kingdom liberalized in 1979, but it did not
join the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System,
instituted that same year. Within the system, Germany was the first country to
make the move, in 1981, and for a long while it remained the only country to
have done so (see table 4-1). In these preliberalization years, there were many bad
reasons to maintain capital controls and one good one: the fear that unlimited
capital mobility could endanger exchange rate stability.
It is often claimed that most countries wanted to use the nominal exchange
rate as an anchor to import the Bundesbank’s discipline. This is a revisionist
view of the situation, at least until the 1980s. To start with, the assumption
underlying the discipline argument was that Europe’s inflation rate would
remain close to that of the United States during the Bretton Woods period and
then stay close to the German rate. It also assumed that Europe’s inflation would
be lower than in the other industrialized countries, which have been floating for
most of the post–Bretton Woods era (Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and more recently, Australia and New Zealand). Figure 4-2 does not
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bear out these assumptions. On average, Europe (excluding the floaters, Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom) exhibits the worst inflation performance in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) area. If
discipline was the motivation, it did not work. Most likely, it was not.
The view that exchange rates can be used as an anchor is fairly recent, at
least in European official thinking. The argument that the inflation anchor
served as the motivation for setting up the European Monetary System (EMS)
mixes up the timing. It was only after the wave of currency crises of 1983, after
France had adopted the “franc fort” strategy, that the EMS started to function
asymmetrically, with the German mark as its recognized anchor. When the
EMS was created, reference was explicitly made to nominal exchange rate sta-
bility, not to the desire to anchor inflation to best practice in Germany.
Realignments were not only possible but actively practiced and always justified
as a “correction” of accumulated inflation differentials. In fact, the EMS was











a. “Non-Europe” is Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Percent
Figure 4-2. Inflation in the OECD Area
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fully avoided adopting the Bretton Woods presumption that countries with
high inflation and weak currency would bear the burden of adjustment in case
of misalignment and market pressure. Responsibility for exchange market
interventions was strictly bilateral, with unlimited support from the strong to
the weak currency country. Much to the discomfort of the Bundesbank,8 the
EMS was officially aiming at a “regression toward the mean,” not at imposing
the Bundesbank’s rigorous best practice.
The view that exchange rate stability promotes trade has no theoretical sup-
port (uncertainty can either encourage or discourage international trade, depend-
ing on assumptions) and limited empirical support. See, for example, works by
Kenen and Rodrik regarding the effects of short-term volatility in real exchange
rates in a sample of industrialized countries and by de Grauwe on the impact of
exchange rate volatility in the European Union; stronger evidence has been
adduced by Rose and by Helliwell and Parsley and Wei on the border effect. At
any rate, the quest for exchange rate stability has been crucial. Policymakers
happened to believe that nominal exchange rate stability matters for trade, pos-
sibly for good reasons.9
Evidence on the stability of intra-European exchange rates is presented in fig-
ure 4-3a for the key French franc/German mark exchange rate. The top chart of
figure 4-3a displays the real exchange rate between these two currencies over the
period 1971–98, at the end of which both currencies ceased to exist. The top
chart in figure 4-3b shows the real exchange rate between the franc and the
United States dollar. The contrast is sharp and is confirmed by the two middle
charts in both figures, which depict the behavior of the pound sterling, a non-
EMS currency (except for a very short period in 1992). Much the same pattern
applies to the other EMS currencies. For comparison purposes, the bottom
chart in figure 4-3a shows the real exchange rate between the Argentina peso
and Brazil real over the period 1980–2003. Much as is the case for Britain and
its European partners, the bilateral volatility between these two currencies (peso
and real) is of the same order of magnitude as their volatility against the dollar,
exemplified in the exchange rate between the Argentine peso and the U.S. dollar
in the bottom chart of figure 4-3b. Clearly, the European countries that wanted
to stabilize their bilateral exchange rates succeeded.
8. As documented in Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993), the Bundesbank had arranged for a
private agreement with the German Treasury that would suspend the intervention clause if it
determined that it was threatening price stability. This clause was invoked during the lira crisis in
September 1992.
9. Kenen and Rodrik (1986); de Grauwe (1988); Rose (2000); Helliwell (1998); Parsley and
Wei (2001).
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Figure 4-3b.
Source: IMF.
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It is important to note that it is not the nominal exchange rate that was stabi-
lized, but the real rate. This remark is important for two reasons. First, while the
target was the real exchange rate, the instrument was the nominal exchange rate.
The procedure was to make frequent use of the ERM provisions for realignment
and to base these realignments explicitly on purchasing power parity (PPP). Sec-
ond, the above observation confirms that the goal was not to use the exchange
rate as a nominal anchor to achieve uniformly low inflation. Germany was
attached to price stability and achieved it throughout the period. Other coun-
tries, notably France and Italy, had more tolerance for inflation, and periodi-
cally realigned their exchange rates to reestablish competitiveness.10 But the
inflation performance of the United Kingdom was similar to that of France and
Italy. If the United Kingdom did not join the ERM it was not because of infla-
tion, but because it accorded less importance to exchange rate stability than its
partners. Clearly, inflation differentials were considerably more modest than
those observed in Latin America, for example. It is likely that the arrangement
would not have been possible in the face of large inflation differentials. In that
sense, exchange stability promoted discipline.
Summarizing, this section argues that the European countries have identified
real exchange rate stability as a key policy target. The discipline argument for
exchange rate stability focuses on the nominal, not the real, exchange rate: nom-
inal rates were anything but stable, and the inflation performance of the Euro-
pean countries has been worse than that of most other developed countries. The
view that exchange rates were kept pegged because the markets were too shallow
to be efficient is not convincing, either. That may have been true in the 1950s
and the 1960s, when the currencies were simply not convertible, but it was not
true in the 1970s and beyond.
Exchange Rate Arrangements in Europe
This section briefly describes the different arrangements adopted in Europe since
the end of World War II. It illustrates two key aspects of Europe’s monetary inte-
gration: a constant quest for internal exchange rate stability and a succession of
daring advances and temporary setbacks. Europe’s approach to exchange rate
coordination has been gradual and pragmatic. It has mainly reacted to events,
both external (such as the end of the Bretton Woods system) and internal (such as
the removal of capital controls), shunning any grand design. The 1971 Werner
Plan to launch a common currency within two years never took off. The project
10. The Netherlands is one country that actively used the exchange rate as an anchor and
undertook never to devalue it against the German mark.
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was adopted twenty years later, but only when it had become obvious that the
ERM could not cope with full capital mobility, even though policymakers
might not have realized this necessity.
Brief Historical Overview
Bretton Woods. The Bretton Woods agreements provided indirectly for fixed
exchange rates within Europe, but they were not a joint undertaking, nor were
they intended to further any specific European goals. The agreements matched
European interests, but they also matched those of the United States, which was
equally preoccupied with the restoration of trade links. Faced with an acute
shortage of dollar balances, European countries did not move to establish cur-
rency convertibility from the outset. As they concentrated on developing bilat-
eral payment agreements, both among themselves and with non-European
countries, they started to work out their own arrangements.
The European Payments Union. The European Payments Union (EPU) was
set up in 1950 to simplify the cumbersome web of some two hundred bilateral
payment agreements. It worked as a multilateral clearing system, focusing on
the overall balances of payments of its member countries within the union.
Generally considered a success, the EPU is credited with helping to bring about
the resumption of intra-European trade. The EPU had some drawbacks, how-
ever, notably its tendency to encourage trade among its members to the detri-
ment of nonmembers.
Convertibility. The next major move, the restoration of currency convertibil-
ity in 1958, was decided collectively, concurrent with the adoption of the
Treaty of Rome, which created the European Common Market. Convertibility
initially only concerned the current account. For many more years the financial
account remained subject to fairly draconian restrictions in most countries. The
arrangement provided for a high degree of exchange rate stability, with few
realignments. The first major depreciation, by the United Kingdom, did not
occur until 1967. It was followed by a depreciation of the French franc and a
revaluation of the German mark, both in 1969.
The snake. By the time the Bretton Woods system collapsed during the period
1971–73, further imbalances had accumulated inside Europe. After a series of
realignments, most European countries undertook to maintain limited margins
of fluctuation for their bilateral exchange rates, while the other developed coun-
tries let their currencies float. The resulting arrangement, known as the European
“currency snake,” was a mixed success. Most countries were able to keep up with
the arrangement, but speculative pressure forced others—especially France, Italy,
and Sweden—to withdraw from the snake. Outside Britain, there was no serious
questioning of the wisdom of keeping exchange rates pegged.
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The Werner Plan. The main setback for monetary integration during this
period was the abandonment of the Werner Plan. Completed in 1970 and
endorsed by the Council of Ministers in 1971, the Werner Report had recom-
mended the rapid adoption of a common currency. It mapped out three
stages, including the pooling of foreign exchange reserves for joint interven-
tions. The turmoil surrounding the breakup of the Bretton Woods system led
the larger countries to aim at more modest steps, partly out of pragmatism,
partly as a pretext to escape a move that was clearly ahead of policymakers’
thinking. The smaller countries, which were seeing their own policy auto-
nomy decline, were frustrated by the failure but unable to shake the domina-
tion of the larger countries.
The European Monetary System. Monetary integration soon took another
direction, however. The EMS was agreed upon in 1978 and began operating in
1979. Eight of the then nine members of the European Community became
active members of the exchange rate mechanism. When the euro was launched
in January 1999, all members of the European Union were part of the ERM,
with the exception of Greece, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Greece joined
the ERM later that year.11
The European Monetary Union. During its first ten years of existence, the
ERM underwent frequent crises. By the early 1980s its survival was very much
in doubt, especially as a series of attacks affected the French franc in the wake of
the election of President François Mitterrand. The political reaction turned out
to be another show of support for fixed exchange rates. The authorities rededi-
cated themselves to a new ERM, one in which the German mark would play the
role of central currency. This “greater Deutschmark area” gradually asserted its
credibility and came to be seen as such a success that policymakers grew embold-
ened and resolved to move to the next logical step, monetary union.12 But the
success of the ERM was concealing a buildup of tensions. The combination of
accumulated imbalances and a major policy mistake—denial of the fact that
German unification would require a revaluation of the mark—triggered a round
of violent speculative attacks. Two countries (Italy and the United Kingdom) left
the ERM, and many were forced to devalue, some of them several times. The
ERM was radically changed when its margins of fluctuation were widened to the
11. Among European nonmembers of the European Union, Switzerland has traditionally
steered its own currency alongside the German mark, even though it has always been very careful
not to declare an official linkup, and has occasionally used the exchange rate as a tool of mone-
tary policy.
12. A detailed review of this evolution is provided by Kenen (1995).
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point of irrelevance. Yet, while the ERM currencies were officially quasi-floating,
unofficially the monetary authorities endeavored to keep them within narrow
margins, in fact quietly mimicking the defunct ERM.
The Exchange Rate Mechanism: A Sophisticated Arrangement
The ERM, which lasted in its first incarnation for twenty years, is of more than
historical interest. To start with, it still plays an important role, as the new
European Union members are expected to participate in the mechanism as a
preliminary step toward joining the monetary union.13 More important, per-
haps, is the fact that it was the success of the ERM that convinced policymakers
to go to the next step, monetary union. This is why it is of general interest to
critically review its main features.
When the ERM was launched, two main requirements shaped its design.
The first one was to provide a tool for stabilizing the intra-European exchange
rates that had been buffeted in the years following the demise of the Bretton
Woods system. It had to be sturdier than the currency snake. The second
requirement was of a political nature. The other countries were unwilling sim-
ply to tie their currencies to the German mark, even though it was already the
most stable European currency.
The solution to the second issue was to make the ERM fully symmetric. In
contrast with the hub-and-spoke arrangement of Bretton Woods, exchange rates
were fixed bilaterally, producing a matrix of bilateral parities that became
known as “the grid.” Each bilateral rate could fluctuate by +/−2.25 percent
around its declared parity.14 In addition, the responsibility of maintaining the
exchange rate within the agreed upon margin of fluctuation was shared by each
pair of countries, with no presumption that more had to be done by the weaker
currency. Symmetry was the response to political sensitivities.
The solution to the first question was an unprecedented commitment that, if
need be, the parities would be defended by unlimited interventions, conducted
by both countries whose bilateral rate was pushed to its declared margin of fluc-
tuation. In addition, other ERM member countries could be asked to provide
support, either through interventions or through short-term loans. Cohesion
and mutual support was the answer to economic fragility.
13. The new exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) was established when the euro was launched.
Initially, its only member was Denmark. Seven of the ten new European Union members have
now joined Denmark, and the three remaining ones have the obligation to join the mechanism
“soon.”
14. The Italian lira was given a temporarily larger margin of +/−6 percent.
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Furthermore, both upon entry and subsequently, the choice of every bilateral
parity had to be agreed collectively and by consensus of all member countries.
This was designed to prevent any beggar-thy-neighbor manipulation by a group
of member countries. It was also seen as a justification for the collective defense
of existing parities.
Thus the ERM was much more than a “European Bretton Woods.” It was an
ambitious undertaking that removed decisions on exchange rate parity from
national hands. It sent the signal that any attack on a particular currency would
be met by a collective defense. It also envisioned an active management of pari-
ties, so that realignments would not come to be seen as a system failure, but
rather as an indication of flexibility.
Indeed, the ERM went through a large number of realignments, as shown in
table 4-2. From its inception in March 1979 until January 1987, no fewer than
twelve adjustments were deemed necessary, on average one every eight months.
Interestingly, these realignments were usually anticipated by the markets and
thus preceded by speculative attacks. These attacks, however, were not lethal
because capital controls limited the volume of required interventions and also
because corrective realignments were promptly enacted.
Interventions by both of the central banks concerned were compulsory when
any bilateral margin was reached, but it soon became apparent that waiting for
that to happen was risky. When pressed against its limit, an exchange rate offers
Table 4-2. Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) Realignments
Sept. 24, Nov. 30, Mar. 22, Oct. 5, Feb. 22, June 14, 
Date 1979 1979 1981 1981 1982 1982
Number of 2 1 1 2 2 4
currencies 
involved
Date Mar. 21, May 18, July 22, Apr. 7, Aug. 4, Jan. 12, 
1983 1983 1985 1986 1986 1987
Number of 7a 7a 7a 5 1 3
currencies 
involved
Date Jan. 8, Sept. 14, Nov. 23, Feb. 1, May 14, Mar. 6, 
1990 1992 1992 1993 1993 1995
Number of 1 3b 2 1 2 2
currencies 
involved
a. All ERM currencies realigned.
b. In addition, two currencies (pound sterling and lira) left the ERM.
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speculators one-way bets—either a realignment occurs and large gains are
reaped, or there is no realignment and the cost of speculating is virtually nil—
that make attacks irresistible. This is why, gradually, most interventions became
increasingly intramarginal—that is, aimed at keeping the bilateral rates well
within the margins of fluctuation, as table 4-3 shows. The table also indicates
that dollar interventions, aimed at stabilizing bilateral parities within the ERM
via the stabilization of U.S. dollar parities, became less important, but never
negligible, as interventions in ERM currencies assumed greater importance.
Table 4-3 also reveals an important asymmetry between the Bundesbank and
the other central banks. While most other central banks increasingly relied on
noncompulsory intramarginal interventions, the Bundesbank limited its own
interventions to fulfilling its obligation of providing bilateral support at the
margin. This is one aspect of the process that led to the progressive emergence
of the German mark as the de facto center of the system. Simplifying somewhat,
initially the ERM worked in a symmetric way; all central banks stabilized their
bilateral parities mainly by managing their currencies against the dollar, as in
the Bretton Woods system. Eventually, all countries dropped the dollar in favor
of the mark, while the Bundesbank steered the evolution of the European cur-
rencies against the dollar.
There is another reason for this evolution. All the countries that were run-
ning higher inflation than Germany and that had been forced to devalue repeat-
edly under speculative pressure gradually accepted the view that they ought to
aim at a lower inflation rate. From 1987 onward, they effectively adopted the
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Table 4-3. Foreign Exchange Market Interventions a
Billions of U.S. dollars
1979–82 1983–85 1987–87 1988–89
All currencies
Inside ERM
At margin 20.5 15.4 22.3 0.9
Intramarginal 29.2 48.6 113.7 32.4
In U.S. dollars 139.4 78.4 53.7 29.5
Bundesbank
Inside ERM
At margin 3.1 1.7 3.3 0
Intramarginal 0 0 0 0
In U.S. dollars 25.4 18.9 5.4 12.4
Source: Gros and Thygesen (1998).
a. Algebraic sum of purchases.
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German mark as the anchor and committed to holding their exchange rate pari-
ties unchanged. In fact, they proceeded to closely follow the Bundesbank’s policy.
This approach worked in the sense that inflation gradually declined everywhere
toward the German level. With nominal exchange rates stable for several years, the
ERM was seen as a major success. The idea of irrevocably fixing exchange rates
by adopting a common currency followed almost naturally, leading to the
Maastricht Treaty.
Meanwhile, however, the inflation differentials that had accumulated in the
effort to achieve inflation convergence had resulted in the overvaluation of
some currencies. The collective removal of capital controls in 1990 meant that
the unavoidable realignments would be a dangerous affair. Indeed, when spec-
ulation started, triggered by difficulties in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, two
currencies were forced to leave (the Italian lira and the pound sterling, which
had joined a few months before at an overvalued rate) and the margins of fluc-
tuation had to be widened to a huge +/−15 percent. The ERM was in shambles,
but the decision to launch the euro had been firmly taken, which provided for
continuing currency stability.
The late difficulties of the ERM illustrate three general points. First, any
system of pegged rates has to be flexible. Using the exchange rate as an anchor
is a possibility for one country, not for a system. Such a strategy has to shape
monetary policy in the country that adopts it; it is a disciplinary device. Within
the ERM, with its symmetric nature and promise of mutual support, the disci-
pline aspect is weakened and any slippage affects all members. Second, it is
impossible to maintain pegs when capital is fully mobile. Strict monetary policy
discipline is a necessary but not sufficient condition in a world where self-fulfilling
crises are conspicuous. Third, it is quite striking that the system worked well when
it was symmetric but failed when Germany had become the de facto center. This
does not mean that a hub-and-spoke system cannot work, but it does suggest that
a regional system can work without a center if all the rest is well thought through.
The Monetary Union
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is less original than the
ERM. In a number of respects it mimics arrangements that can be found in
many federal countries. This section therefore does not attempt to provide a
detailed description of the EMU; rather, it deals with the originality of the
undertaking and points out a few key distinguishing features.
The main challenge is to build adequate institutions. At the technical level,
the situation is fairly straightforward: a single currency requires a single mone-
tary authority, and there are not many possible monetary strategies. To be sure,
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debates rage on the strategy of the ECB, but these are details. More complex is
the governance issue of turning over the important power of carrying out mone-
tary policy to a multinational authority. While the broad design will inevitably
be inspired by arrangements in federal states, the fact that Europe remains a
union of independent nation-states greatly complicates matters.
The solution adopted offers a mix of federal and international arrangements.
The decisionmaking power is given to the European System of Central Banks, the
Eurosystem. Its decisionmaking body is the Governing Council, composed of the
six members of the ECB Executive Board and the governors of the national cen-
tral banks (NCBs) of the participating countries. The Executive Board is of a fed-
eral type, as its members serve in a personal capacity. Yet, they are appointed by
the member states, which inevitably means that nationality matters a great deal.
As could be expected, the emerging pattern is that the large member countries
(France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) have managed to appoint one of their nation-
als and intend to keep it that way, and the two remaining positions are filled by
nationals of the smaller countries. Of course this runs completely counter to the
spirit of the principle that board members are appointed solely on the basis of
their competence and in no way serve as representatives of their countries. Simi-
larly, the fact that the NCB governors serve on the Governing Council ex officio
is another contradiction to the nonrepresentativeness principle.
More worrisome is that the size of the Governing Council is due to expand
as new countries join the EMU. With eighteen voting members, the decision-
making process is already highly unlikely to permit deep exchanges of views.
The council could grow to thirty-one members if all current European Union
members adopt the euro, and with more countries slated to enter the European
Union, the Governing Council could become even larger. This difficulty is well
recognized but politically delicate. The Eurosystem has proposed capping the
number of voting members at twenty-five, resorting to a complex rotation sys-
tem that would take account of the size of countries.
Even more worrisome is the widely discussed “democratic deficit.” The
Eurosystem is completely independent: the members of its Governing Board are
all appointed to long terms and cannot be removed from office. Yet indepen-
dence brings with it the question of accountability. The chosen solution has
been to make the ECB accountable to the European Parliament. However, the
European Parliament has no formal power over the ECB, except for confirming
the appointments of Executive Board members. It cannot make suggestions on
future policies; it can only comment on past policies. The result is a weak ex
post process, with no serious consequences if the Parliament disagrees with the
actions of the Eurosystem.
10101-04_Ch04_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:06 PM  Page 125
126 charles wyplosz
These issues reflect the political and institutional difficulties of a monetary
union. Although Europe is unique in having a structured governance system
(the European Council, which brings together the heads of state and govern-
ment, and the Council of Ministers) and an elected Parliament, the current
organization is not fully satisfactory. It is true that the EMU has functioned
quite well so far, and it is hard to foresee major difficulties, which suggests that
the arrangements are not fundamentally flawed, yet criticism is endemic and
might weaken governance if serious difficulties were to arise.
Fiscal Policy: Coordination and Discipline
The final issue of interest concerns the treatment of fiscal policy. If capital is
freely mobile, the more exchange rates are fixed, the less monetary policy can be
used for macroeconomic stabilization purposes. As a result, fiscal policy be-
comes the main, if not the only, macroeconomic stabilization tool. Yet in the
absence of fiscal policy discipline, any monetary policy commitment, including
exchange rate stability, is bound to be undermined. In addition, it is often
asserted that, because they affect exchange rates, fiscal policies must be coordi-
nated. Thus the tighter the degree of cooperation on the exchange rate, the
more limits have to be put on the implementation of national fiscal policies, in
effect reducing the scope for national macroeconomic stabilization policies. An
alternative is to restrict capital mobility, preferably using a version of the
Chilean encaje.15 Such restrictions do not provide full freedom to carry out
long-lasting divergent policies, especially policies that result in lasting inflation
differentials, but they make exchange rate realignments manageable.
On the other hand, the closer the exchange rate linkage within the region, the
more each country depends on the behavior of the others. It is often claimed that
the overall policy mix matters for regional interest and exchange rates, especially
in a monetary union. This is misleading. If the region is closely integrated in
international financial markets, each country is too small to have an impact on
the regional interest rates. This is true even for the European monetary union.
The collective stance matters if the region is large, as Europe is, but this means that
fully coordinated policies might have an impact. Given that, in each country, fiscal
policy is highly political and hard to design, full coordination is extremely unlikely.
What remains true is that one country’s default, especially if that country is
large relative to the others in the region, could have a serious effect on the whole
region. This is why fiscal discipline becomes a regional concern, in particular
15. The encaje is a system of capital controls that works by imposing costs on inflows. These
costs decline with maturity, mimicking the desirable properties of the Tobin tax.
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within a monetary union. Europe has adopted the Stability and Growth Pact, an
agreement to limit budget deficits to 3 percent of GDP. This pact is ill-conceived
for two reasons. First, what is required is long-run debt sustainability, not limits
on annual deficits. Annual deficits are far too constraining, and a rigid ceiling is
far too demanding. Second, the Stability and Growth Pact includes a procedure
whereby the Council of Ministers can tell individual countries what they should
do with their budget deficits and fine them if they fail to heed the recommenda-
tions. This is an extremely intrusive approach that threatens sovereignty in a sen-
sitive domain. These two flaws have become increasingly visible and have led to a
complete breakdown of the pact, which was “suspended” in November 2003
when the council should have initiated the fine procedure against the two largest
countries, France and Germany.
The European experience illustrates both the need for some commitment to
fiscal discipline and the need for a sensible procedure to ensure compliance. Sug-
gestions for improvement have been advanced by Sapir, Wyplosz, and others.16
They suggest shifting the target away from annual deficits and toward the debt
level and include various proposals for involving the member states more directly.
What Does the European Experience Tell Us?
This section draws on the European experience to explore possible options for
other regions that also feel the need to stabilize their exchange rates.
Sequencing: Where to Go and How to Get There
As noted earlier, there are many ways of stabilizing exchange rates within a
region, ranging from soft managed floats to hard monetary unions. Europe has
climbed the ladder from soft to hard pegs, using each step to develop institu-
tions that were then used to prepare for the next step, but without ever commit-
ting to taking the next step.
Europe’s sequencing has very much followed the traditional sequencing
approach initially proposed by McKinnon.17 It first liberalized intraregional
trade with the creation of the Common Market in 1958, and then gradually
integrated itself into world trade through a succession of accords under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It also instituted current account
convertibility upon launching the Common Market and then very gradually
adopted financial account convertibility, achieving full capital liberalization in
16. See, for example, Sapir (2003) and Wyplosz (2002a).
17. See McKinnon (1979).
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1990 as part of the Single European Act. Retaining capital controls made it pos-
sible to operate the ERM for a decade. Exchange rate agreements started with
fixed-but-adjustable exchange rates until capital liberalization forced a choice
between the two extreme corners, and most countries opted for the monetary
union corner. Thus Europe followed all the textbook prescriptions, and it
worked. The exception is the gap of the 1990s, when full capital mobility was in
place but the monetary union had not yet come to be. This forced the de facto
suspension of the ERM through the adoption of very large margins of fluctua-
tion, which was a way of upholding the mechanism, at least notionally. Yet this
period was accompanied by continuing exchange rate stability (see figure 4-3)
for one notable reason: by then the decision to launch the euro had been taken
and a firm date had been set. While this latter sequencing was entirely fortu-
itous, it is rich with lessons. It establishes the crucial role of expectations in
underpinning exchange rate stability. It also demonstrates the importance of
institutions; the 1990s were dedicated to fulfilling the EMU entry conditions,
and these visible efforts at convergence provided an anchor, underpinned by the
gradual buildup of the Eurosystem.
The European process thus provides a roadmap that is feasible, not only
because it has already been followed, but also because it accords well with basic
principles. Does this mean that monetary union is the only destination and
gradualism the only way to get there? Probably not. Southeast Asia is one exam-
ple of a region where some degree of exchange rate stability has been achieved
since the 1997–99 crisis through unofficial managed floats. The Chiang Mai
Initiative offers some support, but it remains a partial and bilateral effort.
At the other end of the spectrum, can regions immediately jump to a monetary
union without the intermediate step of a system of fixed and adjustable exchange
rates, such as the ERM? In theory, such a leapfrogging strategy is possible. The
European approach of gradualism is not based on economic principles. As a
regime change, it can be achieved virtually instantaneously—in fact, it must be
achieved instantaneously—and this is how it happened in Europe on January 1,
1999. True, that moment was preceded by a long period of mandatory conver-
gence, but that was a protection requested by Germany to ensure that the “culture
of price stability” would become sufficiently ingrained that the euro could be as
good as the German mark. This does not have to be the case in other instances,
provided that inflation differentials are limited, an issue taken up below.
On the other side, the European principle of gradualism is based on political
and institutional principles. The process has been one of continuous erosion of
national sovereignty, brought about through confidence-building steps. A mon-
etary union also requires institutions, not just a common central bank—which
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can be put in place reasonably quickly—but also all the accompanying appoint-
ment and control mechanisms discussed earlier. In addition, it may take years to
design and print banknotes.
Thus while there is no fundamental economic reason to prevent the adop-
tion of a common currency without transiting through an ERM-type agree-
ment, the lead time needed to get a monetary union up and running spans
years. This constraint raises the question of what happens along the way, bear-
ing in mind that excessive turmoil may jeopardize the whole project. One solu-
tion is to quietly build up the required institutions while allowing all future
member currencies to float freely. If this period is characterized by wide fluctua-
tions, it may be difficult to pinpoint the rate at which the disappearing curren-
cies will be converted into the new collective currency. The risk is that some
conversion rates may result in overvaluation. This would seriously threaten the
eventual monetary union, for years of painful deflation might be needed to
eliminate the overvaluation. Another solution is a managed float designed to
erase wide fluctuations, which would make it possible to test possible conver-
sion rates. However, managed floats are never a panacea, for markets are likely
to test the intentions of monetary authorities, which may necessitate heavy
interventions. The best that can be done under such circumstances is to conduct
tightly coordinated interventions, assuming that large reserve stocks have previ-
ously been accumulated. While such interventions are unlikely to succeed, they
can do so if they are supported by an agreement to adopt a common currency
by a clearly established date. A necessary condition for this option to work,
however, is that national monetary and fiscal policies be conducted with suffi-
cient prudence so as not to undermine the project itself.
In the end, we come back full circle. ERM-type arrangements and Maastricht-
style convergence programs are not strictly required to move toward a monetary
union. Yet, given the unavoidable lead time, the transition period is fraught with
potentially lethal dangers. A key concern is that the choice of conversion rates
can only be based on past behavior, which in turn requires sufficient exchange
rate stability during the transition period. In addition, once the monetary union
starts, inflation rates will have to be broadly similar.18 Given that inflation rates
tend to be sticky, inflation convergence needs to be fairly complete before the
monetary union is launched in order to avoid overvaluation. Hence a high degree
of coordination is required during the transition period.
18. National inflation rates in a monetary union do not have to be equal. There may be tempo-
rary fluctuations related to varying macroeconomic conditions. There may also be trends reflecting
different productivity gains (the Balassa-Samuelson phenomenon).
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Institutions
Exchange rate arrangements cannot operate in a void. “Light” arrangements,
such as loosely coordinated managed floats, can be accommodated without ded-
icated institutions, as has been the practice in Southeast Asia. More ambitious
agreements do require institutions. Even light arrangements must be supported
by domestic institutions, a view now well recognized in the literature.19
An obvious characteristic of institutions is that they take time to build and to
establish themselves. In a way, therefore, they are needed before they exist. The
early buildup of institutions may well be a key factor in the success of Europe’s
integration. The European Commission was set up by the Treaty of Rome in
1958, when the Common Market was launched. Its powers and ambitions were
initially quite limited. Over the years, it has become the advocate for integration,
binding together two opposing forces. On the one hand, it embodies the collec-
tive interest and the gains from cooperation. On the other hand, it derives its
powers from governments, which represent national interests. This explains its
often arcane decisionmaking process and many of its shortcomings. The com-
mission’s inherent internal contradiction is not often appreciated: its role is to
manage those elements of national sovereignty that have been given up by its
member states, but it needs approval from those same member states, which are
instinctively loath to relinquish politically sensitive decisionmaking powers. The
fact that the commission exists, and that it has seen the range of its responsibili-
ties grow considerably since it was created, cannot be overestimated. Not only
does the commission act as the lobby for integration, it also undertakes the back-
ground work needed to prepare for further steps. When the time is politically
ripe—which can never be anticipated—everything needed to take the project
forward is readily available in the commission’s drawers. Besides the commission,
Europe has built up a vast array of institutions as it has gradually expanded the
scope for cooperation beyond economics. Each step is usually characterized by
the same uneasy compromise between integrationist and nationalistic forces. A
good example is the European Parliament, which became the handy, if weak,
body to which the ECB is accountable.
Because exchange rate arrangements must involve some reduction in national
sovereignty, entering into them is never an easy decision, and it is likely to need
prodding and technical support. Countries contemplating such arrangements
should have a budding institution that can study the concepts and propose various
solutions. It should not have any power, but it should be clearly regional in ori-
19. See, for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Drazen (2000).
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entation from the outset. An advantage is that it would need to report regularly
to the ministers of finance, thus encouraging and framing their deliberations.
The Role of Financial Markets
In the matter of exchange rate arrangements, financial markets are both foes and
friends. They are foes because they are prone to challenge policies whenever
they detect vulnerability. Some vulnerabilities are the consequence of bad poli-
cies, in which case an early warning is not unproductive, even if it is painful.
But in a world where self-fulfilling crises feed on intrinsic vulnerabilities, mar-
kets can impose excessively high standards of good behavior. When policies are
well designed, however, markets can produce powerful support. A good example
is the run-up to the monetary union in Europe. When it became clear that Italy
would join the EMU, its interest rates quickly converged with those of Ger-
















Figure 4-4. Treasury Bill Rates in Europe, 1992–2000
10101-04_Ch04_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:06 PM  Page 131
132 charles wyplosz
a vote of confidence in the undertaking, but it solidified the link between the
lira and the mark until the euro was launched. In contrast, the British rate has
retained a life of its own, reflected in euro-pound exchange rate fluctuations.
A further lesson is that the European bond markets have become integrated,
thus holding up the promise of a deep and efficient market. This has been a
bonus to the smaller countries and has provided ex post justification of capital
liberalization.
The implication is that markets ought to be called upon when they can pro-
vide support and kept at bay when they can be disruptive. If exchange rate
arrangements are of the soft peg variety, they are highly vulnerable to specula-
tive pressure. This observation provides a solid case for restraining capital flows.
If the decision is to go all the way to a monetary union, the markets can support
the process, but only if it is well crafted and politically guaranteed. Until this
happens, the markets are likely to spot cracks in design and political will and
tear up the project, another argument for imposing restraints.
Finally, is regional financial market integration a substitute for an exchange
arrangement? To start with, if some of the national markets are already inte-
grated with world markets, regional integration means de facto global integra-
tion. As argued earlier, financial market integration sharpens the choice of an
exchange rate regime—the hollowing-out hypothesis. Consequently, such a
move can either provide impetus for a hard exchange arrangement (monetary
union) or force free floating. Regions that include countries that are conducting
a substantial amount of trade among themselves are unlikely to find a high level
of exchange rate volatility.
Conclusions
Europe has provided the two most accomplished examples of regional exchange
rate arrangements: first the ERM and now a monetary union. Are these arrange-
ments that should and can be emulated elsewhere? This chapter argues that
small open economies that have intensive trade links, or that wish to intensify
trade links, are naturally interested in stabilizing their internal exchange rates. It
also argues that the European approach has followed sound, well-recognized
principles. For these reasons, it offers a blueprint that could be adopted in other
regions.
Yet it is not an example that will be easy to follow. The strategy of achieving a
deep level of economic integration was built upon much wider objectives than
just a common market. At the heart of the process has been the desire to put to
rest centuries of war. Fresh memories of mutual destruction have made it easier
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for Europeans to agree to ever wider transfers of sovereignty, in spite of deter-
mined opposition and profound national divergences. Indeed, it is not by chance
that the decision to share a common currency closely followed an exceptional
event, the collapse of the Berlin Wall.
Another important feature of the European process is that there was never any
master plan. Integration has always been characterized by a process of muddling
through, taking two steps forward and one step back, with deep and lingering
divergences as to what the end objective should be. But each integration step
has made the next one more likely. Success in one area emboldened political
leaders to contemplate another even bolder project in another area. More cru-
cially perhaps, each important step has been matched by some additional insti-
tutional buildup, which has provided the backbone for further moves. It is
difficult to overstate the importance of the early creation of institutions to sup-
port the integration process, no matter how imperfect those institutions are.
Another important consideration is that for a significant period many Euro-
pean countries have kept capital controls in place in a world where full capital
mobility was the exception, not the rule. When the worldwide process of liber-
alization picked up speed, Europe had already moved a long way down the road
of regional exchange rate stability. Given its attachment to and success with
exchange rate stability, when forced to choose between a free float and a mone-
tary union as the result of its own financial liberalization, the choice was rela-
tively straightforward.
The European solution of operating soft pegs for an extended period, while
keeping the ultimate aim of a monetary union unspecified, requires that capital
controls be retained or, in some instances, reestablished. This worked in Europe,
and it can work elsewhere as well. But if capital controls are ruled out, the menu
of available choices shrinks and becomes polarized. Soft pegs are unlikely to last
very long, leaving two alternatives: regional floating or a reasonably speedy
move to a monetary union. A monetary union requires strong political will,
especially in regions that have been hesitant to consider transfers of sovereignty
and have not yet put in place the institutions that will be required to prepare and
implement the necessary steps. These include establishing a regional central
bank, providing for some form of democratic accountability, and adopting
measures that will guarantee fiscal discipline. But it seems that it will take excep-
tional circumstances to effectively move in that direction.
This is why, after all, a slow process may be more realistic, even if its evolution
must be measured in generations, not years. The first step in such a process is joint
management of exchange rates—either fixed and adjustable pegs backed by capital
controls as in the ERM, or joint management of floats. This is why the capital
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mobility regime is a key preliminary decision. The role of capital controls remains
an open and controversial issue. It is sometimes claimed that capital controls are
no longer feasible in today’s globalized world. This claim is unsubstantiated.
Nevertheless, countries that have already liberalized their capital movements,
and often paid a high price for it,20 are unlikely to reverse course. At any rate, if
capital flow liberalization is considered desirable, such a step must be accompa-
nied by substantial exchange rate flexibility. In either case, regions that wish to
limit bilateral exchange volatility cannot escape setting up a dedicated institu-
tion and establishing ERM-type multilateral agreements of mutual support.
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Since its beginning, European integration has been accompanied by the creationof major financial mechanisms. Such mechanisms and the resulting financial
transfers have been seen as both an economic and a political condition for making
economic integration effective and equitable. These mechanisms have included
grants (through the Structural Funds), loans (mainly through the European Invest-
ment Bank), and most recently, guarantees (European Investment Fund).
These financial mechanisms have had two major aims: (1) reducing income
differentials between countries and regions within the European Community
(and later the European Union), particularly those resulting from trade liberal-
ization, and (2) allocating major financial resources to facilitate the functioning
of an increasingly integrated market, for example by financing interconnection
of national networks in transport and telecommunications. While other aims
have later been added, these two remain central.
It is important to stress that very large—and growing—resources have been
allocated in Europe consistently for these aims. To an important extent this
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dynamic has been driven by the relatively poorer countries, which during the
negotiations over their joining the European Community have put as a precon-
dition the creation, or sharp increase, of grants and loans. The first such case
was when Italy—before joining the European Economic Community in the
mid-1950s—pressed for the creation of the European Investment Bank, largely
to help fund infrastructure in the poorer southern part of Italy. Similarly, when
other countries joined, the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund were cre-
ated to address their needs. More recently, pre-accession funds have been put in
place to prepare transition economies for joining.
This chapter focuses mainly on the experience of the European Investment
Bank (EIB), a bank that lends far more than the World Bank. However, we
first analyze the broader context of fiscal (grants) mechanisms linked to Euro-
pean integration. We outline their historical evolution, describe their rationale
and main features, and highlight their scale. As we discuss, fiscal transfers via
the structural funds have represented very high proportions of the GDP of
poorer countries (between 3 and 4 percent of GDP for Portugal and Greece
during the 1990s). In the 1990s an interesting innovation was introduced: sig-
nificant fiscal transfers were made to Eastern European countries before they
joined the European Union (EU), via special mechanisms. Thus significant
resources (both loans and grants) have been transferred recently even during
pre-accession periods.
The next section is dedicated to the EIB, which was created to help achieve
the goal of economic convergence. In the bank’s early stages, capital markets
were incomplete and underdeveloped, so there was a strong case, both theoreti-
cally and politically, for dealing with such market imperfections through the
creation of a public bank. Another interesting feature of the evolution of the
EIB is its relatively low level of lending in the initial phase (first decade), with
very large increases afterward. This section concludes by outlining key policy
issues at the EIB today.
In developing countries, particularly the relatively poorer ones, where market
imperfections still prevail, especially in capital and credit markets for long-term
finance, the role of regional public banks in integration processes is probably
more similar to that of the EIB in its early stages—that is, explicitly supporting,
via loans, a regionally integrated infrastructure and providing assistance to
poorer regions. Nonetheless, the issue of greater focus on mechanisms such as
guarantees and other risk-bearing instruments, rather than on pure loans, also
has increasing relevance for integration among developing countries. In the final
analysis, the central lesson from the EIB experience is the importance of a large
and dynamic public bank to support integration and convergence processes.
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Fiscal Transfers within the European Union
The original broad European aim was to reduce disparities between regions by
providing large-scale funding. In the late 1980s, a narrower rationale was
adopted.1 The European Community would not take responsibility for address-
ing those disparities that predated its existence, but it was necessary to find a
means by which additional disparities that might be created in poorer regions by
trade liberalization would be compensated financially. The political goal was to
maintain support for the integration process in poorer countries.
European regional policy has developed gradually, influenced by successive
periods of deepening and widening of the European Union. The major stages
and the financing mechanisms created are outlined in table 5-1.
Funds for Equitable Development
In the preamble to the Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic
Community (EEC) in 1957, the member countries explicitly called for ensuring
“harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the var-
ious regions and the backwardness of the less favored regions.” In keeping with
this clear objective and with the underlying vision that financial transfers are
both a political and an economic condition for making economic integration
effective and equitable, from its inception the European Community created
major financial mechanisms, including both loans and grants.
These major institutional mechanisms created in the EEC responded to
widely accepted studies in economics that have shown that trade liberalization
contributes, via economies of scale and other mechanisms, to more rapid
growth overall, but owing to inherent asymmetries also leads to relatively less
rapid growth (or even decline) in relatively poorer areas.2 Besides creating mech-
anisms to reduce potentially growing inequalities between regions and countries
as a result of trade liberalization, from the start the EEC allocated major financial
resources to interconnect national networks (in transport and telecommunica-
tions, in particular) and to facilitate the functioning of an increasingly inte-
grated market. Broader aims, such as educational and cultural exchanges and
improvements in the environment, have also been funded.
The European Investment Bank was created at the same time as the EEC to
further the objectives of harmonious development and compensation of less
favored regions. It committed a high proportion of its loans to finance infra-
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Table 5-1. Development of European Union Regional Policy
and Main Financing Mechanisms





The preamble to the Treaty
of Rome refers to the need
“to strengthen the unity of
their [the countries of the
European Community]






backwardness of the less
favored regions.”
The northern enlargement 
of the European Union
increases regional imbal-
ances. The United
Kingdom lobbies for an
EU regional policy in its
accession negotiations.






1981, and Spain and
Portugal in 1986—
provides further impetus
for EU regional policy.
The Treaty on European
Union, which comes into
force in 1993, designates
cohesion as one of the
main objectives of the
union, alongside
economic and monetary
union and the single
market.
1958: The European Investment Bank is set up
under the Treaty of Rome to provide long-
term loans in support of European
integration. A key objective of the EIB is to
strengthen the economically weaker
regions.
1958: The two sector-based Structural Funds,
the European Social Fund (ESF) and the
European Agricultural Guidance and
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), are established.
1975: The European Regional Development
Fund (ERDF) is created to redistribute part
of the member states’ budget contributions
to the poorest regions.
1986: The Single European Act lays the basis
for a genuine cohesion policy designed to
offset the burden of the single market for
southern countries and other less favored
regions.
1989–93: The European Council in Brussels
in February 1988 overhauls the operation
of the Structural Funds and doubles the
resources allocated to them.
1993: The Cohesion Fund is created to support
projects in the fields of the environment
and transport in the least prosperous
member states. Alongside the Structural
Funds, a new Financial Instrument for
Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) is created.
In 1994, the European Investment Fund is
created to provide guarantees for
infrastructure and investment in small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
(continued)
10101-05_Ch05_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:06 PM  Page 139
structure in poorer regions and countries. Italy, where there was much poverty
in the south, played a key role in pressing for the bank’s creation.
Several Structural Funds were created to provide grants for poorer regions
and specific sectors (especially agriculture). The three funds created initially
were the European Social Fund, the European Agriculture Guidance and Guar-
antee Fund (the basis for the Common Agricultural Policy), and the European
Regional Development Fund. An additional large fund, the Cohesion Fund,
was created when Portugal and Spain joined, as a result of pressure from the
new members, particularly Spain.
In 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and the transition to the market and
democracy began in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the then European
Community quickly created fairly generous mechanisms to support the CEE
countries’ transition to the market. The transfer of know-how was considered
just as important as the financial assistance provided, if not more so. The previ-
ously existing European Investment Bank lent on an important scale to these
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Source: Information compiled by the authors.
Table 5-1. (continued)
Year Context Main events
In 1993, the Copenhagen
European Council invites
the central European




process is launched in
1997.
The future enlargement of
the European Union,
with the addition of ten
central European
countries, will increase the
demands on the EU
budget for cohesion.
The PHARE Program, set up in 1989 to
provide support to the countries of central
Europe during transition, is reoriented in
1993. From 1997, PHARE becomes totally
focused on pre-accession assistance,
becoming the first of three pre-accession
instruments.
1999: The Structural Funds and the
Cohesion Fund are reformed.
The Instrument for Structural Policies for 
Pre-accession (ISPA) and the Special
Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural
Development (SAPARD) complement 
the PHARE Program to promote the
economic and social development of
applicant countries in central Europe.
In 2000, the European Investment Fund
becomes part of the EIB, focusing on
venture capital and guarantees for
institutions financing SMEs.
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countries, and a new development bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD), was established in support of the transition. In spite
of its name, the EBRD does not respond solely to European interests; its board
of directors comprises both European and other members—Japan, the United
States, and others—and in the years after its creation it lent not only to the
European region but also to the former Soviet Union. The EBRD is thus differ-
ent from the EIB, which was established as, and remains, a European bank.
In 1997 the Council of the European Union officially launched the current
round of European Union enlargement, with ten countries from Central and
Eastern Europe negotiating accession. To assist the accession process, the finan-
cial instruments and mechanisms previously used to support transition to the
market in those countries were transformed fairly easily and seamlessly into
mechanisms for preparing them for integration into the European Single Market,
which is a significantly more advanced stage of trade integration than a free-trade
area. Moreover, during the 1990s, pre-accession funding became far larger than
in the past, and its aims became more ambitious, focusing particularly on coun-
tries preparing to integrate effectively into the single market while also providing
resources for poorer regions and people, as well as supporting cross-border com-
munications. Post-accession funding will become slightly less generous than in
the past (especially for agriculture), but will still be large.
Since their creation, the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund have been
the main instruments of social and economic cohesion policy in the European
Union. Through the four Structural Funds, the European Union grants finan-
cial assistance to resolve structural, economic, and social problems.3 The Struc-
tural Funds underwent major reform in 1988 and again in 1993 when the
Cohesion Fund was introduced.
Since the 1988 reforms, European Union structural policy has become even
more significant in financial terms. By 1999 the Structural Funds and the Cohe-
sion Fund together accounted for around one-third of the budget for EU policies
and amounted to some 0.5 percent of the EU’s GDP. Such funding represented
very high proportions of the GDP of the poorer countries: almost 4 percent for
Portugal and Greece (see table 5-2).
To put this in perspective, the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of post-
war Europe was equivalent to around 1 percent of the annual GDP of the
United States and contributed an average of 2 percent of the European annual
GDP over the period 1948–51. EU structural intervention is lower per year, at
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3. The four Structural Funds are the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the
European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agriculture Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF),
and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG).
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4. European Commission, Annual Report on the Structural Funds (2000).
around 0.5 percent of GDP, but is far higher in cumulative terms, since it has
represented a long-term commitment for a large number of years.
There has been a dramatic increase in the level of funding available through
the Structural Funds over the past forty years. In 1961, about 78.6 million was
allocated through these funds. This figure had risen to 711.8 million by 1971.
Total EU expenditure on the Structural Funds had reached nearly 714 billion
by 1991 and some 732 billion by 2001.4
In terms of the distribution of funds, table 5-2 shows that between 1989 and
1993 the five recipients of the largest share of Structural Fund financing were
Spain (21 percent), Italy (17 percent), Portugal (13 percent), Greece (12 percent),
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Table 5-2. European Union Structural Funds, 1989–1993, and Structural Funds




ECUs and (millions of ECUs
percent of 1989–93 and percent of 1994–99
Country or region EU-12) (percent of GDP)b EU-15) (percent of GDP)c
Belgium 740 (1.2) 0.11 1,808 (1.3) 0.18
Denmark 402 (0.6) 0.08 741 (0.5) 0.11
Germany 6,015 (9.5) 0.13 19,519 (14.1) 0.21
Greece 7,528 (11.9) 2.65 13,980 (10.1) 3.67
Spain 13,100 (20.8) 0.75 31,668 (22.9) 1.74
France 5,907 (9.4) 0.14 13,334 (9.6) 0.22
Ireland 4,460 (7.1) 2.66 5,620 (4.1) 2.82
Italy 10,753 (17.1) 0.27 19,752 (14.3) 0.42
Luxembourg 55 (0.1) 0.17 83 (0.1) 0.15
Netherlands 725 (1.1) 0.07 2,194 (1.6) 0.15
Portugal 8,450 (13.4) 3.07 13,980 (10.1) 3.98
United Kingdom 4,816 (7.6) 0.13 11,409 (8.2) 0.25
EU-12 62,951 (100) 0.29
Austria 1,432 (1.0) 0.19
Finland 1,503 (1.1) 0.40
Sweden 1,178 (0.8) 0.37
EU-15 138,201 (100) 0.51
Source: European Commission.
a. ECU: European currency unit.
b. Based on annual average Structural Fund totals, and on average GDP in the period 1989–93.
c. Based on annual average Structural Fund totals, and on GDP in 1994.
10101-05_Ch05_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:06 PM  Page 142
5. See Milanovic (2002).
6. Ben-David (1996); Ben-David and Kimhi (2000).
7. See EU (2004) and, for example, Solanes (2001).
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and Germany (9 percent). In the later 1994–99 period, for which the figures
include financing from the Cohesion Fund, the major recipients were again Spain
(23 percent), Italy (14 percent), Germany (14 percent), Portugal (10 percent),
and Greece (10 percent). Table 5-2 also indicates the importance of these funds to
the economies of the recipient countries by showing the annualized funding
received as a proportion of their GDP. In both periods, EU structural funding
represented a significant proportion of GDP for Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and
Spain. In 1994–99 Structural Funds accounted for 4.0 percent of GDP for Portu-
gal, 3.7 percent for Greece, 2.8 percent for Ireland, and 1.7 percent for Spain.
In the case of poorer countries such as Portugal and Spain, where time allows
for more precise measurement of outcomes, the impact of post-accession EU
funds has been broadly positive, especially in contributing to convergence with
average European income per capita; it can also be seen in physical develop-
ments, such as the increase in new road and rail links, particularly those con-
necting with other European states. These advances have greatly facilitated both
the integration of trade and integration in the broader sense.
There does remain some debate about the exact contribution made by the
Structural Funds as opposed to that of the overall process of integration. Recent
studies have shown a positive trend toward convergence between richer and
poorer states of the European Union (unlike in other regions of the world),5
and there can be little doubt that the integration process has played a significant
part.6 First Italy, then the poorest states in the EU-15 (Spain, Greece, Portugal,
and Ireland) all saw a process of catching up. Ireland came from behind to an
above-average position in income per head.
There is a little more debate about the specific contribution made by the
Structural Funds themselves. Work by the European Commission and by sev-
eral academics on country convergence has supported the view that the Struc-
tural Funds have played an important role.7 It is certainly the case that for
smaller poorer countries the receipt of up to 4 percent of GNP in financial
transfers can make a substantial difference. In the Irish case, it is widely believed
that these funds were well used and that they contributed to the emergence of
Ireland as a high-tech economy. The convergence that has occurred within the
EU has been a convergence of national levels of income per head, while within
countries there has been something of a divergence between richer and poorer
regions in relative terms. In Greece, Portugal, and Spain, it is the richer regions
that have caught up the fastest with the rest of the European Union.
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The broad conclusion of analysts is that while EU funds seem to have had a
positive effect at the country level, the results at the regional level have been
more nuanced.8 The evidence is consistent with the view that EU funds have
made a positive impact on growth where the policy environment is favorable.
The extreme example of this, of course, has been Ireland. The Greek experience,
in contrast, to some extent indicates the limitations of transfers when absorptive
capacity is insufficient.9
The European Commission, meanwhile, in its latest (2004) Cohesion Report,
finds evidence that since 1988 the “Objective 1 regions”—those entitled to
maximum EU regional support—have been growing faster. A simple regression
of growth by region against receipt of EU funds does indeed show a positive
correlation, but the association is weak, implying that other factors need to
interact with the funds themselves. It can be concluded that there is evidence
that structural funds have had a positive impact on the growth of poorer coun-
tries. However, the nature of the link is complex.
Unfortunately, neither the European Commission nor the authorities that
have received such assistance have formally evaluated the effectiveness of differ-
ent pre-accession instruments. Our analysis, interviews, and experience suggest
that a structural program such as the pre-accession financing program offered to
the Central and Eastern European countries is far superior to the more ad hoc,
substantially lower pre-accession financing provided to Portugal. (Spain had no
pre-accession grants, though it had pre-accession EIB loans.) However, the
effort needed to achieve successful integration into Europe was also smaller for
Spain and Portugal than it was for the CEE countries. This was because Euro-
pean integration had progressed significantly further when the CEE countries
joined than when Spain and Portugal joined, owing especially to the creation in
1992 of the Single European Market. The accession funding for countries such
as Portugal and Spain was focused mainly on the original aims of EU funding:
redistribute to facilitate convergence and support investment, especially in infra-
structure, to help European integration. However, a fairly dominant additional
aim of pre-accession funding to the CEE countries was linked to the vast effort
of harmonization of regulations and standards to meet EU norms (broadly
called the Acquis Communtaire) so as to join a well-advanced single market.
Given their larger scale and their greater flexibility, EIB loans are an extremely
valuable part of the pre-accession package in areas such as infrastructure, small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and others. In both Spain and Portugal, as
8. See Funck and Pizzati (2003).
9. See EIB (2000).
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well as in the Central and Eastern European countries, EIB loans were disbursed
more easily and in a more streamlined way than grants.
Lessons Learned for Other Regional Integration Experiences
Financial mechanisms for accession can contribute to convergence between rich
and poor countries and regions if they are both adequately funded and effective.
The scale and coverage of the financing mechanisms used by the European
Union to aid countries before and after accession has been extensive. European
Union grant financing and EIB loans have together represented a meaningful
proportion of each country’s GDP and total investment. Added to this, the
budget figures for EU Structural Funds do not immediately convey their signifi-
cance for the economically weaker areas of the EU. As resource transfers are very
heavily concentrated in the poorer areas, where economic activity is relatively
low, they are of considerable size. Also, as Structural Fund allocations are based
on the principle of cofinancing, with individual member states contributing
resources to supplement the EU funding, they can act as a catalyst for higher
levels of resource transfers to poorer regions. Naturally, the scale of resources
made available through grants in the European case has been linked to the abil-
ity and willingness of the richer countries in the EU—particularly Germany in
the initial phases—to make such resources available.
Policies designed to improve economic and social cohesion among member
states are also very important in political terms. First, they help to unite member
countries around a common goal. In the European context, for example, there has
always been a strong sense of a European model of society, comprising elements
such as a social market economy, free trade, democratic systems, and social cohe-
sion. The financial mechanisms to support regional integration in the European
Union are very much rooted in a desire to uphold this model of society. Second,
cohesion policies are important in order to maintain the support of poorer and
weaker states and regions for trade integration. Indeed, Portugal and Spain have
been among the most steadfast supporters of the European integration process.
Though the level of enthusiasm for integration may be somewhat lower at present
in regional groupings in developing countries, or in the proposed Free Trade Area
of the Americas, even free-trade areas require sustained political support.
A general lesson from early and later entrants seems to be that financial assis-
tance works better the more decentralized the decisions are. Decentralized deci-
sions (both in countries and in regions) not only are more efficient and make
the best use of local knowledge and experience; they can also play an important
role in fostering institutional development. Greater effectiveness and agility are
also supported by the EIB, which has opened offices in member countries, and
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by the European Commission country offices, which have been given greater
autonomy to approve programs without involving Brussels.
Though the European experience shows that it is valuable to provide support
in a number of dimensions, the experience in different countries, from Portugal
to the Czech Republic, suggests that effectiveness improves with a focus on a
fairly limited number of programs linked to the priorities defined in the trade
integration program. As Devlin and colleagues point out, a limited number
of programs—together with other factors such as clear objectives and work
programs—helps make cooperation successful.10 Problems of absorptive capacity,
especially in smaller countries, can more easily be overcome if assistance is nar-
rowly focused and specific, because this facilitates provision of sufficient finance
and technical assistance that can help overcome problems of implementation.
The EU Structural Funds were initially universal, although they were heavily
concentrated on poorer nations and regions (including poorer regions in richer
countries). Later, a targeted fund—the Cohesion Fund—was created to provide
financing for environment and infrastructure projects in the poorer countries only.
Infrastructure integration has received a great deal of priority and funding.
However, other areas (such as educational and cultural exchanges, research, integra-
tion, and environmental improvements) have also been funded, as European inte-
gration is seen as being broader than purely trade or even economic integration.
The European Investment Bank
The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community,
contained several provisions for the creation of instruments that could con-
tribute to “harmonious development” and the reduction of regional disparities.
The European Investment Bank, one of the most powerful of those instru-
ments, was established by the treaty “to contribute to the balanced and smooth
development of the Common Market in the interest of the Community.” The
EIB was intended as a source of relatively low interest loans and guarantees that
would facilitate the financing of: “(a) projects for developing less developed
regions; (b) projects for modernizing or converting undertakings or for develop-
ing fresh activities called for by the progressive establishment of the common
market; (c) projects of common interest to several Member States, which are of
such size or nature that they cannot be entirely financed by the various means
available in the individual Member States.”11
10. Devlin, Estevadeordal, and Krivonos (2002).
11. Treaty of Rome, Article 130.
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The EIB was created, therefore, as a bank to support the European integra-
tion process. Its three objectives reflected three major concerns expressed during
the negotiation of the Treaty of Rome. The first was to help reduce the gulf
between relatively prosperous and relatively poorer regions. This concern also
reflected the fear that, if not compensated for, European integration could
increase imbalances. In the treaty negotiations, the Italian government pressed
strongly for the creation of the EIB, precisely for this purpose; according to
some sources, the creation of the EIB and its concentration on lending to south-
ern Italy were a precondition for Italy to join the EEC. The second major con-
cern was to help “senile industries,” or areas where such industries were dominant,
that were not able to compete on their own and required support to modernize,
convert, or develop new activities. The third concern was the need to finance
investment that would help to integrate the European economies and that would
apply to several member states or to the EEC as a whole, particularly in the
area of cross-frontier communications (especially transport). This concern was
related to the fact that much of the existing infrastructure at the time was geared
toward meeting domestic needs; the creation of the EEC led to new cross-
border needs. It is noteworthy that these three aspects (possibly in somewhat
different proportions) could also be central supportive measures in other inte-
gration processes.
Because currencies in the mid-1950s were still not fully convertible and capi-
tal markets were underdeveloped, there was a strong case, both theoretically and
politically, for dealing with these market imperfections through the creation of a
public bank. The main mission of this bank would be to assist in channeling sav-
ings from the more developed parts of the EEC to the less developed parts
(regional development). At the same time it was recognized that a customs union
was needed to complete and transform an essentially juxtaposed national infra-
structure into an integrated European infrastructure (European integration).
The European Commission was given responsibility for making funds avail-
able on a grant basis to assist lagging regions. As there was a limited supply of
grant money, and as it was felt that for many projects the problem was not lack
of returns but financial constraints, it made sense to complement grant facilities
with loans. This was the job given to the EIB.
The Institutional Setup
The EIB is an international nonprofit organization with headquarters in Lux-
embourg. Its shareholders are the member countries of the European Union.
The bank is designed as the Hausbank of the European Union. As such, it
receives its strategic lending mission (what type of lending, in which parts of the
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outside world) from its Board of Governors after discussion in the Ecofin
Council. It follows the policies set by the European Commission and ensures
that the projects it finances respect European guidelines (European environ-
mental guidelines, for example). The EIB follows a division of labor with the
commission (for example on economic forecasts) and with other international
organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Its own policy analysis is therefore very limited. The EIB does not sys-
tematically make sectoral policy analyses (a World Bank or European Commis-
sion job) or macro policy analyses (an IMF or European Commission job), and
therefore abstains from making policy recommendations.
As a result, the EIB has a very lean staff (some 1,200 in 2004) and low
expenses in relation to loan volume. Its activity is focused on the European
Union (close to 90 percent of outstanding loans), although over time it has
increasingly been asked also to operate outside the EU.
The EIB was set up in 1957 with subscribed capital of 71 billion. After its last
capital increase and before enlargement on May 1, 2004, its subscribed capital
stood at 7150 billion and its paid-in capital at 77.5 billion. Reserves stood at
718.5 billion, bringing its funds up to 725.9 billion. After enlargement on May
1, 2004, subscriptions of new members increased the total to 7163.6 billion.
Each member state’s share in the bank’s capital is calculated in accordance with
its economic weight within the EU (expressed in GDP) at the time of accession.
Lending and Pricing Policies
The EIB’s lending has been limited to financing projects. Recent developments
create more flexibility. The focus on project lending excludes trade financing or
program financing, such as balance-of-payments support, poverty reduction,
sector reforms, and the like.12 In general, the bank lends up to 50 percent of the
project cost, and often provides as little as one-third of the total funding
required. This implies that the multiplier effect on recipient economies is
increased. Sometimes, at the request of political authorities in the country con-
cerned, this limit is increased to 75 percent to speed up financial support during
downturns of the business cycle or to respond to other priorities. This intro-
duces an interesting explicit element of countercyclicality in the lending opera-
tions of the EIB that should help support economic activity—especially
investment—in periods of economic downturn.
12. Member states have national vehicles to provide and commercial banks to carry out trade
financing. In less developed areas this may not be the case. For this reason, the main financial mis-
sion of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB), for example, is trade financing.
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For a project to receive EIB financial support it must first be eligible. This
means it must fall into one of the categories of projects to which the bank
lends. Then it must satisfy the bank’s exacting borrower quality standards. If
the borrower is not a government, it must provide adequate guarantees. In
addition to the quality conditions to be satisfied by the borrower, the project
must be financially and economically sound. Since the main objective of the
bank is to contribute to the European Community’s economic performance
(regional development, European infrastructure, high environmental standards,
European competitiveness, and energy security), the project must be financially
sound and must have a high social return. This social return (the internal rate of
return augmented by externalities such as employment creation) is always diffi-
cult to assess, leaving scope for political desiderata. The bank’s Board of Direc-
tors is the arbitration court for such matters.
To assess a project’s social return and conformity to EU policies (such as inter-
national competitive bidding and environmental standards), it is evaluated by a
team of lending officers, economists, and engineers. For less sophisticated borrow-
ers, this evaluation can lead to project modification and improvement. The scope
for such enhancements is obviously limited for projects put forward by sophisti-
cated corporations. The technical and economic evaluation of projects of reputed
corporations in the European Union is therefore much more limited.
In its lending activity the bank needs to observe subsidiarity. This means, in
principle, that the bank lends to projects only when there are no other means
available. This is a sound theoretical principle but a difficult one to make opera-
tional. At some price other funds tend to become available to solid borrowers,
who are the borrowers to whom the bank currently tends to lend. But if sub-
sidiarity has to be assessed on the basis of the alternative financing cost, what is
the cutoff spread? In current practice, borrowers make the decision. If the
bank’s offer is more favorable in terms of cost than the alternatives, borrowers
request a bank loan, and the bank’s more favorable offer contributes to the suc-
cess of the project. It might be more efficient if the EIB were to define a bench-
mark (which would naturally be adjusted over time) that would indicate the
minimum cutoff spread over alternative funding for which the EIB would lend.
While subsidiarity is a difficult issue to deal with, the EIB attaches great value to
cooperating closely with banks and other financial institutions.
The EIB is a not-for-profit institution and therefore prices its loans with the
aim only of covering costs. Given its very high degree of financial solidity, it
enjoys a triple-A rating. It therefore borrows at the best terms, with only a slight
spread over triple-A-rated government debt. A markup is added to this cost of
funding to cover administrative costs. Given the high lending volume per
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employee (personnel costs account for 80 percent of total administrative costs),
these costs are small. In line with the increase in outstanding loans per employee,
the cost-covering markup declined to 15 basis points in the early 1990s.
The markup calculation was then changed to reflect more directly costs
incurred per project. A major problem is that the administrative cost is concen-
trated on origination and therefore not related to loan maturity. Hence it would
be best to compute a single up-front fee. For a variety of reasons, however, a
markup embodied in the interest rate is preferred, and a modulation of the
markup for very long maturities has therefore been introduced. The administra-
tive cost of a 71 billion loan is not a hundred times the administrative cost of a
710 million loan. Repeat loans also generate lower costs. Modulation now gen-
erates markups in the range of 5 to 15 basis points. The combination of a low
financial cost with a very low administrative markup means that the bank’s
lending conditions are extremely attractive for borrowers, even when compared
with those of other international financial institutions such as the World Bank
or the EBRD.
As this description of EIB pricing makes clear, there is no explicit subsidy in
EIB lending. Rather, the strong financial backing of the bank minimizes the
cost of resources to the bank, an advantage passed on to customers. There is,
however, an implicit subsidy. All members of the European Union are treated as
equal. Therefore, lending to governments is priced equally, without a risk pre-
mium and independent of country ratings. These ratings vary in the European
Union from triple-B to triple-A. Borrowers outside the European Union benefit
from an EU guarantee, since the EIB is carrying out lending outside the EU on
the basis of an EU mandate. Accordingly, the EIB does not charge a risk pre-
mium, and borrowers receive a de facto subsidy provided by the European Union.
The Rationale
Market imperfections. A public sector bank finds the justification for its existence
in market imperfections.13 When the bank was created, the major market
imperfections were capital controls, a little-developed and segmented capital
market, and uneven development of the banking sector across the European
Community. Indeed, it could be argued that markets were incomplete or even
missing for longer-term funding in the relatively poorer countries of the EC—
first the south of Italy; then new entrants such as Greece, Ireland, and Portugal;
and more recently, the new accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
What are the justifications today?
13. For more discussion, see Stiglitz (1998).
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Except for rated borrowers, the market is still characterized by pronounced
market imperfections arising from information asymmetries. Asymmetric infor-
mation arises because one party to the contract (the borrower) has more and
better information than the other party (the lender or investor). Asymmetric
information leads to two problems in the financial system: adverse selection and
moral hazard.
The asymmetric information problem illustrates that the provision of reliable
information is crucial to the ability of financial markets to perform their function
efficiently and to distinguish good from bad credit risks. One solution to the
asymmetric information problem is for a lender to collect the necessary informa-
tion to screen and monitor investments. This is what banks usually do when they
establish a long-lasting and, ideally, exclusive (from the banks’ point of view)
relationship with a close customer. But in general, there are two barriers to infor-
mation collection. The first is its cost, particularly when more than one lender is
potentially or actively involved. The second problem is the free rider problem—
that is, the fact that investors who do not spend resources on collecting informa-
tion can still take advantage of information that other institutions have collected.
If bank A lends to a firm, it gives a signal to other potential lenders that it has
collected information that it finds satisfactory. The value of this signal that dis-
seminates information to the market is positively correlated with the reputation
of bank A and becomes a “public good.” This provides incentives to free riding.
One solution to the problem of asymmetric information is for a public bank to
incur the cost of information collection. The EIB does this and acts as a “delegated
monitor.”14 It carries out a very detailed evaluation of projects, going beyond the
typical analysis of a commercial bank, and then monitors the loan carefully.
Because the bank has established a high reputation as a careful evaluator and as a
conservative bank with an excellent track record (very few EIB loans have experi-
enced difficulties), the value of the signal sent when it approves a loan is high. The
bank finances only part of a project, but its participation is a signal to free riding
banks that they may confidently finance the remainder of the capital needs.
The project focus of EIB lending diminishes the moral hazard somewhat.
Monitoring in such cases is easier than with a general loan to a company, since
diversion of funds to other uses with higher risk is more limited. Moreover, a
large part of bank lending is carried out with repeat borrowers that value access
to EIB funding.
It could be argued that the role of the EIB could be further strengthened if 
it lent more to riskier borrowers. In the future, the EIB might be induced by
14. Leland and Pyle (1977).
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market forces to shift a larger part of its operations from providing funds with-
out assuming risks (it currently requires guarantees, which means that the guar-
antors bear the risks) to operations in which the EIB would assume more of the
risks (for example, via guarantees) and private lenders would provide the loans.
In fact, the EIB has already started making this shift through the creation of
the European Investment Fund (EIF), of which the EIB is the largest share-
holder. The EIF provides guarantees, takes equity participation, and supports
venture capital funds, thus taking on this new role of assuming risk. Interesting
lessons may exist here for regional banks’ lending to developing economies.
Completing the market: long-term funding and support for national market
development. The EIB lends to the public and private sectors. During the first
decades of its operations, its lending was heavily concentrated in the public sec-
tor, which at that time was almost exclusively responsible for infrastructure proj-
ects in many countries. Such projects are highly capital-intensive and require
long periods of financing. The bank was designed as a long-term lending insti-
tution because market imperfections have been most pronounced in that seg-
ment. Since its creation, the bank has made loans with maturities of up to thirty
years, depending on project needs. Over time, as capital markets have developed
and the expertise needed to finance infrastructure has evolved and spread, the
private sector has gained importance.
The bank lends in any convertible currency requested by customers. It lends
at fixed rates for the life of a loan, at variable rates, or with options for resetting
or conversion of lending conditions. EIB loans also benefit from a grace period
for gradual repayment, which is normally three years, but may be more if the
project profile makes a longer grace period desirable.
Because few banks lend for long maturities at fixed rates, the bank has
acquired a unique reputation for fixed-rate long-term lending.15 The social
value of fixed-nominal-rate lending is, however, debatable. Simulations carried
out by bank staff suggest that it would have been cheaper in the long run for
borrowers to have borrowed from the EIB at variable interest rates than at fixed
rates. Fixed interest rates do have the advantage of providing stable payments.
However, this is valid only for nominal interest payments; in contrast, since
variable interest rates tend to be more closely correlated with inflation, variable
interest rates might actually generate more stable real interest payments.
An interesting and positive side-product of the EIB has been its contribution
to the development of bond markets in local currencies of member states. Such
15. Before the introduction of the euro, long-term loans, even at variable interest rates, were
not generally available in many countries of today’s “Euroland.”
10101-05_Ch05_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:06 PM  Page 152
european financial institutions 153
borrowings by a well-recognized regional bank with a triple-A rating may make
significant contributions to the development of local bond markets. The EIB
played a significant role in this respect in the capital markets of Greece, Portu-
gal, and Spain during the 1990s and since then has done so in the emerging
markets of Central Europe.
Financial Strength of the Bank
The authors of the bank’s establishing agreement had a clear vision of its mis-
sion and of how to accomplish that mission. However, these views obviously
reflected the financial knowledge and market conditions of the 1950s, and
increasingly they need to be interpreted flexibly in the current context.
One compelling argument for the bank’s founders was that it should be
made as financially strong as possible. This was rightly seen as having two
advantages: first, a low likelihood of recourse to shareholder money, and second,
a low cost of funding from capital markets for the projects funded by the bank.
As less-than-triple-A-rated banks realize benefits from creating triple-A-rated
special vehicles, less-than-triple-A-rated governments can do the same. In the
terminology of economics, this is a coordination gain.
The first step toward financial solidity is a generous endowment of equity cap-
ital. The bank has a gearing ratio between outstanding loans and subscribed capi-
tal of 250 percent. The ratio of the World Bank, in comparison, is 100 percent.
However, the conservative nature of the EIB’s gearing ratio becomes apparent
from the second quality feature: 5 percent of the subscribed capital has to be paid
in, and the unpaid 95 percent is a contingent capital guarantee of shareholders.
Moreover, should a shareholder be unable to pay up, then all others are collec-
tively liable. This provides very strong capital backing.
The third qualitative feature is on the assets side. All loans must be ade-
quately guaranteed by a first-class third party. For a long time, guarantees were
provided mainly by governments. This was the case when EIB lending was
mostly concentrated in the public sector. Over time, the share of lending to the
private sector has increased steadily. Third-party guarantees have mainly been
provided by first-class banks (meaning banks with at least a single-A rating).
A test of the contribution of asset quality to the bank’s solidity is provided by
a computation of the Basel I capital adequacy ratio. Although the bank is not
subject to the Basel framework, such a computation is instructive. Until the
early 1990s, more than half of the outstanding loans enjoyed a government
guarantee and hence a zero risk weighting. The remainder of the loan book was
supported by bank guarantees with a 20 percent risk weighting. It comes, there-
fore, as no surprise that the bank’s capital adequacy ratio exceeded 100 percent,
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far in excess of the minimum requirement of international commercial banks of
8 percent. Over time, with a rising share of lending to the private sector, the
capital adequacy ratio has declined gradually, but it was still very comfortable at
over 30 percent in 2003.
As a result of the bank’s very prudent and conservative approach to lending,
it has not lent to weaker economic actors without strong securities or third-
party guarantees. Loan performance therefore has been exceptionally good, and
provisions are large relative to modest past loan losses. Since only a few loans
have been nonperforming over its forty-six-year existence, the bank’s recourse to
guarantors has also been modest. The reverse side of this coin is that potential
borrowers with excellent credit standing and high-quality guarantees could also
find money elsewhere.
The need for third-party guarantees became increasingly recognized as prob-
lematic and overly conservative—problematic because the bank sought increas-
ingly to lend to the private sector but also to maintain very high quality. Focusing
on top borrowers and insisting on third-party guarantees turned out to be both
contradictory and not market conforming. The commercial cost of a third-party
guarantee, added to the bank’s lending rate, made the package unattractive for
borrowers with a top standing and hence access to the capital market.
To make its loans more attractive to prime lenders, the bank introduced
“single signature” loans, which are loans without a third-party guarantee. They
are unlike loans with a third-party guarantee, which are priced on the basis of the
bank’s “opportunity” refinancing cost (that is, what the bank would pay if it had
to refinance on capital markets on the day of fixing the lending rate for a loan).16
With the hedging techniques available, this “opportunity” rate corresponds, on
average, to the bank’s actual cost of refinancing, plus a markup to cover adminis-
trative costs. In addition, a risk premium is added to single-signature loans. This
risk premium is computed by the bank using advanced financial models, with
external ratings as input. Additional securities such as mortgages or revenue
pledges are accepted by the bank and reflected in the size of the risk premium.
Returns from lending and other investments generate a surplus, because all
projects funded with borrowed resources must be cost-covering. This surplus
(technically not a profit because it remunerates only the factor of production) is
added to the bank’s reserves and makes it possible to augment capital by con-
verting reserves into paid-in capital without cash payments by existing share-
holders. Of course, the gearing ratio of the EIB is defined in terms of subscribed
16. Until the late 1980s lending rates were set on the basis of actual borrowing costs. The
change to “opportunity” cost was a response to market developments.
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capital. But as 5 percent of subscribed capital must be paid-in, there is an
implicit relationship with paid-in capital. The bank can satisfy this constraint by
transferring funds from reserves to paid-in capital.
Since 1991 all capital increases of the EIB have been self-financed in this
way. This obviously makes it easier to increase capital. Had the EIB been
obliged to pay out dividends and then call on shareholders for fresh capital, it
might have been more difficult to sustain lending growth with capital increases.
The return to convertibility of member countries in preparation for the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU) facilitated the bank’s access to national capi-
tal markets.17 A big jump was achieved with the EMU, representing for the bank
a significant improvement in funding through large issues in just one currency,
the euro. Moreover, increasing financial sophistication made the management of
the bank’s asset liability position and its currency risk easier. Today it has become
standard to borrow in currencies for which the bank has no direct use but for
which funding costs are interesting and to swap the proceeds into euros. At pres-
ent, the bank has virtually no compelling immediate financial need for expansion.
The bank’s choice to minimize the risk on its balance sheet and to transfer
lending risk to other parties results in very limited risk diversification in its lend-
ing portfolio. This, in combination with the setting of lending rates to ensure
that costs are covered, makes it impossible to securitize some parts of the loan
portfolio without loss: any investor in an EIB unsecuritized bond would have
more security and the same interest rate. For that reason, in an environment of
growing lending volumes, the EIB carries a large historic loan book that needs
to be supported by ever more subscribed capital.
Historical Evolution of Lending
Exponential lending growth. The activity of the EIB was fairly slow to develop
(see figure 5-1). During its first ten years of operation, total loans amounted to
only 77.983 billion, in comparison with 742.332 billion in 2003 alone, both
expressed in 2003 euros (see table 5-3).
In terms of growth of lending adjusted for price increases, the highest growth
rates were achieved during the period 1965–73, when the average annual real
growth rate was 20 percent (excluding the setup period, during which growth
rates are meaningless). During the period 1974–85 the average annual real
growth rate declined to 15 percent, and since 1985 it has been around 8 per-
cent. Even in recent years, between 1995 and 2003, the average annual real
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Source: Prepared by the authors using EIB data.
Figure 5-1. EIB Lending Growth, 1959–2003
growth rate was 7 percent, which was still much higher than real GDP growth
in the European Union.
During the second decade, from 1969 to 1978, the total lending volume
increased to 735.019 billion (in 2003 euros), which was four times greater than
the lending volume during the first decade. This increase was due to more lend-
ing within the six-member European Community and to an expansion of the
community. Italy was the largest borrower, followed by the United Kingdom.
Lending outside of Europe amounted to less than 10 percent of the total, but as
a result of the first oil shock, lending to the energy sector came close to 30 per-
cent of total lending. And global loans became modestly significant, reaching 
8 percent of total lending.
During the period 1979–88 the EIB became a bank with a recognized role in
Europe. Total lending for the decade increased to 7105.151 billion, in 2003
euros (three times as much as the previous decade). Global loans continued
their march to greater significance, reaching over 20 percent of total lending.
Lending to countries outside of Europe declined to 7 percent of the total.
The total for the next decade, 1989–98, was 7238,349 million, in 2003
euros. Unified Germany and the former socialist countries became major bor-
rowers. Two sectors dominated: infrastructure accounted for nearly 50 percent
of total lending and global loans for 25 percent. Remarkably, global loans
accounted for nearly 50 percent of lending to France and Germany, two coun-
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19. See Griffith-Jones, Stevens, and Georgiadis (1992).
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tries that are not generally considered underrepresented in retail banking and
that have numerous savings banks whose primary function is to lend to SMEs.
During the five years between 1999 and 2004, the lending volume reached
7191.396 billion (in 2003 euros), and the bank became a global name. For the
first time since 1958, Italy was replaced by Germany as the bank’s top borrower,
with Spain not far behind. Because accession countries were treated as if they
had already joined the EC, lending outside the community exceeded 19 percent
of the total. As to the sectoral distribution, energy declined strongly, global
loans exceeded 30 percent, and health and education took off.
Among the sectors supported by the EIB, agriculture has never received
much attention, and global loans (given to financial intermediaries to support
SMEs) were modest during the first two decades (see table 5-4).18 The public
sector was the predominant borrower of financing for infrastructure, energy,
and capital-intensive state industries (airlines, electricity generation and distri-
bution, telephone systems, etc.).
As already pointed out, one of the key aims of the EIB was and is to contribute
to convergence of poorer regions and countries by focusing lending on them.
Griffith-Jones and colleagues deflated total allocations of EIB lending by country,
by years of membership, and by population for the period 1959–90 (see table 5-5)
and found that the countries obtaining the largest loans from the EIB during
that period (per capita and per year of membership) included Ireland, Portugal,
Greece, and Spain.19 These were then the poorest countries in the European
Table 5-3. Total EIB Lending








Source: Prepared by the authors using EIB data.
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Community (with the exception of Denmark, which was not so poor, but also
obtained high levels per capita and per year of membership). This provides strong
indicative evidence that the EIB performed an important redistributive role.
Reasons for sustained growth. This very slow evolution of the bank’s lending
during the first twenty years, and the continued rather rapid expansion of activity
over the past twenty years, are all the more remarkable because the very reason
for the creation of the EIB—namely, capital controls and an underdeveloped
capital market—disappeared with the reforms undertaken in the late 1980s and
early 1990s in preparation for the EMU. To put it more provocatively, the EIB
only started to flourish when its original raison d’être vanished. Why?
There are no convincing reasons for the slow start. Surely, it was wise to build
up operations slowly, to gain experience in the field and to focus on economically
promising projects within a narrow range. As a new bank, the EIB first had to
establish a solid reputation. In addition, the underdeveloped, split-up European
capital market put constraints on the refinancing capability of the bank, a con-
straint that has disappeared with the development of the European capital market.
Most of the lending took place in European currencies, since borrowers preferred
not to take an exchange risk. Financial markets in Europe were still national mar-
kets and were not yet sufficiently developed to allow the bank to borrow in the
more mature U.S. market and then swap the proceeds into European currencies.
The successive enlargements of the European Union automatically expanded
the lending volume. The following example will help to quantify the impact of
EC expansion. Out of the total lending of 7198.325 billion in the period
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1999–2003, 786.530 billion went to the six original members of the commu-
nity (EU-6). If Germany had maintained its borrowing at the same level as
France (before unification Germany always borrowed less than France), then
lending to these six countries would have totaled 774.363 billion. It can thus
be concluded that EU expansion accounted for over 60 percent of activity.
Among the most significant recent decisions by the EIB is the decision to
increase lending in the health and education sectors in recognition of the impor-
tance of such investments for economic growth. During the period 1999–2003,
health and education accounted for 5.14 percent of total lending. Meanwhile,
global loans accounted for 31.85 percent, but the share of industry was only
7.75 percent. If global loans, services, health, and education were subtracted from
the adjusted EU-6 lending of 774.363 billion mentioned above, lending in the
six countries would have dropped to some 745 billion, or only 23 percent of
the total. Hence lending outside the initial EU-6 and to sectors that initially
played little or no role accounted for 78 percent of the expansion in EIB lending.
In addition to these factors, a growing mandate to support the political
objectives of the European Union beyond its borders sustained the growth of
EU lending. The first lending mission outside the European Community con-
cerned projects in African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. In the early 1990s
Latin America and the poorer countries in Asia became eligible. Of course, the
biggest impact on EIB lending outside the EU came from the opening up of the
former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where the EIB is by
far the largest lender. In 2003 the EIB lent more than 74 billion to CEE coun-
tries, or about the amount of its total lending in 1985. Also, for geopolitical
symmetry, lending to Mediterranean countries picked up.
Until the turn of the century, the bank limited its lending outside the Euro-
pean Union to 10 percent of its overall lending. In 2003, lending outside the
EU represented 19.26 percent, of which 10.85 percent went to acceding and
accession countries and 8.41 percent to countries in the rest of the world. Since
the expansion of the EU on May 1, 2004, a large part of the bank’s lending has
once again become internal, and lending outside the EU has gone back down to
close to 10 percent of the total.
Given that the capital adequacy ratio of the EIB is so large, and its expertise
so valuable, it may be worthwhile to consider whether it should increase its
lending to the developing world.
Lessons for New Regional Development Banks
Analysis of the EIB experience suggests a number of structural and operational
features of interest for other regional development banks (RDBs).
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—A regional development bank should be endowed with a small, first-class
professional staff in order to establish a reputation beyond reproach. Management
should execute its mission as set by the bank’s establishing agreement and by its
board of governors (the finance ministers of member states). To minimize politi-
cal horse trading, maximize social acceptance, and optimize the economic effects
of the bank’s interventions, an advisory board composed of nongovernment
experts should provide an opinion on all lending projects for which the social rate
of return is below a set benchmark. Otherwise, all loans should be required to
yield a social rate of return at or above the benchmark.
—The activity of a regional development bank should be focused. For proj-
ect lending, a list of eligible projects might prove useful. This list should recog-
nize the importance of education and health for human capital formation. As
the development of regional trade is a key objective, trade financing should be
among the top priorities. Also, transnational investment projects (pipelines,
train and road connections, airports, and seaports, for example) should receive
priority status.
—There should be no a priori restrictions on either private or public sector
counterparts. Particular priority could be attached to private-public partnerships.
Financial support for any lending project should be limited to the amount
needed to stimulate cofinancing and increase the multiplying effect.
—Borrowing and lending in local currencies of the regional development
bank should receive priority, with the double aim of avoiding foreign exchange
risk for the borrower and assisting in the development of regional capital mar-
kets. However, this will absorb regional savings. Therefore, borrowing in for-
eign currencies should not be excluded. Loans should be made available for long
maturities on a variable-rate basis. This will facilitate shorter-term borrowing by
the RDB for longer-term loans, minimize the risk for the borrower in real
terms, and, experience suggests, reduce the long-term cost of borrowing.
—Subsidiarity (that is, the risk that RDB loans will take business away from
private banks or capital markets) will most likely not be an issue in emerging
markets. To gain professional independence in carrying out its tasks as defined
by its board of governors, and to ensure maximum economic impact from its
financial interventions, the bank could set a minimum social rate of return (that
is, the financial rate of return, plus the positive or negative value of externalities)
as an absolute condition for loan acceptance.
—Asymmetric information is a problem everywhere, but even more so in mar-
kets with less developed financial markets. An important role of the RDB is there-
fore investment in project information and signaling to potential cofinanciers.
To perform this role effectively, the RDB first needs to establish an impeccable
10101-05_Ch05_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:06 PM  Page 161
162 s. griffith-jones, a. steinherr, and a. t. fuzzo de lima
reputation. It must also assume some of the risks. Risk is the greatest stumbling
block in credit markets. It would be difficult to sell off the risk, and the signal-
ing power would be diminished.
—The regional development bank should be endowed with a comfortable cap-
ital base. Because public coffers are not plentiful in emerging countries, it might
be useful to complement the paid-in capital with subscribed, but not paid-in, cap-
ital for possible contingencies. The RDB should be allowed to retain any surpluses
to build up reserves. With strong risk management and a high-quality loan port-
folio, the RDB can obtain an international credit rating above those of member
countries. The goal should be triple-A. This is achievable with strong manage-
ment, a good loan portfolio, cost- and risk-covering prices, and a solid capital
base. Weak ratings of member countries are a disadvantage, but not a decisive one
(with respect to paid-in capital, pecunia non olet, so that only contingent capital
would be affected by a discount factor). This will allow the economies in the
region to have access to better borrowing conditions.
—Over time, as the regional development bank’s growing balance sheet
requires additional capital to maintain the bank’s gearing ratio, certain loans
might be securitized. This would avoid capital increases and focus the role of
the RDB on loan originating.
—Pricing of loans should cover the financial cost, the risks taken, and the
administrative costs. A small profit could be added to strengthen the capital
base. With a triple-A rating and a lean staff, lending rates can be hundreds of
basis points lower than the rates of private banks or the financing costs of local
governments.
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For most developing countries, open regionalism has emerged as a sensibleresponse to the ongoing turbulent and asymmetric process of economic
globalization: it avoids the huge costs associated with both isolationism and out-
right liberalization. Moreover, the successful experience of the countries that
now form the European Union has made regional integration an increasingly
attractive option for the developing world.
Whenever regional integration is intended to go beyond just a free-trade
agreement, macroeconomic coordination becomes a key issue. From a theoreti-
cal standpoint, the underlying idea is simple: when economies are interdepen-
dent, the events that take place and the policies implemented in each of them
will, through various transmission channels, affect the performance of all the
rest. Under these conditions, macro policy coordination appears to be a means
of internalizing the effects of reciprocal interrelationships on decisionmaking in
each economy while improving the results for all concerned.
This idea has spread beyond the borders of the Old World, but for a variety of
reasons, repeated attempts to implement macroeconomic coordination mecha-
nisms outside Europe, and in Latin America in particular, have run into numer-
ous difficulties. Be that as it may, regional integration agreements are now a
well-established reality on the world scene, and Latin America is no exception. In
Macroeconomic Coordination in Latin America:
Does It Have a Future?
josé luis machinea and guillermo rozenwurcel
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many cases, moreover, the participants in these agreements are seeking to go
beyond improving trade relations and to set for themselves decidedly more ambi-
tious integration goals. The reasons are not solely economic, but involve wider
political and cultural motivations as well.
If the movement in this direction grows stronger, then it is natural to expect
that coordination efforts will not be abandoned. Exploring the obstacles that
will have to be overcome and the circumstances under which these initiatives
can be profitable therefore becomes a necessary task. It is clear that this task can
be completed satisfactorily only if the specific nature of the economic inter-
dependence and political conditions and factors existing in each case are taken
into account. Contributing to the efforts to achieve this objective in Latin
America is the primary motivation for this analysis.
In the following sections we look at the particular characteristics of the eco-
nomic interdependence entailed in the integration agreements existing in Latin
America, with emphasis on how they differ from those in Europe. We assess the
experience with macroeconomic coordination in the Southern Common Mar-
ket (Mercosur), the region’s largest trading bloc. An effort is made here to draw
some lessons applicable to the other integration schemes in the region. Finally,
we raise the question of how the demand for coordination can be increased in
Latin America and seek to identify the main obstacles, opportunities, and incen-
tives in this regard.
Reasons for Macroeconomic Coordination: How Much Economic
Interdependence Is There in Latin America?
A high level of interdependence among countries is one of the main reasons for
increasing the coordination of macroeconomic policies, since interdependence
implies that each member of the group is affected by what happens in the other
countries. The degree of interdependence among a group of countries is usually
measured on the basis of the trade and financial links existing among them.
Trade Interdependence
Intraregional trade has followed quite different trends in the various subregional
integration schemes in Latin America throughout the 1990s and thus far in the
present decade. As figure 6-1 shows, Mercosur and the Andean Community
(AC) grew steadily up to 1997–98, both in dollar value and in the share of total
trade activity accounted for by intraregional trade. This trend changed abruptly
when the international crisis erupted, however, and intraregional trade’s share of
the total dropped significantly, although the Andean Community managed to
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maintain the dollar value of such trade near the highs recorded in 1997–98, while
in Mercosur it fell steeply. In the Central American Common Market (CACM),
on the other hand, the dollar value of intraregional trade (without including
maquila activities) has risen steadily throughout this period, and intraregional
trade’s share of the total, although it has fluctuated sharply, has also exhibited an
overall increase. Within the Caribbean Community (Caricom), intraregional
trade expanded considerably, both in dollar value and when measured as a per-
centage of total trade until 1998, and it has remained fairly steady since then.
Figures 6-2 and 6-3, in turn, assess the trade interdependence existing in the
different Latin American economic blocs and other regional agreements. This
comparison is based on two indicators: (a) intraregional trade with respect to
total trade, and (b) intraregional trade in terms of GDP. For Latin America and
the Caribbean, the indicators show that interdependence in subregional integra-
tion agreements, although it increased over the past decade, is still substantially
less tight than in other regions. These findings become particularly evident when
intraregional trade is analyzed in terms of GDP. The differences between the two
indicators are primarily attributable to the openness of the individual countries.
In any event, the expansion of intraregional trade is limited by the size of the
blocs. There are enormous differences in this respect: whereas the European
Union (EU) accounts for 37.2 percent of world trade, no subregional agreement
in Latin America accounts for more than 1 percent, with the sole exception of
Mercosur, which, though it is the largest bloc in the region, accounts for only
1.4 percent of world trade.











Source: ECLAC, Division of International Trade and Integration, on the basis of official data.
Figure 6-1. Share of Intraregional Exports in Total Regional Exports, 1985–2003
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Financial Integration
The reciprocal externalities operating among the countries of Latin American
subregional blocs have not been transmitted solely via trade channels, however.
Macroeconomic spillovers from financial markets have also been extremely sig-
nificant, even though the integration of financial transactions or related activi-
ties within domestic financial markets is virtually nil.1 Financial conditions in
the countries of subregional blocs are connected in two ways. On the one hand,
since external vulnerability is a trait shared by all the member countries, changes
in international financing conditions tend to have a more or less similar impact
on all their economies. On the other hand, the contagion effects deriving from
the imperfect information prevailing in international financial markets tend to
magnify their financial interdependence. The strong correlation between the









Source: ECLAC, Division of International Trade and Integration, on the basis of official data.
a. The figures given are annual averages. EU: European Union; NAFTA: North American Free Trade 
Agreement; ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations; Caricom: Caribbean Community; CACM: 
Central American Common Market; Mercosur: Southern Common Market; AC: Andean Community.
2000–2003
1990–1991
Figure 6-2. Share of Intraregional Exports in Total Regional Exports, 1990–91
and 2000–03a
1. Machinea and Rappoport (2004).
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Source: ECLAC, Division of International Trade and Integration, on the basis of official data.
a. The figures given are annual averages. 
2000–2003
1990–1991
Figure 6-3. Intraregional Exports as a Percentage of Regional GDP, 1990–91
and 2000–03a
2. One exception is the absence of contagion in the final phases of the Argentine crisis. This
could be attributed to the “absence of surprise” as events unfolded, which enabled investors to pre-
pare themselves by reallocating their assets gradually. During the preceding months, however, there
was an impact on other countries in the region, and during 2002 the crisis severely affected
Uruguay. Although there are different definitions of contagion, references here are to a situation in
which a crisis in another country increases the probability of crisis in the home country, after con-
trolling for the economic fundamentals (Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1996).
3. Inter-American Development Bank (2002, chap. 7).
4. Fernández-Arias, Panizza, and Stein (2002).
country risk ratings in Mercosur—in particular those of the largest economies
of the bloc—until shortly before Argentina’s default is a good illustration of this
point (see figure 6-4).2
In fact, empirical studies have shown the existence of strong interconnections
among financial markets in emerging countries that are clearly influenced by
geographic proximity, trade links, and economic policy similarities.3 Moreover,
there is evidence that a country’s currency crises are more closely associated with
exchange rate misalignments with a partner in a trade agreement than with the
rest of the world.4 However, when contagion is measured through the impact of
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a change in one country’s capital flows on the other partners’ flows, the evi-
dence is more ambiguous.5
These trade-related and financial externalities notwithstanding, their pres-
ence has not generated a reciprocal demand for permanent macroeconomic
cooperation. The reason is simple: although the expansion of intraregional trade
was regarded as a long-lasting phenomenon, every time one of the two largest
partners was overtaken by a crisis, the most prevalent reaction was a fear of
financial spillovers. In such situations, the usual response of policymakers in the
other countries has been to send out signals that differentiate them from their
distressed neighbor in an effort to influence the mainstream perception on finan-
cial markets.6 Their reason for doing so is that the adverse effects to be expected in




1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of data from JP Morgan Securities and the Uruguay Republic Pension 
Fund (AFAP).
a.  Uruguay Bond Index (UBI). Since May 2003, Uruguay has changed the reference bond basket.
b.  Global Bond 2009 Sovereign Spread over United States Treasury (UST) bond yields.




Global ChilebUBI Uruguay a
Figure 6-4. Country Risk: December 1993–September 2004
5. This issue is described in more detail in Inter-American Development Bank (2002, chap. 7).
6. The extreme case was the Argentine government’s behavior in 1999 after Brazil’s 
devaluation.
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for governmental and private sector actors has shortened to such a point, that
the ratio between the perceived costs and benefits of integration has grown dras-
tically worse.
Dependence or Interdependence?
Statistics on interdependence for the bloc as a whole often conceal consider-
able differences between countries, which are often due to differences in their
size. Figures 6-5 and 6-6 indicate the level of dependence or interdependence
in different regional agreements based on two indicators: (1) distribution of
regional GDP, and (2) intensity of reciprocal trade between the largest partner
in each agreement and the rest of the bloc. The figures show that there are con-
siderable differences in country size within the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercosur. In such cases, there are fewer coordina-
tion incentives for the largest country. In NAFTA, in particular, it is unthink-
able that the United States would be prepared to coordinate its fiscal and
monetary policies with Canada and Mexico. Although concern for its neigh-
bors may lead the United States to help them in critical situations such as
Mexico’s “tequila crisis” in 1994, it is extremely unlikely that it would ever
agree to have Mexican or Canadian representatives sitting on the U.S. Federal
Reserve Board.
Other Reasons for Coordination
Incentives for cooperation are not only related to size and economic inter-
dependence. Beyond trade and financial interdependence, there may be other
economic or political reasons for coordination among members of an agree-
ment. European integration is a clear example of this. But without doubt, large
size differences among the partners reduce the incentives for coordination.
Additional motives for coordination may include cyclical synchronism, its
importance in introducing discipline in the face of domestic pressures, and its
use as a mechanism to reduce macroeconomic volatility and to build up govern-
ment credibility within a country.
Cyclical synchronism. Benefits from macroeconomic coordination increase (or
the costs decrease) to the extent that the countries belonging to the regional
agreement face similar situations. If cycles are synchronous, economic policy
decisions will be similar, and therefore the cost of forgoing autonomous policies
will be lower.
Countries in subregional blocs in Latin America have historically registered
low synchronism in economic cycles, at least when they are compared against
countries of the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
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Source: ECLAC, Division of International Trade and Integration, based on IDB (2002) Integration 2002 
Report, chap. 7 (box 7.1),  p. 48.
a.The indicator was estimated with the following formula:
The formula shows the ratio between the exports of the larger country j to the regional integration 
agreement B, and the sum of the exports of the rest of the member countries i to the larger country j. In 
both cases, exports are normalized by the respective total exports. In parentheses, the left axis shows the 
larger country in terms of its share of regional GDP, considering figure 6-7.
1989
2002
Figure 6-6. Degree of Interdependence of Core Countries in Some Integration
Schemes, 1989 and 2002 a
(ASEAN) (see figure 6-7). Within this context, the CACM countries are found
to have a relatively high level of correlation, while Mercosur and the Andean
Community evidence the lowest level of synchronism in the region.7 Neverthe-
less, some studies suggest that, at least in the case of Mercosur, during the 1990s
the cycles of the member countries, and particularly those of the two largest part-
ners, were somewhat more closely synchronized than in the past.8 This has
occurred mainly as the result of external financial disturbances that have affected
all the countries of the bloc.
Domestic resistance. Similarly, a macroeconomic coordination agreement can
serve to implement measures that have met with domestic resistance. However,
7. De la Cuba and Winkelried (2004).
8. Lacunza and others (2003); Fanelli and González Rozada (2003); Machinea (2003a).
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the importance of the role of regional agreements in imposing some degree of
internal discipline depends on whether the agreement is perceived by the actors
involved as being advantageous for the country. While this has been the case for
Europe, it has not necessarily been so for Latin America and the Caribbean.
“Borrowing credibility.” It is not clear whether macroeconomic policy coor-
dination is an effective means of building domestic credibility in the region.
Unlike in Europe, it is difficult to find in the region countries that have
strong enough reputations to generate credibility for other nations by part-
nering with them in the area of macroeconomic policy. Even more important,
countries in Latin America do not have strong enough reputations to emerge
unharmed from an association with a country that has a history of severe
instability.
Finally, while a country’s volatility affects its partners in different ways,
exchange rate volatility typically attracts the most attention because of its effects
on trade and on the political economy of the integration process. As can be seen
in figure 6-8, although exchange rate volatility is not so intense in Central
America, it is particularly severe in Mercosur and is also quite significant in the
Andean Community, the two largest economic blocs in Latin America.
There are several reasons for these large exchange rate volatilities, notable
among them the different domestic macroeconomic policies and the coexistence











Figure 6-7. Cyclical Synchronism: Weighted Average of Correlation Coefficient,
1962–2002
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Ecuador and convertibility in Argentina with more flexible exchange regimes in
the rest of Latin America explains part of the volatility from 1998 on, the period
in which the countries of the region experienced similar large financial shocks.9
The potential advantages of macroeconomic coordination as a means of
reducing economic volatility, in particular exchange rate volatility, and improv-
ing economic performance in the members of a regional agreement are dis-
cussed in the following sections.
Macroeconomic Coordination: The Experience of Mercosur 
from a Latin American Perspective
Regarding the size of the economies involved, Mercosur is Latin America’s
largest integration initiative to date. When it was created, the member countries
committed themselves to structuring a customs union, which, over time, was to
develop into a common market.
The difficulties that Mercosur is currently experiencing, however, raise serious
doubts about the possibility of achieving significant progress on integration in
5
Percent








Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official data.
Jan 1999–May 2004
Jan 2002–May 2004
Figure 6-8. Volatility of Bilateral Real Exchange Rates
9. See Machinea (2003a) and Fanelli and González-Rosada (2003) for a detailed discussion of
the Mercosur case.
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the near future. Questions about its functioning, and even its usefulness for the
economic development of its members, have been raised with particular force in
recent years. To differing degrees and intensities, many of the obstacles facing
Mercosur are similar to those being encountered in other integration agreements
in the region.
From that vantage point, this section first analyzes how the Mercosur inte-
gration process has evolved. It then looks at recent changes in the nature and
intensity of the interdependence among the countries of this bloc. Finally, the
main lessons to be learned from the failed attempt at macroeconomic coordina-
tion made in 2000 are discussed.
Evolution of the Integration Process: From Hope to Disenchantment
Mercosur was established in 1991, and by the middle of that decade the integra-
tion process was already having difficulty meeting the commitments it had
made to eliminate nontariff barriers, adopt a common external tariff, establish
special import regimes and a common customs code, and harmonize procedures
to deal with unfair trade practices. The virtual absence of any supranational
institutional structure was a significant factor in these difficulties.
The difficulties went largely unnoticed while the two largest countries of the
bloc were experiencing rapid growth. In 1997, however, there was a significant
break in the trend toward the elimination of trade restrictions, which occurred
when Brazil, in order to curb the growth of its current account deficit caused by
a sharp appreciation of the exchange rate, decided to impose general import
restrictions, which also applied to its partners under the agreement.10
The negative macroeconomic performance of the past few years has been
transmitted to the countries’ intraregional trade. As a result, intraregional trade
as a share of total trade fell from 25.3 percent in 1998 (before the international
financial crisis began to affect the region) to 12 percent in 2003.
As a result of the deterioration in the macroeconomic situation triggered by
events in the international arena from 1998 on, the weaknesses of the integra-
tion process became more apparent as the recession increased the countries’ sen-
sitivity to trade problems and caused relations between the member countries to
worsen even further, undermining their countries’ already debatable willingness
to create even a minimal institutional framework and significantly weakening
not only the integration process but also trade relations within the bloc.
10. As a matter of fact, in 1992, again in a context of significant exchange rate appreciation,
Argentina had already resorted to the temporary establishment of a 10 percent statistical duty on
imports of any origin.
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As was discussed in the previous section, the conditions for extending integra-
tion and establishing macroeconomic cooperation mechanisms within Mercosur,
and in Latin America in general, are comparatively less favorable than those that
prevailed in the process that led to the establishment of the European Union. First,
the degree of trade integration that can be attained by Mercosur, and for that
matter the other integration schemes in Latin America, is unlikely to approach
the levels seen in the European Union or NAFTA for a number of reasons, includ-
ing one quite simple factor: the enormous differences in the size of their respective
markets. Second, cyclical synchronism is still quite low, and even though the cycles
have become more synchronized in the 1990s, this has mainly been the result of
spillovers arising from external financial disturbances. Third, the extreme volatil-
ity of exchange rates, added to the deep economic crises of recent years and the
fact that the region has grown more slowly than the rest of the world, have led to
a proliferation of intraregional trade restrictions, significantly weakening not only
the integration process but also trade and political relations within the bloc.
Fourth, in times of crisis, the political horizon is shortened to a minimum and
the authorities’ discount rate soars. It is therefore not surprising that the benefits
of integration, which tend to make themselves felt over the long term, appear to
be outweighed by its costs, which are evident in the short term. There are two
clear manifestations of this effect. On the one hand, whenever sharp macroeco-
nomic fluctuations in either of the two largest members of the bloc have signifi-
cantly altered intraregional trade flows in ways that have adversely affected their
neighbors, sectoral pressures and the public’s reaction have inevitably given rise
to policy responses oriented toward counteracting those effects. These policy
measures have generally been aimed at restraining imports from the country that,
either because of the presence of recessionary conditions or because of a devalua-
tion of its currency, was in a better competitive position in the regional market.
On the other hand, every time a country is in deep trouble, the partners’ foresee-
able reaction is to try to distance themselves from the neighbor that is experienc-
ing difficulties. As a result, instead of creating demand for coordination, financial
interdependence has repeatedly generated political conflicts within the bloc.
It may be argued that if progress were made in macroeconomic coordination,
intraregional trade would be strengthened, the correlation of the countries’
cycles would be increased, and favorable conditions would be created for deep-
ening their integration.11 It is clear, however, that such cooperation requires a
minimum set of political and economic conditions that have thus far not been
seen in Mercosur. Moreover, in view of the scale of economic problems, the
11. Frankel and Rose (1996).
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political will of the relevant parties becomes a critical factor. In addition to fac-
ing unfavorable economic conditions, Mercosur has also exhibited weaknesses
on the political front.12
At this writing in 2006, Mercosur is in trouble. The remaining exceptions to
the common external tariff have prevented consolidation of the customs union
and, what is more, new nontariff barriers have appeared. Although a technical
secretariat was created in 2002 and, more recently, a Commission of Permanent
Representatives was established, given these bodies’ small budgets and diffuse
functions, the bloc still has virtually no institutional structure.
The Attempt at Macroeconomic Coordination in 2000: 
Lessons from a Failed Experiment
Although the need to coordinate macroeconomic policies is explicitly stated in the
first article of the Treaty of Asunción, which sanctioned the creation of Mercosur,
given the relative weakness of the macroeconomic spillovers among the countries
of the bloc, in the beginning the demand for coordination was not significant.
However, in 2000 an attempt to advance in this direction was made that,
although overtaken by later events, set a precedent that may be useful to ana-
lyze. The ministers of finance and the presidents of the countries’ central banks
agreed in their first meeting of that year: (1) to establish common targets on
macroeconomic matters and in financial services; (2) to develop performance
indicators based on a common methodology; (3) to begin regular publication of
a series of harmonized fiscal indicators starting in September 2000; (4) to set
jointly agreed goals in relation to the fiscal deficit, the public debt, and inflation
in March 2001; (5) to complete and update a survey and comparative analysis
of current regulations relating to financial and capital markets, including pay-
ment systems, with a view to moving toward the integration of these markets;
and (6) to establish a macroeconomic monitoring group made up of high-level
officials whose first task would be to evaluate the consistency of the joint
methodology to be used to prepare the indicators.
It proved possible to harmonize the statistics on the fiscal deficit, public
debt, and prices in a relatively short span of time. Then, in December 2000,
the ministers of finance and the presidents of the countries’ central banks met
in Florianopolis, Brazil, to set targets for the fiscal deficit, public debt, and infla-
tion that would enter into force beginning in 2002. The target set for prices was a
ceiling rate for the annual increase in the consumer price index (CPI) of 5 percent
12. The difficulties of deepening integration in the economic sphere have been an obstacle for
strengthening the political relationships within the bloc.
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until 2005 and 4 percent beginning in 2006 (in this case on the basis of the core
inflation rate of the CPI, to be estimated using a harmonized methodology). As
for fiscal matters, a maximum value of 3 percent was set for the consolidated
deficit, and a downward trend was projected for the debt/GDP ratio starting in
2005, with a maximum limit of 40 percent to be reached by 2010 at the latest.
The discussion of goals related to the external sector, including targets for the
current account and the short-term external debt, was left for the future.
At the meeting in Florianopolis it was not possible, however, to make signifi-
cant progress in developing incentives for compliance with these goals. What
the authorities did succeed in agreeing upon was that any country that deviated
from these goals should inform the macroeconomic monitoring group of the
corrective measures it would take to return to the established limits, and that it
would have to apply those measures within one year from the date of presenta-
tion to the group. It was also agreed that the ministers of finance and the presi-
dents of the countries’ central banks could make public comments on such
measures as they deemed appropriate.
Two lessons can be learned from this experience. First, it was demonstrated
that it is possible to achieve results fairly quickly if people at the highest political
decisionmaking levels are involved and if capable technical bodies exist. A sec-
ond lesson is of a more negative nature and concerns the rewards and penalties
required to ensure compliance with the goals. In this connection, the results
were not very significant. This issue may not be a serious drawback in the initial
phases of an experiment of this nature, but it brought to light the absence of
effective mechanisms for securing compliance with the commitments assumed.
The deterioration of the Argentine economy that culminated in its collapse
in late 2001 and 2002, coupled with the worsening situation in the other coun-
tries of the bloc, led to the introduction of new trade restrictions, exceptions to
the common external tariff, and heated disputes among member countries. As a
result, this first attempt at coordination came to an abrupt end. The conclusion
is clear: when there is excessive instability and high exchange rate volatility in
one of the countries concerned, especially one of the larger ones, macroeco-
nomic cooperation becomes unworkable.
The Future of Macroeconomic Coordination 
in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Is it possible to increase the demand for coordination? Above all else, individual
countries need to have responsible macroeconomic policies that guarantee a
minimum level of stability. It is impossible to coordinate policies without reason-
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ably stable economies. Viewed from this standpoint, stability can be considered,
to a certain extent, an initial basic condition for the emergence of a demand for
policy coordination between neighboring countries.
In principle, the strengthening of trade integration tends to generate greater
incentives for coordination. However, regional experience shows that reinforc-
ing such integration alone is not sufficient to increase the demand for coordina-
tion. It is therefore essential to find other incentives for this coordination, and
especially for ensuring compliance with the agreements reached by the parties.
Bearing this need in mind, this section presents an analysis of the main
obstacles and opportunities for macroeconomic cooperation and coordination
in Latin America. The discussion first looks briefly at the question of where to
start and how to gradually shift from “softer” to “harder” forms of coordination.
It then moves on to the issue of rules and incentives for coordination. The diffi-
culties raised by exchange rate volatility as well as the type of macroeconomic
policy mix called for under exchange rate floats, the currently prevailing regime
in the region, are then examined. Finally, the feasibility and implications of the
integration of domestic financial markets, as well as the role that subregional
stabilization funds or other financial instruments might play, are explored.
Where to Begin
Given the complexity of the factors involved, macroeconomic coordination
processes can only progress gradually. There is consensus about this issue in the
literature, which is also supported by the European experience. Periodic meet-
ings, exchange of information, standardization of statistics, and the creation of
supranational forums for policy debate are necessary procedures for gradually
building the mutual trust and knowledge that are critical to avoiding the “pris-
oner’s dilemma” and the creation of incentives for opportunistic behavior.13
Seen from this vantage point, the exchange of information can be considered
an initial way of implementing cooperation policies. Although information
exchange is a “soft” form of coordination that has no direct effect on macro-
economic performance, it does enable countries to become better acquainted,
improve their understanding of each other’s specificities and circumstances, and
achieve a common vision, which is far from happening in Latin American inte-
gration processes.
13. Ghymers (2001). The Macroeconomic Dialogue Network (REDIMA), an ECLAC initia-
tive launched in 2000, has played an important role in promoting this approach, albeit with mixed
results, in Mercosur, the Andean Community, and CACM, the three Latin American subregional
integration agreements.
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The integration process will be strengthened if countries set up and main-
tain a supranational technical forum in which they can meet regularly and sys-
tematically take on certain tasks (such as the standardization of statistics and
harmonization of indicators), assess other experiences, analyze various aspects
of the integration process, and, when the time comes, formulate criteria and
options for convergence. This forum could function informally, but its institu-
tionalization would send a strong signal of the importance attached to the goal
of coordination.
Nevertheless, if there is political will to make progress toward integration, a
long-term approach should be adopted. The establishment of mutual confi-
dence should not be taken for granted but should be seen as the first objective to
be achieved through an “institutional investment” that requires the allocation of
resources, concrete action, and continuity over time.
During this initial phase of “soft” coordination, it is crucial to achieve a min-
imum level of national macroeconomic stability (exchange rate stability in par-
ticular), especially for the larger members of the bloc, which because of their size
bear the responsibility of its leadership. Only if this minimum objective is
achieved will more concrete coordination mechanisms appear to be an attractive
way of reinforcing the credibility of the larger countries and of enabling the
smaller countries to “buy credibility” for their own macroeconomic policies.
Toward a “Harder” Form of Coordination
The main objective of the second stage of macroeconomic coordination is to sus-
tain stability in the long term. This requires the adoption of more explicit coordi-
nation mechanisms. As suggested by the European experience, this implies
establishing goals for the convergence of a set of macroeconomic variables.
The convergence of certain variables at predetermined values established by
common agreement does not guarantee that these values will be maintained in
the future. Furthermore, a commitment to hold the fiscal deficit below a certain
level may limit a country’s capacity to implement countercyclical policies. Sus-
taining macroeconomic stability over the long run requires institutions that
encourage fiscal and monetary responsibility, nominal price flexibility, and fac-
tor mobility. Some scholars therefore believe that carrying out the institutional
reforms needed to ensure lasting stability in each country is more important
than setting convergence objectives.14
However, as the experiences of some countries in the region show, institu-
tional reforms are not irreversible either. Thus, although such reforms are surely
14. See, for example, Eichengreen (1998).
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vital, mutual commitment to the convergence of certain key variables at credible
levels may enhance the policy consistency and stability of the economies
involved. In addition to exchange rate issues, which are discussed later, the ques-
tion of macroeconomic convergence raises other matters, such as the fiscal situa-
tion, inflation, and, given the region’s external vulnerability, its exposure to
changes in international market conditions.
Fiscal convergence is necessary to prevent any one country’s lack of discipline
from damaging its own financial market, increasing its country risk, and, via
contagion effects, impairing the flow of capital to the region as a whole. Given
its intertemporal dimension, the effort to achieve convergence should include
the fiscal deficit and the public debt, measured as proportions of GDP. To
avoid curtailing the possibility of implementing countercyclical policies, the
deficit that should be taken into account for these purposes is the structural
deficit (adjusted for cyclical variations). In light of the region’s track record in
such matters and its governments’ lesser borrowing capacity, the limit for the
structural deficit should be lower than the level set in Europe. For countries that
are initially above the limit, the adjustment period allowed to align themselves
with the target should be reasonably brief. A low deficit does not, however,
guarantee a government’s solvency if its debt is too high—hence the need to
place a ceiling on the public debt. Since satisfying this condition may not be
feasible immediately, the adjustment period allowed will have to be longer than
the period set for convergence on the deficit target.
Because high inflation also tends to contribute to volatility, the first objective
of setting an inflation target is to reduce uncertainty. In floating exchange rate
regimes, inflation targets also help to curb volatility in the nominal exchange rate.
The external vulnerability of the region is precisely what makes it necessary
for macroeconomic coordination to include targets for the external sector.15
These targets would be the current account deficit and short-term external debt.
Fiscal policy may not be sufficient to achieve these objectives in the face of large
capital flows. In the event of massive capital inflows, for instance, it might be
necessary to impose restrictions on short-term capital movements.
Rules and Incentives for Coordination
Establishing explicit macroeconomic coordination mechanisms—through, for
example, the adoption of convergence targets—will be useful only if those tar-
gets are feasible and if compliance with the relevant agreements can be enforced
to a reasonable extent. The need to ensure that targets are feasible raises the
15. This is suggested by Lavagna and Giambiagi (2000), Zahler (2001), and others.
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question of just how strict the rules should be, while the need to enforce com-
pliance is linked to the issue of incentives.
Adopting rules that are too strict could make compliance excessively costly or
simply impossible under certain circumstances; knowledge is never complete,
and there is no way of predicting all eventualities. Thus a certain degree of pol-
icy flexibility has to be maintained in order to deal with unexpected critical situ-
ations. Excessive flexibility, however, could undermine the credibility of the
commitments undertaken.
Striking the right balance is not simple in any case, but especially not for the
countries of the region. On the one hand, adopting policies based on strict rules
seems to be the only option for governments whose good reputations are often
in doubt. On the other hand, many such policies in the region have failed to
take account of the intrinsic vulnerability of the economies involved and have
therefore been unsuccessful because policymakers lack enough maneuvering
room to respond to unexpected shocks. The collapse of the convertibility regime
in Argentina is the most recent example of this type of situation.
In any event, integration agreements aimed at furthering macroeconomic
coordination in the region can clearly afford to grant little leeway in the estab-
lishment of common targets. It therefore becomes vital to determine which
alternatives could be used to stimulate cooperation.
The high costs of irresponsible policies in the current context of economic
globalization already constitute an incentive for macroeconomic discipline,
which is also encouraged by the conditionality of agreements with the IMF and
other multilateral credit agencies.16 To a certain extent, these factors act implic-
itly as exogenous coordination variables.
More explicit use could be made of incentives at the international level in
promoting macroeconomic coordination. For instance, multilateral financial
institutions could play an important role if program design took into account
the regional agreements already in place.17 What is more, convergence targets
would be much more influential if the criteria used for setting them were
agreed with those same institutions. Similarly, the rules established by the
Bank for International Settlements for the prudent regulation of national
financial systems could be adapted and used as a basis for regional financial
16. In Mercosur, for instance, all countries have concluded agreements with the IMF in
recent years.
17. The Brazilian devaluation of 1999, which was supported by the IMF, and its impact on
neighboring countries provides a good example of the negative externalities that the IMF could
help to mitigate if its recommendations took account of regional interdependence.
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integration agreements. It would be a mistake to ignore external incentives
because of potential political susceptibilities, especially when internal incen-
tives are weak.
Indeed, the European experience shows that the most powerful coordination
incentive, especially for smaller countries, is the enhanced reputation associated
with achieving convergence targets. Unfortunately, this incentive may not apply
in the Latin America and Caribbean region for some time. For economic agents,
the main sign that a government is implementing its macroeconomic policy
responsibly is compliance with agreements concluded with the IMF and other
multilateral financial institutions, and this does not seem about to change any-
time soon.
The gains afforded by reducing exchange rate volatility with major trading
partners are another incentive for coordination. Of course, the importance of
this factor will increase in proportion to the volume of intraregional trade.
Although this factor is present in the integration agreements in Latin America
and the Caribbean, it clearly cannot come to be as important as it has been in
the European experience.18
Another incentive that has also been considered in Europe is the threat of
direct sanctions (either financial or of other sorts). For this kind of incentive to
be effective, noncompliance must entail possible exclusion from the agreement.
When the number of countries involved is too small or their economic size is
too different, it is extremely unlikely that direct sanctions can be enforced. In
Latin America this is clearly the case with Mercosur: the exclusion of Uruguay
or Paraguay would have enormous costs for the integration project, while the
departure of Brazil or Argentina would signify the end of the agreement alto-
gether. Direct sanctions do not seem easy to impose in the other Latin Ameri-
can subregional agreements either.
Although moral sanctions are “softer” than financial penalties, they are also
an incentive worth considering. In principle, the fact that their cost is tolerable
but not negligible makes moral sanctions viable and capable of making some
contribution to the objective of coordination. One possibility is to set up an
independent assessment committee, made up of regional and international
experts, tasked with periodically checking compliance with agreements and
18. See Ghymers (2002). In retrospect, however, it can be seen that direct sanctions have not
played such an important role in the European Union. In fact, in recent years, instances of non-
compliance by some countries of the bloc have gone unpunished. It is quite clear that the reason
for this is that the countries concerned, Germany and France in particular, are among the most
important ones in the union.
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making recommendations where appropriate. Logic would dictate that the
assessments should be public in order to have some effect.
It does not seem too bold to conclude that the incentives mentioned here are
not enough to make macroeconomic cooperation an attractive option for exist-
ing subregional integration agreements in Latin America and the Caribbean.
This issue is discussed again later, after a review of the available alternatives for
limiting exchange rate volatility and an analysis of the viability of subregional
funds in that context.
Options for Limiting Exchange Rate Volatility
It is impossible to deepen an integration process without curtailing variations
in the exchange rates of the countries involved, given their direct influence on
trade and the political economy of integration.19 In a significant sample of
developed and developing countries, Fernández-Arias, Panizza, and Stein
observed that the negative effects of exchange rate mismatches tend to be
greater in relation to other countries within the region than with the rest of the
world;20 this is probably attributable to the part played by “regional goods”—
that is, goods that, for different reasons, are mainly traded within the region
where they are produced.
In principle, it is to be expected that, as a result of increased uncertainty,
both the level of the exchange rate and exchange rate fluctuations would have
adverse effects on foreign trade. This is especially true if there is high volatility
and if there are no adequate hedging instruments to cover risk, as is common in
less-developed countries.21 In the specific case of Mercosur, many applied studies
have found that variations in the exchange rate do have some effect on intra-
regional trade.22
Significant variations in exchange rates also affect the political economy of
the process. When the exchange rate is devalued in a given country (especially
a large country within the region), the appreciation of the other countries’
exchange rates shifts the internal balance of forces in favor of anti-integration
sectors, generates more protectionist pressures, and reduces governments’ capac-
ity for cooperation. The negative reactions are much more dramatic during a
regional recession than during a period of growth.
19. For a detailed discussion, see Machinea (2003b).
20. See Fernández-Arias, Panizza, and Stein (2002).
21. This hypothesis is supported by several empirical studies (Devlin and others, 2001; Este-
vadeordal, Frantz, and Saez, 2001; Giordano and Monteagudo, 2002).
22. Heymann and Navajas (1991, 1998).
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There are various causes of fluctuations in the exchange rate. At the national
level, monetary and fiscal excesses are obviously a major determining factor. In a
context of high capital mobility, the effects manifest themselves primarily in
public and external debt (especially short-term debt). External structural distur-
bances affect the real equilibrium exchange rate as well. When such disturbances
are asymmetrical—that is, when they affect the various countries involved in the
integration process in differing ways—then there is a change in the real equilib-
rium exchange rates between those countries.
Domestic fundamentals and external disturbances are not the only causes of
exchange rate variability in the short and long terms, however. Under condi-
tions of high capital mobility, the exchange market behaves much like any other
financial assets market. As pointed out by Frankel and Rose, asymmetrical access
to relevant information, imperfect transmission of information between market
participants, and their heterogeneous nature may give rise to herd behavior or
bandwagon effects that could trigger sharp appreciations or devaluations in nom-
inal and real exchange rates.23
Last, the implications of having coexisting different exchange rate regimes
must also be considered. It is not particularly controversial to state that nomi-
nal wages and prices are not completely flexible, that purchasing power parities
cannot be accurately determined, and that nominal devaluations account, in
large part, for the performance of the real exchange rate.24 The exchange rate
regime is therefore a relevant factor in accounting for the real exchange rate,
and the coexistence of different systems affects real exchange rate variations
across countries. This manifests itself when countries from a given region expe-
rience a symmetrical external disturbance that changes the equilibrium
exchange rate of all the countries in relation to the rest of the world without
altering the equilibrium parity among them.
Regardless of its causes, exchange rate volatility is a formidable barrier to
moving forward with integration. The question is how to control it. Monetary
union is the most expedient means since, by definition, it eliminates exchange
rate variations between the countries involved. For economic and political rea-
sons, however, this option is not feasible within the subregional integration
groupings in Latin America and the Caribbean.
With monetary union ruled out, at least for the foreseeable future, it is vital
to consider alternative options. As previously stated, the coexistence of different
exchange rate systems contributes to large exchange rate variations resulting
23. Frankel and Rose (1995).
24. See Froot and Rogoff (1995); and Obstfeld (2000).
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from common external disturbances. In fact, floating regimes are prevalent in
most Latin American countries at present.
Given the fact that international financial and commodities markets con-
tinue to be highly unstable, the currency float prevailing in the region seems to
be the most advisable option. In this respect, Eichengreen and Taylor showed
that the variability of exchange rates is lessened when countries adopt floating
exchange rate systems and steer monetary policy toward a particular inflation
rate (inflation targeting).25 The explanation behind this phenomenon is that, in
most cases, countries with fixed exchange rates face rather abrupt exchange rate
adjustments when they abandon exchange rate parity.
However, as noted by Calvo and Reinhart, the difficulties associated with
flexible exchange rates should not be underestimated.26 On the one hand, it is
true that a float facilitates adjustments in the equilibrium rate when circum-
stances call for it. On the other hand, it is equally true that the fluctuations per-
mitted by this regime, particularly in the context of heightened capital mobility,
are not always due to “fundamental” reasons, at least in the short and medium
terms. In principle, the advantage of adjusting the real equilibrium exchange rate
more quickly comes at the cost of greater uncertainty.
Besides, in countries where dollar-denominated debt is widespread, whether
in the public or private sector, the problems that arise with abrupt fluctuations
in the exchange rate are significant, owing to their effects on financial assets. If
dollarization is so widespread that it encompasses bank claims and, above all, if
deposits are dollarized as well, then the situation becomes even more compli-
cated: the likelihood that an unforeseen devaluation would trigger a currency
and financial crisis and prompt a drastic slowdown in production levels
increases dramatically.27
In addition to the challenges posed by a floating regime in reducing the vari-
ability of the exchange rate in each country, its implications for the rest of the
region must also be considered. A floating exchange rate system tends to facili-
tate exchange rate stability among the countries of a given region when all of the
countries are affected similarly by external shocks. However, exchange rate flexi-
bility increases variability when disturbances, whether external or internal, are
asymmetrical.
An analysis by Fanelli and González Rozada of the cyclical co-movements of
Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay offers two important findings in this connec-
25. Eichengreen and Taylor (2002).
26. Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
27. See Rozenwurcel (2003).
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tion.28 Although the authors focus on Mercosur, its applicability in the rest of
the region is more than plausible. They find that common external shocks aris-
ing from volatility in international financial markets are an important factor in
explaining the common component shared by the economic cycles of the three
countries and that the spillovers among them are considerable. They also find,
however, that the idiosyncratic component accounts for most of the cycle of each
country (approximately 85 percent), leaving only 15 percent to be explained by
the common component.29
The large size of the idiosyncratic component present in the cycles of the
members of the bloc reveals significant differences in their respective production
structures, in addition to the existence of marked asymmetries in the shocks
they are exposed to, as well as a lack of policy coordination. An immediate con-
sequence of this is that, although they have similar exchange rate regimes, signif-
icant sources of exchange rate volatility persist among Mercosur partners.
A second conclusion to be drawn is that if countries belonging to a trading bloc
decide to coordinate their macroeconomic policies and adopt common macro-
economic targets, this could certainly help reduce exchange rate fluctuations, even
though the exchange rate itself may not be a target. In fact, policy differences
among the various countries are responsible for much of the lack of synchroniza-
tion in their economic cycles. Therefore, coordinating macroeconomic policy
would not only deactivate an important source of instability in each country, but
would also eliminate one of the mechanisms that amplifies external shocks.
Coordination under Floating Exchange Rate Regimes
Given that floating regimes are inherently unstable, if exchange rate volatility is
to be reduced a managed float is preferable to a free float. Nevertheless, in order
to manage the float, the authorities must intervene in the foreign exchange mar-
ket, and in order for them to do this, sufficient reserves must be available and
monetary effects must not put pressure on prices.
In truth, central bank interventions can have different objectives. At present,
China and other Asian countries, for example, have aimed their exchange rate
policies at maintaining a devalued real exchange rate as part of their develop-
ment strategy.30 The pros and cons of this approach fall outside the scope of this
chapter. Nonetheless, according to Rodrik, one of the few stylized facts that can
28. Fanelli and González Rozada (2003).
29. A common external shock could have a different impact on the partners as a result of idio-
syncratic reasons related to the economic and financial structure.
30. See Dooley, Fokerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004).
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be deduced from a careful analysis of concrete experiences of economic develop-
ment is that policy prescriptions “travel” poorly from one country to the next.31
In particular, considering the economic conditions needed to make a policy of
this nature viable, in terms of both reserve accumulation and inflation, such an
alternative in most Latin American countries is unlikely to materialize.
Therefore, the main aim of exchange rate policies in the region should be to
smooth out short-term swings, which generate “noise” that engenders uncer-
tainty and has a negative effect on expectations and economic performance. Any
intervention on the part of monetary authorities, though, must not hinder
adjustments in the real exchange rate to accommodate disturbances that under-
mine its long-term equilibrium.
At any rate, a managed float entails a trade-off in terms of the objectives of
monetary policy, since the monetary effects of exchange rate interventions can
lead to inflation. This issue cannot be taken lightly in Latin America, where
many countries have a long history of inflation.
In particular, as long as financial deepening continues to be very limited and
dollarization rather widespread, as is the case in many Latin American countries,
managed floats may cease to be feasible when strong external shocks occur.
What should be done in such extreme cases? One possibility is to let the
exchange rate float freely. If the real parity is at a reasonable level and if fiscal
and monetary policies are managed responsibly, regulating short-term capital
movements seems to be a better option.
Although restrictions on capital flows continue to be a subject of heated
debate, considering the high volatility exhibited by globalized financial markets,
there are good theoretical reasons for using them.32 Moreover, empirical evidence
suggests that, although they have costs and do not work perfectly, when imple-
mented sensibly such restrictions can be efficient in moderating flows, modify-
ing their composition, and smoothing out swings in the exchange rate.33
Until now, the motivation behind regional integration has not explicitly fig-
ured in this discussion on monetary and exchange rate policy under a floating
regime. However, it is evident that even if all members of a regional agreement
adopt a floating exchange rate, the differences in their monetary and exchange
rate policies may seriously hinder any reduction in the volatility of exchange
rates in the region.
31. Rodrik (2003).
32. See Rodrik (2003); Rogoff (2002); Ffrench-Davis and Larraín (2003); Ocampo and Chi-
appe (2003); and DeLong (2004).
33. Ffrench-Davis and Villar (2005).
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Therefore, if the objective of furthering integration is to be maintained, it is
very important—in addition to setting common macroeconomic targets, particu-
larly inflation targets—for the countries to gradually make progress on the coordi-
nation of their exchange rate policies, starting with the definition of common
criteria for intervention, then moving on to the harmonization of regulations per-
taining to capital movements and, possibly, the adoption of a system of currency
bands. Of course, in an area as sensitive as this, major advances cannot be expected
to occur quickly. However, in principle the countries could agree on a mechanism
for consulting with one another concerning possible courses of action to follow in
extreme situations. This exercise would not imply any concrete commitments for
action, but it would be the starting point for the joint learning process that is
needed in order to propose more ambitious objectives later on.
Integration of Regional Financial Systems and Macroeconomic Stability
The existing subregional agreements in Latin America do not, at present, pro-
vide any major incentives for financial integration.34 On the contrary, thus far
contagion effects have been the only source of externalities operating between
financial systems in the region. Under certain conditions, however, the regional
integration of domestic financial systems can generate positive synergies among
member countries and can help to reduce macroeconomic volatility.
In fact, the vulnerability of the countries’ financial systems is a main source of
macroeconomic instability in the region. Raising and harmonizing the regulatory
standards of the members’ financial markets in accordance with international
best practices can therefore be seen as a means of complementing macroeconomic
coordination in relation to monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate matters as part of
a concerted effort to reduce volatility and deepen regional integration.35
The harmonization of financial regulations is a good starting point for the
financial integration process because it does not involve any weakening of the
independence of national policymakers and institutions. Thus it will not be per-
ceived as a vehicle for contagion among the financial systems of each country.
The contribution that financial harmonization can make to macroeconomic
stability is not, however, the only reason for promoting the integration of finan-
cial systems at the regional level. In time, this form of integration can also help
34. This subject is discussed in depth in Machinea and Rappoport (2004).
35. The fragility of domestic financial systems in the region and the magnitude of the shocks to
which they are exposed would seem to indicate that the regulations to be adopted should be stricter
than those required to meet the Basel standards. Factors that are not addressed by those standards,
such as currency mismatches or public debt risk, should also be taken into account, however. The
regulations to be established should therefore be based on modified “Basel plus” standards.
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to reduce transaction costs and further the development of a regional capital
market. In order for this to occur, however, the harmonization of prudential
regulations would have to be extended, during a second stage, to include con-
vergence among other financial institutions. In particular, consideration should
be given to the adoption of similar mechanisms for deposit insurance and the
creation of a regionwide payments system.
This step, unlike the harmonization of regulations, can indeed affect the
countries’ risk of contagion, since it would increase the interdependence of their
financial systems. The timing of the announcement of such measures is therefore
just as important as their proper implementation.
Stabilization Funds and Other Subregional Financial Agreements
There are very good reasons why the majority of the countries in the region
have recently adopted floating exchange rate regimes. But the inherent volatility
of the exchange rate does not disappear even when the fundamentals are kept in
order and monetary policy is managed responsibly. The difficulties that this
poses on the domestic level and for regional integration processes are even
greater because the countries have a very limited capacity to intervene in order
to curb the instability of foreign exchange markets. Macro-level coordination
may contribute to achieving this objective, but it is not sufficient in itself.
The European experience of the past few decades shows that various mecha-
nisms for regional cooperation in the exchange rate and financial sphere have
played a very important role in stabilizing parities within the region.36 Of
course, in the European case there was another fundamental element that is
lacking in the region: in Europe some of the countries had convertible curren-
cies and could thus intervene in exchange markets with their own currencies.37
The idea of creating supranational funds to contribute to regional stability
has begun to gather momentum in Latin America as a result of the severe crises
that erupted on international financial markets in the 1990s.38 These crises
revealed shortcomings and delays in the provision of assistance by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund to emerging economies, which are attributable only in
part to the fact that resources and capacities were overwhelmed by the scale of
the events in question. Other reasons include the extensive discussions related to
conditionality clauses and, in some cases, to the “wait and see” attitude toward
the results of policies. If this diagnosis is correct, regional and subregional funds
36. See Giovannini and Mayer (1991) and Eichengreen and Ghironi (1996).
37. The best-known case is Germany’s intervention to defend the value of the franc in 1992.
38. Ocampo (1999); Mistry (1999); Agosin (2001); Machinea (2003a).
10101-06_Ch06_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:07 PM  Page 190
macroeconomic coordination in latin america 191
that would act as lenders “of first resort” could be an effective complement to
the role of the IMF as a lender of last resort.39
In fact, a subregional stabilization fund has already been operating in Latin
America for quite some time. The Latin American Reserve Fund (Fondo Latino-
americano de Reservas, FLAR) was created in 1978 by the countries of the
Andean Community. More recently, in 1991, Costa Rica also joined the fund.
The main purpose of FLAR is to provide short-term financing aimed at crisis
prevention and management. Only shareholders are eligible for loans. FLAR’s
financing played an important countercyclical role in the recent period of high
volatility in the international environment: its loans peaked in 1996 and 1999,
helping GDP growth in the Andean countries to recover quite rapidly from two
severe external shocks.
From the point of view of subregional integration processes, having a mecha-
nism that could help countries to cushion the effects of external shocks and
change investors’ perceptions before contagion spreads to their neighbors would
be very helpful. In addition to facilitating the adjustment of the country or coun-
tries concerned, it would minimize the defensive reactions of partner countries in
their attempts to distance themselves from a troubled neighbor. Moreover, sub-
regional funds could serve as an incentive for macroeconomic coordination. This
would be the case if compliance with the agreed goals for convergence were
required in order for requesting countries to receive assistance from the fund.
The effectiveness of these subregional funds will of course depend on the vol-
ume of resources available. Thus, unless developed countries provided support,
it seems improbable that funds of this type could soften the impact of simulta-
neous abrupt reversals in capital flows, particularly when their scale is significant
and they trigger contagion effects in neighboring countries of the region (see
figure 6-9).
On the other hand, because variations in the terms of trade do not show any
significant correlation and the magnitude of their impact is much less than that
of financial disturbances, these funds could be quite useful in responding to this
type of shock even if resources come only from the countries of the region (see
figure 6-10).
With regard to Mercosur, during the 1990s the maximum impact of fluctua-
tions in the terms of trade was on the order of U.S.$6.3 billion in 1999 and for
the rest of the decade never reached even one-third of that figure.40 In contrast,
capital outflows amounted to almost U.S.$16 billion in 1999 and exceeded
39. Mistry (1999).
40. These figures are from Machinea (2003a).
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Source: Machinea (2003c). 
a. Annual changes > 20 percent of total exports. 
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Source: Machinea (2003c).  
a. Correlation coefficients are expressed as the simple average of the correlation coefficients among 
the rates of growth of each country member. 
b. Because not all data were available, only four countries were included for Caricom: Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, which represent 63 percent of regional GDP. 
Figure 6-10. Real Shocks: Correlation between Terms of Trade and Export Prices
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U.S.$10 billion two years previously. Accordingly, a regional fund on the order
of U.S.$5 billion (which in 2000 was just over 10 percent of the total reserves of
the countries in the region) would be able to offset almost 80 percent of annual
losses resulting from variations in the terms of trade on the scale of the worst
fluctuations experienced in the 1990s, but its coverage would be scarcely more
than 30 percent of annual capital outflows, similar to the highest levels recorded
in that decade.41
In addition to the level of resources, the creation of subregional funds poses a
second problem: the differences in size of the countries that might be involved.
In fact, the creation of a fund exclusively for Mercosur, for example, would
seem very difficult to implement. Taking into account the fact that Brazil gener-
ates approximately 65 percent of the region’s GDP and 60 percent of its foreign
trade, it would be almost impossible for a fund established solely by the current
members to help that country to cushion adverse shocks.
The problem of size asymmetries becomes less severe as the number of coun-
tries participating in such a fund rises.42 The drawback is that a fund formed by
member countries of different subregional blocs would make its potential role as
an incentive for macroeconomic coordination within each bloc much more dif-
ficult to implement.
Conclusions
The progress made in the area of macroeconomic cooperation and coordination
in Latin America has so far been rather poor. From an economic viewpoint, the
lack of synchronization among cycles weakens demand for coordination. One of
the main causes of this is the low level of trade interdependence. In fact, the rel-
ative scale of intraregional trade in the existing integration schemes is substan-
tially lower than in other economic blocs, and there is little reason to expect that
it will increase very much in the future.
Moreover, since financial integration is virtually nil, the reciprocal externali-
ties existing on this front are due exclusively to contagion effects generated by the
frequent shocks brought about by the highly volatile nature of globalized finan-
cial markets. Adverse macroeconomic spillovers caused by contagion tend to lead
41. Regional funds could therefore contribute to stabilization but would not eliminate the need
to review the role of multilateral financial agencies. In particular, the possibility of offsetting at least
part of the effects of capital flow volatility would require, as a minimum, the reformulation by the
IMF of its Compensatory Financing Facility to transform it into an automatic disbursement line.
42. Agosin (2001), for example, proposes that all the countries of South America establish a
joint fund.
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countries to try to differentiate themselves from their neighbors in times of crisis.
This in turn exacerbates political tensions and weakens integration processes.
The perception that coordination with regional partners can engender more
negative than positive externalities tends to create a vicious cycle. As in the
prisoner’s dilemma, each country expects that the other will behave in a non-
cooperative way and acts accordingly, thereby further undermining incentives
for coordination.43
Under these conditions, it is justifiable to wonder whether it is reasonable for
subregional blocs to continue trying to coordinate their macroeconomic poli-
cies. The response depends on the objective being pursued. In other words, it
depends on whether or not the aim is to deepen cooperation and further the
integration process.
If the decision is not to advance beyond trade linkages, then a free-trade area
will be sufficient, and macroeconomic coordination will be mostly unnecessary.
This choice implies accepting the idea that the importance of subregional blocs
will fade as the conclusion of bilateral free-trade agreements with other coun-
tries and regions becomes more frequent.
The other option is to deepen the integration process. This implies that
countries are willing to move forward toward the creation of a common market,
which in turn would involve agreeing on common protection levels and hence a
similar development agenda. For example, relatively high levels of protection for
certain production sectors make sense only if the aim is to develop those sectors
within the agreement. However, if the production strategies of the various
countries differ, it will be difficult for them to form a customs union.
It is clear, therefore, that this option entails accepting some loss of sover-
eignty and calls for a strong political will to back it up. This is true for any
country, but in particular for the larger partners in the agreement, for which the
loss of autonomy is more costly. In other words, when economic interdepen-
dence among the members of an integration agreement is highly asymmetrical,
the larger partners have the responsibility to provide leadership in order to move
the integration process forward.
Only under these conditions does it make sense to pursue macroeconomic
coordination. However, in this case, the following dilemma arises: in order to
deepen integration, macroeconomic policies must be coordinated, but in order for
demand for coordination to emerge, a significant degree of economic interde-
pendence is required. While the example of Europe is usually cited to demonstrate
that the demand for coordination increases with the level of interdependence, it
43. Ghymers (2002).
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is also true that, from an evolutionary perspective, the same example reveals that
coordination and interdependence can become complementary factors and can
be developed together as part of a recursive process.
Nevertheless, macroeconomic coordination in Latin America entails greater
difficulties than those that confronted Europe in the early stages of its integra-
tion process. In Latin America there is no exogenous exchange rate coordination
mechanism such as prevailed under the Bretton Woods agreements in the initial
phase of the European integration process. Moreover, the situation is com-
pounded by the governments’ lack of sufficiently strong reputations, the
fragility of the countries’ domestic financial systems, and the scale of the exter-
nal shocks now affecting the region. In any case, although concrete forms of
coordination will vary according to the specific characteristics of the different
integration agreements, there are certain lessons to be drawn from international
experience and certain common features of Latin American economic condi-
tions that should be taken into account in all cases.
Macroeconomic coordination can only move forward gradually. The com-
plexity of the factors involved and the need to generate the necessary confidence
and mutual understanding make this inevitable. In addition, a basic minimum
degree of domestic macroeconomic stability, and above all, exchange rate stabil-
ity, must be achieved initially, especially among the principal partners in the
bloc. Only if this minimum objective is achieved will the perceived benefits of
coordination outweigh its costs and the use of more concrete mechanisms have
greater appeal.
These more concrete mechanisms, therefore, must wait for a more advanced
stage in which it will be possible to set convergence goals so as to consolidate
macroeconomic stability and its long-term sustainability. Given the region’s
external vulnerability, in addition to the usual targets (fiscal deficit, public debt,
and inflation), coordination in Latin America must include goals for the external
sector relating to such variables as the current account deficit and the short-term
external debt. In addition, measures designed to harmonize prudent regulations
in financial markets can also contribute to macroeconomic stability.
Obviously, the adoption of convergence goals will contribute to regional sta-
bility only if countries strive to fulfill them. Incentives, therefore, are a crucial
issue. Apart from the “exogenous” incentives for macroeconomic discipline
deriving from agreements with multilateral financial institutions, endogenous
incentives must also be present. In the European experience, the chance to build
stronger reputations proved to be a powerful incentive for the fulfillment of such
goals. But, for the time being at least, this is clearly not true in Latin America.
Supervision of compliance with convergence goals by a committee of experts,
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and dissemination of the corrective measures that it recommends in the event of
noncompliance, may gradually lend greater importance to this incentive, but
only in the long run. The adoption of effective sanctions does not appear to be a
very credible alternative either, especially when the countries do not perceive the
costs of being excluded from an integration agreement as being very high.
In sum, for one reason or another, the incentives that were present in the
European experience are not strong enough to bring about macroeconomic
coordination in Latin America. That being the case, the creation of stabilization
funds and other subregional financial mechanisms can become significant addi-
tional incentives for macroeconomic coordination. Stabilization funds capable
of providing fast-disbursing resources to facilitate the adjustment of member
countries to external shocks could prove to be an efficient complement to the
role of the IMF. If, in addition, the fulfillment of commitments with regard to
convergence targets were one of the requirements for receiving disbursements,
these funds could also encourage macroeconomic coordination. Subregional
development banks, besides being an effective complement to multilateral lend-
ing institutions in certain areas, can play an important role in easing countries’
access to the international financial markets. Moreover, they can be an effective
tool for promoting intraregional trade and furthering financial integration.
Nevertheless, the establishment of such institutions entails several difficulties.
In the case of stabilization funds, in particular, sharp asymmetries can render
the fund useless for the larger countries, such as Brazil in Mercosur. The partici-
pation of a larger number of countries in the fund would make this problem less
severe, but to maintain its role as an incentive for coordination, it would be nec-
essary to increase the number of partners in the bloc. Irrespective of the asym-
metries that exist, given the positive correlation of capital flows to countries of
the region, the amount of resources needed to cushion the impact of common
financial shocks could be very high. However, these funds could be useful for
terms-of-trade shocks and, in small and even medium-sized countries, financial
shocks as well. Large-scale funds would require support from developed coun-
tries, as is the case with the Chiang Mai Initiative in Asia.
Finally, there is the problem of exchange rate volatility. Addressing this phe-
nomenon is crucial in order to achieve deeper integration: the volatility of bilat-
eral exchange rates not only undermines intraregional trade, but also exacerbates
political tensions within the integration scheme. The adoption of similar ex-
change rate regimes helps to alleviate the problem. But the exchange rate floats
that have tended to prevail in the region—which have been adopted in order to
cope with the persistent instability of international financial markets—exhibit
difficulties that should not be underestimated. From the standpoint of regional
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integration, in particular, the existence of major asymmetries in the shocks to
which countries of the region are exposed means that important sources of
exchange rate volatility continue to exist. The coordination of macroeconomic
policies can help to reduce this volatility but will not eliminate the problem.
For this reason, in addition to ensuring that monetary policy is consistent with
the objective of smoothing out exchange rate fluctuations and refraining from
ruling out the introduction of restrictions on capital flows, it is very important
for the countries to move toward some degree of coordination of their exchange
rate regimes. Clearly, in an area as sensitive as this, major advances cannot be
expected overnight. Nevertheless, countries could, as a first step, agree on a
mechanism for consulting with one another concerning possible courses of
action, without committing themselves to specific measures but with a view to
setting more ambitious objectives later on.
In any event, the volatility inherent in flotation regimes will not disappear
even if the fundamentals are kept in line and appropriate mechanisms for macro-
economic policy coordination are in place. These difficulties are compounded by
the magnitude of the external shocks to which the countries of the region are
exposed. Thus the creation and strengthening of the subregional stabilization
funds might serve as a tool for cushioning the impact of these shocks, facilitating
macroeconomic cooperation, and advancing toward deeper integration.
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The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have made significantprogress in building a system of institutions for financial cooperation and
integration. In addition to promoting productive and social investment financing
via development banks, another aim of financial integration has been to facilitate
intraregional trade and help finance the countries’ short-term liquidity needs.
The foreign debt crisis of the 1980s undermined regional financial coopera-
tion and integration, except among the institutions covering the countries of the
Andean Community, which were more dynamic during the 1980s crisis. Starting
in the 1990s, there was a revival in financial integration schemes. Indeed, in the
subset of member countries of the Andean Community, the Central American
Common Market, and the Caribbean Community, the subregional banks now
contribute approximately 46 percent of the funding from development banks.
To deepen regional and subregional financial integration and cooperation,
these institutions must be able to respond to the new challenges and demands
arising from changes in national and international financial systems. However,
support for balance-of-payments financing requirements continues to be one of
Subregional Financial Cooperation: 
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the weakest areas of financial cooperation in the region. In addition to being an
important source of funding, the development banks should facilitate the coun-
tries’ access to international financial markets by taking greater advantage of
their credit risk rating and of instruments that help the countries to access
financial resources in international capital markets.
This chapter examines the financial cooperation dynamic in the countries
of the Andean Community, the Central American Common Market, and the
Caribbean Community. In particular, it discusses the development of the Andean
Development Corporation, the Central American Bank for Economic Integra-
tion, the Caribbean Development Bank, and the Latin American Reserve Fund.
Old and New Challenges of Regional Financial Cooperation
Latin America and the Caribbean is one of the regions in the developing world
that has made the most progress on economic integration. The process of finan-
cial and monetary cooperation in the region has been closely linked with the
countries’ commercial integration. Growth in intraregional trade led to the cre-
ation of institutions for facilitating payments derived from commercial transac-
tions among the countries. Clearing systems and agreements were established.
In 1960 the Clearing System for the Central American Common Market was
created; in 1965 the Agreement on Reciprocal Payments and Credits was set up
in the framework of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), now
the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA); and in 1977 the Multi-
lateral Clearing System for the Caricom member countries was set up.
At the same time that these payment agreements were implemented, financial
institutions were created to address collectively the problems of low savings and
undeveloped financial systems. The Andean Development Corporation (Corpo-
ración Andina de Fomento, CAF) was created in 1968 to serve the Andean Com-
munity; the Central American Common Market (CACM) created the Central
American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) in 1961; and the Caribbean
countries (Caricom) created the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) in 1969.
A factor common to all these subregional institutions was their development
bank status. In general, they were created to support the economic and social
development of their member countries. Therefore their functions focused
mainly on mobilizing medium- and long-term resources for financing produc-
tive investment, preferably in areas that would foster economic complementa-
tion among the member countries.
The foreign debt crisis that struck the region in 1982 undermined the opera-
tion of the financial integration schemes, hitting clearing systems hardest and
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development banks to a lesser extent. Of course, the crisis did not have the same
impact on all of the subregional schemes. While systems of multilateral trade
clearing and balance-of-payments support virtually stopped operating in Central
America and the Caribbean, this did not happen with the LAIA Reciprocal Pay-
ments and Credit Agreement or with the Andean group’s financial institutions.
In fact, CAF operations increased significantly beginning in 1983. Between
1983 and 1990, CAF approved loans worth U.S.$2.727 billion, corresponding
to around 85 percent of total loans approved between 1971 and 1990. CABEI
approved loans worth an average of U.S.$91 million per year, whereas for the
period 1984–89, CDB approved average annual loans of U.S.$51 million, a
figure rather higher than the U.S.$30 million per year approved in the period
1971–80 (see table 7-1).
In spite of the difficulties financing external accounts, one of the weakest links
in the region’s financial integration has been the inability to get collectively
organized to provide support for balance-of-payments financing needs. In the
Central American sphere, the Central American Monetary Stabilization Fund
(Fondo Centroamericano de Estabilización Monetaria, FOCEM) was created to
provide financial support for the member countries’ balance of payments. Its
resources came from contributions from the countries, plus any extraregional
resources that FOCEM was able to capture. In practice, FOCEM operations
have been suspended since 1983.
A different fate awaited the Andean Reserve Fund (Fondo Andinas de Reservas,
FAR), created in 1978, which became the Latin American Reserve Fund (Fondo
Latinoamericano de Reservas, FLAR) when Costa Rica joined in 1989. Origi-
nally, this institution was created to provide short-term liquidity for financing
balance-of-payments imbalances of members of the Andean Group (now the
Andean Community: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela). FLAR now focuses on providing support to the mem-
ber countries’ balance of payments, granting credit and securing third-party
loans; improving the liquidity of international reserve investments; and helping
to harmonize the member countries’ monetary, exchange rate, and financial
policies. FAR/FLAR played an important role in supporting the short-term li-
quidity needs of the Andean countries during the 1980s and 1990s. One of the
principal benefits it confers on its member countries is timely and rapid access
to resources in excess of the countries’ individual contributions.
Challenges of Financial Integration
Attempts to improve and deepen the processes of financial integration in the
region must recognize previous efforts to build regional and subregional financial

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10101-07_Ch07_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:08 PM  Page 203
204 daniel titelman
institutions and adapt these institutions to meet the demands that arise from
changes in national and international financial systems. In the financial sphere,
closer integration and increasingly volatile capital flows have heightened the finan-
cial vulnerability of the region’s economies, which has led to recurrent financial
and economic crises that have undermined their capacity for economic growth.
In this context, numerous authors have argued that strengthening regional
and subregional financial institutions is important in order, first, to comple-
ment global institutions, and second, to provide instruments and public goods
that are provided neither by the international financial system nor by global
financial institutions.1 (For the purposes of this essay, we shall concentrate on
the functions appropriate to subregional development banks and to mechanisms
for financial balance-of-payments support.
Since the 1990s, the dynamic of the business cycle in the countries of the
region has been closely correlated with inflows and outflows of financial capital.2
This preponderance of financial variables in determining the cycle is not exclu-
sive to the region, but is a phenomenon that has accompanied this phase in the
globalization process, stemming from closer financial integration worldwide. This
means that the countries of the region are facing international financial problems
that are common to all developing and emerging economies. Economic crises
have been marked by problems of financial and commercial contagion typical of
what may be called “latest-generation” crises. The 1990s have witnessed a num-
ber of crises that reflect components of regional and extraregional contagion.
The tequila crisis in 1995 was an example of regional contagion, whereas the
Asian crisis of 1997 and the Russian crisis of 1998 were examples of extraregional
contagion.
Since, in addition to terms-of-trade shocks, there have been external shocks
of a financial, exchange rate, or monetary nature affecting the countries’ capac-
ity to finance their balance of payments, it is more important than in the past to
have regional institutions to facilitate the capture of resources to cover tempo-
rary liquidity requirements. Recent experience shows that, individually, the
economies of the region have not been successful in mitigating financial shocks
and have had to make costly economic adjustments to tackle their liquidity
problems. The economies are unable to generate adequate levels of international
reserves to cope with sudden changes in capital flows; the international financial
system has not been capable of providing short-term financing during crisis
1. See Culpeper (this volume); Ocampo (2002a and 2002b); Mistry (1999); Economic Com-
mission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2002a); and Agosin (2001).
2. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2002b).
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periods; and last, even though the IMF did step in with exceptional financing, it
imposed very onerous economic conditionalities and was not fast or flexible
enough. Furthermore, added to the difficulties specific to each country, there is
a component of regional crisis contagion, which makes it more difficult for the
countries to access financial resources in international markets. For this reason,
promoting and expanding institutions such as FLAR is seen to be a key element
of regional financial integration.
In addition to helping to cope with balance-of-payments crises, a regional
fund such as FLAR should promote greater coordination of macroeconomic
policies, which would lessen vulnerability to regional and extraregional shocks.
Lack of harmonization in macroeconomic policies and sharp fluctuations in
bilateral exchange rates have conspired against more decisive progress toward
commercial and financial integration among the countries of the region.
In spite of closer financial integration with the rest of the world, the countries
of the region still have severely limited domestic and foreign savings to finance
productive and social investment. In this respect, development banks, as well as
catalyst institutions for medium- and long-term financial resources, continue to
be important for promoting and boosting economic growth. Multilateral devel-
opment banks, both regional and subregional, have played an important role in
providing external financing to the region. During the 1990s, multilateral
development banks provided three-quarters of the net capital inflows to coun-
tries in the region with a per capita income of less than U.S.$2,000. These
resources helped in part to offset the adverse effects of external shocks. In coun-
tries with a per capita income of between U.S.$2,000 and U.S.$4,000, resources
from multilateral banks represented around 14 percent of net capital inflows.
However, in the wealthier countries—that is to say, countries with a per capita
income of more than U.S.$4,000—resources from multilateral development
banks accounted for around 11 percent of total net inflows. Also, multilateral
development banks granted more favorable financial conditions for credits than
did private sources of financing, with lower interest rates and a longer term.3
Since the ability to access foreign capital flows continues to be a key factor in
the economic growth dynamic, development banks must support and facilitate
access to private external financing in order to improve the term and costs.
Since lending by these institutions is generally countercyclical, they also play a
role in stabilizing financial flows. An issue of vital importance for the region is
financial risk management. The weak structure of most national financial sys-
tems has hampered financing of productive activity and innovation. Regional
3. Titelman (2002).
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and subregional development banks must therefore support the emergence of
new national, subregional, and regional financial instruments.
Over and above providing financial resources, regional and subregional dev-
elopment banks must take a more prominent role in the financial development
of the countries in the region, which evidence varying levels of financial deepen-
ing. Legal problems, the supervision and regulation of national financial sys-
tems, and the capacity to manage financial risk would all be alleviated by the
presence of subregional financial institutions acting in a complementary capac-
ity with more global financial institutions.
Subregional or regional financial institutions can enhance the work of global
institutions by playing a complementary role. The ability to incorporate specific
regional or subregional requirements into the structure and operation of devel-
opment finance institutions enables them to provide development banking,
emergency financing, and technical support services. Last, recent experience
shows that the countries’ sense of ownership is crucial to institution building
and increases their willingness to accept the imposition of conditionalities by
financial institutions, which leads to greater flexibility for lending resources.4
Subregional Development Banks
Regional and subregional development banks have been major sources of fund-
ing for all the economies of the region, in particular for relatively less devel-
oped countries. During the period 1990–2003, these institutions approved
credits to the region worth an average of U.S.$15 billion per year. This figure
is almost three times the average annual U.S.$5 billion approved in the period
1971–89. During the 1990s, subregional development banks contributed
around 20 percent of total resources, in contrast to only around 5 percent in
the period 1971–90 (see table 7-2).
Development banks have been actively involved in the subregional sphere.
The Andean Development Corporation (CAF) was created to support the sus-
tainable development and integration of the countries of the Andean Commu-
nity, and the countries eligible to receive financial resources therefore include all
the Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela). However, CAF membership has grown over time to
include a very large group of Latin American and Caribbean countries, together
with Spain. At present, CAF grants loans and extends lines of credit to corpora-
tions, lending institutions, and public and private banks financing foreign trade
4. Ocampo (2002a); Agosin (2001).
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and working capital operations. In addition, it provides the financial sector with
global credits and lines of credit for channeling resources to a variety of projects
in the productive sector. It also offers governments and government bodies
development bank services for special financing of physical infrastructure and
integration projects. Added to this, it provides investment bank services, such as
shareholding, acquisition, and guarantee for the issue of securities, and structur-
ing and financing projects with limited guarantees (limited-recourse financing,
cofinancing, syndicated loans, financial guarantees, and others). Furthermore, it
offers financing for projects to promote human development and integrate mar-
ginalized groups (such as indigenous peoples).
In the Caribbean subregion, the Caribbean Development Bank was created in
1969 to contribute to the growth and economic development of the Caribbean
member countries (Caricom) and to promote cooperation and economic inte-
gration among them, paying special attention to the needs of the region’s less-
developed countries. To this end, the bank has applied the Caricom definition
of less-developed country to the following countries: Anguilla, Antigua and
Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Added to these are the British
overseas territories of the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the
Turks and Caicos Islands. In addition, there are the borrower member coun-
tries: Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. The
CDB provides financing to the governments of its borrower member countries
and to public and private sector entities from those countries. Furthermore, it
grants loans to private sector entities without a government guarantee and
invests in shares in those enterprises.
On the Central American isthmus, the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration (CABEI) gears its activities toward investment financing, giving
precedence to the export, basic services (infrastructure, electricity, communica-
tions), and agricultural sectors, and in general to projects in the productive sector
that foster economic complementation among the member countries. It operates
several funds, the most prominent of which are the Central American Economic
Integration Fund (Fondo Centroamericano de Integración Económica), the
Housing Finance Fund (Fondo Financiero de la Vivienda), the Export Promo-
tion Fund (Fondo para la Promoción de Exportaciones), the Fund for Promo-
ting Central American Exports (Fondo de Fortalecimiento de Exportaciones
Centroamericanas), the Technical Cooperation Fund (Fondo de Cooperación
Técnica), and the Regional Debt Conversion Fund (Fondo Regional para la
Conversión de Deuda). The member countries eligible for financing are Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
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A fourth and smaller institution, FONPLATA (Fondo Financiero para el
Desarrollo de la Cuenca del Plata; in English, Financial Fund for the Development
of the Plata River Basin), was created in 1971 to act as the financial body of the
Cuenca del Plata treaty.5 Its main objective is to finance studies, projects, programs,
and works intended to promote the economic development and the physical inte-
gration of the Plata River basin. The fund began operating in 1977 with initial capi-
tal of U.S.$160 million contributed by its member states (33 percent by Argentina
and Brazil and 11.11 percent by Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay). As of December
2003, the total authorized capital of the fund was U.S.$390 million. From the
beginning of its activities up to December 2003, FONPLATA had approved sixty-
two financing operations for a total of approximately U.S.$593.5 million. The
total financing of projects carried out by the fund, together with local contributions
and resources from other multilateral as well as national sources, amounts to
U.S.$2,482 million. The fund has mainly financed preinvestment and investment
projects in the transport sector (70 percent of the total).6
Regional and subregional development banks are able to offer a wide range of
instruments and services (see table 7-3). These are linked largely with the provi-
sion of financing, access to financial markets, financial development, technical
training, and disaster financing. The only development bank authorized to pro-
vide funds for balance-of-payments support is CABEI, via the Central American
Monetary Stabilization Fund. However, as mentioned earlier, this fund ceased
to operate in the early 1980s. As illustrated below, the importance and use of
the instruments also differ significantly from one subregional bank to another.
Relative Importance of Subregional Banks
Beginning in the 1990s, the relative importance of financing from subregional
development banks increased (see tables 7-4 and 7-5). In the Andean countries,
CAF contributed around 56 percent of the total resources approved by the devel-
opment banks for the Andean Community countries. From 1995 on, except in
1998–99, CAF has been the main source of multilateral financing for the
Andean countries, attaining 68 percent of the total approved during 2002.
On the Central American isthmus, CABEI has also increased its loans,
albeit to a lesser extent and with more ups and downs. CABEI had significant
growth between 1995 and 1998 (from U.S.$358 million approved in 1995 to
5. Signatories to that 1969 treaty were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The
objective of the treaty is to join efforts to promote economic development and the physical integra-
tion of the member countries.
6. See www.fonplata.org.
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Table 7-3. Products and Services of Multilateral Financial Institutions
Worldwide Regional Subregional
Product or service World Bank IDB CABEI CAF CDB
Investment x x x x x
Preinvestment x x x x
Cofinancing x x x x x
Trust funds x x x x x
Guarantees x x x
Access to the capital market x x x x
Technical cooperation and counseling x x x x x
Training x x x x x
Capacity building x x x
Second-tier banking x x x x
Development of the capital market x x x
Sectoral restructuring x x x x x
Venture capital for SMEs x x x
and rural enterprises
Balance-of-payments support x
Disasters x x x x x
Source: Maldonado (2003).
Table 7-4. Loans Approved by Development Banks, 1995–2004
Millions of current U.S. dollars
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Andean Community countries
IDB and 2,133 1,924 1,392 2,996 2,558 2,152 1,917 1,559 4,124 2,329
World Bank
CAF 2,258 2,314 2,900 2,673 2,182 2,323 3,198 3,290 3,304 3,503
Central American Common Market countries
IDB and 876 626 593 1,233 1,027 513 1,079 1,043 513 760
World Bank
CABEI 358 569 532 932 336 330 572 680 681 800
Caricom countries
IDB and 345 506 176 189 334 270 310 326 242 221
World Bank
CDB 92 73 51 117 137 179 85 108 185 94
Source: Prepared by the author using the annual reports of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB),
World Bank, Andean Development Corporation (CAF), Central American Bank for Economic Integration
(CABEI), and Caribbean Development Bank (CDB).
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U.S.$932 million in 1998), before shrinking significantly in 1999 and 2000
and recovering in 2001. In comparison with other multilateral sources (the
World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank [IDB]), CABEI has con-
tributed an average of around 40 percent of the total financing approved by
these institutions for the Central American countries, reaching a maximum of
57 percent in 2003. Disbursements increased from U.S.$310 million in 1995 to
U.S.$864 million in 2002, when they were equivalent to 51 percent of total dis-
bursements by the multilateral institutions.
In the Caribbean region, the CDB also increased its loan portfolio, from
U.S.$108 million approved in 1991 to U.S.$179 million approved in 2000, only
to fall again and recover in 2003, when it approved loans worth U.S.$185 mil-
lion. As a source of multilateral financing for the Caribbean subregion, it
accounted for around 30 percent of total loan approvals between 1992 and 2002.
Disbursements grew from U.S.$59 million in 1995 to U.S.$119 million in
2002, and in the period 1995–2002 they were equivalent to 23 percent of the
total disbursed by multilateral development banks.
Measured in terms of the gross domestic product (GDP), subregional banks’
financing flows are equally significant. For the period 1995–2004, CAF approved
loans equivalent to 1.0 percent of the GDP of the Andean Community countries.
During the period 1995–2004, CABEI approved average resources equivalent
Table 7-5. Loans Approved by Development Banks, 1995–2004
Percent of GDP
Bank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Andean Community countries
IDB and 0.9 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 1.6 0.7
World Bank
CAF 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1
Central American Common Market countries
IDB and 2.0 1.4 1.2 2.3 1.8 0.9 1.8 1.6 0.8 1.0
World Bank
CABEI 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1
Caricom countries
IDB and 2.0 2.7 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.9 0.8
World Bank
CDB 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.3
Source: Prepared by the author using annual reports of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), World
Bank, Andean Development Corporation (CAF), Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI)
and Caribbean Development Bank (CDB).
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to 1.0 percent of the GDP of the Central American countries. The resources
approved by the CDB were on average around 0.5 percent of the Caricom coun-
tries’ GDP (see table 7-5).
Term and Sectoral Allocation
Over the past decade, CAF has progressed significantly in its capacity to provide
medium- and long-term resources. The proportion of long-term resources has
increased considerably more than short-term resources. While for the period
1991–2000 long-term loans represented around 50 percent of the total approved,
between 2001 and 2003 they rose to 80 percent. A significant part of this financ-
ing was directed toward infrastructure investment, accounting for 24 percent in
1991–2000 and rising to 50 percent in 2001–03. The productive sector also
receives major loan allocations, absorbing 15 percent of the total approved in
2001–03, followed by the social sector (see table 7-6). This contrasts with the
IDB and the World Bank, which in recent years have directed a major part of
their financing to the social sector.
Between 1970 and 2003, the CDB approved financing for a total of some
U.S.$2.7 billion, which went mainly to infrastructure (30 percent), financial
Table 7-6. CAF Loans by Economic Sector, 1971–2003
Millions of current U.S. dollars
Cumulative Cumulative 
1971–90 1991–2000 2001 2002 2003
Productive sectors 1,379 4,209 985 122 362
Infrastructure 628 5,383 1,290 1,872 1,667
Social sectors 0 922 353 536 311
Economic reforms 0 528 195 0 172
Long-term 2,007 11,042 2,823 2,530 2,512
Short-term 953 10,934 375 760 792
Total approved 2,960 21,976 3,198 3,290 3,304
As a percentage of the total approved
Productive sectors 47 19 31 4 11
Infrastructure 21 24 40 57 50
Social sectors 0 4 11 16 9
Economic reforms 0 2 6 0 5
Long-term 68 50 88 77 76
Short-term 32 50 12 23 24
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Prepared by the author using Andean Development Corporation annual reports.
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Table 7-7. CDB Total Financing by Economic Sector, 1970–2003a
Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted
Cumulative Cumulative 
1970–89 1990–2000 2001 2002 2003
Productive sector 344 120 0 13 32
Infrastructure 604 136 10 24 33
Social sector 228 31 29 10 11
Natural disasters 81 0 5 41 0
Other financing 668 147 75 26 28
Total approved 1,925 434 119 114 189
As a percentage of the total approved
Productive sector 18 28 0 12 17
Infrastructure 31 31 8 21 17
Social sector 12 7 24 9 6
Natural disasters 4 0 4 36 0
Other financing 35 34 63 23 15
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the Caribbean Development Bank.
a. Total financing includes loans, grants, and equity.
markets, and financing activities (34 percent), and to a lesser extent to the
productive sector (18 percent), the social sector (11 percent), and natural dis-
asters (4 percent). In recent years the CDB has mobilized more resources for
financing social sector projects and tackling the aftereffects of natural disas-
ters, which accounted for 36 percent of the resources approved in 2002 (see
table 7-7).
CABEI has traditionally channeled an important part of its resources to
financing infrastructure, which accounted for 45 percent of approved resources
between 2001 and 2003. Financing for the productive sector increased in relative
importance from 14 percent of loans approved in the period 1961–90 to 42 per-
cent in the period 1991–2003 (see table 7-8).
Credit Risk Rating, Access to Financial Markets, 
and Countercyclical Financing
One of the main characteristics of the Latin American and Caribbean econo-
mies in recent years has been their irregular access to international capital flows.
This reflects flaws in the market at the level of both the countries and the inter-
national financial system. In this context, subregional development banks can
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play a significant role in intermediating financing funds from international mar-
kets to the countries of the region.
As can be seen in table 7-9, CAF, CDB, and CABEI have a much higher
investment rating than their member countries (A, AAA, and Baa1, respectively),
based, among other things, on the fact that they have exceeded the Basel reserve
requirements, to the tune of 30 percent, 43 percent, and 47 percent respectively in
2002. These institutions therefore find themselves in a position that allows them
to intermediate private financing funds at a lesser cost than their member coun-
tries. This can facilitate access to financing for a number of relatively less devel-
oped countries, while reducing the cost of these resources.
While the main function of subregional development banks is to generate
medium- and long-term financial resources, they must also play a role in stabi-
lizing financial flows and providing countercyclical financing. Experience shows
that these institutions did indeed contribute in this way during the 1980s and
1990s. In general, although they have differing dynamics, development banks
have increased their loan approvals during crisis periods and, in addition, they
have had a countercyclical component (see figure 7-1). The decline in private
financial flows toward the Andean Community countries, beginning in 1999,
was partially offset by an increase in flows from CAF, which reduced the nega-
tive effect of diminished private flows.
Table 7-8. CABEI Loans by Economic Sector, 1961–2003a
Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted
Cumulative Cumulative 
1961–90 1991–2000 2001 2002 2003
Productive sector 318 1,299 156 203 315
Infrastructure 1,382 1,149 180 269 321
Social sector 311 448 54 96 93
Other 228 152 10 1 0
Total approved 2,239 3,048 400 569 729
As a percentage of the total approved
Productive sector 14 42 39 36 43
Infrastructure 62 38 45 47 44
Social sector 14 15 14 17 13
Other 10 5 2 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the Central American Bank for Economic Integration
(CABEI).
a. Amounts are as of June of every year.
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Share Capital and Sense of Ownership
One argument in favor of regional and subregional financial institutions is that
countries eligible to receive resources have more say and decisionmaking power
to influence the policies and instruments of such institutions than of global
institutions. As a result, regional and subregional financial institutions have
more flexibility to disburse resources in a timely manner, with conditionalities
that, in many instances, are more in line with the countries’ needs and realities.
As the countries feel better represented, it makes them more likely to comply
with the financial commitments they acquire with such institutions.
Table 7-9. Long-Term Debt Rating in Foreign Currency, according to Moody’s
Regional group Rating Loan
CACM
Costa Rica Ba1










Trinidad and Tobago Baa3 CDB




Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia






Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) B
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the Andean Community, the Central American Bank
for Economic Integration, the Caribbean Development Bank, and Bloomberg.
subregional financial cooperation 215














Financial balance plus 
errors and omissions
CABEI loans
Financial balance plus 
errors and omissions
CDB loans




Financial flows and loans (millions of U.S. $) Growth rate (percent)
B. Central American Common Market
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Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from the countries and from the Andean Commu-
nity, Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and Caribbean Development Bank.
a. Private capital has been estimated from the financial balance (FB) and the errors and omissions
(E&O) of the balance of payments.
Figure 7-1. GDP Growth, Loan Approvals, and Inflow of Private Capital,
1991–2003a
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The main shareholders of CAF are the Andean countries, which own around
96 percent of its share capital and are the chief recipients of funds, with the re-
maining 4 percent of shares distributed among Brazil, Chile, the Dominican
Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Spain, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Uruguay. The CAF shareholder structure means that the Andean countries
take an active part in defining the corporation’s objectives, ensuring greater har-
monization between the institution’s activities and the countries’ requirements.
Unlike in CAF, CDB shareholders include countries from other regions of the
world, such as Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Taiwan
Province of China, together with Colombia, Mexico, and the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela from the region. Member countries eligible for financing
represent 57 percent of the share capital. The CACM member countries own
72 percent of the share capital of CABEI. The remainder is distributed among
Taiwan Province of China (11 percent), Mexico (9 percent), and Argentina and
Colombia (4 percent each).
In comparative terms, CAF has a very good recovery rate for its loan port-
folio. Between 1999 and 2003, which were economically difficult years for the
region, CAF had almost no delinquency in its loan portfolio (see table 7-10).
Development banks have centered their financial management on granting
credits, as well as providing supplementary nonfinancial services. Only recently
have they started using new instruments for facilitating access to capital mar-
kets. The standardization of products and processes has been shown to have a
significant impact on reducing intermediation costs and on facilitating access to
new forms of asset financing, which is a positive area for development banks to
break into. Trust management, the provision of guarantee funds and insurance,
and asset securitization are all promising activities. For instance, acting in a
second-tier capacity, development banks can perform credit securitization. This
is where subregional development banks buy portfolios of callable loans from
Table 7-10. CAF Loan Portfolio Delinquency, 1999–2003
Loan type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Portfolio of outstanding loans 4,188 4,478 5,455 6,062 6,597
(millions of U.S. dollars)
Recovered/mature loans 100 100 100 100 100
(percent)
Delinquency as a percentage 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
of the loan portfolio
Source: Prepared by the author, using data from the countries, the Andean Development Corporation
(CAF), and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).
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first-tier commercial banks or from national development banks, package them,
and place them on the securities market. This allows them to transfer the credit
risk to the securities market, giving national banks new lending capacity.
Though not new, loan guarantee and insurance schemes have attracted grow-
ing interest in recent years as instruments for facilitating access to financing. This
type of instrument reduces the financial risk and credit transaction costs, which
should result in better terms and conditions. Since subregional development banks
have a greater capacity to distribute risk than national banks, they can play an
important role in this type of instrument. Guarantee funds can be used to support
other instruments that improve and facilitate financial intermediation for produc-
tive development, such as the venture capital industry. In Latin America and the
Caribbean, little use is made of venture capital funds for financing investment.
To promote their role in this type of activity, subregional development banks
should forge closer links with national development banks to create synergies
between national financial instruments and subregional instruments. Sub-
regional banks could also provide technical assistance to harmonize the various
instruments and ensure that they have legitimacy in the various national mar-
kets, to train investors in using these instruments, and to finance the cost of ini-
tiating and implementing the new instruments.
Balance-of-Payments Support and Regional Reserve Funds
One of the weakest links in regional financial integration is support for balance-
of-payments financing. The only institution in the region active in this field is
the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR), which currently covers Bolivia,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
FLAR activities have three objectives: to provide financial support for its member
countries’ balance of payments; to improve the terms for its member countries’
reserves investments; and to help to harmonize its member countries’ monetary
and financial policies.
In order to provide balance-of-payments financing, FAR/FLAR operates as a
credit cooperative in which the member countries’ central banks are able to take
loans in proportion to their capital contributions. There are different credit
facilities:
—Credits for balance-of-payments support are issued for a three-year term,
with a one-year grace period, capped at 2.5 times the paid-up capital (except for
Ecuador and Bolivia, where it is 3.5 times the paid-up capital), and their
approval requires the consent of the board of directors.
10101-07_Ch07_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:08 PM  Page 218
—Credits for restructuring the external national debt are issued for a three-
year term, with a one-year grace period, capped at 1.5 times the paid-up capital,
and their approval requires the consent of the board of directors.
—Liquidity credits are issued for a term of up to one year, capped at 1.0 times
the paid-up capital, and their approval requires the authorization of the chief
executive officer.
—Standby credits are issued for a term of up to six months, capped at 2.0 times
the paid-up capital, and their approval requires the authorization of the chief exec-
utive officer.
—Treasury credits (repos) are issued for a term of one to thirty days, capped
at 2.0 times the paid-up capital and 50 percent collateralized, and their approval
requires the authorization of the chief executive officer.
—The Andean peso is an accounting unit created to facilitate payment
between the central banks and other authorized holders. However, this currency
has been little used.
Relative Importance
Between its creation and the end of 2003, FAR/FLAR disbursed credits worth a
total of U.S.$4.9 billion, consisting chiefly of credits for balance-of-payments
support and liquidity credits. During the worst years of the debt crisis, 1982–84,
FAR/FLAR increased its resource contribution significantly. The same happened
in the 1995 and 1998–99 crises (see table 7-11).
During the period 1978–2003, FAR/FLAR contributed average resources
equivalent to 60 percent of IMF exceptional financing to the Andean Commu-
nity countries. In the 1978–89 period, FAR/FLAR channeled resources of around
U.S.$3 billion, of which Ecuador received 25 percent; Bolivia and Colombia
around 23 percent each; Peru, 20 percent; and the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, 9 percent. Of the U.S.$1.9 billion disbursed during the period
1990–2004, Ecuador received 46 percent; Peru, 26 percent; Bolivia, 10 percent;
Costa Rica, 8 percent; Colombia, 6.5 percent; and the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela, 1 percent. For the beneficiary countries, these funds have helped sig-
nificantly to relieve liquidity restrictions. Measured in export terms, these flows
have reached major proportions in the different countries. In Bolivia, for exam-
ple, flows were equivalent to 30 percent of exports in 1985–86; in Peru they were
11 percent in 1991; in Ecuador, 11 percent in 1998; and in Colombia, 12 per-
cent in 1984. From the international reserves perspective, the figures are even
higher, with Bolivia showing flows equivalent to 35 percent of its international
reserves in 1985–86; Peru, 13 percent in 1991; Ecuador, 28 percent in 1998;
and Colombia, 30 percent in 1984.
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Table 7-11. FAR/FLAR Disbursements and IMF Exceptional Financing, 1978–99 a
Millions of U.S. dollars
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
FAR/FLAR disbursementsb
Bolivia 39 53 53 53 30 165 190 28 96
Colombia 50 529 85
Ecuador 105 67 127 34 250 93 54
Costa Rica




Total 15 18 39 53 158 364 686 284 440 291 251 390
IMF exceptional financing c
Bolivia 38 11 96 27 19 135 91 58
Ecuador 218 40 86 89 49 78 20
Costa Rica 27 20 62 119 35




Total 145 267 261 62 358 532 147 121 224 49 169 1,052
220 daniel titelman
An important aspect of FAR/FLAR funding is its timeliness and speed, and it
has always contributed crisis funding to its member countries with a clear anti-
cyclical impact (see figure 7-2). In some cases, FAR/FLAR was the only institu-
tion to contribute resources for crisis situations, as was the case for Peru in 1988,
when its GDP fell by 8.4 percent and FAR/FLAR disbursed resources worth
U.S.$130 million, whereas the IMF contributed no emergency financing.
Bolivia and Ecuador are the two countries to have received the most FAR/
FLAR disbursements. These countries are granted privileged access to this fund:
they can use 3.5 times their capital for balance-of-payments support credits,
whereas other countries can use only 2.5 times their capital. As table 7-12
shows, when the debt capacity with FAR/FLAR is added to the member coun-
tries’ international reserves, the ratio of short-term debt to international reserves
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
121 48 20
125




390 451 20 234 34 494 125 156
31 31 51 44 26 49 23 46 23 15 24




1,906 449 57 897 186 26 557 244 46 23 165 72 98
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drops significantly in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Costa Rica, countries that con-
tribute a smaller quota to the IMF.
Financing and Sense of Ownership
FAR/FLAR resources come mainly from paid-up capital from the member
countries, which defines their debt capacity with the fund. In December 2003,
of its equity of U.S.$1,554 million, 90 percent came from paid-up capital
(U.S.$1,386), 9 percent from reserves, and 1 percent from net profits. The mem-
ber countries have always paid off their loans with FAR/FLAR, even in situations
of moratorium on external national debt. For example, during the 1980s and
1990s, Peru and Ecuador restructured their international obligations, defaulting
in international financial markets. However, these countries continued to comply
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the countries, the Latin American Reserve Fund, and the International
Monetary Fund.
a. The FAR/FLAR accounting year is from July to June; for the IMF it is a calendar year.
b. FAR/FLAR contingency financing is not detailed by country because it is zero for every year. The same applies to disburse-
ments, because of debt restructuring, except for 1995 and 2003, when funds worth U.S.$200 million and U.S.$156 million were
disbursed to Ecuador and Costa Rica, respectively. Also, not included in FAR/FLAR disbursements by country are countries that
always had zero disbursements for any reason during the period 1978–2004.
c. IMF disbursements do not include the reserve tranche.
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with their obligations to FAR/FLAR, an indication that the member countries have
endowed it with preferred-creditor status.
Preferred-creditor status reflects a number of factors. One is a sense of owner-
ship, which has been reflected in speedy and timely financing, owing to the fact
that loan approvals require the authorization of either the board of directors,
which is made up of the member countries’ central banks, or the chief executive
officer, depending on the type of credit. This has given it an operational advan-
tage over the IMF, which is not necessarily reflected in the amounts, but is
reflected in the timeliness and relevance of the credits. Another is that the sense
of ownership has been reflected in rules stipulated in the central banks’ articles
of agreement and accounting rules. Under these rules, the central banks must
register any loans granted by FAR/FLAR as liabilities in the international re-
serves account, thereby providing an additional guarantee of repayment. At
present, FAR/FLAR has a Moody’s rating of Aa2 and a Standard & Poor’s rat-
ing of A+. These ratings reflect the preferred-creditor status of FAR/FLAR.
FLAR member countries have consistently honored their obligations, even
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Source: Prepared by the author, using data from the countries and figures from the Latin American 
Reserve Fund.
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while encountering severe economic stress and being in default to their com-
mercial creditors, giving it repayment priority over other creditors in the event
of a moratorium, with the result that FLAR has a zero default record in its basic
loan operations.7
Feasibility of Expanding FLAR Regional Coverage
In spite of prudent and relatively stable macroeconomic management by many
of the countries of the region, they have proven to be highly sensitive to volatil-
ity in international capital movements. This vulnerability reflects flaws in inter-
national financial markets, insufficiently developed domestic financial markets,
and the countries’ low level of international reserves, which has made them
unable to cope with problems of contagion and speculative attacks on their cur-
rencies. Therefore it is of paramount importance to boost regional financial
cooperation by strengthening a regional reserve fund.
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7. Moody’s (www.moodys.com); Standard & Poor’s (www.standardandpoors.com).
Table 7-12. Impact of FAR/FLAR on Financial Vulnerability: Short-Term Debt
and International Reserves, March 2003
Millions of dollars, except where indicated
Venezuela 
Costa (Bolivarian 
Bolivia Colombia Rica Ecuador Peru Rep. of )
Subscribed capital 234 469 234 234 469 469
Paid-up capital 157 313 133 157 313 313
IMF quotas 233 1,053 222 414 878 3,721
Short-term debt 370 3,800 1,499 2,316 2,335 3,720
International reserves 893 10,844 1,497 1,004 9,721 12,107
Short-term debt/ 41 35 100 231 24 31
international reserves 
(percent)
Short-term debt/increased 26 33 82 149 22 29
international reserves 
(percent)a
Source: Prepared by the author using data from the countries, the Latin American Reserve Fund, and
the International Monetary Fund.
a. The quotient of short-term debt over increased international reserves is calculated by adding to
international reserves the debt capacity in FAR/FLAR, which is equal to 2.5 times the paid-up capital,
except for Bolivia and Ecuador, where it is 3.5 times.
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In an examination of the viability of expanding the FLAR area of coverage,
Agosin argued that, despite the significant covariance between the capital flows
to the different countries of the region, it is not so great as to make a regional
reserve fund financially unviable.8 Insofar as crises in the region have a clear
sequential component, a regional fund is feasible and, furthermore, could help
to curb mechanisms of crisis transmission between countries. If this fund
were endowed with 15 percent of the reserves of the eleven countries of the
region (including all the large countries, except Mexico), it could provide financ-
ing to cope with capital outflows equivalent to the entire short-term foreign
debt of all the countries in question.9 Thus by contributing around 15 percent
of their international reserves, the countries could help to resolve short-term
financial problems.
FLAR should not focus solely on providing support for balance-of-payments
financing and short-term liquidity; it should also support coordination of the
macroeconomic and monetary policies of the countries in the region. The fact
that the countries feel a greater sense of ownership of this institution facilitates
use of the fund to promote the coordination of monetary, exchange rate, and
fiscal policies. FLAR, together with the member countries’ central banks, could
promote periodic assessments of the progress of the economies, as well as help to
establish common standards for regulation and financial supervision. Stepping
up the regional effort to monitor the countries’ economic performance and
helping to establish early warning systems for crisis risk could alleviate conta-
gion problems and reduce financial vulnerability.
Summary and Conclusions
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have succeeded in building a
major system of regional and subregional financial institutions, which was under-
mined by the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s. The effects of this crisis were not
uniform throughout the various subregions and institutions. In general, clearing
agreements, and to a lesser extent development banks, were the hardest hit.
However, FAR/FLAR discharged its duty of providing balance-of-payments sup-
port. Within the subregional sphere, the financial institutions of the Andean
Community were the least affected, and during the 1980s they maintained a bet-
ter performance than those of the Central American Common Market or the
Caribbean Community.
8. See Agosin (2001).
9. Agosin (2001).
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The participation of subregional development banks has increased signifi-
cantly since the 1990s, growing at an annual rate of around 10 percent, to the
point where they now channel roughly 46 percent of this type of financing to
the Andean Community, CACM, and Caricom countries. CAF is the most
dynamic and has mobilized the largest volume of resources. Loans have tended
to favor countries with a lower relative income and have focused mainly on
financing infrastructure investment. The subregional development banks have
disbursed a significant volume of resources, accounting for an average of around
1 percent of GDP of the Andean and Central American subregions and 0.5 per-
cent of the Caribbean GDP.
Given the current characteristics of the process of financial integration by the
countries of the region with the world economy, subregional development banks
should not limit their role to acting as a complementary source of funding for
their member countries. In addition to providing countercyclical financing, they
should expand their functions to include supporting and facilitating the coun-
tries’ access to international financial markets by taking greater advantage of their
better credit risk rating; and they should promote the emergence of instruments
to help these countries capture resources in international markets.
Subregional development banks must also actively support national and
regional financial development. Proper management of economic and financial
risk is key to stimulating and facilitating economic growth. Since subregional
development banks are more able to distribute risk than national banks, they
have an important role in promoting new financial instruments that reduce the
risks and costs of accessing financial flows. A promising area in this respect is
the deepening of domestic and subregional capital markets by means of asset
securitization, guarantee funds, and insurance mechanisms. This calls for stronger
ties with development and commercial banks and the countries’ capital markets.
With respect to support for short-term liquidity needs and balance-of-payments
financing, FAR/FLAR has played a major role in providing timely emergency
financing to its member countries, in particular relatively less developed coun-
tries. In the case of Bolivia and Ecuador, it has loaned resources equivalent to
35 percent of Bolivia’s international reserves and 28 percent of Ecuador’s. Further-
more, when debt capacity with FAR/FLAR is added to the international reserves
of FAR/FLAR member countries, the short-term debt/international reserves ratio
drops significantly in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Costa Rica, which reduces these
countries’ financial vulnerability. In addition, FAR/FLAR has played a clear
countercyclical role, complementing exceptional financing from the IMF.
However, because FAR/FLAR has such limited geographic coverage, balance-
of-payments support via emergency financing continues to be one of the weakest
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links in regional financial integration. Given the characteristics and dynamics of
the latest generation of balance-of-payments crises, an essential task in the pro-
cess of intra- and extraregional financial integration is to strengthen and expand
FAR/FLAR. Since the covariance between capital flows to the different countries
is significant but not excessively high—reflecting a major sequential component
of crises in the region—it is feasible to expand the geographic coverage of
FAR/FLAR. This would help to reduce contagion of crises between countries.
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The large currency crises of the past decade have been regional in nature.1This feature of financial crises suggests that neighboring countries have a
strong incentive to engage in mutual surveillance and to extend financial assis-
tance to one another in the face of potentially contagious threats to stability.
Regardless of whether the sudden shifts in market expectations and confidence
were the primary source of the Asian financial crisis, foreign lenders were so
alarmed by the Thai crisis that they abruptly pulled their investments out of the
other countries in the region, making the crisis contagious. The geographic
proximity and economic similarities (or similar structural problems) of these
Asian countries prompted a blanket withdrawal of foreign lending and portfolio
investment, with differences in economic fundamentals often being overlooked.
If the channels of contagion cannot be blocked off through multilateral cooper-
ation at an early stage in a crisis, countries without their own extensive foreign
reserves will not be able to survive independently. Hence, neighbors have an
interest in helping put out a fire (a financial crisis) before it spreads to them.2




The author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments from José Antonio Ocampo on an earlier
draft.
1. See Glick and Rose (1999).
2. Ito, Ogawa, and Sasaki (1999).
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3. See Park and Wang (2002).
4. See Sakakibara (2003).
5. See Henning (2002).
But as long as a crisis remains confined to a specific country or region, there is
no urgent political need for unaffected countries to pay the significant costs
associated with playing the role of firefighter.
The formation of a regional financial arrangement in East Asia reflects in
part frustration with the slow reform of the international financial system.3 The
sense of urgency concerning reform of the international financial architecture
has receded considerably in the G-7 countries. The slow progress has been fur-
ther complicated by the perception that the current international architecture is
defective. The lack of global governance, including a global lender of last resort
and international financial regulation, is not likely to be remedied anytime
soon.4 As long as there continue to be structural problems on the supply side of
international capital—such as volatile capital movements and exchange rate
gyrations of the U.S. dollar, the euro, and the yen—the East Asian countries
will remain as vulnerable as ever to future crises. It is thus in the interest of East
Asians to work together to create their own self-help arrangements. The Chiang
Mai Initiative (CMI) of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Japan,
China, and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) is one such available option.
However, it is equally important that individual East Asian countries continue
to undertake financial sector restructuring and development. Without sound
financial institutions and adequate regulatory regimes, Asian financial markets
will remain vulnerable to external shocks. Regional policy dialogue should also
contribute to strengthening the efforts to restructure and advance the develop-
ment of financial markets in East Asia. The CMI has emerged as a regional
forum for policy dialogue and also for concerted regional efforts at financial
reform in the region.
Three pillars—liquidity assistance, monitoring and surveillance, and ex-
change rate coordination—are essential for regional financial and monetary
cooperation. However, the development of this cooperation and its related insti-
tutions will follow an evolutionary path, as was the case with European monetary
integration. A shallow form of financial cooperation may comprise no more than
a common foreign reserve pooling or mutual credit arrangements such as bilat-
eral swaps. In other words, some kinds of shallow financial cooperation are con-
ceivable without any commitment to exchange rate coordination, under which
the exchange rates of participating countries would be pegged to each other or
would vanish through the adoption of a common currency. The East Asian
countries presently appear to be pursuing this form of financial cooperation.5
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Although a full-fledged form of monetary integration is not viable at this stage,
East Asia may begin to examine the feasibility and desirability of cooperation
and coordination in exchange rate policies.6
Evidently, there is a rising sense of East Asian identity today. After the pro-
posal to create an Asian monetary fund was aborted, the leaders of ASEAN
responded by inviting China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea to join in an
effort to build a regional mechanism for economic cooperation in East Asia.
The ASEAN+3 summit in November 1999 released a Joint Statement on East
Asian Cooperation that covers a wide range of possible areas for regional coop-
eration. Recognizing the need to establish regional financial arrangements 
to supplement the existing international facilities, the finance ministers of
ASEAN+3 at their meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in May 2000 then agreed
to strengthen the existing cooperative frameworks in the region through the
Chiang Mai Initiative.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current process and future
prospects for regional financial and monetary cooperation in East Asia. More
specifically, it sketches an institutional design for a regional financial architec-
ture encompassing the three major pillars (liquidity assistance arrangements,
policy dialogue and surveillance, and exchange rate coordination). Through an
evolutionary process of enlargement and consolidation of the CMI, this study
envisions the creation of an Asian monetary fund that is fully equipped with li-
quidity support facilities and a monitoring and surveillance mechanism. The
chapter does not, however, contemplate any manifest collective exchange rate
coordination under the ASEAN+3 framework.
The chapter is organized as follows: The following sections successively dis-
cuss the economic rationale for a regional financial arrangement in East Asia;
developments in the Chiang Mai Initiative; and major barriers to financial
cooperation and integration in East Asia.
Economic Rationale for a Regional Financial Arrangement 
in East Asia
The 1997–98 Asian financial crisis brought home the need to create a regional
mechanism of defense against future crises in East Asia. However, other events
have also encouraged the regional integration movement. This section discusses
some of these developments as background for an examination of whether they
6. East Asian currency union remains a very remote possibility, but this does not necessarily
mean that a currency union could not be envisaged as a long-term objective.
regional financial integration in east asia 229
10101-08_Ch08_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:08 PM  Page 229
230 yung chul park
can maintain the momentum for enhanced regional cooperation and lead to
financial market integration and monetary unification in the long run.
Trade Integration and Stability of Bilateral Exchange Rates
Since the early 1990s, many of the East Asian countries have made sustained
efforts to deregulate and open domestic markets, including financial markets, to
foreign competition. As a result of market orientation and trade liberalization,
East Asia has seen a large increase in intraregional trade and investment. In
terms of imports, intraregional trade in East Asia (among the ASEAN+3 coun-
tries and Taiwan Province of China) accounted for 46 percent of the region’s
total trade in 2001, when the entire region was still recovering from the crisis
(see table 8-1). There is every indication that this trend will continue.
Financial liberalization and market opening has also contributed to both
regional and global integration of financial markets in the East Asian countries.
And there is growing awareness that further integration of intraregional trade
in goods, services, and financial assets will call for stabilization of the bilateral
exchange rates for East Asian currencies. With deepening in regional trade inte-
gration, East Asia is bound to lose disproportionately more than other regions
from trade disruptions caused by currency crises. Stability of bilateral exchange
rates would also facilitate and increase the benefits of capital mobility in the
region.
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, the flexible exchange system became
the accepted norm in the new international financial architecture. The new con-
sensus, however, did not last very long. Williamson and Frankel argue that inter-
mediate regimes such as the “basket, band, and crawl” system are more likely to
be appropriate than “two-corner solutions” for many emerging market econo-
mies (EMEs). In particular, Williamson advocates several intermediate regimes
with soft margins. Fischer suggests that developing countries that are not
exposed to capital flows could choose from a wide variety of intermediate regimes
and that flexible exchange rate systems suitable for EMEs could include crawl-
ing bands with wide ranges.7
If East Asian countries find it desirable to follow some type of intermediate
regime, a case can be made for creating regional financial cooperative arrange-
ments that could help stabilize bilateral exchange rates in the region. Although
the ASEAN+3 authorities have no plans for transforming the CMI into a mone-
tary union, the East Asian countries could use the CMI as a framework for devel-
oping an East Asian common currency area in the long run, after a transition
7. See Williamson (2000); Frankel (1999); and Fischer (2001).
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period during which a mechanism for the coordination of exchange rate policies
would be established.
The IMF and Capital Account Crisis Management
A 2003 International Monetary Fund (IMF) report makes it clear that East Asia
suffered a capital account crisis in 1997 and 1998, which required a management
and resolution strategy different from the traditional IMF recipe for crises origi-
nating from current account deficits. A large increase in capital flows into some
of the East Asian countries set off an asset market boom and a precipitous
increase in the current account deficit, thereby making these countries vulnerable
to speculative attacks. The perception of vulnerability of these countries triggered
a sharp and large capital outflow, which was further aggravated by the panic and
herding behavior of foreign investors. Once the dollar peg became indefensible,
the value of the currencies plummeted. Many banks and corporations with bal-
ance sheet mismatches could not service their foreign-currency-denominated
debts and eventually became insolvent. A sharp contraction in the level of out-
put then followed.
The crisis resolution strategy of the IMF was twofold. First, it imposed tight
monetary and fiscal policies with the aim of stabilizing the exchange rate and
generating current account surpluses by contracting domestic demand. These
policies, together with weak currencies, were expected to help lure back foreign
investors. Second, the IMF required the crisis countries to undertake a wide
range of reforms in the corporate, financial, and public sectors to strengthen the
structural foundation of their economies. These reforms were intended to help
the affected countries return to the pre-crisis path of robust growth; they were
also viewed as critical to restoring international lenders’ confidence in their
economies.
Once the crisis broke out, output contraction and the turbulence of foreign
exchange and other financial markets in one country were rapidly transmitted to
other economies in the region through trade and financial market linkages. Pro-
nouncements by international financial institutions, including the IMF and
policymakers from the G-7 countries, that the crisis countries had serious struc-
tural problems in their financial, corporate, and public sectors did little to
inspire confidence in these economies.8 Indeed, to some extent the IMF crisis
management program actually helped fuel contagion of the crisis.
At this writing nine years after the crisis, assessments of the success of the
structural reforms are mixed. A 2001 World Bank report continued to argue that
8. Furman and Stiglitz (1998).
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progress on structural and institutional reforms remained key to retaining confi-
dence and resilience to shocks in East Asia.9 One lesson of the Asian situation
is that when a crisis in a country originates in the capital account, policy coordi-
nation or at least policy dialogue and review among neighboring countries is
essential to prevent contagion of the crisis. Another lesson is that an appropriate
response to a capital account crisis is to serve notice to international financial
markets that the country in crisis is prepared to supply—either by itself or in
cooperation with regional or global financial institutions, including the IMF—
as much liquidity as it takes to thwart an impending speculative attack.
These lessons clearly suggest that regional financial cooperative arrangements
such as the CMI could complement the role of the IMF in managing a capital
account crisis. In the absence of policy dialogues and exchanges of information
among neighbors, individual countries may not be able to find the causes of
large changes in capital flows and exchange rates, or more important, respond
to the crisis if it spreads. An efficient regional policy coordination mechanism
will help monitor and make necessary policy adjustments in response to
changes in market expectations. Even smoothing out high-frequency move-
ments in the nominal exchange rate in individual countries may have to be
coordinated at a regional level in order not to send wrong signals to foreign
exchange markets. Unless the countries in the region maintain close working
relationships in coordinating policies and exchanging information, they will
not be able to make a prompt assessment of the nature of the crisis and mount
a quick response.
The IMF could monitor capital flows within and between regions and also
the behavior of market participants. But given its narrow mandate and its small
staff, the IMF may not have either the institutional or the professional capacity
to keep track of developments in the financial markets of all of its member
countries. Since the Fund obtains most of its macroeconomic and market infor-
mation from the authorities of member countries, its ability to prescribe preven-
tive measures to countries vulnerable to the crisis may be limited. At best it can
serve as a lender and as a crisis manager. However, the Asian experience demon-
strates that the crisis management ability of the IMF is severely constrained.
At the time of the crisis, the CMI countries as a whole held about U.S.$700
billion in foreign reserves. The total financing required from the IMF, other
international financial institutions, and a number of donor countries to restore
financial stability in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand amounted
to U.S.$111.7 billion. If the IMF had been ready to supply a large amount of
9. World Bank (2001).
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liquidity to the crisis countries, or if the thirteen countries had established a
cooperative mechanism through which they could pool their reserves to assist
other countries in need of financial support, they could have nipped the Thai cri-
sis in the bud and minimized its contagion by supplying only a small fraction of
their total reserves. In view of the large loss of output and the fall in employment
in the region, such a cooperative response would indeed have been desirable.
Inasmuch as East Asia suffered a liquidity crisis, compounded by the panic
and herding behavior of foreign investors, a more effective IMF crisis manage-
ment strategy—instead of tightening monetary and fiscal policy—would have
been to supply a large amount of short-term financing to replenish foreign
exchange reserves at the first sign of a speculative attack. Such a strategy could
have stopped the spread of the crisis and the ensuing slump throughout the
region.10 At the time of the crisis, there were neither regional nor global lenders
of last resort to deal with the bank-run problems that East Asian countries were
facing. With its limited financial resources, the IMF could not manage the East
Asian crisis by itself; it had to enlist the financial support of the G-7 and other
countries. This situation is testimony that, as a global institution, the IMF
would be more effective in resolving crises if it established cooperative relations
with its regional counterparts and hence encouraged the development of
regional financial mechanisms.
Once established, an East Asian monetary fund could serve as an institution
complementary to the IMF by providing additional resources and by working
with the Fund to prevent and manage financial crises. It could also support the
work of the IMF by monitoring economic developments in the region and tak-
ing part in IMF global surveillance activities. As Henning notes, it is difficult to
assess ex ante whether resources supplied through regional financial arrangements
are really additional to those supplied by the international community.11 The
“additionality” problem arises in principle whenever there are multiple sources of
10. Contagion is geographically concentrated, making a regional grouping for support logical.
In addition to providing financial assistance in tandem with international support, a regional
financial cooperation mechanism may conduct policy reviews and initiate a dialogue process. Pol-
icy dialogue, including monitoring and surveillance, is the bedrock on which coherent policy for-
mation under regional financial arrangements rests. A monitoring and surveillance process would
provide prompt and relevant information for assessing the situation of countries in trouble and the
potential contagious effects of a crisis to neighboring countries. Furthermore, a joint exercise based
on a regionwide early warning system would facilitate closer examination of financial vulnerabili-
ties in the region. In addition, the regional policy dialogue process would contribute to ensuring
effective implementation of high-quality banking and financial standards and promoting financial
market development in East Asia.
11. Henning (2002).
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finance and conditionality, yet it appears to have been managed successfully in
numerous historical cases. Potential conflicts can be avoided through consulta-
tion and coordination, which may be provided in part by the United States and
the East Asian governments.
Limited and Slow Progress in International Financial Reform
One of several developments that have reinforced regionalism in East Asia has
been slow progress in the reform of the international financial system. The need
for reform is no longer so urgently felt in the G-7 countries, despite the eco-
nomic collapse of 2001–02 in Argentina and the growing trade imbalance
between the United States and East Asia. The slow progress has been further
compounded by the perception that none of the many proposals for a new
architecture may be effective in sustaining global financial stability. In particu-
lar, as long as the structural problems on the supply side of international capital
markets are not addressed, the East Asian countries fear that they will remain as
vulnerable to future crises as they are now.12
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo show that there has been no international reform
agenda acceptable to both developing and developed countries.13 The 2002
Monterrey Consensus produced a new international agenda, but it is not alto-
gether clear whether the new agenda will be put into action. Some of the
progress that has been made is asymmetrical in the sense that the reform has
focused on strengthening the financial and corporate sectors of developing and
emerging market economies instead of rectifying imperfections in international
capital markets. Some of the advances in the new architecture have also been
jeopardized by the growing reluctance of developing countries to support large
IMF financing. Finally, it should be noted that developing countries have been
largely excluded from the key institutions and forums involved in international
financial reform.
It is natural that many emerging market economies, faced with the uneven
and slow process of the reform, would consider developing their own mecha-
nisms of defense against future financial crises. One such defensive measure is the
CMI in East Asia. Instead of waiting until the G-7 creates a new architecture—
whose effectiveness would be questionable, at best—the East Asian countries
have taken the initiative of working together to create their own system of
defense, and have fortified themselves by accumulating large amounts of reserves
to deal with sudden and unexpected capital outflows.
12. Park and Wang (2002).
13. Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2001).
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Accumulating Reserves: A War Chest or Insurance?
Many developing and emerging market economies, in particular those in coun-
tries that have fallen victim to financial crises, have taken recourse to amassing
foreign reserves as a defense against future crises. Before the onset of capital
account liberalization in the early 1990s, foreign currency reserves were held
mainly for transactions purposes. The rule of thumb was to hold reserves in an
amount equivalent to imports for three to four months. This implicit rule
appears to be no longer acceptable. In order to meet the increased volume of
their capital account transactions, but above all in order to build a war chest
large enough to stave off future speculative attacks, many East Asian emerging
market economies have accumulated large amounts of reserves.
For example, at the end of 2005, the volume of reserves as a share of GDP in
the Republic of Korea was almost 27 percent, which was more than four times
the level in 1996. Similar developments have taken place in other crisis-hit parts
of East Asia (see table 8-2). In Taiwan Province of China, the ratio of reserves to
GDP almost doubled between 1996 and 2005. The ratio climbed to 54 percent
at the end of 2005 from about 20 percent in 1997 in Malaysia. Although
reserve accumulation has been relatively modest in both Thailand and the
Philippines, these countries have added almost 10 percentage points to their
ratios since the end of 1997. The thirteen East Asian countries that constitute
ASEAN+3 held collective foreign currency reserves estimated at more than
U.S.$2.5 trillion at the end of 2005. By any measure, this level is excessive and
costly, and it represents a clear case of misallocation of resources.14 If these
reserves are pooled, a mere 10 percent of the total would be sufficient to provide
a formidable line of defense against any future crises.
In theory, floating rates and capital account liberalization are supposed to
reduce the amounts of reserves to be held for the prevention of crises. Except for
China, Hong Kong SAR, and Malaysia, all the crisis countries have been on a
flexible exchange rate system and have deregulated their capital account trans-
actions to a considerable degree since the 1997 crisis. However, the shift to
floating rates and participation in international financial markets over the past
five years has not reduced their reserve holdings relative to their output, largely
because capital flows have been unstable and capital account liberalization has
not improved their access to international capital markets.
14. In a speech at a Tokyo conference, Stiglitz argued that the existing dollar-based reserve sys-
tem benefits the United States, whereas developing countries bear a disproportionate burden of
holding large amounts of reserves to counter volatility in the currency market. He went on to say
that an Asian monetary fund, which would have given a quicker remedy to the Asian financial crisis,
could be an alternative model, providing a good basis for a new global regime (see Stiglitz 2002).
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Table 8-2. Foreign Exchange Reserves and Current Account Balances, 1996–2005
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Foreign exchange reserves (billions of U.S. dollars)
Republic of Korea 34.0 20.4 52.0 74.0 96.1 102.8 121.3 155.3 199.1 210.4
Chinaa 107.0 142.8 149.2 157.7 168.3 215.6 291.1 408.2 618.6 769.0
Hong Kong SAR 63.8 92.8 89.6 96.3 107.6 111.2 111.9 118.4 123.5 122.3
Taiwan Province 88.0 83.5 90.3 106.2 106.7 122.2 161.7 206.6 242.0 253.8
of China
Thailand 37.7 26.2 28.8 34.1 31.9 32.4 38.0 41.1 49.8 52.1
Indonesia 24.0 20.6 22.7 23.5 28.5 27.2 31.0 35.0 36.3 34.7
Malaysia 27.0 20.8 25.6 30.6 29.1 30.5 34.2 44.5 66.7 70.5
Philippines 10.0 7.3 9.2 13.2 13.0 13.4 13.1 13.5 16.2 18.5
Singapore 77.0 71.4 75.0 77.2 80.4 75.4 82.0 95.7 112.8 116.6
Current account balance (billions of U.S. dollars)
Republic of Korea −23.0 −8.2 40.4 24.5 11.0 8.2 6.1 12.3 28.9 15.5
Chinaa 7.2 37.0 31.5 15.7 20.5 17.4 35.4 45.9 68.7 100.3
Hong Kong SAR −3.5 −6.2 3.9 10.5 8.8 9.9 12.6 16.2 16.4 24.7
Taiwan Province 10.9 7.1 3.4 8.4 9.3 17.9 25.6 29.2 18.6 10.9
of China
Thailand −14.7 −3.0 14.2 12.4 9.2 6.2 7.0 8.0 7.3 . . .
Indonesia −8.5 −5.8 4.1 5.8 8.0 6.9 8.1 7.5 3.1 . . .
Malaysia −4.5 −5.9 9.5 12.6 8.9 7.3 7.2 13.4 14.9 . . .
Philippines −3.9 −4.4 1.5 7.9 9.3 1.3 4.2 3.3 2.0 . . .
Singapore 13.9 16.9 21.0 21.3 21.7 16.1 18.7 28.2 27.9 31.5
Foreign exchange reserves (percent of GDP)
Republic of Korea 6.5 4.2 16.2 17.8 21.0 21.3 22.2 25.7 29.3 26.6
Chinaa 13.1 15.8 15.8 15.9 15.5 18.3 22.9 28.9 38.7 42.4
Hong Kong SAR 41.4 54.3 55.0 60.5 65.8 68.3 69.3 75.0 74.5 69.1
Taiwan Province 31.5 32.7 32.6 35.9 36.4 43.5 57.3 72.2 75.0 73.8
of China
Thailand 20.7 17.3 25.7 27.5 26.0 28.0 29.9 28.7 30.5 29.2
Indonesia 10.6 9.6 23.0 16.2 18.9 19.3 17.9 16.8 14.1 12.4
Malaysia 26.7 20.8 35.0 37.7 32.6 34.6 36.0 43.2 56.6 53.7
Philippines 12.1 8.8 14.9 17.3 27.4 18.6 16.8 16.7 18.8 19.8
Singapore 83.7 85.2 99.9 89.3 82.2 88.8 94.3 104.8 105.6 101.0
Current account balance (percent of GDP)
Republic of Korea −4.4 −1.7 12.6 5.9 2.4 1.7 1.0 2.0 4.2 2.0
Chinaa 0.9 4.1 3.3 1.6 1.9 1.5 2.8 3.3 4.3 5.5
Hong Kong SAR −2.3 −3.6 2.4 6.6 5.4 6.1 7.8 10.2 9.9 14.0
Taiwan Province 3.9 2.8 1.2 2.8 3.2 6.5 9.1 10.2 5.8 3.2
of China
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With growing financial integration, the adequacy of reserve holdings in
emerging market economies is often gauged by the amount of short-term for-
eign borrowings, and a good benchmark is that the ratio of reserves to short-
term foreign debts should be equal to or higher than 1.15 Even when this
benchmark is applied, the reserve holdings of the crisis-hit countries in East Asia
are excessive. In the Republic of Korea and Indonesia, the ratio has been higher
than 2. China and Thailand hold reserves six and four times, respectively, as
large as their short-term external liabilities (see table 8-3). If emerging market
economies in East Asia and elsewhere have to hold more reserves than their
short-term foreign indebtedness, then questions arise as to whether these coun-
tries should borrow at all from the short end of international capital markets
and whether they should open their financial markets.
Commercial banks hold reserves equal to only a small fraction of their short-
term deposit liabilities; they can do so because, among other things, they have
access to the domestic lender of last resort. In the absence of a global and
regional lender of last resort, financial institutions in EMEs cannot engage in
term transformation involving foreign currency loans. Could EMEs instead
make arrangements with international banking institutions to establish private
contingent lines of credit from which they could draw in case they come under
speculative attack? The Mexican experience is instructive in this regard: the
availability of contingent credit lines does not increase liquidity once a financial
crisis breaks out, because the banks that provide contingent credit lines to the
central bank withdraw other credits extended to firms and financial institutions
to reduce their country exposure.16
15. The short-term foreign debt benchmark therefore suggests that reserve holdings for other uses
must be secured by long-term foreign borrowing or the accumulation of current account surpluses.
16. Carstens (2001).
Thailand −8.1 −2.0 12.7 10.0 7.5 5.4 5.5 5.6 4.5 . . .
Indonesia −3.8 −2.7 4.2 4.1 5.3 4.9 4.7 3.6 1.2 . . .
Malaysia −4.4 −5.6 13.1 15.9 9.9 8.3 7.6 12.9 12.6 . . .
Philippines −4.8 −5.3 2.4 10.3 19.7 1.8 5.3 4.2 2.3 . . .
Singapore 15.1 20.2 23.3 24.0 22.2 19.1 21.5 30.9 26.1 27.2
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IFS) database, the International Monetary Fund, and the
Asia Regional Information Center (ARIC).
a. Estimates by the International Institute of Finance.
Table 8-2. (continued)
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
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Owing to the limited availability of private contingent lines of credit,
together with the absence of a global or regional lender of last resort, EMEs may
have to hold a larger amount of reserves, and to do so they may have to run a
sizable surplus on the current account, as the East Asian crisis countries have
done since the crisis in 1997. However, this reserve accumulation in EMEs has
undesirable implications for future trade relations between developing and
developed countries and for the growth of the world economy.
As a growing number of EMEs increase their holdings of reserves by running
current account surpluses, trade relations between developing and developed
countries are likely to suffer from tension and unnecessary conflicts. The large
accumulation of reserves in EMEs may also sap global growth as it reduces
global aggregate demand. Therefore, both developing and developed countries
will find it in their interest to search for other schemes that can reduce EMEs’
holdings of foreign exchange reserves. For example, a group of countries, not
necessarily from the same region, may decide to pool a certain percentage of
their reserves to create new credit facilities for short-term liquidity support.
Individual countries belonging to the arrangement could then reduce their
holdings by borrowing from these new credit facilities.
Regional Financial Arrangements: Building Blocks?
Any argument supporting regional trade and financial arrangements must
address the fundamental question of whether they, whatever form they may
take, are conducive to an orderly global integration of trade and financial mar-
kets. Although many misgivings have been expressed about the role of the grow-
ing number of recent regional economic arrangements, the experience of the past
decade—in particular that of the European Union—suggests that such arrange-
ments have not interfered with multilateral trade and financial liberalization.
Table 8-3. Ratio of Foreign Reserves to Short-Term Debt, 1998–2004
Year Indonesia Republic of Korea Thailand China
1998 0.90 1.33 1.01 8.60
1999 1.49 1.74 1.74 10.39
2000 1.46 1.95 2.18 12.87
2001 1.08 2.45 2.42 4.26
2002 2.37 2.42 3.19 5.50
2003 2.72 2.81 3.77 5.30
2004 2.25 3.30 4.10 5.90
Source: Asia Regional Information Center (www.aric.adb.org).
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In other words, they have been building blocks rather than stumbling blocks
for a more integrated world economy. There is no evidence to suggest that an
East Asian financial arrangement would be oriented toward a withdrawal from
the global economy and that, hence, it would erect barriers to global financial
integration.
Lawrence points out that the forces that were driving the wave of regionalism
in the early 1990s differed fundamentally from those driving earlier moves
toward regionalization and that the regional initiatives represented efforts to
facilitate their members’ participation in the world economy rather than their
withdrawal from it.17 Trade and financial developments since then have not
been at odds with this observation. Many developing countries are motivated to
join regional groupings as a means of facilitating implementation of a strategy to
liberalize and open their economies. Since most of the East Asian EMEs are
pursuing outward-looking development strategies geared to promoting exports
and attracting foreign investment, they would have very little to gain by form-
ing a regional arrangement designed to thwart globalization.
Ever since the proposal for creating an Asian monetary fund was first made,
the opponents of a regional financial arrangement in East Asia have raised two
issues. First, they argue that the ASEAN+3 countries have yet to develop the
economic, social, and political conditions needed to support such an arrange-
ment. When these conditions are not met, there is a danger that a regional
arrangement for financial cooperation such as the CMI could undermine the
role of the IMF and other global financial institutions. Specifically, regional
financial arrangements may aggravate the moral hazard problems associated
with excessive borrowing and the application of loose macroeconomic policies
by participating economies. The opponents also contend that there is no need
for regional financial arrangements, because the new information and commu-
nication technology, together with capital account liberalization, is driving
financial globalization at an unprecedented speed.
Many of the countries participating in the CMI have been embroiled in terri-
torial, political, and economic disputes with one another. Scholars have argued
that East Asia lacks the tradition of integrationist thinking and the web of inter-
locking diplomatic agreements that would encourage European-style monetary
and financial cooperation.18 Therefore, “any monetary arrangement that seeks to
stabilize exchange rates in the absence of the necessary political preconditions
17. Lawrence (1996).
18. See, for example, Eichengreen (2000); Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999); and Bayoumi,
Eichengreen, and Mauro (1999).
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will be fragile and crisis-prone.”19 They are also concerned that regional mech-
anisms for financial cooperation would not be endowed with the necessary lend-
ing discipline and proper surveillance of the sovereign states participating in
the arrangements.
In response to these views, it can be argued that the ASEAN+3 countries
have participated in various regional groupings and in the process have accumu-
lated a great deal of experience in managing cooperative arrangements with
other countries. The ASEAN states have more than thirty years’ experience with
regional cooperation. Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has helped to consol-
idate unity, promote free trade, and provide mutual financial assistance among
member states. The ASEAN+3 countries have also been active members of the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. Some of these countries
also participate in the Manila framework and in other regional cooperative
arrangements, such as the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia–Pacific Central
Banks (EMEAP) and the South East Asian and South East Asia, New Zealand,
and Australia associations of central banks (SEACEN and SEANZA), which
have served as informal forums for policy dialogue.
Nevertheless, it may be true that East Asians are not prepared to negotiate an
international treaty that includes provisions for sanctions and fines for countries
that do not adjust their domestic policies accordingly. This unwillingness would
make it difficult for the regional fund to impose politically unpopular policies
on member countries and hence could pose a serious problem concerning policy
discipline.20 However, moral hazard is not a problem that besets only regional
arrangements. The IMF is not immune to this problem. The moral hazard con-
cern is so serious that some people even question whether the IMF should con-
tinue to play the role of quasi-lender of last resort, and to them creation of
regional monetary funds must be anathema.21
19. Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and Mauro (1999, p. 2).
20. Eichengreen finds it useful to distinguish between technical assistance and financial assis-
tance (Eichengreen 2000). It is true that there is no reason to discourage competition in the market
for technical assistance. Governments should be free to choose the source of technical assistance
with the best track record. However, his concern is that if multiple monetary funds were available,
East Asian governments would have an incentive to shop around for the most generous assistance
and the least onerous terms. He seems to believe that Asian monetary fund conditionalities would
be much softer than IMF conditionalities. His point should be taken when Asians consider further
development beyond the CMI that assumes IMF conditionality as a given.
21. See Meltzer Commission (2000). The task force report of the Council on Foreign Relations
(1999) advises the fund to adhere consistently to normal lending limits to redress the moral hazard
problem. The reasons why East Asian financial arrangements would suffer more from the moral
hazard problem than the IMF or any other regional institution have not been made clear.
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The ongoing revolution in information and communication technology will
no doubt accelerate financial globalization. However, it should be noted that an
orderly globalization requires global governance; at present, the world economy
has no system of global governance, which might include a global central bank
and global regulatory authorities, and the prospects for developing one are
rather remote. Global governance may appear reasonable, but in reality it is
politically unacceptable and must be dismissed as quixotic.22 As a second best
alternative to a global governance system, global standards and codes of conduct
on banking, corporate governance, management of monetary and fiscal policies,
and many other matters have been proposed by emerging market economies
and developing countries. However, questions have been raised about whether
one-size-fits-all codes and standards should be imposed on EMEs and develop-
ing countries, and if so, whether they could be enforced. If regional differences
matter in devising standards and codes and harmonizing institutions, it could be
argued that some public goods for finance could be produced more efficiently at
the regional level.
The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)
The 1997 Asian financial crisis set in motion two interrelated financial develop-
ments in East Asia. The first was that most of the East Asian countries, includ-
ing the crisis-hit ones, increased the pace and scope of domestic financial reform
to liberalize and open their financial markets and also to improve soundness,
corporate governance, and risk management at financial institutions. The sec-
ond was the regional movement for financial cooperation and integration that
culminated in the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and the Asian Bond Market Ini-
tiative (ABMI).
When the financial crisis in Thailand became contagious, spreading to other
East Asian countries in the second half of 1997, Japan proposed to create an
Asian monetary fund (AMF) as a framework for financial cooperation and pol-
icy coordination in the region, in particular as a means for creating lending
facilities, in addition to those of the IMF, as a safeguard against future financial
crises in East Asia. Although the proposal was well received throughout the
region, it was shelved in the face of objections from the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, and the IMF.
The AMF idea was revived again when the finance ministers of ASEAN,
China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3) agreed on May 6, 2000, in
22. Eichengreen (2000).
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Chiang Mai, Thailand, to establish a system of bilateral currency swap arrange-
ments among the ASEAN+3 countries under what has come to be known as the
Chiang Mai Initiative. The eight countries participating in the CMI have also
institutionalized regular meetings of finance ministers (the ASEAN+3 Finance
Ministers’ Meeting, AFMM+3) and deputy ministers (the ASEAN+3 Finance
and Central Bank Deputies’ Meeting, AFDM+3) for policy dialogue and coor-
dination, as well as the annual ASEAN+3 summit.23 As a sequel to the CMI for
regional financial integration, ASEAN+3 launched the ABMI to develop regional
bond markets in Asia. A regional financial arrangement for economic cooperation
and policy coordination in general comprises: (1) a mechanism of short-term li-
quidity support, such as the CMI, for members experiencing balance-of-payments
deficits; (2) a mechanism of surveillance for monitoring economic and policy
developments in member countries and for imposing policy conditionality on
those countries receiving financial support; and (3) a regional collective exchange
rate system designed to stabilize the bilateral exchange rates of member countries.
The ASEAN+3 states are working on a plan to establish a surveillance system
for the CMI network. So far, there has been no serious discussion on developing
a collective exchange rate system for the region as a whole. The ABMI will com-
plement the CMI by integrating the bond markets of individual countries in
East Asia.24
The financial cooperation structure conceived by the architects of the CMI
covers only the basic principles and operational procedures for bilateral swap
transactions. For the initiative to serve as a full-fledged regional financial mecha-
nism comparable to the European Monetary System, for example, further orga-
nizational and operational details on surveillance and exchange rate policy
coordination will have to be worked out.
Questions have also been raised as to the significance and viability of regional
financial integration in a world economy that has seen financial globalization
advance at a fast pace. In order to integrate financial markets into a single uni-
fied regional market, individual countries will have to open their financial mar-
kets. But they will then be integrating their markets into global financial
markets at the same time unless they discriminate against nonregional market
participants. The architects of the CMI may have been primarily interested in
23. Financial market participants have ignored the CMI as a defense mechanism against future
crises because the amount of liquidity any member may draw from the system is small and, moreover,
it is uncertain whether the swap borrowing could be activated in a crisis situation. Despite these criti-
cisms and the market’s disregard, ASEAN+3 has managed to close ranks to expand the scope of pol-
icy dialogue and move to the second stage of integration.
24. For additional discussion of this topic, see chapter 9 in this volume.
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creating a regional liquidity support system to prevent the occurrence of finan-
cial crises. However, there is no evidence that regional financial arrangements,
whatever form they may take, are effective in warding off financial crises. There
is also lingering doubt about whether the CMI arrangement could avoid moral
hazard in managing balance-of-payment problems in East Asia because the par-
ticipating countries would not be able to impose tight conditionality on other
members borrowing from the arrangement. Although these arguments raise
legitimate questions, they do not mean that the creation of a regional financial
arrangement in East Asia is not justified. If it were properly structured and man-
aged, it could facilitate multilateral trade and financial liberalization, thereby
contributing to global financial stability.25
Structure and Status of the CMI
The CMI consists of two regional financial arrangements. One is the network of
bilateral swaps and repurchase agreements among eight members of ASEAN+3.
The other is the expanded ASEAN swap system. The latter was created by the
original five ASEAN countries, which agreed in 1977 to establish an ASEAN
swap arrangement (ASA). In May 2000 the ASA was expanded to include the
other five new ASEAN members, and the total amount of the facility was raised
to U.S.$1 billion from the initial amount of U.S.$200 million.
The CMI network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) among the eight
members of ASEAN+3 provides liquidity assistance in the form of swaps of
U.S. dollars for the domestic currencies of the participating countries. For each
BSA, the contracting parties determine the maximum amount that can be
drawn from the arrangement. The bilateral swap agreement allows an automatic
disbursement of up to 10 percent of the agreed maximum amount. A country
drawing more than 10 percent of the maximum from the facility is placed under
an IMF macroeconomic and structural adjustment program. The BSA network
is thus complementary to the IMF lending facilities. The participating countries
are able to draw from their respective BSAs for a period of ninety days. The first
drawing may be renewed seven times. The interest rate applicable to the draw-
ing is the LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) plus a premium of 150 basis
points for the first drawing and the first renewal. Thereafter, the premium rises
by an additional 50 basis points for every two renewals, but it is not to exceed
300 basis points.
The BSAs include one-way and two-way swaps (see table 8-4). China’s and
Japan’s initial contracts with the five Southeast Asian countries were one-way
25. Bergsten and Park (2002).
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BSAs from which only the ASEAN five could draw. The first round of CMI
implementation was completed in May 2004, with sixteen BSAs totaling
U.S.$36.5 billion having been concluded. Japan participated in seven agree-
ments, and China and the Republic of Korea took part in six each. Under these
initial BSAs, the Republic of Korea, which is the largest beneficiary of the CMI,
could draw a maximum of $13 billion from the system, including the resources
available under the Miyazawa initiative. In the eyes of participants in the global
financial market, however, the liquidity available to the Republic of Korea and
other members was not enough to be of any significance in preventing future
crises, and the ASEAN+3 countries therefore decided to double the total size of
the CMI in 2005 (see below).
The CMI is comparable to the liquidity support arrangements that had sup-
ported the European Monetary System before the monetary union was created
in 1999. However, the CMI had a different motivation from the beginning.
The European facilities were created with the aim of limiting bilateral exchange
rate fluctuations among regional currencies. The CMI started with high capital
mobility and flexible exchange rates, although some members of ASEAN+3
have maintained a relatively fixed exchange rate regime. So far, the ASEAN+3
countries have not sought any manifest exchange rate coordination. In the
absence of exchange rate coordination, incentives for mutual surveillance will be
limited because a member country facing a speculative currency attack may be
free to float its exchange rate against those of neighboring countries.26
As long as the CMI is simply a source of financial resources supplementary to
the IMF, the size of the swaps does not have to be large enough to meet the
potential liquidity need. Although the CMI can be managed without its own
conditionality at this point, it does need to establish its own surveillance mecha-
nism to avoid breaches of the swap contracts. Because up to 10 percent of each
swap can be disbursed with only the consent of the swap-providing countries,
the latter need to formulate their own assessments of the credibility and the
capacity of the swap-requesting countries to honor their contracts. The current
practices under the ASEAN+3 process cannot effectively resolve repayment
default problems.
Most participating countries agree in principle that the CMI network needs
to be supported by an independent monitoring and surveillance system that
would monitor economic developments in the region, serve as an institutional
framework for policy dialogue and coordination among the members, and
impose structural and policy reform on the countries drawing from the BSAs.
26. Wang and Woo (2004).
248 yung chul park
10101-08_Ch08_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:08 PM  Page 248
However, the ASEAN+3 countries at the current stage do not seem well pre-
pared to establish a policy coordination mechanism in the surveillance process,
although collective efforts are being made in this regard.27
At the annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) in Jeju,
Republic of Korea, in April 2004, the finance ministers of ASEAN+3 agreed 
to undertake a further review of the CMI to explore ways in which the scope of
its operations could be further enhanced and consolidated. A working group
created to conduct the review presented a report highlighting the major issues
related to CMI enlargement and consolidation at the meeting of finance minis-
ters held during the AsDB meeting in Istanbul in May 2005.28 In order to
develop the CMI into a more credible and effective liquidity support system,
the ASEAN+3 finance ministers approved the proposal made in the report, which
was intended to double the size of the existing individual bilateral swaps, with
the provision that the actual increase would be decided by bilateral negotiations
among the members.29 As of February 2006, nine of the initial contracts had
been replaced by ten new contracts for a total of U.S.$56 billion, more than
doubling the initial amount of those contracts (U.S.$21 billion). Japan replaced
the one-way contracts with the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and Singapore
with two-way contracts. The maximum withdrawal for the Republic of Korea,
still the largest beneficiary of the CMI, increased by U.S.$7 billion, to a total of
U.S.$20 billion. The total amount of all BSAs came to U.S.$71.5 billion, which
was almost double the initial amount of U.S.$36.5 billion (see table 8-4).
At this stage of development, however, there is no guarantee that the BSAs
will be activated, because some of the swap-providing countries may exercise
their right to opt out. Under the current CMI arrangement, any country wish-
ing to obtain short-term liquidity must negotiate the activation with all swap-
providing countries individually. If a large number of the members refuse to
provide swaps and different swap providers demand different terms and condi-
tions, then the CMI may cease to be an efficient liquidity support system. The
discussion of swap activation with multiple contractual parties may take time
27. For instance, the ASEAN surveillance process is built on the basis of consensus and infor-
mality in keeping with the tradition of noninterference (Manzano, 2001). East Asia, in contrast to
Europe, lacks the tradition of integrationist thinking and the web of interlocking agreements that
encourage monetary and financial cooperation (Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1999). Eichengreen
and Bayoumi stress that East Asia does not meet the necessary intellectual preconditions for
regional integration. For this reason, they conclude that it is unrealistic to speak of pooling
national sovereignties. While there is no doubt considerable work to be done in promoting policy
coordination in the region, it is wrong to say that it cannot be done in East Asia.
28. ASEAN+3 (2005a).
29. ASEAN+3 (2005b).
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and hence may deprive the swap-requesting country of the ability to mount an
effective and prompt defense against a speculative attack. In order to avoid this
inherent bias in the system, it has been proposed to create a secretariat or com-
mittee that would determine joint activation of all swap contracts of swap-
requesting countries, so that swap disbursements could be made in a concerted
and timely manner. At the 2005 Istanbul AsDB meeting, the finance ministers
of ASEAN+3 agreed in principle to adopt a collective decisionmaking mecha-
nism for the network of BSAs in order to ensure timely availability of liquidity
from the system through the joint activation of swaps.30 Details of the collective
decisionmaking mechanism are to be worked out by the ASEAN+3 Finance and
Central Bank Deputies’ Meeting.
As noted earlier, the swap-requesting country can draw up to 10 percent of
the contract amount without being subject to IMF conditionality with regard
to policy adjustments. Several members of the CMI had previously proposed
that the limit should be raised to 20 or 30 percent, and, accepting this pro-
posal, the finance ministers of ASEAN+3 agreed to raise the limit to 20 percent
at the Istanbul AsDB meeting. However, the CMI members realize that neither
multilateralization of the CMI nor an increase in the drawing limit to more than
20 percent will be possible unless a more effective surveillance system is estab-
lished. Creating a surveillance mechanism for the CMI has been a controversial
issue, and the working group has not been able to produce a surveillance system
acceptable to all members. During the Istanbul meeting, the ASEAN+3 finance
ministers reaffirmed the need to enhance ASEAN+3 economic surveillance and
to integrate it into the CMI, but they were not able to come to any decision on
the structure, role, and location of a surveillance unit.
If the CMI members were to agree on multilateralization and on the creation
of a regional surveillance unit, their agreement would be tantamount to estab-
lishing an institution similar to a regional monetary fund. Although most of the
ASEAN+3 members find it premature to set up such an institution, they realize
the need to create an institution that can manage and set terms and conditions
for bilateral swap transactions, in addition to performing secretariat functions
for policy dialogue and coordination among members. There have been several
proposals for organizing an ASEAN+3 secretariat, but none has been seriously
considered because the member countries have been divided on the structure
and location of the secretariat. This disagreement is not likely to be resolved
anytime soon.
30. ASEAN+3 (2005b).
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There are two other issues concerning the enhancement of the CMI as a
regional financial institution that remain unresolved. One is the enlargement of
the CMI membership. Several nonmember Asian countries, including India,
have expressed interest in joining the CMI. At present, there is broad consensus
that enlargement should be deferred until some of the operational issues of the
CMI are settled. Nevertheless, the inclusion of some of the less developed
ASEAN members may be raised at future meetings of ASEAN+3.
Another issue is the coordination of exchange rate policy among the mem-
bers of ASEAN+3. With the growing need to stabilize bilateral exchange rates
between ASEAN+3 states, proposals have been made to strengthen the CMI
network so that it might serve as an institutional base for monetary integration
in East Asia in the future. Although a formal discussion of monetary integration
has been put on hold, China’s shift from dollar pegging to an intermediate
regime in July 2005 is likely to renew the debate on the need and the modality
for coordination of exchange rate policy in the region.
Barriers to Financial Cooperation and Integration
The East Asian policymakers who conceived the idea of the CMI would easily
concede that the BSA system as it is currently structured has a long way to go
before it can be accepted as an effective mechanism of defense against finan-
cial crises. Although at this writing six years have passed since the system was
established in May 2000, the leaders of the CMI group have yet to produce an
operational structure for BSAs, in particular a monitoring and surveillance
mechanism. And it is highly unlikely that they will do so anytime soon since
they are hindered by a number of institutional and political constraints to fur-
ther expansion of the CMI.
Institutional Constraints
The most serious of these constraints is that the thirteen countries have failed
to articulate the ultimate objectives of the CMI arrangement. The participating
countries themselves are still unclear about whether the CMI is going to remain
a regional liquidity support program or serve as a building block for the devel-
opment of a full-fledged regional monetary system in East Asia. As noted in the
preceding section, when bilateral swap arrangements are activated collectively
and supported by a surveillance system, they constitute a de facto regional mon-
etary fund. The CMI could thus serve as the foundation on which an elaborate
system of financial cooperation and policy coordination could be built, following
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31. From the theoretical standpoint of the neofunctionalists, initial steps toward integration
trigger self-sustaining economic and political dynamics, leading to further cooperation. Economic
interactions create spillovers or externalities that need to be coordinated by the governments
involved. Such economic policy coordination at the regional level can be seen as an inevitable
response to increased economic interactions within the region. Once the integration process starts,
spillovers deepen and widen integration through interest group pressure, public opinion, elite
socialization, and other domestic actors and processes (George, 1985).
32. Historically, there has been much less movement toward trade regionalism in East Asia
than in Europe. East Asian countries are reliant on markets in the United States and the European
Union, so there has been less incentive for them to expand trade integration within the region. The
first major attempt was made only in 1992, when six ASEAN countries agreed to launch a scheme
for ASEAN free trade.
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in the footsteps of European monetary integration.31 At this stage of develop-
ment, however, many countries in East Asia are not prepared to accept the idea
of—or at least feel uneasy about—restructuring the CMI as the forerunner to an
Asian monetary fund.
A second institutional constraint is related to the need to coordinate the activ-
ities of the CMI with other regional arrangements, such as the Manila framework
supported by Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Most of the CMI
countries also participate in the Manila framework and in APEC. At some point
in the future, the leaders of the ASEAN+3 countries may have to decide on a
mode of cooperation and division of labor between these institutions and the
CMI for promoting regional growth and stability. Many of the ASEAN+3 states
have been engaged in policy reviews and dialogues through the APEC meetings
and the Manila framework. Unless the CMI is developed into a credible financ-
ing mechanism by increasing swap amounts, it will take on a role similar to that
of these other regional economic forums. The cohesion of the group will then be
weakened as questions are raised about whether the thirteen countries constitute
an appropriate grouping for a regional financing arrangement in East Asia.
A third impediment is that the fear of another round of financial crisis has
receded, thanks to a recovery that has been faster than predicted based on previ-
ous crisis episodes. With this false perception of security, the ASEAN+3 coun-
tries have become less interested in enlarging and institutionalizing the CMI
operations. Instead, their focus has shifted recently to creating free-trade areas
(FTAs) in East Asia (see table 8-5).32 The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) now
includes the whole of Southeast Asia, and it continues to expand. On November
29, 2004, China and the ASEAN countries agreed to form a free-trade area by
2010, allowing for some preferential treatment for less-developed ASEAN coun-
tries. Japan has concluded a free-trade agreement with Singapore and has started
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Table 8-5. Progress of Major Free-Trade Agreements in East Asia, 2005
Stages of evolution
Participants in Signed Implementation 
free-trade agreements Discussion Joint study Negotiation (year) (year)
ASEAN
ASEAN Free X (1993)
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Singapore–New Zealand X (2002)










Source: Compiled from various sources.
a. Comprehensive Economic Cooperation.
b. Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
c. Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement between Australia and New Zealand.
d. European Free Trade Association.
e. Southern Common Market.
f. Gulf Cooperation Council.
g. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.
Table 8-5. (continued)
Stages of evolution
Participants in Signed Implementation 
free-trade agreements Discussion Joint study Negotiation (year) (year)
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negotiations on a similar agreement with the Republic of Korea and ASEAN and
with several states of ASEAN on an individual basis.
The free-trade movement is undoubtedly a desirable development, and the
CMI could help further it by stabilizing bilateral exchange rates for regional cur-
rencies and minimizing the disruptive effects of financial market turbulence.
The ASEAN+3 countries may thus have an incentive to broaden the scope of
the CMI in parallel with negotiations on establishing free-trade areas in the
region. In reality, however, it appears that free-trade discussions have rather dis-
tracted many East Asian countries from their CMI negotiations.
A regionwide East Asian FTA covering the ASEAN+3 countries is proving
slow to materialize because China and Japan are seeking bilateral trade agree-
ments rather than multilateral ones. Indeed, the current pattern of regional
trade agreements in East Asia is bewildering.33 It consists largely of a web of
bilateral arrangements, many of which are still on the drawing board. There has
apparently been no formal attempt to build a regional multilateral agreement
like the European Common Market agreement, and bilateral agreements are
unlikely to foster a collective framework.34
A fourth constraint is that financial deregulation and market opening have
drawn East Asia away from regional financial integration. Over the past decade, a
number of East Asian countries have opened up their financial markets to foreign
capital by reducing restrictions on inward and outward capital flows. Financial
liberalization throughout East Asia has led many countries to establish closer
links with international financial centers.35 In East Asia, there is no sign of the
development of an integrated regional financial market. This relative lack of
progress in regional financial integration is not surprising. Eichengreen and Park
explain the various factors involved by comparing the region with Europe.36
According to their analysis, Europe has gone further than East Asia in the
integration of product and factor markets. While the European Union has a
true single market of goods and services, progress toward the creation of an
Asian free-trade area remains incomplete. And while Europe has removed essen-
tially all barriers to the free movement of capital and most barriers to the move-
ment of labor, in East Asia limits on factor mobility remain pervasive. In Europe,
regionalism is motivated in no small part by a desire for political integration
that has no counterpart in East Asia. Whereas Europe has built institutions of
33. See Scollay and Gilbert (2001).
34. Wyplosz (2004).
35. Lee, Park, and Shin (2004).
36. Eichengreen and Park (2003).
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transnational governance (such as the European Commission, the European
Parliament, the European Court of Justice, and now the European Central
Bank), East Asian integration is “weakly institutionalized.” It is predicated not
on transnational institutions but on intergovernmental agreements that defer to
the sovereignty of the participating states. Moreover, integration in East Asia is
not being driven by an alliance of key nations like France and Germany or by a
single hegemonic power (the role played by the United States in the Western
hemisphere); it is a more multipolar process.
As is well known, East Asia is less financially integrated than Europe. In East
Asia, financial claims are all denominated in U.S. dollars and the bulk of foreign
lending and borrowing are intermediated through international financial markets
in New York and London. Therefore, regional financial arrangements themselves
cannot effectively address the inherent structural balance-sheet problem that
most East Asian emerging and developing countries are currently facing. The
absence of regional financial integration is closely linked to the absence of a
regional lender of last resort. In Europe, West Germany was prepared to supply a
virtually unlimited amount of short-term liquidity under the European Mone-
tary System when weak currency countries were under severe pressure from cur-
rency devaluation. In East Asia, Japan appears to play only a limited role as a
regional lender of last resort.
Leadership Issues
Finally, there is a leadership problem that defies easy solution. If the thirteen
countries have the more ambitious goal of developing a collective exchange rate
mechanism similar to the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in Europe, with the
long-term objective of adopting a common currency, they will have to increase
the number and the amounts of BSAs. As the European experience shows, such
a move requires leadership that can foster cohesion among the thirteen coun-
tries by mediating the divergent interests of members.
China and Japan are expected to provide leadership in forging regional con-
sensus for expanding and consolidating BSAs as a regional institution, but they
have not been able to agree on a number of operational issues, including a sur-
veillance mechanism. Except for Japan, no other potential swap lenders, includ-
ing China, are prepared to increase the amounts of their bilateral swaps with
other contracting parties. Japan could increase its swap amounts with the
ASEAN states and the Republic of Korea (under the presumption that China
will not borrow from Japan) to make the CMI a more credible financing scheme.
However, unless Japanese authorities receive some sort of assurance that their
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short-term lending will be repaid, they are not likely to lead an expansion and
institutionalization of the CMI. As a minimum condition for expansion of the
CMI, Japan would demand the creation of an effective surveillance mechanism
for the region in which it could exercise influence commensurate with its finan-
cial contribution. However, China would be unlikely to accept any arrangement
in which it felt that it was playing second fiddle to Japan in a regional organiza-
tion in East Asia. This concern appears to be the most serious roadblock to fur-
ther development of the CMI.
China and Japan have different interests and hence different strategies for
economic integration in East Asia. As far as China is concerned, economic inte-
gration with the ten ASEAN members and with the South and Central Asian
countries may be more important both economically and geopolitically than
financial cooperation or free trade with either Japan or the Republic of Korea.
While China is a military superpower in the world and has been growing rap-
idly, it is still a developing economy far behind Japan in technological and
industrial sophistication. These differences in the economic and military status
of the two countries suggest that, even if they manage to resolve their past dif-
ferences, China and Japan may find it difficult to work together as equal part-
ners for regional integration in East Asia.
Despite slow progress in reconciliation between China and Japan, China seems
to be emerging as an active player in both the international and the regional are-
nas. Since the mid-1990s, China has expanded the number and depth of its bilat-
eral relationships, joined various trade and security accords, deepened its
participation in key multilateral organizations, and helped address global security
issues. The pinnacle of this process was the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and
Friendly Cooperation, signed by China with Russia in 2001.37
China borders Russia and many of the South and Central Asian countries in
addition to several ASEAN members. It is therefore natural for China to seek
expansion and deepening of its trade and financial relations with those neighbor-
ing countries. To that end, China has been courting ASEAN with the aim of
establishing a free-trade agreement, and in November 2001 it joined the Bangkok
agreement on a free-trade area that includes the Republic of Korea and the South
Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, Laos, and Sri Lanka). In Central Asia, China
has also taken a leading role in establishing the region’s first multilateral group,
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Founded to settle long-standing territo-
rial disputes and to demilitarize borders, the organization now stresses counter-
37. See Medeiros and Fravel (2003).
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terrorism cooperation and regional trade among Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and China.38
In contrast, Japan has not been able to articulate its strategic interests in East
Asia. While it has been at the forefront in supporting greater economic coopera-
tion among the East Asian countries, its perspective on the geographic area of
East Asia has not been altogether clear. Japan has been promoting integration
among the “ASEAN+5,” but which two economies are to be added to ASEAN+3
to make ASEAN+5? At times, the two economies mentioned have been Aus-
tralia and New Zealand and at other times Taiwan Province of China and Hong
Kong SAR.
There is also a suspicion that Japan is not interested in free trade and finan-
cial arrangements per se in East Asia for purely economic reasons. Instead, Japan
is thought to be engaging in discussion of regional arrangements with other East
Asian countries with the aim of maintaining its leadership role as the region’s
largest economy by checking and balancing China’s expansion. Many analysts
believe that Japan’s active involvement in regional economic integration is moti-
vated by its desire to maintain its traditional pole position.39 Japan has also been
gripped with a decade-long recession and has been unable to restructure its
economy.40 These developments, combined with its lack of a strategy for East
Asian development, seem to undermine Japan’s ability to pull the East Asian
countries together for regional cooperation and integration.
What, then, are the likely courses of development for the regional financial
architecture in East Asia? How would financial integration proceed in the
region? One possible scenario is that China and Japan will come to realize that,
despite the differences in their strategies, together they are the key to developing
a common political will in East Asia. Sakakibara argues that the role of China
and Japan in East Asia’s integration process is synonymous with that of France
and Germany in Europe.41 Similarly, the Kobe Research Project report, submit-
ted to the fourth gathering of finance ministers of the Asia-Europe Meeting
38. In June 2001, the presidents of six countries signed the Declaration of the Shanghai Cooper-
ation Organization (SCO). The aim of the SCO is to strengthen mutual trust and friendly relations
among member states, encouraging their further effective cooperation in the political and economic
spheres and in science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental
protection, and other fields, with a view to jointly ensuring regional peace, security, and stability
and creating a new international political and economic order.
39. See D. Wall, “Koizumi Trade Pitch Nests,” Japan Times, April 21, 2002.
40. Uncertain economic prospects may make Japan unlikely to be the driver in the region’s
integration movement as it was in the past. China is emerging both as a strong competitor and as a
promising market.
41. Sakakibara (2003).
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(ASEM) held in Copenhagen in July 2002, affirms that cooperation between
Japan and China, as core countries in East Asia, will be essential in leading the
process of economic and financial integration in the region, just as the alliance
between France and Germany played a central role in the integration and coop-
eration process in Europe.42
This realization could soften their positions and lead to compromise on an
institutional setting and on augmentation of the existing financial architecture
in East Asia. For instance, China might accept Japan’s demand for de facto con-
trol over monitoring and surveillance in return for Japan’s pledge for a substan-
tial increase in financial assistance in the form of one-way swaps and official
development assistance (ODA) to ASEAN members. China might agree to this
scheme, if it were confident about concluding a free-trade agreement with the
ASEAN members in the near future. A China–ASEAN free-trade pact could
circumscribe Japan’s influence on ASEAN affairs even though Japan is a major
provider of financial resources to the region. In this process, the Republic of
Korea and ASEAN could play a mediating role in the cultivation of a common
political will between China and Japan.43
In another possible scenario, China would assume a more aggressive leader-
ship role in regional integration. In view of the uncertain prospects for the Japa-
nese economy, China could emerge as the region’s engine of growth over the
longer term if it sustains its own growth. As part of this leadership role, China
might choose to negotiate both the expansion of the BSAs and a free-trade pact
with ASEAN. In that case, the original CMI would become “ASEAN+1” in the
sense that Japan would play second fiddle. Realizing that financial integration is
an integral part of a successful free-trade area, China might indeed seriously
42. France and Germany also had a wartime legacy. Although Charles de Gaulle was a nation-
alist and his nationalism was popular within the country, he also appreciated that membership in
the common market would benefit France economically. However, de Gaulle remained implacably
opposed to any increase in the powers of the European Commission or to any other increase in
supranationalism. He showed just how opposed in 1965, when he precipitated the most dramatic
crisis in the history of the European Community (George, 1985). It was Chancellor Helmut
Schmidt of Germany and President Giscard d’Estaing of France who restarted the stalled integra-
tion process at the end of the 1970s. The joint initiative of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President
François Mitterrand resulted in a great leap toward European monetary union in the early 1990s.
The Franco-German alliance formed the core for the integration process in Europe because it was
the political will of these two countries that motivated further integration.
43. Murase (2004) emphasizes the role of the Republic of Korea, pointing out that, as financial
cooperation improves, the Republic of Korea will likely play a role similar to that of the Benelux
countries in Europe. In the formation of a regional monetary system, it could supplement Sino-
Japanese leadership while representing the interests of smaller countries in the region. In the
future, the Republic of Korea, like key members of ASEAN, could be a location for the secretariat
and other organizations.
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consider this option. However, without Japan, ASEAN+1 would not be a viable
arrangement for a regional financing scheme, simply because China is hardly in a
position to commit itself to financing the balance-of-payments deficits of all
ASEAN member states. It is also questionable whether ASEAN would join any
regional financial arrangement in which China was the dominant member.
A third scenario is the enlargement of the CMI to include Australia and New
Zealand and possibly India in South Asia. This would most likely be the route
favored by Japan, which would find it easier to deal with China if there were more
countries supporting Japan’s strategy. However, many members of ASEAN+3
believe that, at this stage, reaching critical mass within the existing CMI should
precede any enlargement discussion. Since enlargement is not likely to lead to any
substantial increase in the availability of short-term financing, most ASEAN+3
members would not take the third scenario seriously.
Perhaps the most realistic scenario is that the countries participating in the
CMI will simply maintain the status quo, continuing to discuss modalities of
policy dialogue and debate the merits of various types of surveillance systems for
the CMI and the feasibility of augmenting swap amounts—but without making
any substantial progress.
Concluding Remarks
The adoption and implementation of the CMI can be counted as a major step
toward strengthening financial cooperation among the thirteen East Asian
countries. However, ASEAN+3 will face much tougher challenges and tasks in
exploring developments beyond the CMI. The East Asian countries need to
clarify for the international community what their motivations are, how they
will develop an action plan, and how they believe the plan fits in with the exist-
ing global financial system.44
Regionalism in East Asia is taking two forms: free-trade arrangements and
financial arrangements. These arrangements imply that geographically proximate
countries band together to foster trade on the one hand and to promote financial
and exchange rate stability on the other. The two processes reinforce each other.
The euro area pursued trade integration first, but from a theoretical point of
view there is no clear reason for this. Even in Europe, trade integration slowed
down whenever there were concerns about exchange rate stability among mem-
ber countries, which suggests that some form of monetary integration is an
important condition for trade integration.45 Furthermore, there are many good
44. Park and Wang (2000).
45. Shin and Wang (2004).
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reasons for forming a monetary union before establishing a free-trade arrange-
ment. A monetary union can quite significantly increase trade among member
countries by serving as a means of avoiding the bottlenecks that may occur in
the process of negotiating and implementing a free-trade arrangement. This
increased trade is likely to occur mostly within similar industries, so weakening
asymmetric shocks across member countries will also decrease the costs of main-
taining a monetary union. In addition, a monetary union can accelerate finan-
cial integration in the region, which might not be accomplished otherwise.
Hence, a monetary union is a self-validating process.
Few East Asian policymakers would be naive enough to believe that they will
be able to work out an agreement on creating an East Asian monetary fund or a
common currency area in the near future. At best, monetary unification is a
long-term objective, and the ASEAN+3 countries have just taken the first step
toward regional integration in financial markets. However, East Asia enjoys the
latecomer’s advantage in promoting financial and monetary integration because
it can learn from the European experience. In the end, the Western countries
will have to decide whether regional financial arrangements in East Asia will
contribute to global stability and welfare. The European experience suggests
that they are likely to do so. It would therefore be in the interest of Europe and
of the United States to support the expansion and consolidation of the CMI
inasmuch as financial deepening in East Asia will support an orderly globaliza-
tion of the world economy.
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Of all the structural weaknesses that might have caused the 1997–98 EastAsian financial crisis, the absence of vibrant bond markets never fails to
make the list. One year after the crisis, Donald Tsang, the financial secretary of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China at the time, cited
the failure to establish a strong and robust Asian bond market as one reason for
the financial turmoil in East Asia. Going further, he deploringly asked, “How is
it that we in Asia have never been able to replicate the success of the Eurobond
market in this part of the world?”1 International financial institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have also invari-
ably pointed to the absence of efficient domestic bond markets as one of the
major causes of the 1997 financial crisis.2 Even before the crisis, East Asian
countries were being urged to develop a domestic bond market to complement
their bank-dominated financial systems.3
Since the crisis, the development of local bond markets has been a focus of
attention as one of the major objectives of financial reforms proposed by the
IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (AsDB) for the East
Asian Bond Market Development: 
Rationale and Strategies
yung chul park, jae ha park, julia leung, 
and kanit sangsubhan
9
1. Donald Tsang, “Asian Bond Market,” Asian Debt Conference, July 6, 1998, p. 1.
2. International Monetary Fund (2003).
3. See World Bank (1995).
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Asian economies. In parallel, there have been repeated calls to establish regional
bond markets in East Asia.4 In response to these calls and as part of the regional
efforts being made to promote financial cooperation and integration through
the Chiang Mai Initiative, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations +3 SME
Network (ASEAN+3) has explored possibilities and modalities for creating Asian
bonds and the necessary components of market infrastructure.
There is a large and growing volume of literature on regional bond markets in
East Asia.5 Several strategies for the creation of new, and the expansion of exist-
ing, regional bond markets in East Asia have been put forward. However, some
regional policymakers continue to debate the rationale for creating regional bond
markets, and a full consensus has yet to be reached on the need for them.
The Rationale for Creating Asian Bond Markets
The idea of regional bond markets started with the realization that the under-
development of bond markets in the region and the resulting excessive dependence
on bank-intermediated financing and foreign short-term financing were major
causes of the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. The development of local currency
bond markets is therefore one of the most important policy goals in the region.
The disadvantages of not having a full-fledged bond market were made evident
during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. An efficient and mature bond market
can play an important role during times when the other channels of financial
intermediation—banks and equity markets—falter or fail. Most important, the
existence of an alternative source of funding would reduce the corporate sector’s
over-reliance on short-term foreign-currency loans. A sound and healthy corporate
sector contributes directly to macroeconomic and financial stability, and improved
financial intermediation brings such microeconomic benefits as efficiency gains
and diversification of tools for both borrowers and savers. The absence of a devel-
oped bond market in the region was one of the main factors behind the extreme
volatility that precipitated the Asian financial crisis. The crisis itself spurred gov-
ernments in the region to focus on promoting domestic bond markets.
Although considerable progress has been made in developing bond markets
since the crisis, the breadth and depth of the Asian bond markets still lag behind
those of the developed economies. With a market value of less than 50 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP), the many Asian domestic bond markets are
still smaller than those of the United States and Japan, where domestic bond
markets are equivalent to 100 percent of GDP (see table 9-1). In addition, bond
4. See Yoshitomi and Shirai (2001).
5. See, for example, Park and Park (2003) and Oh and Park (2003).
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markets’ share of total financing in Asia is still much smaller than it is in the
United States and Japan (see table 9-2); and Asian bond markets still lack li-
quidity and remain quite fragmented.
In the wake of the financial crisis, other important reasons for a stronger,
deeper, and broader debt market in the region have also come to the fore. The
huge current account surpluses of economies in the region have led to very sizable
accumulations of reserves by the public sector. Total foreign exchange reserves of
the major Asian economies other than Japan nearly doubled between 2000 and
2003, rising from about U.S.$700 billion in 2000 to over U.S.$1.2 trillion in
2003.6 This has spurred demand for investment in financial instruments, espe-
cially bonds. However, the absence of deep bond markets in the emerging Asian
economies means that a substantial portion of this higher demand has been satis-
fied through investments in bonds denominated in major foreign currencies.
Table 9-2. Financing Structure of Asian Economies and Selected Countries, 
1995 and 2003
Percentage of total financing (rounded)—total outstanding bank loans, stocks, and bonds
December 31, 1995 December 31, 2003
Bank Stock Bond Bank Stock Bond 
Country loans a market market loans market market b
Hong Kong SAR 39.6 55.6 4.8 23.3 69.7 7.0
Indonesia 60.2 38.0 1.7 42.9 51.3 5.8
Republic of Korea 44.6 29.4 26.1 45.7 23.9 30.4
Malaysia 22.4 65.3 12.4 29.7 47.9 22.4
Philippines 30.1 64.9 4.9 47.9 47.3 4.7
Singapore 31.5 60.0 8.4 32.5 47.5 20.0
Taiwan 62.9 31.2 5.9 42.5 43.1 14.4
Province 
of China
Thailand 50.8 43.9 5.3 38.3 40.2 21.5
Total 45.0 44.5 10.6 36.8 44.6 18.5
United States 21.1 30.4 48.5 19.5 33.2 47.2
United Kingdom 42.5 44.5 13.1* 44.7 38.8 16.5
(*March 31, 1995)
Japan 43.4 27.8 28.8 33.7 21.9 44.4
Total 30.2 30.7 39.1 25.1 31.4 43.5
Source: See Table 9-1.
Notes: See Table 9-1.
6. Included in this list are China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and Thailand.
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According to U.S. Treasury statistics, Asian investors are leading buyers of
U.S. securities. As shown in table 9-3, net purchases of U.S. Treasury and
agency paper by Asian economies amounted to U.S.$270 billion in 2003, more
than 60 percent of the world total. Indeed, net foreign portfolio investment by
the emerging Asian economies increased sharply over the five-year period
1998–2003—from U.S.$50 billion to U.S.$225 billion. Emerging Asia as a
whole is now a large net exporter of portfolio capital.
However, a closer examination of the patterns of portfolio investment flows
into and out of the Asian region reveals an inherent instability. Fund flows out of
Asia have mainly consisted of large bond investment funds channeled to industri-
alized economies owing to the higher credit ratings and the greater depth of bond
markets in the United States, Japan, and Europe. Some of these funds are recycled
Table 9-3. Net Purchases of U.S. Bonds and Notes by Asian Economies 
from U.S. Residents
Billions of U.S. dollars
Agency All bonds 
Treasury paper Subtotal Corporate and notes 
(A) (B) (A + B) (C) (A + B +C)
Country 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003 2002 2003
China 24.1 30.5 29.3 30.0 53.4 60.5 6.0 4.6 59.4 65.1
Hong Kong −9.1 6.0 12.6 12.0 3.5 18.0 3.7 4.3 7.2 22.3
SAR
Indonesia 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.1 0.1 0.0 1.4 1.1
Japan 30.5 148.3 37.6 24.4 68.1 172.6 10.9 12.5 79.0 185.1
Republic 12.9 5.2 0.7 8.5 13.6 13.7 1.5 0.8 15.1 14.5
of Korea
Malaysia 0.9 −0.3 1.3 −1.2 2.2 −1.5 0.1 0.0 2.3 −1.5
Philippines 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6
Singapore −2.6 −8.3 2.2 0.7 −0.4 −7.6 1.3 3.3 0.9 −4.3
Thailand −1.9 −6.0 0.1 0.2 −1.8 −5.8 0.2 0.4 −1.6 −5.4
Taiwan −0.6 9.0 10.8 9.5 10.2 18.5 1.4 1.6 11.6 20.1
Province 
of China
Total 55.2 185.5 95.4 84.6 150.6 270.0 25.3 27.6 175.9 297.6
Percent of 66.3 68.1 49.8 51.7 54.8 61.9 13.9 10.1 38.5 42.0
world 
total
World total 83.2 272.4 191.6 163.5 274.8 435.9 182.3 272.3 457.1 708.2
Source: United States Treasury.
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back into the region’s institutions, managed by foreign financial intermediaries.
Such investment is mostly in equities and derivatives, which are more volatile
instruments than bank lending or debt financing. Although the flows of foreign
funds into Asia have certainly helped diversify financial intermediation channels,
they are more susceptible to market vagaries. Also, foreign financial intermediaries
are usually large international financial institutions with considerable market
power and influence because of the volumes they can mobilize relative to the size
of emerging economies’ financial markets. When the market is under duress, they
can push prices in a particular direction. The implications for emerging markets
are market volatility, a strong tendency to overshoot, and consequently daunting
challenges to maintaining monetary and financial stability.
Major Initiatives
Asian countries have attempted to meet these challenges through greater collab-
oration on developing regional bond markets in diverse forums such as Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia–
Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP), and ASEAN+3.
APEC has been trying to develop regional bond markets, particularly securitiza-
tion and credit-guarantee markets, to promote greater openness, diversity, and
competitiveness in regional financial markets. The need to do so was reiterated in
the APEC Finance Ministers’ Joint Ministerial Statement of September 2002 and
in the APEC Leaders’ Declaration of October 2002 in Los Cabos, Mexico. The
objectives of this effort are to identify impediments to the adoption of securitiza-
tion markets and the creation of the credit-guarantee markets within the APEC
economies and to propose appropriate solutions to remove them. It is believed that
securitization coupled with credit enhancement, to the extent that it helps recon-
cile credit and liquidity mismatches between issuers and investors, offers significant
benefits for developing markets and can also facilitate balance-sheet restructuring.
To promote regional bond markets, the central banks of East Asia and the
Pacific region also formed the Asian Bond Fund (ABF). EMEAP contributed
U.S.$1 billion to the first ABF (ABF1). ABF1 was to channel investment into
dollar-denominated sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds issued by Asian entities.
To further the development of regional and domestic bond markets in Asia, the
central banks committed U.S.$2 billion to another fund, known as ABF2, to
invest in local-currency-denominated Asian bonds.
ABF1 and ABF2 were intended to serve as low-cost mechanisms for investing
in Asian bonds and as catalysts for domestic financial reforms in Asia. ABF1 has
had relatively little effect on the market for East Asian sovereign dollar bonds,
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since non-EMEAP investors are precluded from investing in it. Moreover,
ABF2, created to encourage investment in local-currency-denominated bonds,
is expected to have a more significant development impact, given that the com-
ponent funds of ABF2 are to be offered to other investors.
Last, the ASEAN+3 countries have discussed the development of the regional
bond market—both intensively and extensively—through the Asian Bond Mar-
ket Initiative (ABMI). At an informal meeting of ASEAN+3 Finance Ministry
and Central Bank Deputies (AFDM+3) in Tokyo in November 2002, member
countries proposed discussing the feasibility of creating new Asian bond markets
and improving existing ones, under the ASEAN+3 framework. The proposal
received broad support from the thirteen members. One month later, Japan
introduced the ABMI, a comprehensive plan for developing regional bond mar-
kets in Asia.
On February 28, 2003, AFDM+3 delegates held an informal follow-up ses-
sion in Tokyo on fostering bond markets in Asia. The Republic of Korea, Japan,
Thailand, and other countries put forth various proposals to facilitate the devel-
opment of bond markets in the region. The delegates agreed to study the propos-
als in depth so as to expedite achieving tangible results. Echoing the delegates’
proposals and reflections, the member countries agreed to establish six working
groups to study issues related to regional bond markets, including securitization,
regional credit-rating agencies, regional clearing and settlement systems, and
regional credit-guarantee agencies. Since early 2003, the working groups have
discussed these issues intensively in meetings and seminars.
Progress of Existing Initiatives
APEC: Development of Securitization and Credit-Guarantee Markets
An Initiative on the Development of Securitization and Credit Guarantee Mar-
kets, cosponsored by Hong Kong SAR, China, the Republic of Korea, and
Thailand, was endorsed at the Ninth APEC Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Los
Cabos, Mexico, in September 2002. The aim of the initiative was to promote
understanding and awareness of the importance of securitization and credit guar-
antees for regional bond-market development and to help the APEC economies
identify and take concrete steps to remove obstacles to the development of secu-
ritization and credit guarantees in bond markets.
This initiative focuses on taking action through two central components. The
first component consists of policy dialogues involving both the public and pri-
vate sectors to promote the understanding and sharing of views on securitization
and credit-guarantee markets. The second component calls for expert panels to
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visit and provide advice to APEC economies committed to developing domestic
securitization and credit guarantees for bond markets.
Four member economies—China, Thailand, Mexico, and the Philippines—
have agreed to receive expert advice. Seven economies—Japan, Australia, the
United States, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong SAR, and China—
and the World Bank have provided experts. Panels of experts were formed for the
recipient economies and have visited them twice. After the first and second visits to
Thailand, China, and Mexico, the panels drafted and submitted action plans and
policy recommendations for removing impediments to the development of securi-
tization and credit-guarantee markets in each economy. An interagency taskforce
of the countries reviewed the plans and recommendations and discussed them dur-
ing the second panel visits. In addition, the first and second high-level policy dia-
logues were held in Seoul in April 2003 and in Hong Kong SAR in March 2004.
ASEAN+3: ABMI
Although the ASEAN+3 ABMI was officially approved at the ASEAN+3
Finance Ministers’ Meeting in Manila on August 7, 2003, informal meetings
and seminars had been held on the topic since early that year. One of those
meetings, organized by AFDM+3, was held in Tokyo on February 28, 2003.
Member countries tabled various proposals on how to foster bond markets in
the region. The delegates agreed on the need to study the proposals and ideas in
greater depth to achieve tangible results as soon as possible. The various views,
suggestions, and proposals of the delegates were incorporated through the estab-
lishment of six working groups of volunteers who were to conduct in-depth
studies on various aspects of bond market development. The six working groups
and chair countries are listed in table 9-4. The working groups examine these
Table 9-4. Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) Volunteer Working Groups
Working group Chair country
Creation of New Securitized Debt Instruments Thailand
Credit Guarantee and Investment Mechanisms Republic of Korea, China
Foreign Exchange Transactions and Settlement Malaysia
Issues
Issuance of Local-Currency-Denominated China
Bonds by Multilateral Development Banks, 
Foreign-Government Agencies and Asian 
Multinational Corporations
Rating Systems and Information Dissemination Singapore and Japan
Technical Assistance Coordination Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia
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issues through two perspectives: facilitating market access through a broad variety
of mechanisms; and improving market infrastructure to foster bond markets in
Asia. The market-access issues include: (1) sovereign bond issuance by Asian
governments to establish benchmarks; (2) bond issuance by Asian government
financial institutions to promote domestic private enterprises; (3) the creation of 
asset-backed securities markets, including collateralized debt obligations; (4) bond
issuance in the region by multilateral financial institutions and government
agencies; (5) bond issuance to fund foreign direct investment in Asian countries;
and (6) the issuance of bonds denominated in a broader range of currencies and
the introduction of currency-basket bonds. In turn, the issues related to creating
market infrastructure to foster bond markets in Asia are: (1) providing credit
guarantees through the active use of existing guarantors and the possible creation
of an Asian regional guarantee facility; (2) strengthening the rating system by
enhancing the role of domestic rating agencies and possibly establishing an Asian
credit-rating board; (3) establishing a mechanism for disseminating information
on issuers and credit-rating agencies; (4) facilitating foreign-exchange transactions
and addressing settlement issues on cross-border transactions; (5) enhancing
capacity building through market research and technical-assistance programs to
promote policy dialogue and human-resource development among member
countries; and (6) examining the components of the legal and institutional infra-
structure, such as laws governing companies and corporations, securities trans-
actions, and taxes.
Each group has subsequently organized several seminars and symposiums to
facilitate the exchange of views among academics, think tanks, and private sector
representatives. In addition, ASEAN+3 officials regularly hold separate meetings.
The working groups’ activities made officials of ASEAN+3 governments aware of
obstacles to efficient coordination. Therefore, at the November 2003 informal
meeting of AFDM+3 in Seoul, the ASEAN+3 countries agreed to establish a
focal group to coordinate the working groups. The focal group’s main role is to
monitor the progress of the six ABMI working groups and to coordinate their
future action plans. This includes: (1) submitting a summary progress report of
ABM1 to the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministry and Central Bank Deputies’ meet-
ing; (2) providing a progress update on each working group; (3) coordinating
the meeting schedules of the six working groups; and (4) reporting each group’s
plans to the other groups. The focal group meetings are to be held twice a year,
before the AFDM+3 meetings. The six working groups were later reorganized
into four groups; of the two remaining groups, the one chaired by China com-
pleted its tasks, and the other was transformed into the Technical Assistance
Coordination Team (TACT).
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Three years after its December 2002 inauguration, ABMI could point to
many concrete achievements. These accomplishments included issuance by the
AsDB of ringgit-denominated bonds in Malaysia and the securing of permission
for multilateral development banks to issue local-currency-denominated bonds
in Thailand and China, the creation of a new scheme of cross-boundary primary
collateralized bond obligations (CBOs) by the Republic of Korea and Japan, the
provision of credit guarantees by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation
(JBIC) and Nippon Export and Investment Insurance for bonds issued by Asian
multilateral companies, and the launch of the AsianBondsOnline website.7
Most notably, in December 2004 the governments of Japan and the Repub-
lic of Korea announced the finalization of an agreement for the introduction of
cross-boundary, yen-denominated CBOs by the Republic of Korea (“Korean
CBOs”) so as to provide much-needed financing to small and medium-sized
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a. Small Business Corporation.
b. Industrial Bank of Korea.
c. Japan Bank for International Cooperation.
d. Small and medium-sized enterprises.
e. Special Purpose Corporation.
Figure 9-1. Yen-Denominated Collateralized Bond Obligation (CBO) Scheme 
of the Republic of Korea and Japan
7. Asian Bonds Online, published by the Asian Development Bank (www.asianbondsonline.org).
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the Republic of Korea was all the more important in that it was structured for
placement outside of the country. The implementation of an innovative, dual-
guarantee structure made Korean CBOs attractive to the Asian investor base,
injecting badly needed liquidity into the SME sector in the Republic of Korea
through lending at an extremely competitive rate.
The size of the issue is 10 billion yen, and the underlying portfolio is com-
posed of a pool of forty-six SME bonds. In line with other domestic CBOs in the
Republic of Korea, the issue consists of senior and subordinated bonds issued by
the Small Business Corporation (SBC) of Korea. To ensure that the issue would
appeal to a broad spectrum of investors in Asia, the Industrial Bank of Korea
(IBK) extended a fully backed credit facility to support the timely payment of the
senior obligations under the senior bonds.
In preparation for such initiatives in developing regional bond markets, Japan’s
Ministry of Finance had amended the “Ministerial Notification” that governs the
JBIC guarantee policies. This allowed the JBIC to justify taking a more proactive
role in guarantee operations for appropriately structured credit-enhanced debt
instruments within the region. Following this amendment, the JBIC began delib-
erating proposals to guarantee the initial launch of Korean CBOs.
The efforts by both countries in this pioneering initiative reflect the increased
economic collaboration and harmonization between them. It is hoped that the
provision of credit enhancement measures by quasi-sovereign institutions to
back appropriately structured transactions within Asia will correct the—at least
perceived—risk-return imbalance in regional markets and at the same time serve
as a catalyst of growth in the regional bond markets. At the first Republic of
Korea–Japan Dialogue, on February 4, 2006, the finance ministers of the two
countries agreed to continue their joint efforts in this field, recognizing that the
first issue of this pan-Asia bond had promoted bond market development in the
region, and specifically in their two countries.
In addition, the Regional Multicurrency Bond (RMCB) project was created
to explore the possibility of issuing regional multicurrency bonds or currency-
basket bonds. The final report on this project proposed practical steps for issu-
ing RMCBs, in the following order: (1) issuing reverse dual-currency bonds,
(2) issuing asset-backed securities or collateralized bond obligations, and (3) issu-
ing synthetic currency bonds. The working group members later agreed to launch
phase II of RMCB through a research project named “Developing Asian Currency-
Basket Bond Markets” that would explore the possibility of developing asset-
backed-securities-type Asian currency-basket bond markets in the region.
Many issues related to the creation of infrastructure have also been discussed.
Realizing the importance of this, AsDB conducted an in-depth study on the
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regional settlement and clearing mechanism Asia Link. The findings can be sum-
marized as follows: First, although current settlement arrangements do not sig-
nificantly impede cross-border transactions, there is an important degree of
compliance with and convergence among market practices across the region,
particularly regarding legal certainty, delivery versus payment, and support for
repo and securities lending (including legal certainty on tax treatment). Sec-
ond, although the establishment of a regional central security depository would
be useful, there is no private sector support for such a measure, owing to the
low volume of cross-border market transactions. Third, four suggestions for
improving regional settlement systems were put forth: ensuring greater trans-
parency, enhancing compliance with international standards, promoting greater
regional cooperation, and reducing risk even further.
In addition, a proposal was recently made in favor of linking East Asia’s cen-
tral banks with its national clearing and settlement systems, for them to jointly
serve as the clearing and settlement system for the region’s bond markets.8 At the
November 7, 2004, working group meeting, it was suggested that future efforts
to harmonize standards and procedures related to payment and settlement for
cross-border bond transactions should take advantage of relevant studies by other
forums such as ASEAN and EMEAP. This would avoid the duplication of the
efforts already being made by other working groups. In this regard, the EMEAP
working group is now evaluating the recommendations of the Committee on
Payments and Settlement Systems of the Bank for International Settlement and
the International Organization of Securities Commissions.
The long-term solution for regional credit rating is to strengthen the rule of
law and enhance the quality of information disclosure by building up social cap-
ital and promoting institution building. In the short run, EMEAP could con-
sider establishing East Asian rating agencies, either through independent ABFs
or in conjunction with ASEAN+3. EMEAP could also promote regional
schemes to encourage cooperation with global rating agencies on devising sepa-
rate firm-level ratings based solely on firm-specific risks.
Finally, in-depth research was conducted on the establishment of credit guar-
antee mechanisms. Such mechanisms are important for developing regional bond
markets because they can mitigate the credit quality gap between issuers’ poor
ratings and investors’ requirements. The final report of the study, presented in
October 2005, concludes that there is sufficient business for the mechanisms and
a market gap to be filled. If the introduction of these mechanisms translates into
the creation of independent institutions, a contractually committed capital base
8. See Oh and Park (2003).
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of at least U.S.$3.5 billion will be required. A mix of business products, includ-
ing bond guarantees, warehouse loans, investment in financial infrastructure, and
technical assistance, is advisable in the initial stages. A number of organizational
choices could be considered, such as: (1) new independent multilateral develop-
ment institution (MDI) structured on a stand-alone basis; (2) an MDI structured
as a subsidiary or affiliate of the AsDB; (3) the expansion of existing AsDB facili-
ties; (4) the consolidation of bilateral efforts; or (5) public-private partnerships.
In addition, member countries could introduce regulatory improvements.
Regarding the findings of the report, member countries agreed that the most
important requirement was for a demand study, and that, although demand in
the region is sufficient to warrant exploring new mechanisms, the actual amount
of demand for the mechanism remains uncertain.
Once the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ Meeting gives its approval at the
annual AsDB meeting to be held in May 2006, a second-stage study will be con-
ducted to devise a business model for the mechanism and to examine the viability
of the preferred organizational option. In the meantime, the cochairs will hold
comprehensive talks with all the member countries to build consensus on a course
of action and on a time frame for deciding on the technical and nontechnical fac-
tors that will determine the future direction of the possible mechanisms.
EMEAP: ABF1 and ABF2
The ABF is the first fund of its kind in the region. The first phase of the initiative,
ABF1, was launched in June 2003 and has been fully invested in U.S.-dollar-
denominated bonds in the EMEAP economies. EMEAP next prepared the second
phase of the project—broadening the ABF to cover local-currency-denominated
bonds. Known as ABF2, this phase was launched in December 2004.9 The aim of
both phases of the initiative is to foster the bond market by improving domestic
and regional bond-market infrastructure.
ABF1: the critical first step. The establishment of ABF1 was announced in
June 2003. All eleven EMEAP central banks invested in ABF1 at its launch, and
it had a capitalization of some U.S.$1 billion. The fund is now fully invested in
U.S.-dollar-denominated bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities
in eight EMEAP economies (China, Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, the Republic
of Korea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand). The boon to
development provided by ABF1 consists in more than the first-round demand
9. Executives’ Meeting of East Asia–Pacific Central Banks and Monetary Authorities (EMEAP),
“EMEAP Central Banks Announce the Asian Bond Fund 2,” press release, December 2004
(www.emeap.org); EMEAP, “EMEAP Central Banks to Launch Asian Bond Fund 2,” press
release, June 2003 (www.emeap.org).
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effect of the central banks’ U.S.$1 billion investment. Indeed, the seed money
invested by the EMEAP central banks has served to attract additional private
sector funding, thereby deepening and broadening market demand. The pro-
motional effect of ABF1 is expected to kindle second-round investor and issuer
interest in Asian bond markets, broadening the investor base and increasing
market liquidity over time.
Furthermore, the ABF1 initiative is a milestone in cooperation among regional
central banks. As noted, it is the first initiative of its kind in Asia, and its success
is as symbolic as it is substantive. Not only did the launch of ABF1 send a strong
message to the financial markets that the regional authorities are committed to
stepping up cooperation to promote bond market development; it also paved the
way for the development of ABF2. That just one year elapsed from the initial dis-
cussions to the actual commitment of funds and the launching of ABF1 testifies to
the rapport and sense of ownership among EMEAP members, which have proven
valuable for the development of ABF2. ABF2 involves many more complex and
technical issues than did ABF1, and the precedent of ABF1 was very useful for
garnering political support and commitment to face the challenges to ABF2.
ABF2: the bold new second phase. Building on the momentum generated during
the development of ABF1, EMEAP proceeded to extend the ABF concept to
local-currency-denominated Asian bonds. Because of the project’s complexity and
the decision that the funds would be opened up to private sector investment in the
future, EMEAP appointed private sector financial advisers to assist with designing
and structuring ABF2 as well as with constructing benchmark indexes for it.
In April 2004, EMEAP announced ABF2’s basic design and the state-of-the-art
ideas on which that design was based. It proposed that ABF2 should consist of
two components: the Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund (PAIF) and eight single-
market funds (see figure 9-2). Finally, in December of that year, there was an offi-
cial announcement that ABF2, initially capitalized with U.S.$2 billion, would
invest in domestic-currency bonds issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign enti-
ties in every EMEAP economy except Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. All
eleven EMEAP members were to invest in it.
The PAIF is a single-bond index fund that invests in local-currency-
denominated bonds in the eight EMEAP economies. It is expected to serve as a
convenient and cost-effective investment mechanism and to become a new class
of asset for regional and international investors seeking to diversify their expo-
sure in Asian bond markets.
The eight single-market funds, in turn, invest in local-currency-denominated
bonds issued in the respective EMEAP economies. The single-market funds are
intended to provide local investors with low-cost and index-driven options
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while giving regional and international investors the flexibility to invest in the
Asian bond markets of their choice.
The ABF2 funds are passively managed against a set of transparent and pre-
determined benchmark indexes, covering local-currency bonds issued by sovereign
and quasi-sovereign entities in the eight EMEAP economies. They have been
designed to facilitate investment by other public and private sector parties. In
2005, the PAIF and the single-market funds of Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, and
Singapore were listed. The remaining five single-market funds will be offered to
the public in the first half of 2006.
Whereas the aim of ABF1 is to attract additional money into the bond market,
the objective of ABF2 goes further, seeking to have a stronger and longer-lasting
















Components potentially open to participation by
other public and private sector investors.
a. Executives’ Meeting of East Asia–Pacific Central Banks.
b. Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund.
Figure 9-2. Asian Bond Fund 2 (ABF2) Framework
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ABF2, individual EMEAP economies leverage the interest and momentum gen-
erated by collective investment in ABF2 to improve market infrastructure by
identifying legal, regulatory, and tax hurdles in their markets and undertaking
necessary reforms. Overall, ABF2 has yielded the following benefits:
—The introduction of a new class of assets: Some ABF2 funds are struc-
tured as bond exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Although new to Asia, ETFs are
increasingly used in the United States and Canada. The development of bond
ETFs should promote product diversification and give both retail and institu-
tional investors a low-cost bond product with low entry thresholds.
—The removal of barriers to cross-border capital flows: ABF2 was instru-
mental in relaxing cross-border restrictions on participation by foreign investors
in several markets. The registration of the PAIF in Hong Kong SAR, Japan, and
Singapore has promoted the cross-border offering of financial products. The
PAIF was also the first foreign entity to obtain permission to invest both in
ETFs and in interbank traded bonds in mainland China and to enjoy flexibility
in the repatriation of income. Qualified foreign institutional investors (more
commonly known as QFIIs), for example, may only invest in exchange-traded
renminbi-denominated bonds, in accordance with various limits on investment
and repatriation. In Malaysia, foreign-exchange administration rules have been
liberalized to facilitate cross-border investment, including by the PAIF. In Thai-
land and Malaysia, domestic bond markets now allow issues by multilateral
agencies, and nonresident investors are now exempt from withholding taxes.
—The adoption of international standards: The observance of international
standards would likely encourage greater foreign investment in domestic mar-
kets. The PAIF-related documents, such as its trust deed and prospectus, were
carefully drafted in line with international standards and best practices and will
serve as a model for other ABF2 funds. This is expected to promote the adop-
tion of international standards in the EMEAP markets.
—Increased market transparency: Transparency improves the price discovery
process, enhances market efficiency, and fosters investor confidence. Numerous
studies in the United States have shown that increased transparency on trading
prices has narrowed bid-ask spreads on corporate bonds.10 Structuring some
ABF2 funds as bond ETFs would enhance trading transparency, making order
flows and trade information available to participants, the regulatory authorities,
and the public.
—Improvement of market infrastructure: ABF2 has also improved bond-
market infrastructure by introducing the iBoxx ABF family of indexes to Asia.
10. See, for example, Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2005).
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These are a set of transparent, replicable, and credible bond-market indexes com-
piled by an independent index provider, the International Index Company (IIC),
for the PAIF and the eight single-market funds. Although the region has several
bond indexes, they are compiled by major market players in the region using
proprietary data, which raises uncertainty about their impartiality. By contrast,
the IIC uses multiple sources for bond valuation and adopts transparent index-
construction rules to ensure that iBoxx ABF indexes are impartial, transparent,
and representative. iBoxx ABF indexes are easily adopted and customized by
private sector investors for other fixed-income products and derivatives.
Misconceptions regarding the ABF initiative. There has been a certain degree of
confusion and misunderstanding about the ABF initiative’s objectives and poten-
tial consequences. As occurs with any public sector initiative, concerns have been
voiced about the potential for moral hazard—the possibility, for example, that
some issuers might expect to be bailed out. Hence it should be stressed that both
ABF1 and ABF2 are passively managed against predetermined benchmark
indexes. Bonds are selected for inclusion in the benchmark indexes according to
objective predetermined criteria. Also, the day-to-day management of ABF1 and
ABF2 is carried out by third parties. These fund-management measures should
help assuage any concerns over real or perceived moral hazard or the possibility
that troubled bond issuers would expect relief in the event of a market collapse.
Concerns have also been raised that investments in ABF1 might crowd out
existing investments in Asian bonds and that central banks’ buy-and-hold strat-
egy might deprive the market of liquidity. However, in perspective, given the
large market capitalization—about U.S.$40 billion—of the sovereign and
quasi-sovereign U.S.-dollar-denominated Asian bond market, the U.S.$1 billion
ABF1 is unlikely to have a material impact on the smooth functioning of the
markets. Moreover, any concerns about possible crowding out will be far less
warranted with ABF2, not least because of the much higher total market capi-
talization of local currency bonds, estimated at more than U.S.$1.1 trillion,
than of the U.S.-dollar-denominated Asian bonds.
Critics have argued that the long-standing health of demand for high-grade
Asian bonds shows that the main reason for the underdevelopment of Asian
bond markets lies in supply, not in demand. Therefore, the skeptics say, there is
little to be gained from developing ABF2, which mainly addresses demand-
side issues. These arguments miss the point. Note that the bulk of investor
demand for local-currency-denominated Asian bonds is for those with short- to
medium-term maturities. There is indeed a lack of demand and liquidity for
bond issues with longer-term maturities (beyond five years), as is evidenced by
the fact that the best Asian corporations have issued only a small volume of
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longer-maturity, local-currency bonds. It appears that Asian companies wanting
to borrow longer-term funds by issuing bonds have to turn to the global mar-
ket. This, however, entails the risk of a higher cost (because of the lower foreign-
currency ratings) and a possible currency mismatch (because it means issuing
foreign-currency-denominated bonds). It is hoped that the ABF initiative, by
stoking demand for long-term bonds, will encourage issuers to tap local bond
markets for longer-term funds, thereby allowing the supply-side issue to be
addressed. (On overseas investment by Asian economies, see table 9-5.)
Market-Oriented Strategy: A Road Map 
for Asian Bond-Market Development
Regardless of the approach ultimately chosen to foster Asian bond markets, a series
of preparatory steps must also be taken. The most logical and realistic road map for
developing Asian bond markets begins with deregulating and opening domestic
Table 9-5. Net Overseas Portfolio Investments of Asian Economies, 1998, 2003,
and 2004
Billions of U.S. dollars
Net private sector Net public sector 
portfolio investment portfolio investment a
(A) (B) Total (A+B)
Country 1998 2003 2004 1998 2003 2004 1998 2003 2004
China 3.7 −11.4 −19.7 6.4 117.0 206.3 10.2 105.6 186.7
Hong Kong −22.1 34.0 32.3 −3.2 6.5 5.2 −25.2 40.5 37.5
SAR
Indonesia 1.9 −2.3 −3.2 6.1 4.0 0.0 8.0 1.7 −3.2
Republic of 1.2 −18.3 −9.2 31.6 33.9 43.7 32.8 15.6 34.5
Korea
Malaysia −0.3 −1.0 −8.9 4.8 10.3 21.9 4.5 9.3 12.9
Philippines 0.9 1.3 1.6 2.0 0.3 −0.5 2.9 1.6 1.1
Singapore 8.7 10.5 11.3 3.6 13.7 16.5 12.3 24.2 27.8
Thailand −0.4 0.1 −1.5 2.6 3.0 7.6 2.3 3.1 6.1
Total −6.3 12.9 2.7 54.0 188.8 300.6 47.4 201.7 303.4
Japan 39.2 95.1 −22.9 −4.2 202.1 170.6 35.0 297.2 147.7
Taiwan 2.4 5.9 6.2 4.8 37.1 35.1 7.2 43.0 41.3
Province 
of China
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics database and CEIC.
a. As reflected in increased reserves.
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financial systems so that more investment-grade, local-currency bonds can be
issued, domestic investors can invest in foreign bonds, and foreign borrowers can
issue bonds denominated in different currencies in East Asia’s domestic markets.
During the early stage of development of domestic bond markets, when these
markets are small and illiquid, domestic borrowers should be allowed to issue
local currency bonds in regional and global bond markets. However, such liber-
alization should be accompanied by efforts to expand and liberalize domestic
bond markets and establish a broad base of foreign and domestic investors.
Market liberalization would be the first step toward facilitating cross-border
investment in bonds in Asia, which would, in turn, naturally lead to the forma-
tion of integrated Asian bond markets. In this evolutionary process, countries
with a well-developed financial infrastructure and few restrictions on financial
movements would emerge as regional trading centers for Asian bonds.
Market liberalization alone will not, however, lead to greater cross-border
investment without a regional financial infrastructure that includes a regional
clearing and settlement system, regional credit-guarantee institutions, hedging
facilities, and credit-rating agencies. In addition to establishing such infrastruc-
ture, East Asian countries should also be able to join forces to harmonize their
legal and regulatory systems, domestic clearing and settlement systems, market
practices, and withholding taxes on bond coupon payments.
Harmonization clearly requires close cooperation within ASEAN+3 as well as
leadership dedicated to East Asia’s financial development and stability. How-
ever, prospects for closer cooperation among ASEAN+3 members are not prom-
ising at this stage. Many smaller member countries to which the benefits of
efficient regional bond markets are rather abstract have been indifferent to the
promotion of the ABMI. And it is not clear which country or group of coun-
tries has the moral authority, clout, and money to lead the regionwide financial
reform and the building of regional financial infrastructure in East Asia.
In devising strategies for regional capital markets, East Asian countries can take
either a market-led or a government-led approach. The market-led, or evolution-
ary, approach relies more on competition among countries attempting to trans-
form their domestic capital markets into a regional market. Lack of leadership and
divergent interests among ASEAN+3 members suggest that the market-oriented
approach is preferable. For one thing, the thirteen countries may find it difficult
to agree on any one of the several strategies for Asian bond-market development
proposed by Thailand, Hong Kong SAR, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. And
even if they do agree on a strategy, the chosen strategy might not see the light of
day as long as some ASEAN+3 states continue to be locked in competition to
transform their domestic capital markets into regional and international financial
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centers. This rivalry is one reason—perhaps the most important reason—the
market-oriented approach would be more realistic than the government-led one.
If the market-oriented strategy were pursued, the most efficient domestic
capital markets would emerge as the dominant regional capital markets. In
this scenario, East Asian governments would have to work together to develop
regional financial, legal, and regulatory frameworks to ensure the efficiency
and stability of those regional capital markets. A more direct, government-led
approach would require the active participation of East Asian governments not
only in building financial and other institutional frameworks but also in offer-
ing a wide range of capital-market instruments tailored to investor preferences
through, for example, schemes to guarantee principal and interest payments on
private bonds, securitize bank loans, and expand credit.
Several countries have already taken steps to open their domestic bond markets
to foreign borrowers and investors or to create an offshore market. The ensuing
competition among these countries will lead both borrowers and investors to
migrate to the markets with the most efficient payment and settlement systems,
which will then become regional financial centers.
For an Asian bond market to rapidly develop, Asian currency bonds, whether
sovereign or corporate, will have to be tailored to private and institutional investors’
preferences in terms of maturity and credit quality. At the early stage of bond-
market development, institutional investors, including various types of local cur-
rency investment funds, insurance companies, and investment banks, are likely to
dictate which bonds can be issued and traded. They will also encourage healthy
competition among potential regional financial centers and the building of regional
financial infrastructures. Consequently, it would be desirable to bring these market
participants into the planning stage of the ABMI. The public sector’s role in this
process will be to support the removal of impediments to market development.
If Tokyo, Hong Kong SAR, or Singapore wants to transform domestic bond
markets into regional ones, or to create offshore international bond markets, they
will have to attract borrowers and investors by offering low-cost lending. For
these cities to become full-fledged financial centers, their respective governments
will need to create a variety of market-supporting institutions and encourage the
emergence of insurance and financial-derivative markets. They will also have to
lead the building of a regional financial infrastructure in East Asia.
Evaluation of Current Approaches
At the current stage of Asia’s development, there is no guarantee that regional
efforts, even if they could be marshaled, would succeed in fostering regional
10101-09_Ch09_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:09 PM  Page 283
284 y. c. park, j. h. park, j. leung, and k. sangsubhan
capital markets as competitive as the global capital markets in North America
and Europe. Furthermore, the continuing globalization of financial markets and
the advances in financial technology that allow financial firms in international
financial centers to reach investors and borrowers in remote corners of the world
raise questions as to the need and rationale for creating regional capital markets.
It is also true, however, that given the dynamism of the East Asian economy
and its enormous pool of savings, the region could accommodate large and effi-
cient regional capital markets as competitive as global capital markets. If these
markets were efficient and robust, they might improve the allocation of resources
and help safeguard the region against financial crises.
ASEAN+3 has been involved primarily in building the regional infrastructure
required for Asian bond markets. This includes institutions such as regional
credit agencies, cross-border securities borrowing and lending mechanisms,
credit enhancement and guarantee agencies, clearing and settlement systems, a
centralized depository system, and exchanges and over-the-counter bond mar-
kets. In addition, the six working groups are devising plans to harmonize various
financial standards, regulatory systems, and tax regimes throughout the region.
In addition to ASEAN+3, another regional forum, Asian Cooperation Dialogue
(ACD), has been promoting Asian bond markets. The twenty-eight-member ACD
was established following Thailand’s initiative for multilateral cooperation in
economic and social development in Asia.11 While actively participating in the
ASEAN+3 working groups, Thailand has been seeking the support of other
Asian countries for the expansion of the ACD’s activities. Prime Minister Thaksin
of Thailand first proposed the creation of a regional forum for Asia-wide cooper-
ation in September 2000, and the first ACD ministerial meeting was held in
June 2002 in Cha-Am, Thailand. It was initially created as an informal non-
institutional forum in which Asian foreign ministers could exchange views on
issues of mutual interest.
Unlike ASEAN+3, ACD has rather broad objectives that include cooperation
in trade, finance, science and technology, information technology, energy, and
the environment. Ultimately, it envisions the formation of an Asian Commu-
nity. A number of member countries have volunteered to actively promote coop-
eration in eighteen areas in which they have expertise and interest.
At the second ministerial meeting, in June 2003 in Chiang Mai, Prime Minis-
ter Thaksin proposed that the ACD’s future actions include the development of
an Asian credit-rating agency, Asian-currency-denominated bonds, and an Asian
11. The member countries are ASEAN+3 and Bahrain, Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, Kuwait,
Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, and Sri Lanka.
10101-09_Ch09_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:09 PM  Page 284
fund-management agency. Thailand followed up on this initiative by establish-
ing a working group on the development of an Asian bond market in June 2003.
The second working group meeting, held on April 29–30, 2004, in Thailand,
examined the creation of Asian-currency-denominated bond markets.
However, Asia’s regional bond markets will not become more efficient unless
these cooperative efforts are accompanied by the opening of capital markets
through domestic financial reform in individual member countries. Attempts to
build capital markets in East Asia have been undermined by numerous institu-
tional weaknesses and regulatory controls. The major culprits are a lack of profes-
sional expertise in the securities industry; the inadequacy of financial and legal
infrastructure, including regulatory systems; low accounting and auditing stan-
dards; and opaque corporate governance. Unfortunately, ASEAN+3’s six work-
ing groups are unlikely to take a stand on the urgent need for domestic reform
because they are not allowed to address issues related to individual members’
internal affairs.
In the end, ASEAN+3’s inability to organize a joint program for domestic
financial reform will likely frustrate its efforts to create robust Asian bond markets:
without domestic financial market deregulation and capital account liberaliza-
tion, Asian borrowers and investors will be unable to take advantage of regional
bond markets since cross-border lending and investment will be restricted.
Observers of the proposals and debates taking place at the numerous ABMI
workshops and conferences often become so engrossed in the details of compet-
ing plans that they lose sight of what ASEAN+3 is collectively trying to accom-
plish by supporting the ABI. Moreover, ABMI advocates frequently forget to
ask several fundamental questions about the need and rationale for creating
Asian bond markets.
One issue ABMI proponents overlook is whether existing regional bond mar-
kets are sufficiently large and efficient to meet the bond-financing needs of Asian
governments and corporations. While there has been a chorus of proposals to
construct regional capital markets and stock exchanges in East Asia, the fact that
several bond markets already exist in the region is often ignored. In theory, East
Asian corporations could also turn to stock markets in other countries of the
region for their equity financing. East Asian corporations and financial institu-
tions can also raise funds through Samurai bonds denominated in yen or Shogun
bonds denominated in a foreign currency and issued in Japan, though both the
Samurai and Shogun bond markets have been moribund.
Singapore has actively sought to develop a corporate bond market to allow
foreign entities to issue Singapore-dollar-denominated bonds. Hong Kong SAR
has taken the lead in organizing an Asian clearing and settlement network by
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linking its system with those of other countries in the region and thereby
strengthening its status as a regional financial center. As East Asian economies
continue to open their financial markets, some of their domestic bond markets
will become accessible to foreign investors and borrowers and hence may even-
tually assume the characteristics of regional or international bond markets.
Any regional capital-market development strategy could therefore benefit
from a study of why existing capital markets have been unable to serve as alterna-
tive sources of local or global financing. In particular, Tokyo was once, and per-
haps still is, a logical place to establish a regional bond-trading center. But it has
never gained any credibility as a regional financial center and has been unable to
transform itself into a regional capital market simply because borrowing from
regional markets has been more expensive than borrowing from global markets.
Also unanswered is how the proposed Asian bond markets are to be struc-
tured—that is, whether they will be distinct from domestic bond markets on the
one hand, and from global bond markets on the other. In an increasingly glob-
alized financial system, domestic and regional markets will eventually have to be
integrated into the global bond markets. Therefore, in principle it can be argued
that East Asian economies may be better off integrating their domestic bond
markets with global markets from the beginning rather than going the round-
about way of creating regional bond markets. However, such integration might
not be possible, for a number of reasons. Moreover, if direct integration indeed
proves unviable, then ABMI advocates should be able to explain why that is so
and at the same time whether or not the proposed regional bond markets will be
building blocks for a truly integrated global financial system.
There is a general perception that global bond markets such as the Euro and
Yankee markets have not been and will not be able to meet the bond financing
needs of Asian governments and corporations. Indeed, it is true that global bond
markets could have done more to discover more creditworthy East Asian borrowers
and help them issue local- as well as foreign-currency-denominated global bonds.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that domestic restrictions on bond
issuance and trading have seriously limited the access of many East Asian bor-
rowers to the global bond markets and of global investors to East Asian domes-
tic and regional bond markets. And these restrictions are also largely responsible
for the narrowness, shallowness, and illiquidity of East Asia’s domestic and
regional bond markets. More fundamentally, ABMI advocates do not convinc-
ingly explain why East Asian borrowers whose low credit ratings preclude them
from issuing investment-grade bonds denominated in their own currencies in
the global bond markets would be able to do so in regional bond markets,
unless they are proposing the construction of high-yield Asian bond markets.
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These questions about the viability of the ABMI suggest that its objectives
should be clarified in advance in order to help determine the structure and char-
acteristics of the proposed Asian bond markets. One of the most often-heard
objectives for robust Asian bond markets is to keep at least part of Asian savings
in Asia, rather than sending them to other countries, in particular to the United
States, which uses these funds to finance its current account deficits. Another
objective is for deep and liquid Asian bond markets to help East Asian economies
guard more effectively against future crises, which should allow them to raise
more funds in their own currencies in regional bond markets and thereby avoid
currency-mismatch problems.
A third reason for building Asian bond markets stresses the importance of
pressing forward with the financial reforms that began after the 1997 crisis, espe-
cially because of recent signs of regression. A number of recent studies show that
reform efforts in the region are stalled, with several countries in fact relapsing into
old practices for managing financial institutions and outmoded financial policies.
Many ABMI advocates rightly argue that the initiative will exert peer pressure on
and generate incentives for Asian countries to move forward with financial reform.
The second of these objectives appears to be the least important. Though effi-
cient bond markets offer a wider range of financing sources and savings instru-
ments, and thereby facilitate the diversification of the financial system, they are
no substitute for sound macroeconomic policy. Moreover, a review of the events
that led up to the 1997 crisis suggests that currency mismatch may have been
overstated as a cause of the crisis.
As for the first objective, the frequently heard argument that the channeling
of practically all official reserves from Asia to developed markets was both a con-
sequence and, albeit to a lesser degree, a cause of the underdevelopment of the
Asian bond markets is untenable. The ASEAN+3 collectively holds nearly
U.S.$1.5 trillion in reserves, the bulk of which is invested in U.S. short-term
Treasury and agency securities. There is no criterion of optimum reserve holding
according to which the ASEAN+3 can be claimed to have accumulated more
reserves than necessary, even in light of the ASEAN+3 countries’ need to build
up substantial war chests to ward off future speculative attacks.
Many ABMI advocates are quick to point out that at least some reserves
could be used to finance additional Asian investment. Moreover, the huge
dollar-denominated holdings also entail large losses, since they earn a low return
while East Asian borrowers pay a much higher interest rate on their foreign
loans. The losses result from the pattern of capital flows between East Asia and
the advanced countries, which is often described as East Asia exporting risky
assets in exchange for importing safe ones.
10101-09_Ch09_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:09 PM  Page 287
288 y. c. park, j. h. park, j. leung, and k. sangsubhan
Keeping East Asian savings in East Asia is certainly one of the reasons for creat-
ing ABF1 and ABF2. However, it is incorrect to claim that East Asian economies
invest less than they save because of the absence of regional or domestic bond
markets or the inefficiency of existing ones. Before the 1997 crisis, when they had
smaller and less liquid bond markets than they do now, East Asian economies
invested much more than they have in subsequent years.
Suppose East Asian countries were to unload a substantial portion—say 
5 percent—of their total holdings of U.S.-dollar reserves to acquire Asian
bonds. Such a portfolio substitution would certainly strengthen East Asian cur-
rencies against the United States dollar. However, when the consequences of
currency appreciation are factored in, the purchase of Asian bonds might not
lead to more investment in East Asia. The large holdings of foreign-exchange
reserves are the result of the sterilization of surpluses the East Asian economies
have generated in their current and capital accounts since the 1997 crisis. And
the East Asian countries are not prepared to let their dollar exchange rates appre-
ciate by refraining from intervening in foreign-exchange markets.
Concluding Remarks
The promotion of bond markets in Asia has recently emerged as a leading policy
goal. Efforts to develop such markets have been made on numerous fronts and
through many forums, such as APEC, EMEAP, and ASEAN+3. Several con-
structive and interesting strategies for and ways of developing regional bond
markets in East Asia have been put forth.
Although these forums have all endeavored to reach the common goal of fos-
tering Asian bond markets, their approaches are different, as are the countries and
institutions participating in them. Most notably, APEC has followed a country-
specific approach, trying to develop domestic bond markets in selected countries
and focusing on securitization and credit guarantees. EMEAP basically relies on a
demand-side approach, forming funds to invest in bonds issued by Asian entities.
Finally, ASEAN+3 has taken a comprehensive approach, including providing
quality bonds in Asia and building infrastructure. In this respect, the initiatives
complement one another, rather than overlapping or competing. Therefore, the
establishment of a mechanism or forum to coordinate and harmonize the activi-
ties of these separate initiatives and to foster regional bond markets needs to be
considered.
This chapter first examined the economic tenets that justify the creation of
regional bond markets in a climate characterized by bank-dominated financial
structures, an overriding need to recycle Asian savings back into industrialized
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markets in the region, and volatile foreign-capital inflows. Next, diverse efforts and
initiatives to promote regional bond markets through multilateral cooperation
were reviewed in detail. The authors now propose a road map for Asian bond
market development, taking into account all aspects of this policy issue and the
varying stages of development of the region’s financial markets.
The most expedient way to begin developing Asian bond markets is for each
country to develop its own domestic bond market and then open it to foreign
investors—that is, for Asian countries to open up their domestic bond markets
and enable Asian issuers to sell bonds in any country, while allowing investors to
buy bonds in any country’s domestic market. However, East Asian bond markets
are at greatly different stages of development. Some are much more liberalized
than others, and the different markets have different types of capital controls.
Most Asian countries do not even have the economies of scale to support all
the elements of bond-market infrastructure, such as a settlement and depository
system, a primary dealer system, and credit-rating, bond-pricing, and credit-
guarantee agencies, all of which are required for the emergence of domestic bond
markets. Therefore, without substantial political pressure in favor of such an ini-
tiative, it is unrealistic to expect each Asian country to develop and open up its
domestic bond markets in the near future.
The last issue this chapter addresses relates to the building of infrastructure
for the Asian bond markets, such as the establishment of a regional clearing and
settlement system, regional credit-rating agencies, and regional credit-guarantee
mechanisms. Relatively little research has been conducted on a clearing and settle-
ment institution, although its importance is widely recognized by policymakers
and market practitioners. The authors suggest that a regional version of the
International Central Securities Depository (ICSD) be created, which could be
named “AsiaSettle.” It would link each country’s central bank and national cen-
tral securities depository (CSD).
The emergence of Asian bond markets also requires a common credit-rating
system or standard among Asian countries. However, unlike a clearing and set-
tlement system, the establishment of a regional credit-rating agency should not
depend on government support. Instead, harmonization could be gradually
brought about through the coordination of local and global credit-rating agen-
cies, which should encourage a common credit-rating system. The Association
of Credit Rating Agencies in Asia is currently working on such harmonization.
A new and more adequate guarantee institution, able to meet Asian bond
markets’ current needs, is also needed. None of the many existing guarantee
institutions, including multilateral institutions and private guarantee compa-
nies, is in a position to satisfy the demand for guarantees in Asia, which is
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already high and expected to grow over time. In the light of lessons from the
experience with the now defunct ASIA Ltd., the new institution would have a
better chance of success if it were heavily capitalized and its expected return on
capital were lower. The creation of a regional credit-guarantee institution would
also entail a stronger capital-injection commitment from participating countries
during periods of uncertainty. Thus the institution should initially be public,
although commercially viable.
Arguments for building a regional institution—whether for a credit-rating or
a settlement agency—are mistakenly seen as veiled attempts to introduce market
protection. The building of regional infrastructure should be viewed instead as a
catalyst for opening underdeveloped Asian bond markets and easing local regu-
lations to promote international bond markets in Asia.
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The Arab region has a rich and diversified experience of regional economiccooperation, beginning in 1944 with the creation of the League of Arab
States (Arab League). The league was among the first official regional institutions
to be created after World War II. The aim of the league was to develop coopera-
tion between Arab countries in all fields, including trade, finance, and defense.
Unfortunately, the league was not very successful in securing a common
Arab position in international affairs, owing to various political and economic
factors that are not studied here. It also failed in a number of endeavors to
develop Arab economic integration. Although some Arab subregional economic
cooperation and integration agreements were signed, only the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), created in 1981 by the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula countries of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Qatar,
was successful. The Union of Arab Maghreb, which was created in 1989 by
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Mauritania, has been weakened by politi-
cal tensions between some of its member countries, while the Arab Cooperation
Council, founded the same year by Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and Yemen, was dis-
solved in 1991.
While many inter-Arab agreements on economic and financial arrangements
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agreements has been very limited. Since the early 1970s, however, substantial
progress has been made in the field of regional financial cooperation through
the creation of various financial institutions to provide needy Arab countries
with low-cost official regional lending. This successful experience was quickly
extended to countries outside the region through the creation in 1974 of both
the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and the Arab Bank for Economic Devel-
opment in Africa (BADEA), together with the Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa
(SAAFA).
Low-cost official financing was also made available to Arab and non-Arab
countries in the developing world by national financial institutions created by the
Arab oil-exporting countries. As this chapter describes, much of the financing
originating from the region has come from pan-Arab institutions and the Islamic
Development Bank, and has been made available primarily to Arab countries,
but also to developing countries belonging to the Organization of the Islamic
Conference and others.
In fact, since the oil-price boom of the 1970s, financial institutions in the
Arab region have mushroomed, including large commercial banking and finance
institutions created by Arab governments or Arab government–owned banks
(Arab Banking Corporation [ABC]; Gulf Investment Bank [GIB]; Arab Invest-
ment Company [AIC]; and Gulf Investment Corporation [GIC]), in addition to
numerous private Islamic banking and financial institutions.
Banking institutions were also created as consortium banks by the main
Arab banks (private and government) and large banks in Europe or in other
countries (Union of French and Arab Banks and Banque Arabe et Internationale
d’Investissement in Paris; European Arab Bank in Brussels; Arab Malaysian
Bank in Kuala Lumpur).1 Some of these banks are no longer in existence, like
some other large consortium banks that were created on international capital mar-
kets during the 1970s.
This chapter is concerned only with official financial institutions and
arrangements in the Arab region that supply concessional financing or facilities
and grants. Owing to particular regional economic and financial circumstances,
most of these institutions provide development finance facilities to countries
outside the region. Another specific feature of these institutions is that none of
their shareholders are member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and none tap international financial
markets or domestic Arab capital markets to finance their operations. Their activi-
ties are funded exclusively from the contributions of shareholder countries, with
292 georges corm
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the bulk of such contributions coming from the Arab Peninsula oil-exporting
countries.
In fact, Arab regional official funding flourished in the highly specific cir-
cumstances of the oil-price boom in the early 1970s. It survived the sharp
downturn in oil prices during the 1980s and 1990s, and operations continued,
albeit at lower levels than in the 1970s. Although the sharp upturn in oil prices
beginning in 2000 led to an increase in funding, funding did not return to the
levels of the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s. Today a large pool of
expertise in development finance has accumulated in the region, and most insti-
tutions have geared their operations to their countries’ emerging needs (equity
investment, microcredit, aid to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
technical assistance grants, and others). However, available resources are still
being used primarily to finance infrastructure.
Available statistical aggregates are not always sufficiently detailed or are not
presented in a way that facilitates proper analysis. However, the annual reports
produced by some of these institutions are quite detailed. Aggregate figures from
Arab sources differ from the statistics in the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) annual report. Although OECD statistics do not seem to adequately
cover all Arab institutions and financial arrangements, both statistical sources
are used to analyze the different official development assistance (ODA) flows
originating from the region, in which Arab countries play a major role.
It is also worth noting that the region’s institutional setup suffers from the fact
that, as defined by the United Nations system, the Arab countries, as well as other
Middle Eastern countries, belong to different regions. The UN system recognizes
no Arab region as such. Thus the Economic and Social Commission for Western
Asia (ESCWA) includes only some of the Arab countries (Arabian Peninsula
countries, as well as Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine); other
Arab countries in Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya, and
Sudan, in addition to Egypt, which is a member of both commissions) are mem-
bers of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Turkey
belongs to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).
Large multilateral funding institutions, such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), also do not recognize an Arab region, but
rather a Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region that includes all the
Arab countries except Sudan and Mauritania, together with Iran, Afghanistan,
and Pakistan. The United Nations and other sister institutions always include
Turkey in European regional groups, even though it is a key Middle Eastern
country. This designation represents an additional complication when one looks
at the Arab region.
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Economic and Political Background to the Creation 
and Development of Arab Development Agencies
Since its creation, the Arab League has promoted a number of schemes to
induce member countries to develop regional economic integration.2 The basis
of this cooperation was the Treaty of Common Defense and Economic Cooper-
ation signed by Arab League member countries in 1950. Two collective bodies
were successively created to promote economic cooperation and integration:
first, in 1953, the Economic Council (which became the Economic and Social
Council in 1977); then, in 1957, the Council for Arab Economic Unity, which
was joined by Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, and Egypt but was not implemented until
1964. In 1964 this council decided to create an Arab Common Market, which
again only a few Arab countries joined. In 1996 the Greater Arab Free Trade
Area (GAFTA) was created, which seventeen of the twenty-one Arab countries
have now joined. Tariff reductions on goods attained 60 percent at the end of
2003. The GCC member countries signed a customs union in the same year,
setting a common tariff ceiling of 5 percent.
Since 1991, Lebanon and Syria have signed various economic cooperation
treaties, including an agreement to abolish customs duties for trade in goods.
More recently, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia signed an agreement
called the “Aghadeer Declaration,” launching a free-trade area among the four
countries, which will be implemented fully by the end of 2012.
Arab League members signed many other specific agreements during the
1950s and 1960s in the field of customs harmonization, facilitation of trade and
transit, and facilitation of payments and capital movements.3 In spite of these
efforts, inter-Arab trade has not developed, remaining at a level of between 6 and
8 percent of total Arab foreign trade.
Although this chapter does not discuss the problems undermining progress
in Arab regional economic integration, it is worth noting that economic cooper-
ation between Arab countries has grown substantially over the past twenty years
in the area of inter-Arab private investment and official development assistance,
on both a bilateral and a regional level.
This growth in cooperation can be attributed to the sudden increase in oil
receipts by Arab oil-exporting countries when oil prices exploded during the
1970s. At that time, these countries’ domestic economies did not have the
capacity to absorb the new financial flows that were accruing to them. Some of
2. For more details see Al Imam (2004); Arab Thought Forum (2002); and Arab Monetary
Fund (2005).
3. See Al Iman (2004).
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these countries with small populations (Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar, Oman, and Libya) could not find enough domestic needs to absorb the
enormous financial surpluses that began to accumulate from the oil sector. In
contrast, many Arab non-oil-exporting countries had very large populations
(Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, and Morocco) with rather low per capita income
and pressing needs for more state spending on infrastructure. Other small Arab
economies, such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Tunisia, also had a major financial
need to increase state investment in infrastructure, health, and education.
Because official efforts by the Arab League to promote economic cooperation
and regional integration were unsuccessful, and a small group of Arab countries
became very rich financially, a consensus emerged that priority should be given
to building regional financial institutions to provide the poorer Arab countries
with concessional loans and grants. In fact, this had begun at the end of the
1960s, when the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)
was created on paper in 1968, although it did not become operational until
1972. This effort accelerated when oil prices started to rise in 1971.
Another factor contributing to the building of Arab economic cooperation
was of a more political nature. It is linked with the Arab-Israeli war of 1967,
when Arab Gulf countries that did not participate in the war but were begin-
ning to become richer as a result of rising oil production, agreed to extend
financial assistance to the countries that participated in the war and had suffered
heavy economic losses ( Jordan, Egypt, and Syria). Bilateral loans or grants were
provided to these three countries to rebuild their armies and help to compensate
them for their economic losses.4
The trend was reinforced as the Arab oil-exporting countries became richer
in the wake of the fourfold increase in oil prices and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
During this period, “rich” Arab countries were encouraged to promote Arab
regional financial agencies and to supply them with adequate resources to enable
them to reduce the bilateral lending that was now being provided not only to
other Arab countries, but also to other developing countries that were suffering
from the rise in oil prices. This was also the rationale behind the creation of the
Islamic Development Bank in 1974, another big financial institution whose
geographic scope extends beyond the Arab world. The same could be said of the
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, created in 1972.5
Other pan-Arab institutions were created in the same economic context, such
as the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), the Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation
4. On this aspect of Arab financial cooperation, see Corm (1988).
5. See Shihata (1982).
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(APICORP), the Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development
(AAAID), and the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (IAIGC).
In 1972, Arab oil-exporting countries created an organization of their own,
called the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). This
organization was not intended to be a substitute for the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), covering Arab and non-Arab oil
exporters, but rather to act as a forum in which Arab oil-exporting countries could
discuss and study the development of Arab oil policies and arrive at a common
position within OPEC or in relations between OPEC and consumer countries.
Another important point is that the Arab oil-exporting countries were strong
promoters and founders, with very sizable financial contributions from other
lending institutions created in the same period as the International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the OPEC Development Fund.
The oil-exporting countries also created national lending agencies to provide
soft loans and grants to Arab countries and to other developing countries. Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Iraq created national agencies
(called funds) to grant soft loans to Arab and non-Arab developing countries. Dur-
ing the same period, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, then Venezuela, also
created the Venezuelan External Fund to supply soft loans to developing countries.
This was at a time when developing countries began to be classified into two
categories: oil-exporting and non-oil-exporting countries. Arab development agen-
cies (ADAs) also divided Arab countries into the same categories. As regional
ADAs and national external funds became operational, bilateral lending and grants
from Arab oil-exporting countries began to decline, although they were again used
more extensively during the first Gulf War (for Morocco, Egypt, and Syria, which
participated in the coalition to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation).
In fact, since the mid-1970s, Arab oil-exporting countries have devoted a sub-
stantial percentage of their GDP to foreign aid, and both ADAs and the IsDB
have developed in-depth expertise in development lending and support to the
public and private sectors. The amounts of ODA provided by Arab oil-exporting
countries, either bilaterally or by funding regional institutions, were dependent
on oil prices, with aid increasing when prices rose and decreasing when prices fell.
However, the level of aid provided by Arab region oil-exporting countries, inside
and outside the region, is still fairly substantial and is higher in relation to GDP
than aid from OECD members of the Development Assistance Committee.
All Arab regional institutions meet each year to review policies and programs
and to discuss progress in Arab economic cooperation. Ministers of finance or
economic affairs sitting on the boards of these institutions regularly attend this
important yearly gathering in Kuwait, where the head offices of many of these
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institutions are housed in the same building. In addition, Arab central gover-
nors meet annually during the AMF General Assembly.
As noted earlier, the analysis in this chapter is restricted to official Arab insti-
tutions or official institutions based in the Arab world (such as the Islamic
Development Bank) that are responsible for supplying various forms of develop-
ment finance and grants. The chapter also reviews existing official financial
facilities to encourage trade development within the region or between the
Islamic countries that these institutions cover.
An Analysis of Regional Financial Institutions 
and Their Activities: The Global View
It is not easy to analyze available statistics on Arab institutional aid. Although
this paper is mainly concerned with regional development lending institutions,
it is useful to look at the main channels through which official aid is disbursed.
The following four main channels have been identified:
—bilateral official aid to Arab and non-Arab developing countries;
—aid from national aid funds to Arab and non-Arab developing countries;
—aid from regional Arab lending institutions to Arab countries; and
—aid from multilateral lending institutions with geographic specialization,
namely the Islamic Development Bank and the Arab Bank for Economic Devel-
opment in Africa.
The main statistical data concerning these channels are gathered by AFESD
and published each year in the Arab Unified Economic Report (AUER). This
report is prepared by AFESD but published jointly by the General Secretariat of
the Arab League, AFESD, the Arab Monetary Fund, and OAPEC.
The tables and figures in this section of the chapter are based on data from
either the latest annual AUER or the OECD online electronic database on
ODA flows to developing countries.
Aggregated Arab ODA
According to the 2005 annual AUER, global Arab official development assistance
totaled U.S.$123.8 billion for the period 1970–2004, as shown in table 10-1.
However, the OECD online database on ODA flows reports a total of
U.S.$96.02 billion for the same period, as shown in table 10-2. The difference
might stem from the fact that AUER coverage is wider than OECD coverage. As
the table shows, aid is supplied predominantly by the GCC countries (table 10-1,
94 percent). Although other Arab oil-exporting countries have also been donors,
their contribution ceased after the first Gulf War. Iraq’s contribution stopped
even earlier, owing to the war with Iran, which depleted its financial resources.
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Saudi Arabia is by far the largest donor among the GCC countries (66 per-
cent of the total), followed by Kuwait (15.5 percent), and the United Arab Emi-
rates (10.3 percent). Other GCC donors are marginal.
Aid soared from U.S.$7.7 billion in the period 1970–74 to a peak of
U.S.$32.7 billion in the 1980–84 period. With the fall in oil prices, it declined
to a low of U.S.$6.8 billion during the 1995–99 period. However, with the
upturn in oil prices since 1999, the amounts disbursed increased substantially
(2000–04), to reach U.S.$15.8 billion.
Table 10-2 shows the scale of Arab assistance in relation to the GDP of the
donor countries over the past sixteen years. After peaking at a sizable 4 percent
in 1990, the percentage of GDP earmarked by the GCC countries for ODA
declined to 0.3 percent in 1997. Although it rose again to 1.1 percent in 2002,
it declined once more to 0.5 percent in 2004 despite the further rise in oil
prices.
Trend in the Arab Share of ODA from All Donors
The OECD online database allows us to compare the trend in ODA from DAC
member countries and from Arab donors; it also allows us to make the same
comparison between total ODA from multilateral agencies and from Arab agen-
cies. ODA from Arab development agencies appears to be underestimated in the
OECD statistical system.
According to the OECD database, Arab ODA was 7.3 percent of total ODA
(DAC and non-DAC) between 1970 and 2004, but represented 95.9 percent of
non-DAC ODA. During the oil boom years (1974–81), the share of Arab
ODA as a percentage of total ODA fluctuated between 22 percent and 26 per-
cent. Figure 10-1 shows the yearly trend in the Arab countries’ share of total
ODA since 1970. It reveals that the first peak in the share of Arab ODA in the
1974–84 period was linked with the oil-price increase, while the second peak in
1991–92 was linked with assistance provided in the context of the first Gulf
War. The new increase since 2002 was again linked with an oil-price rise.
Arab Donors’ Share of Total Bilateral ODA to Arab Countries
Table 10-3 reports the Arab donor countries’ share as a percentage of total ODA
to Arab countries, according to the OECD database. The Arab share of total
ODA to Arab beneficiaries reached 26.7 percent in the period from 1970 to
2004. For certain Arab countries, this share was as high as 94.8 percent (Bahrain),
45.4 percent (Jordan), 36.9 percent (Lebanon), 79.1 percent (Oman), 76.6 per-
cent (Syria), and 35.7 percent (Yemen). Thus almost all ODA granted to GCC
countries is of Arab origin, while a very substantial part of ODA to countries suf-
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fering from the Arab-Israeli conflict (Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria) came from Arab
donors (between 40 percent and 80 percent).
Arab agencies provide a 10.6 percent share of the ODA supplied to the Arab
region by all multilateral institutions. However, the OECD database seems to
restrict coverage of Arab agencies to the two main exclusively Arab institutions,
and probably excludes national funds (which may be included in bilateral aid),
as well as the Islamic Development Bank and the Arab Bank for Economic
Development in Africa. ODA to the Arab region has concentrated on a few
countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria). Bilateral Arab ODA has been
more evenly distributed, although Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Morocco have also
been major beneficiaries of Arab aid.
Thus, according to the OECD database on aid flow and the main ODA aggre-
gate shown in table 10-4, Arab ODA represents an important share of resource
flows to developing countries. During the period 1970–2004, it disbursed 7 per-
cent of total ODA, although during the oil boom years this share rose to almost
30 percent. In fact, ODA from Arab countries represented 95 percent of ODA
from non-DAC countries, while the Arab donors’ share totaled 58 percent of all
ODA disbursed to Arab countries. According to the same OECD statistics, Arab
Percent
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Source: Based on OECD online database: www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/DACAuthenticate.asp.
Figure 10-1. Evolution of the Share of Total ODA Provided by Arab Countries 
to Developing Countries, 1970–2004
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agencies disbursed 10.6 percent of the total ODA provided by multilateral institu-
tions worldwide. The following section, based on statistics from the main Arab
official sources, gives a different picture of the size of Arab funding from the vari-
ous regional institutions.
ODA from Arab Development Lending Institutions
According to AUER estimates, the amounts disbursed via national, regional,
and multilateral lending institutions with a majority Arab shareholding were
U.S.$72.4 billion for the 1970–2004 period, as shown in table 10-5, rather than
the U.S.$6.7 billion cited in the OECD database shown in appendix table 10A-4.
This represents 58.5 percent of total ODA disbursed by Arab donors since 1970,
amounting to U.S.$123.8 billion, as shown in table 10-1.
Table 10-5 also illustrates the geographic distribution of aid from these vari-
ous institutions. The table shows that the largest loan and aid portfolio is held
by multilateral Arab institutions, or institutions that are not exclusively Arab.
This portfolio represents 39 percent of total aid disbursed by all institutions.
The Islamic Development Bank is by far the most active institution in this
group (28.3 percent of total lending by all institutions); however 49 percent of
its lending goes to the Arab region. The Arab region receives 39 percent of total
lending by this group of institutions.
National institutions are the second largest distributors of development assis-
tance (33 percent of the total). However, only 55.2 percent of their lending goes
to the Arab region, while purely regional Arab institutions provide 27.9 percent
of all loans. Their operations focus exclusively on Arab countries.
Table 10-4. Arab Share in the Distribution of ODA, 1970–2004
Amount Share
(billions of U.S. dollars) (percent)
DAC countries’ ODA 921 66
Multilateral agencies 368 27
Non-DAC ODA 101 7
Arab donors’ ODA 96 7
Arab donors’ share of non-DAC ODA 95
Total aid from all donors to Arab countries 210 15
Total aid from all donors 1,390 100
Arab donors’ share of ODA to Arab countries 51 27
Arab countries’ share of total Arab ODA 58
Source: Based on the OECD online database: www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/
DACAuthenticate.asp.
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The table also shows that the Arab region is the largest beneficiary of assis-
tance from all these institutions (61.4 percent of the total). However, non-
Arab Asia (22.2 percent) and sub-Saharan Africa (14.4 percent) were also
beneficiaries. The Latin American region is only a marginal beneficiary (1.4 per-
cent). Existing AUER statistics do not identify individual beneficiary countries
of total ODA.
Table 10-5. Total Arab-Based National, Regional, and Multilateral ODA,
Provided from Creation until December 12, 2004 a
Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise noted
Total
aid
provided Share of each
since Arab Latin Other institution
Donor creation region Africa Asia America countries (percent)
Regional Arab institutions
Arab Fund (AFESD) 15,923 15,923 0 0 0 0 22.0
Arab Monetary Fund 4,293 4,293 0 0 0 0 5.9
Subtotal 20,216 20,216 0 0 0 0 27.9
National ODA institutions
Abu Dhabi Fund 3,317 2,596 147 567 0 7 4.6
Saudi Fund 7,637 3,675 1,441 2,368 60 94 10.5
Kuwait Fund 13,014 6,965 2,281 3,196 303 270 18.0
Subtotal 23,968 13,235 3,868 6,131 362 371 33.1
Share of each beneficiary 100 55.2 16.1 25.6 1.5 1.5
region (percent)
Not exclusively Arab institutions
Islamic Bank 20,528 10,049 2,015 8,423 18 24 28.3
Arab Bank for Economic 2,348 10 2,338 0 0 0 3.2
Development in Africa
OPEC Fund 5,371 955 2,174 1,547 641 54 7.4
Subtotal 28,247 11,014 6,527 9,970 659 78 39.0
Share of each beneficiary 100 39.0 23.1 35.3 2.3 0.3
region (percent)
Total Arab and 72,432 44,466 10,395 16,101 1,021 449 100
associated funds
Total share of each 100 61.4 14.3 22.2 1.4 0.6
beneficiary region
Source: Arab League and others, Arab Unified Economic Report (2005).
a. The Kuwait Fund was started 1962, others between 1974 and 1978.
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Distribution of ODA by Economic Sector
Statistics from AUER can be used to analyze the distribution of Arab ODA to
different economic sectors. Table 10-6 shows the cumulative distribution up to
2004. Assistance focuses on two main sectors: power, and transport and com-
munication. In the Arab region, more than 47 percent of lending was provided
to these two sectors. In Africa the transport and communication sector received
up to 37.7 percent of all lending. In spite of enormous agriculture and livestock
requirements, this sector has been allocated only 13.5 percent of total assistance.
The same trends are apparent in the annual statistics on the sectoral distribu-
tion of assistance for 2004. Energy, transport, and communication still represent 
49.3 percent of commitments, while agriculture and livestock has declined to 
4.1 percent. However, water and water drainage is on a rising trend (14.1 percent).
Unfortunately, there are no details regarding the item “other.” Support to
social sectors (such as health and education) is included under this miscella-
neous heading. It is to be hoped that, in the future, Arab ODA will concentrate
more on key sectors where the problems of the Arab economies appear to be
linked increasingly with certain social issues, as described in the recently pub-
lished UNDP Arab Human Development Reports.
In fact, substantial financial resources are not yet being allocated to some of
the key issues identified for economic and social reforms. A major concern is the
persistently large pockets of illiteracy and extreme poverty in some Arab coun-
tries and the general lack of competitive production capacity, which contributes
to the Arab economies’ marginal position in a globalized world economy despite
their huge energy resources.6
Main Conclusions
The network of Arab or Arab-based regional financial institutions is complex,
and there is a duplication of functions among national, regional (Arab-focused),
and multilateral institutions specializing in certain Muslim or African countries.
In addition, the amount of funding made available for Arab ODA has varied
widely over the past thirty years. Three main issues need to be tackled in the
future to increase the efficiency of institutions providing ODA.
The first relates to the heavy reliance of these institutions’ activities on oil
prices. The data reviewed in this section show that the amounts disbursed by
these institutions are highly dependent on the price of oil. These institutions
should try to diversify their funding sources to reduce their exposure to fluctua-
tions in the financial wealth of the rich Gulf oil-exporting countries.
6. On this point see Corm (2003) and World Economic Forum (2003).
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The second issue concerns the very broad geographic mandate of some of the
largest institutions. Changes in circumstances make it necessary to reshape the
network created in the early 1970s. The period when the fourfold increase in oil
prices created major hardships for non-oil-producing developing countries is
now well past, although it remains to be seen what impact recent oil-price
increases will have on the least-developed countries. Unlike in the 1970s, today
there are no longer the same international pressures on rich Arab oil-exporting
countries to contribute major grant aid to less-developed countries affected by
sharp oil-price increases. Some of these exporting countries have themselves
become borrowers on their domestic markets or on international markets.
As more resources are made available through other regional and multilateral
institutions, is there still a need for Arab-based institutions to provide develop-
ment funding to non-Arab countries? This is of course a question of inter-
national policy by the rich Arab oil-exporting countries, which their governments
could usefully examine. Policies to gain friends in the international arena could
be pursued through direct bilateral aid or their national agencies, and not neces-
sarily through official regional funding institutions.
The third issue is the need to focus more on strategic bottlenecks affecting the
performance of Arab economies. Although there is an increasing trend to com-
mit and disburse more aid to small and medium-sized enterprises or to increase
funding for the health and education sectors, as well as to support various types
of institutional reform for promoting governance and sustainable development,
the trend of lending to traditional infrastructure sectors still predominates.
Description of the Main Arab Regional and Multilateral Institutions
The lending conditions of the most relevant regional Arab institutions and
Arab-based multilateral institutions are similar to those of the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) with regard to the loan term.
Interest rates charged to borrowers vary from a minimum of 1 percent to a max-
imum of 4.5 to 5 percent (except by one institution, which may charge as much
as 6 percent). The appendix tables provide the main lending conditions of the
institutions described in this chapter.
There have also been several debt relief operations between oil-rich coun-
tries and Arab beneficiary states. However, no statistics are available because
such operations were bilateral and took place within a specific political context
(such as the 1991 Gulf War). World Bank statistics indicate that official debt
relief operations affected only Egypt (for a substantial amount of more than
U.S.$13 billion in 1991) and, very marginally, Jordan, after signing a peace
treaty with Israel in 1994. Other countries, including Yemen, Morocco, Algeria,
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and Jordan, benefited from a number of debt rescheduling operations through
the Paris Club.
Although national funds for assisting Arab and other developing economies
(such as the Kuwait Fund, the Saudi Fund, and the Abu-Dhabi Fund) play an
important role in providing financial assistance to the region, this chapter dis-
cusses only those institutions for which capital and resources are provided by
more than one state. However, national entities are included in the appendix
tables, which give details of the operations of all Arab or Arab-based develop-
ment assistance institutions.
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD)7
The AFESD is the oldest institution created by the Arab countries. Although the
Economic and Social Council of the League of Arab States decided to create the
fund in 1968, the first meeting of the Board of Governors was not convened
until three years later, in February 1972, and the fund came into operation only
at the beginning of 1974. The fund is located in Kuwait, the country that created
the first national fund back in 1962. The fund’s basic activities are to provide
soft lending to Arab League countries for infrastructure projects.
AFESD members include all twenty-one Arab countries in the League of
Arab States: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Many prominent
Arab economists have been staff members or heads of the fund. Most of these
economists also played a role in their own country at a later stage as ministers of
economic affairs or prime ministers.
The fund’s total loan commitments from the start of operations until the end
of 2004 totaled 4,770 million Kuwaiti dinars (KD) (or U.S.$15.7 billion).8 The
cumulative disbursement amounted to KD2.973 million (or U.S.$9.8 billion)
at the end of 2004. The fund’s resources consist of its share capital of KD663
million (authorized KD800 million) and reserves of KD1.6 billion at the end of
2004.
In recent years, the fund has greatly expanded technical assistance activities
in the form of grants. Either such grants are used to support inter-Arab activities
(Arab research, training, and education centers, support for pan-Arab seminars
on economic and social issues, and feasibility studies), or they are specifically
earmarked for assisting member countries. The cumulative amount of grants for
7. www.arabfund.org. All data in this section are taken from this website.
8. www.arabfund.org/OPERATNS.htm.
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supporting inter-Arab activities totaled KD37 million at the end of 2004, while
national grants totaled KD68.2 million.9
The fund places special emphasis on supporting regional projects. During
the period 1974–2004, it provided sixty-five pan-Arab loans for a total value of
KD322.1 million to assist in implementing twenty-nine regional infrastructure
projects.10 In particular, it has been successful in promoting the inter-Arab grid to
connect national electricity systems. In recent years, the fund has developed activ-
ities to support the private sector through loans or equity holdings. However, pri-
vate sector loans represented only 2.6 percent of total loans extended in 2004.
Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) and Arab Trade Financing Program (ATFP)11
The AMF was created in 1976 by the Arab central banks. It began operations in
1978. The fund’s capital is denominated in Arab accounting dinars (AAD),12
equivalent to three special drawing rights (SDRs) and different from the Islamic
dinar (ID). The paid-up capital in convertible currencies is AAD318.8 million.
AMF annual operations are similar to IMF operations. However, the conditions
are much less strict than those of the IMF and are tailored to each beneficiary’s
specific economic status. At the end of 2004 the number of loans extended by
the fund since the start of its activities totaled 131, with a value equivalent to
U.S.$4.8 billion (AAD1,037.2 million). The balance of outstanding loans
totaled AAD252.7 million at the end of the same year.
Technical assistance grants disbursed in 2004 were equivalent to AAD994,000;
4,080 trainees participated in the 119 training courses and twelve workshops
organized by the fund in the period 1981–2004.
The fund takes deposits from Arab central banks and monetary agencies.
Such deposits amounted to U.S.$1,544 million at the end of 2004. The fund
also supports the development of Arab capital markets via its database and the
publication of a specialized quarterly bulletin. In addition, the fund manages a
very successful funding program (ATFP) to stimulate inter-Arab trade. The pro-
gram was established in 1989 with paid-up capital of U.S.$500 million con-
tributed by forty-four shareholders, including Arab banking and financial
9. www.arabfund.org/TECHASST.htm.
10. www.arabfund.org/LOANS.htm.
11. Arab Monetary Fund (2004).
12. The value of this unit should have been determined not by a fixed parity between it and the
unit of Special Drawing Rights (SDR), but by a basket that included all Arab currencies weighted
according to the GDP and external trade of the respective Arab countries. However, member
countries never adopted the basket as defined by a special technical committee of which this chap-
ter’s author was a member.
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institutions, as well as Arab central banks. Between its inception in 1991 and
2004, it provided 342 credit lines to banks in member countries, worth a total
of U.S.$3.5 billion. However, the fund does not actively promote an inter-bank
Arab market for official or banking deposits, and neither does it provide swap
facilities with Arab central banks.
Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)
The IsDB is by far the largest multilateral Arab-Muslim country financial
institution. Total cumulative approved operations at the end of the 2004–05
financial year (from January 1, 1976, to February 9, 2005) were equivalent to
U.S.$38.3 billion. Up to 61 percent of this amount was used to finance trade,13
while 37 percent went to project and technical assistance and 2 percent to spe-
cial assistance operations.14
The bank’s capital was subscribed in a new account currency, the Islamic
dinar (ID).15 Fifty-five countries contributed to it, including twenty-one Arab
countries, representing 69.21 percent of the capital. The largest contributor by
far was Saudi Arabia, with 27.33 percent, followed by Libya (10.96 percent),
Egypt (9.48 percent), and the United Arab Emirates (7.76 percent).
The bank’s initial capital was ID2 billion. As of February 9, 2005, it stood
at ID15 billion (authorized) and ID8.1 billion (disbursed). Between the start
of its activities in 1976 and February 9, 2005, the IsDB approved 1,397 financ-
ing operations (excluding trade financing and special assistance operations),
and technical assistance grants totaled U.S.$189 million and trade financing
U.S.$23.3 billion. Until February 21, 2004, its ten largest beneficiaries in cumu-
lative project financing were the following countries: Turkey (U.S.$756 million);
Iran (U.S.$731.2 million); Algeria (U.S.$695.9 million); Egypt (U.S.$601.8
million); Lebanon (U.S.$571.6 million); Pakistan (U.S.$559.1 million); Jordan
(U.S.$540.3 million); Indonesia (U.S.$526.4 million); Oman (U.S.$515.7 mil-
lion); and Malaysia (U.S.$503.8 million).16
The bank has a variety of operations and activities, some of which have been
decentralized to specialized affiliate institutions, namely:
—the IsDB Infrastructure Fund to help to raise private capital for financing
infrastructure development in its member countries. Committed investments
amount to U.S.$980.5 million;
13. Trade between the bank’s member countries accounted for only 11 percent of total exports
and 14 percent of total imports in 2001. However, the level is higher than between Arab countries
(6 to 8 percent, as already mentioned).
14. See Islamic Development Bank (2005).
15. One Islamic dinar is equivalent to one SDR.
16. See Islamic Development Bank (2004).
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—the World Waqf Foundation17 (and the Awkaf Properties investment fund
that develops and invests Awquaf real estate properties, the beneficiaries of
which are the needy, orphans, and others);
—the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector, estab-
lished in 1999 with capital of U.S.$1 billion; since it started, forty-seven proj-
ects valued at U.S.$270.2 million have been approved;
—the Islamic Corporation for Insurance of Investment and Export Credit
(ICIEC);
—the Islamic Research and Training Institute.
The IsDB is also encouraging the development of other Islamic financial
institutions and the promotion of funding techniques consistent with the prin-
ciples of Islamic law. This is why, in 1989, it also created the Unit Investment
Fund to provide private or public Islamic institutions with a vehicle through
which to invest resources according to Islamic principles. The bank provides
funding according to Islamic economic principles, which prohibit the charging
of interest but allow various types of profit-sharing schemes or the leasing of
capital goods and receipt of rent from the borrower.
OPEC Fund
Although not a purely Arab regional institution, the OPEC Fund can be con-
sidered a multilateral financial institution that is funded largely by the contribu-
tions of the rich Arab oil-exporting OPEC members. The OPEC Fund was
established in 1976 as an expression of South-South solidarity. All non-OPEC
developing countries are eligible for fund assistance. It provides concessional
loans for projects, programs, and balance-of-payments support, as well as grants
for technical assistance, food aid, and other types of assistance. In addition, in
the past few years it has participated in the financing of private sector activities.
Between its creation and the end of December 2005, 119 countries benefited
from the fund. Cumulatively, it has committed U.S.$7,906.5 million in develop-
ment assistance and disbursed U.S.$5,187.5 million. Least developed countries
(LDCs) receive the biggest share of fund resources (56 percent of the fund’s
public sector lending commitments by the end of 2003).
The fund has extended 1,064 loans to the public sector with a value of
U.S.$6,168.10 million, of which 79 percent went to project financing and 12 per-
cent to balance-of-payments support; it has participated in eighty-three financing
operations in favor of the private sector, totaling U.S.$417.9 million,18 and has
17. The term “Waqf ” applies to properties placed in trust for charitable purposes according to
Islamic law. In Islamic and Arab countries, waqfs are important economic institutions.
18. www.opecfund.org/about/about.aspx.
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provided 773 grants with a value of U.S.$348.6 million, of which 32 percent was
extended to technical assistance, 15 percent to emergency relief, 10 percent to the
AIDS Fund special account, 6 percent to the Food Aid Special Account, and so
on.19 Funding worth U.S.$861.1 million has been channeled to IFAD and
U.S.$110.7 million to the IMF Trust Fund.20 By the end of 2005, contributions
pledged by member countries amounted to U.S.$3,435 million and reserves stood
at U.S.$2,249 million.
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
BADEA cumulative disbursements from 1974 to 2003 totaled U.S.$1.4 billion,
in addition to Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa commitments of U.S.$214.2 mil-
lion.21 There has been an upward trend in annual commitments in recent years,
rising from U.S.$95.6 million in 1997 to U.S.$140 million in 2003. Its lending
has concentrated on infrastructure (51.7 percent), agricultural and rural develop-
ment (28.4 percent), and to a lesser extent, energy (6.9 percent) and other sectors.
Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment and Development (AAAID)
and Arab Organization for Agricultural Development (AOAD)
The Arab League has created two specialized agricultural institutions. AAAID
was founded in 1974, with the aim of promoting investment in the agricultural
sector. Its paid-up capital at the end of 2003 is U.S.$340 million. It has
invested U.S.$383 million in the sector, comprising U.S.$157 million in loans
and U.S.$226 million in equity participation.22 AOAD was created in 1972. Its
mission is to provide technical assistance, database information, and scientific
knowledge on Arab agricultural sectors.
Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (IAIGC)
The decision to create this institution was taken in 1970, but it did not come into
operation until 1975. Its paid-up capital at the end of 2004 was U.S.$122.5 mil-
lion, with reserves of U.S.$178.8 million.23 The institution provides insurance
cover for inter-Arab investment and export credits. In spite of its limited resources,
the institution is quite efficient.
By 2004, the IAIGC had signed forty-seven guarantee contracts with a total
value of U.S.$134.6 million. It had a portfolio of current contracts worth
19. For the full breakdown of disbursements, see www.opecfund.org/projects_operations/
grant_operations.aspx.
20. www.opecfund.org/about/about.aspx.
21. OPEC Fund for International Development (2004).
22. www.aaaid.org/english/financial_situations.htm.
23. www.iaigc.org/index_e.html.
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U.S.$266.1 million at the end of 2004, 36.3 percent of which was for invest-
ment guarantees and 63.7 percent for export credit guarantees.24
It produces several annual publications, including an annual report entitled
“Investment Climate in the Arab Countries.” This report contains a detailed
review of investment trends in each Arab country and of any new legal or insti-
tutional change beneficial or detrimental to the investment climate. It also mon-
itors inter-Arab investments.
Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development 
Organizations (AGFUND)
This very special regional institution was created by Prince Talal Bin Abdul Aziz
Al Saud in 1981, with the support of the leaders of the Arab Gulf states, who
are its members and contribute its budget. AGFUND supports sustainable
development efforts of every type, targeting the neediest groups in all develop-
ing countries. Support beneficiaries are NGOs, which receive their funding
through projects arranged with UN specialized institutions: the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the United
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and others.
Cumulative commitments totaled U.S.$237.8 million at the end of 2003,
and cumulative disbursements totaled U.S.$198 million for 925 projects in 
131 different countries. Health projects represented 23.5 percent of total assis-
tance; capacity building, 36.3 percent; education, 15 percent; and special devel-
opment, 25.2 percent.25
Other Pan-Arab Regional Financial Institutions
Three major official financial regional institutions promote private and equity
investment. The mandates of these institutions differ in their geographic and
sectoral focus. The Arab Investment Company is a pan-Arab joint stock com-
pany founded in 1974 and owned by seventeen Arab states, and more than 55 per-
cent of its U.S.$450 million paid-up capital has been subscribed by the Gulf
oil-exporting countries. It has been established to take equity holdings in eco-
nomically viable projects in any Arab country.26
The Gulf Investment Corporation was founded in 1983 with authorized capi-
tal of U.S.$2.1 billion, subscribed by the six GCC member states. Disbursed
24. Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation (2005).
25. OPEC Fund for International Development (2004).
26. www.taic.com/company.htm.
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capital and shareholder equity is U.S.$1 billion. GIC has established a diversified
portfolio of equity holdings in different companies in its member countries.27
In 1975 the Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation (APICORP) was also
created as an inter-Arab joint stock company with capital contributed by the Arab
oil-exporting countries in the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
APICORP has been set up to support hydrocarbon and energy-related industries
in Arab countries by means of equity financing or medium-term loans. Its autho-
rized capital is U.S.$1.2 billion, and its disbursed capital is U.S.$550 million.28
In addition, two regional financial institutions play an important technical role
that should be enhanced in the future to serve as a catalyst for developing Arab
financial markets. One is the Union of Arab Banks, created in 1977, with its head-
quarters in Beirut, Lebanon, and a membership that includes all major Arab banks.
The union organizes technical seminars on all banking-related topics (Cooke ratio,
combating money laundering, electronic banking, credit cards, and others). The
other is the more recently created Union of Arab Stock Exchanges, with a man-
date to promote links between the various Arab stock markets. Its headquarters is
also in Beirut, and it organizes seminars and workshops on technical issues.
Conclusion: Increasing the Efficiency of Regional Arab
Arrangements and Institutions
There is no lack of arrangements and institutions in the Arab region to promote
regional cooperation and support greater efficiency in the Arab economies within
the globalization context. Rather, efforts have been scattered among a plethora of
different institutions with overlapping mandates of varying regional scope. This
was the result of the highly specific economic and political circumstances that
affected the region. The level of funding provided by the various institutions
has also been heavily dependent on fluctuations in oil prices, and it is crucial to
find additional funding sources to reduce this dependency in the future.
In spite of all the regional financial cooperation efforts in place, it has to be
acknowledged that the region’s economic performance has been weak in com-
parison with that in other regions in the world, in particular the Southeast Asian
economies. Until recently, this weak performance stemmed in part from the
steady decline in oil prices and the Arab economies’ overall dependence on oil
exports. It is also the result of structural economic problems affecting the region
and, in particular, falling productivity deriving from increasing dependence on
27. www.gulfinvestmentcorp.com/about.htm.
28. www.apicorp-arabia.com.
10101-10_Ch10_Redo.qxd  10/5/06  3:09 PM  Page 314
the arab experience 315
the oil sector and the concentration of domestic investment on the real estate
and energy-related sectors.29
The Arab network of regional development institutions and arrangements is
striving to improve the technical and financial services it provides to the Arab and
other regions. However, these institutions should be more aggressive in tackling the
main obstacles described in this chapter. The following lines of action could pro-
vide a basis for future reforms of regional financial arrangements in the Arab region.
Tapping Resources from Domestic and International Financial Markets to
Reduce Oil-Price Dependency and Increase Lending and Grant Assistance
The funding capacity of national and regional Arab financial institutions is
highly reliant on contributions from the main rich oil-exporting countries. The
level of these contributions, especially for national funds to support other Arab
and developing countries, is dependent on the highly volatile oil receipts of
donor countries, particularly as those receipts affect bilateral aid and country
contributions to the capital of regional institutions.
To lessen this dependence and increase their capacity to fund new types of
activities and reforms needed for more sustainable growth, Arab institutions should
begin to tap domestic and regional financial markets. While regional development
institutions in Latin America and Asia are tapping their domestic and foreign capital
markets to increase their lending capacity, no Arab development institution has ever
attempted to do so in domestic or foreign capital markets. This ought to be a very
feasible solution, especially in view of the solvency of the main state contributors
to the capital of these institutions. The positive sharp upturn in oil prices in recent
years has consolidated this solvency after it was eroded by the invasion of Kuwait
in 1990 and the successive years of high budget deficit in Saudi Arabia owing to
decline and low oil prices during the period 1982 to 1999. The Saudi budget now
has a surplus and the domestic debt has been reduced, while the state of Kuwait
has been able to reconstitute the foreign assets of its Future Generation Fund.
No matter how willing “rich” Arab governments are to increase their share in
the subscribed capital of these institutions, the time would seem ripe for govern-
ments sitting on the institutions’ boards to introduce a legal mechanism to
allow the institutions to tap financial markets, as other regional or multilateral
institutions have been successful in doing.
Domestic capital markets are still in need of deepening, which they could
achieve by issuing high-quality bonds. Although most Arab equity markets,
mainly in the Gulf region and in a few other Arab countries, have been booming
29. On this point see Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (2003 and 2004).
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because of higher oil prices, bond markets are still very narrow and not properly
institutionalized. If regional institutions were to issue prime quality bonds, it
could give a very welcome boost to these markets.
In fact, Arab domestic capital markets are still very narrow in comparison
with emerging markets in Asia or Latin America. In spite of the huge financial
assets of individuals, private and public banks, and financial institutions, the
region still has no real regional financial market. In the future, the various pan-
Arab financial institutions could play a major role in deepening and enlarging
capital markets in the region.
Rationalizing the Institutional Network and Improving 
Its Operational Efficiency
There is certainly room for merging institutions. Surely BADEA should be
merged with the Islamic Development Bank in order to remove the duplication
of effort between the two institutions with respect to Africa.
Another useful topic of discussion is the need to pool regional resources ear-
marked for the Arab region, as these are scattered among national, regional, and
multilateral funds. Should all regional development lending be conducted
through one institution, for example, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social
Development? In this case, the IsDB could specialize in lending to non-Arab
countries, while the AFESD would become the sole development lender to the
Arab region. Another alternative might be for the IsDB to entrust “Arabic win-
dow” operations to the AFESD, which it would continue to fund.
Of course, these are very thorny issues, because no institution would agree
lightly to have its mandate revised or its bureaucracy merged with another.
However, it goes without saying that beneficiary entities in Arab countries
should also become more efficient in order to make more effective and speedier
use of these institutions’ financial resources.
Concentrating Funding on the Most Strategic Bottlenecks
Most Arab economies could be characterized as rent economies, with oil being
the main determinant of GDP growth for both oil-exporting and non-oil-
exporting countries. Non-oil exporters have in fact developed a dependence on
financial resources from oil exporters, either as grants and aid or as migrant
remittances. For this group of countries, the amount of ODA from “rich” Arab
countries and from Arab agencies, in addition to workers’ remittances from oil-
exporting countries, constitutes a major growth variable.
Other factors explaining the lack of productivity include the fact that the
educational sector is not linked with the needs of local economies, and the 
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unemployment rate is very high in the entire region, affecting mainly the younger
generation. At the same time, Arabian Peninsula countries import a substantial
number of foreign workers, while unemployment is growing among their own
nationals; there are very large numbers of immigrants from the Indian subconti-
nent and other Arab countries.
The private sector lacks competitiveness because it does not spend on research
and development (R&D) and on quality control of its products; domestic markets
continue to be controlled by a few large family groups that extend their business
horizontally, but not vertically. The informal sector, which is a major source of
employment, is not encouraged to modernize and develop to enable it to be inte-
grated into the modern segment of the economy by means of subcontracting, licens-
ing, or franchising. This is why the value-added component of GDP is still very
low. All this has led to a continual brain drain that undermines the productivity of
Arab economies. In addition, workers’ salaries in the private sector are not compet-
itive with salaries in other regions of the world, such as Asia and Central Europe.
There is a general lack of governance and transparency in the public sector
and in relations between the private and public sectors, which encourages cor-
ruption and the resultant high transaction costs. An additional stimulus to cor-
ruption is very low public sector salaries in low-income Arab countries.
A lack of productivity and innovation in the Arab economies creates more
unemployment or disguised unemployment, fueling the brain drain still further.
This creates a vicious circle that is not easy to break without substantial changes
in economic policies.
While these interlinked bottlenecks persist, no sharp increase in intraregional
trade is likely. If the network of Arab and Arab-based official financial institu-
tions can be reshaped to make it more efficient, it will be easier to clear the main
economic bottlenecks. The focus should be on the need for more financial sup-
port for R&D, economic innovation, human resource training, linkages between
the educational system and the private sector, and other ways to improve produc-
tivity in Arab economies and increase private sector competitive capacity on both
domestic and international markets.
The trend to supply SMEs with sufficient funding and improve the capacity
of the informal sector should be given a substantial boost. More collective efforts
are needed from the various national, regional, and multilateral institutions based
in the Arab region to curb the severe brain drain that is undermining the region.
The governors of the institutions that meet every year should review current
lending operations to set new priorities and new orientations for the develop-
ment assistance provided by the national and pan-Arab development institu-
tions within the region.
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Table 10A-2. Main Activity Indicators of Selected Arab 
and Arab-Based Agencies, 2003
Millions of U.S. dollars
Capital at end of 2003 Cumulative to end of 2003
Agency Subscribed Paid-up Commitments Disbursements
Arab Gulf Program for 251 251 238 198
United Nations
Development (AGFUND)a
Abu Dhabi Fund for 1,089 580 3,384 2,061
Development (ADFD)
Arab Bank for Economic 1,500 1,500 2,197 1,387
Development in
Africa (BADEA)
Arab Fund for Economic 2,714 2,280 15,492 9,502
and Social Development
(AFESD)
Kuwait Fund for Arab 6,600 6,600 12,400 9,836
Economic Development
(KFAED)
OPEC Fund for International 3,435 2,920 6,896 4,588
Development (OPEC Fund)
Arab Trade Financing 500 500 3,984b 3,505b
Program (ATFP)
Islamic Development 9,912 4,050 34,244 23,784
Bank (IsDB)
Saudi Fund for Development 8,267 8,267 6,473.80 5,276.86
(SFD)
Source: Arab National and Regional Development Institutions 2004, OPEC Fund for International
Development. For Arab Trade Financing Program (ATFP), see www.Atfp.Org.Ae/English/Report/
Eng2004.Pdf.
a. Paid-in capital + reserves.
b. In 2004.
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Since the early 1990s there has been renewed interest among African nations indeveloping financial and monetary cooperation arrangements that help to
strengthen their own financial institutions and complement their efforts to reach
out to a rapidly globalizing world. The new arrangements are intended to help
improve not only the mobilization of resources, both domestic and foreign, but
also the regulation of institutions in order to avert crises in financial and exchange
rate systems. The realization that strong financial systems are important in provid-
ing access to greater financial resources from more varied sources, particularly as
countries pursue macroeconomic reforms, is certainly now more widespread.
This new interest is not surprising, considering that one of the most signifi-
cant developments in global finance has been the growth in capital flows
between industrialized and developing economies, although this has eluded
Africa. Africa’s share of the significantly expanded private capital flows to devel-
oping countries averaged only 1.6 percent in the period 1992–2002. There are
also indications that private capital flow to Africa slowed down in the wake of
the East Asian crisis, even though this was considered to be far less significant
than the slowdown in East Asia (see figures 11-1 and 11-2). These developments
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Figure 11-1. Net Private Capital Flows, 1970–2003
Billions of U.S. dollars
Source: Generated from World Bank (2005, CD-ROM).
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have been partially blamed on the fragility of financial markets in the region,
despite financial sector reforms in many countries.1
The interest in greater financial and monetary cooperation for the purpose
of enhancing resource flows and regulating such flows is partially linked to the
turmoil that the world saw in the 1990s, resulting from the financial crises in
Asia and other parts of the world. The crises led to discussions on a new inter-
national financial architecture, based on strengthening the surveillance of
financial markets through requirements for greater transparency and informa-
tion flow; strengthening financial regulation and supervision; assisting coun-
tries to overcome difficulties in implementing international standards and
regulations through capacity building; improving liability management by bor-
rowers; discouraging dogma in exchange rate determination; sharing responsi-
bility for crisis resolution among private creditors, the international community,
and debtor authorities; and finally a number of measures for dealing with emer-
gencies, including the imposition of reserve requirements on short-term capital
flows, withholding taxes on such short-term inflows, and expanding country
reserves. The new architecture also calls for greater transparency in the func-
tions of international financial institutions. While the new measures are gener-
ally regarded as essential for bringing sanity to the operations of financial
markets and limiting the occurrence of crises, it is not clear whether such mea-
sures necessarily attract and sustain private capital.
The emergence of European Monetary Union (EMU) has raised considerable
interest in the development of similar arrangements in parts of Africa.2 Thus,
beyond the issue of finding their proper place in the international financial archi-
tecture, subregional integration bodies have considered financial cooperation as
part of a broader framework for achieving greater regional integration, including
greater monetary cooperation. In West Africa, for example, the medium- to
long-term aim of the monetary cooperation program, adopted in 1987 by the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was to achieve con-
vertibility of West African currencies and create a single currency by the year
2000. What has been achieved so far is much more modest. The West African
Clearing House (WACH) has been transformed into the West African Monetary
Agency (WAMA); a credit-guarantee fund for the WAMA clearing and pay-
ments mechanism has been introduced; and West African travelers’ checks have
been issued since late 1998. Further progress in achieving a common currency
has been constrained by the severe macroeconomic conditions in member states.
financial and monetary cooperation in africa 331
1. See Aryeetey and Senbet (1999).
2. Honohan and Lane (2000).
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One objective of the newly established East African Cooperation Agreement
is to create a common market, subsequently a monetary union, and ultimately a
political federation. Achieving these goals is predicated on progress in policy
harmonization, macroeconomic stability, and infrastructure development. It has
not moved as fast as the West African nations on the monetary cooperation
front. The treaty steered clear of customs union and common market issues,
having only two articles on safeguards.
Financial and monetary cooperation in southern Africa is dominated by the
role of South Africa, which drives both the regional currency areas in the Com-
mon Monetary Area (CMA) and the Southern African Development Commu-
nity (SADC). Indeed, there are various regional integration initiatives involving
the southern African region, each with its own action program. The declaration
and treaty establishing the SADC in 1992 does not specifically refer to a regional
currency area. However, monetary integration is generally considered in the
region to be one way in which economic integration could be furthered, culmi-
nating in the creation of a regional monetary union. For the moment, however,
monetary integration in SADC may be regarded as a long-term objective, and
not as urgent as in West Africa.
While different parts of Africa may be moving at different speeds toward
financial and monetary cooperation, there have been a number of assessments of
how such arrangements relate to similar developments in other parts of the
world. Following the introduction of the euro, Honohan and Lane analyzed the
prospects for greater monetary integration in Africa in the wake of European
Monetary Union. They argued that, even though the structural characteristics
of African economies are quite different from those of European economies,
much could be gained from monetary cooperation, with the European Union
acting as an external agency of restraint and to promote stability in the financial
sector. They conceded, however, that one should not expect too much from
such arrangements. They observed that there was little evidence of contagious
attacks on African currencies requiring the coordination of exchange rate poli-
cies. Also, economies of scale in the prudential regulation of financial systems
could be achieved through international cooperation, without the need for a
common currency. They also suggested that the same was true of enhanced risk-
pooling through the financial system. Finally, their study concludes that though
the European Monetary Union has only a marginal impact on the net benefits
of monetary cooperation, the euro would be a natural anchor for any African
monetary union, especially if the United Kingdom and the pound sterling were
to join the European Monetary Union, strongly promoting the idea that “the
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most likely route to new monetary cooperation in Africa is through a common
peg to the euro.”3
Considering the various pressures and dynamics for financial and monetary
cooperation in Africa, this chapter discusses the scope of such moves and the
experiences of different parts of the region. The aim is to draw attention to fac-
tors underlying current initiatives in the region and to assess their prospects for
achieving set objectives. The next section discusses various expectations of
regional financial cooperation arrangements. The chapter then discusses African
experiences of regional financial and monetary cooperation; this review looks at
the different types of cooperation arrangements and how they are linked to the
structure of financial markets. Finally, the chapter assesses the outcomes of
cooperation efforts and looks at the potential for enhanced financial and mone-
tary cooperation in parts of Africa.
Expectations of Financial and Monetary Cooperation in Africa
The discussion of financial and monetary cooperation may be linked to the con-
cept of optimal currency areas, even though it is possible to achieve considerable
cooperation in the absence of such a union. The literature on optimal currency
areas is relevant because African countries’ search for additional financial
resources from global sources and the need to protect themselves against any
adverse side effects makes it important to bolster confidence in their currencies.
In the past, the search for confidence boosters often led them to align their cur-
rencies with one of the major world currencies, usually the U.S. dollar. However,
current understanding of the short- and long-term consequences of monetary
and exchange rate policies has grown remarkably, while there has been a trend
toward greater independence among monetary authorities around the world.
This has improved confidence in many currencies, to the extent that the decision
on which currency a country should align with is becoming less influenced by
concerns about confidence. In the absence of concerns about confidence, the
thinking regarding currency alignments revolves around the fundamental eco-
nomic natures of the different economies. The old saying that “birds of a feather
flock together” is today reflected in many of the financial and monetary cooper-
ation attempts being made throughout Africa. How can countries with similar
interests support one another? What figure 11-3 shows is that the flow of private
3. Honohan and Lane (2002, p. 1).
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capital to African countries was patchy in the 1990s, hence the search for a more
level playing field.
In light of the above expectations, cooperation within a currency union can
be considered from four main angles, depending on the extent to which:
—the cooperation arrangement fosters the development of an agency of
restraint to the government;
—the arrangement deepens the financial system;
—the arrangement reduces the probability of speculative pressures;
—the arrangement leads to the international integration of economies.
The issue of developing an agency of restraint for African countries first
gained prominence following the work of Collier and Gunning, who suggested
that many of the past ills of African economies were caused by bad policies
resulting from unrestrained fiscal programs in many countries, and by the fact
that no internal agencies existed to restrain governments. They then argued that
an integration arrangement with Northern partners would generate broad gains
from global liberalization. Such a union is also expected to enhance the credibil-
ity of African economic liberalization and generate the desired investment
inflows. They further argued that integration with the North has incorporated
effective sanctions, which current African regional arrangements have not. This
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Figure 11-3. Net Private Capital Flows, 1980–2001
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is because they guard against policy reversals.4 In this arrangement, the Euro-
pean Union acts as the agency of restraint for African economies. Thus, the dis-
cussion has focused largely on external agencies of restraint that may not have
similar structural characteristics but may have a common interest. This is cer-
tainly quite different from an external agency of restraint built around a collec-
tive of similar economies.
Regarding the deepening of financial systems, Senbet points to the increasing
need for and interest in linking financial institutions on a regional basis. The
lack of depth in financial systems is shown in table 11-1. Senbet has argued that
one way to address the thinness and illiquidity of African capital markets is for
the various countries to pool resources for regional cooperation in banking and
capital market development. Properly functioning markets can position a coun-
try competitively in markets for global capital. This promotes the inflow of
international capital and subjects a country to international discipline. Further-
more, accessing global markets for capital reduces reliance on foreign aid. The
regionalization of African stock markets is expected to enhance mobilization of
both domestic and global financial resources to fund regional companies, while
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Table 11-1. Money and Quasi Money (M2) as a Percentage of Gross Domestic
Product, 1980–2001
Country 1980 1990 2000 2001
Benin 17 24 29.9 31.0
Botswana 26 26 26.8 31.7
Cameroon 21 23 17.3 18.3
Côte d’Ivoire 27 29 21.8 24.1
Ethiopia n.a. 37 41.3 45.2
Ghana 16 13 26.8 17.4
Kenya 30 27 43.1 39.3
Malawi 18 18 16.8 15.5
Mozambique n.a. 40 30.4 30.7
Nigeria 24 19 24.8 28.6
Senegal 27 23 25.4 26.5
South Africa 50 54 56.2 59.7
Tanzania n.a. 19 19.2 20.0
Uganda 13 6 16.9 16.5
Zambia 28 20 24.1 21.0
Zimbabwe 31 28 24.8 36.4
Source: World Bank (1998, 2003).
n.a. Not available.
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injecting more liquidity into the markets.5 For this to work, the tax treatment of
investments must be harmonized, since tax policy is an important incentive or
disincentive for both issuers and investors. Ultimately, regulations and account-
ing reporting systems, along with clearance, settlement, and depository systems,
should conform to international standards. The establishment of regional secu-
rities and exchange commissions, regional self-regulatory organizations, regional
committees to promote the harmonization of legal and regulatory schemes, and
coordinated monetary arrangements (for example, via currency zones) are some
of the mechanisms for such financial integration.
Honohan and Lane suggest that the regionalization of banking could offer
some potential for risk reduction through “better international diversification of
loan portfolios.”6 The internationalization of the banking sector is seen as an
effective way of minimizing vulnerability to financial crises, as multicountry
banks are perceived to be more diversified and less vulnerable to a downturn in
any one country.
With respect to containing speculative pressures, it is the view of Honohan
and Lane that, as African economies are not on the radar of the world’s holders of
private capital, they are not in much danger of being swamped by speculative
attacks. They point out that one reason why African countries may suffer from
contagion is that the financial system is largely dependent on European banks, a
fact that ensures that the banks are likely to view different countries in the same
way and that may lead to countries’ being treated similarly even when this is
unnecessary. Nevertheless, there is little evidence of exchange rates’ being the sub-
ject of contagion. Were the likelihood of contagion to be high, a monetary coop-
eration arrangement could be expected to have both negative and positive effects.
There is also little evidence that the creation of monetary cooperation arrange-
ments will eventually lead to greater economic and political integration. While a
number of African countries appear to be pursuing greater degrees of financial
and monetary cooperation, particularly in West Africa, with a view to accelerat-
ing the process of regional integration, the experience of other areas tends to be
the reverse, as in the European Union.
While expectations differ on how much cooperation arrangements may
achieve, there have been only a few technical analyses of the likely outcomes of
such arrangements. In analyzing the cost and benefit of the common monetary
area in South Africa, Grandes applied a two-step econometric approach based on
the theory of generalized purchasing power parity (G-PPP).7 This study empha-
5. Senbet (1998).
6. Honohan and Lane (2000, p. 14).
7. See Grandes (2003).
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sized two aspects of the monetary integration process in southern Africa in the
light of G-PPP theory and determined whether the monetary area, including
Botswana, constituted an optimal currency area in the classic sense. He con-
cluded that the area formed an optimal currency area, given the existence of
common long-term trends in their bilateral real exchange rates. He also observed
that further macro efficiency gains could be made if the countries went all the
way and developed a full monetary union. This was because there was evidence
of similar production structures, higher output correlation, and risk-hedging pos-
sibilities, and peripheral countries were able to resort to South Africa’s capital
markets and overdraft facilities at the reserve bank. However, the difficulties that
had to be overcome were: a degree of divergence in terms-of-trade shocks, lack of
export diversification, and the predominance of interindustrial trade patterns.
Other relevant works on optimal currency areas for Africa include a paper by
Anyanwu.8 He estimated the macroeconomic effect of monetary unions on
trade and output and suggested that a monetary union is beneficial to bilateral
trade and economic growth. In his study, he used panel economic indicators for
individual West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) members,
as well as non-WAEMU ECOWAS counterparts, to determine whether mone-
tary union brought price, output, fiscal, and trade stabilization during the
period 1990–2001. The panel data contained both a time component and a
cross-sectional component, in a bid to determine the magnitude of expected
change in one country as a result of a unit change in any variable. The results
suggested that economic growth stability was greater in WAEMU countries
than in non-WAEMU countries during the analysis period, but the same was not
observed for inflation. Inflation instability in the WAEMU region was greater
than in the non-WAEMU region. He suggested that more work needed to be
done in the areas of price stability, fiscal discipline, and intraregional trade to
make union meaningful. He also suggested that important benefits from mone-
tary union could come through central bank credibility.
African Financial and Monetary Cooperation Experiences
In view of continuing difficulty with financial management in a number of
countries, despite reform, it is not surprising that countries should seek refuge
in supranational arrangements. Indeed, arrangements for achieving financial
and monetary cooperation among different countries in Africa date back as far
as colonial days. These cooperation arrangements were widespread in both the
8. Anyanwu (2003).
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French and British colonies, and much of what we see today is derived from
those early experiences.
Financial and Monetary Cooperation in West Africa
Financial and monetary cooperation among many ECOWAS countries started
long before postindependence economic integration efforts began in the sub-
region.9 Because the arrangements were originally driven by administrative con-
venience and seigniorage considerations,10 exchange rate policy and fiscal restraint
were not an issue. An essential component of colonial economic arrangements was
the institution of an orderly financial and monetary system. In British West
Africa, following legislation that effectively established a common currency,11
the monetary policy of the four colonies was administered by the West African
Currency Board (WACB), which was established in 1912 and had its headquarters
in London. The currency board was established among others to provide for
and to control the supply of currency in the British West African Colonies, Pro-
tectorates and Trust Territories. In practice, however, WACB was no more than
an automatic money-exchange organization issuing as much local currency as
the banks wanted to buy for sterling, and vice versa. It definitely did not function
as a monetary authority, and its effectiveness as a currency board has been ques-
tioned.12 Uche also argued that the prime motivation for its creation was to facil-
itate greater efficiency in the management of the financial affairs of the colonies:
“It made economic sense to administer these geographically proximate colonies
through one currency board which was headquartered in London. Inter colony
integration therefore could only have been an incidental benefit of the currency
board system and not its objective.”13
Commercial banking in British West Africa was also developed along regional
cooperative lines, cutting across country borders. This led to the establishment
of the Bank of British West Africa as the first bank in the region. The bank
9. ECOWAS embraces over 200 million people in all fifteen states of West Africa, ten of which
have parallel allegiances to other groupings, and (until 1999) Mauritania. Thus the now dormant
Mano River Union (MRU) embraced Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone; the erstwhile West African
Economic Community (WAEC) comprised Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, and Senegal; and the remaining six ECOWAS states (Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Nigeria, and Togo) belonged to no other grouping until Guinea-Bissau and Togo joined
other French-speaking countries and the members of the Mano River Union to establish WAEMU
in 1994.
10. Honohan and Lane (2000, p. 6).
11. The British colonial currency was pegged to, and fully backed by, the pound sterling, and
the currency board was modeled on the currency arrangements in the British Bank Act of 1844.
12. Honohan and Lane (2000).
13. Uche (2001, p. 6).
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maintained offices in all four colonies, where it adopted similar administrative
and operational policies. Uche argues that the fact that only modest economic
exchanges occurred in these colonies is an indicator that the subregional institu-
tions were not designed for this purpose.
With political independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the role of the WACB
system began to change. Governments adopted a more interventionist and
nationalistic ideology, and having a national currency became a symbol of sov-
ereignty. This led most participants to abandon the currency board arrange-
ment. Various countries began to establish their own central banks. The first to
pull out was Ghana in 1957, followed by Nigeria in 1959. Sierra Leone and
Gambia, however, operated their own currency board–type arrangement for a
few more years, and in 1971 Gambia was the last African country to abandon
the sterling peg. Honohan and Lane have documented the extensive use of
national central banks to finance government budgets in the early postindepen-
dence years, completely unrestrained by the usual regulations of central banks.14
More recent integration efforts in the English-speaking part of the subregion
have been driven by the ECOWAS agenda. Thus, as in other parts of Africa,
West Africa’s experience with formal regional integration has been largely
driven by the desire to overcome the constraint of small economic size, which
was hampering their ability to industrialize efficiently, by extending the logic of
protected and state-led economic development to a larger number of countries.
Indeed, the preamble to the 1975 ECOWAS Treaty noted that the community
was being created in view of the overriding need to accelerate, foster, and
encourage the economic and social development of member states in order to
improve the living standards of their peoples.15 ECOWAS saw regional integra-
tion as a multistep process eventually leading to a customs union and later to a
common market integrating states in the West African subregion politically and
culturally. Both the original treaty and the subsequently revised 1992 version
(complemented by more than thirty protocols and supplementary protocols)
include initiatives to promote cooperation and development in industry, trans-
port, telecommunications and energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce,
and monetary and financial matters, as well as social and cultural affairs. The
principal areas of operation have been:
—expanding the regional market;
—harmonizing agricultural and industrial policies through production 
integration;
14. Honohan and Lane (2000).
15. ECOWAS (1975).
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—ensuring the harmonious integration of physical infrastructure;
—promoting monetary and financial integration to facilitate trade;
—maintaining regional peace, stability, and security; and
—ensuring free movement of persons, including rights of residence and
establishment.
Although the creation of a West African Monetary Union has been high on
the ECOWAS agenda since its inception in 1975, owing to the length of time
required to achieve that objective, some West African countries have considered
forming a second monetary zone, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
under the umbrella of ECOWAS. The creation of WAMZ is seen as a possible
means of accelerating the formation of a unified West African Monetary Union.
Monetary cooperation is very important to ECOWAS members that are not in
the CFA franc (le franc des Colonies Françaises d’Afrique) zone because their
French-speaking counterparts with a common currency are perceived to be rela-
tively stable and intraregional trade in that region is also seen to be more exten-
sive than in the rest of the ECOWAS region.
A timetable was set for a group of countries—Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria,
Guinea, and Sierra Leone—to meet the policy convergence criteria set for the
union. These conditions are economic stability, budgetary discipline, an infla-
tion rate of no more than 5 percent, and a healthy foreign exchange reserve;
once these were met, it was anticipated that monetary union would be intro-
duced by July 2005. There are also ongoing efforts to set up institutions, such as
the convergence council, technical committees, and the West African Monetary
Institute.
While some believed that the varying socioeconomic conditions that exist in
the different countries will make it difficult for the member countries to attain
an inflation level of under 5 percent and also to build enough foreign exchange
reserves, others thought that these could be achieved by the end of 2004, thus
paving the way for a common currency (the eco) to be introduced. Table 11-2
shows the status of the convergence criteria at the start of the endeavor. All of
the countries in the second monetary zone satisfied the criterion of central bank
financing of the budget deficit at the end of 2000, and all of the countries except
Ghana met the inflation conditions. For many, the budget deficit/GDP ratio
and the gross foreign currency reserve conditions were difficult to meet. Only
Nigeria succeeded. The countries also found it more difficult to meet the more
stringent secondary convergence criteria. By 2004, the countries’ ability to
achieve the convergence criteria had worsened significantly. Ogunkola suggested
that, even if all the convergence criteria were met, it was still doubtful that a sta-
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ble regional currency area would be achieved, given that economic restructuring
was a long-term endeavor.16
Interestingly, even though the planned single currency for the zone is to serve
the interests of local people and the business community, there is little public
education on the subject. The current flurry of activity to speed up implementa-
tion of a common currency for West Africa suggests that this may be an area in
which policymakers are prepared to relax their opposition to the “variable geom-
etry” approach suggested by Collier and Gunning.17 Opposition to the approach
was based on the belief that it ran counter to the principles and ideals of the
African Economic Community, namely equality of nations and shared purpose
in integration. The fear was that variable geometry could lead to the exclusion of
some countries and to the division of the continent into subregions dominated
by external influences. The creation of WAEMU was seen as one such example.
While supporters have referred to it as an attempt to quicken the pace of mone-
tary union, opponents consider it more as a tool to serve sectional interests.18
Trends in the CFA franc zone. The early experience of French-speaking West
African countries was not too different from that of their English-speaking
counterparts. Under French colonial rule, the colonies were organized under
one colonial administration into a federation. France issued currencies in each
colony, and these were firmly pegged to the French franc. The currencies were
later consolidated into the CFA franc, issued by the Central Bank for Overseas
Table 11-2. The State of Primary Convergence Criteria, 2000
Budget deficit/ Central bank financing  Gross reserves/  
GDP ratio, Inflation of budget deficit/ annual Number
excluding grants rate year-1 tax revenue imports of criteria
Country (percent) (percent) (percent) in months satisfied
Benchmark ≤5 percent <10 percent ≤10 percent ≥3 months
Gambia 3.84 0.80 0.00 2.94 3
Ghana 10.74 40.50 8.20 0.53 1
Guinea 5.99 7.20 6.20 1.15 2
Nigeria 1.88 6.90 0.00 4.30 4
Sierra Leone 17.30 −2.75 1.87 1.26 2
Source: West African Monetary Institute.
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France (Caisse Centrale de la France d’Outre Mer). In setting up the franc zone
in western Africa, the objectives of the monetary authorities included achieving:
convertibility into French francs at a fixed parity; free capital mobility through-
out the zone; pooling of most foreign exchange reserves at the French Treasury;
the establishment of a common trade and financial policy toward the rest of the
world; and guaranteed convertibility by France through the establishment of
“operations accounts” for each colonial central bank with the French Treasury.19
For most of the pre-independence period, many of these colonies remained
only marginally autonomous within a French West African federation. The
degree of economic integration among them remained somewhat higher than
among English-speaking countries in the same region. With political indepen-
dence in 1960, however, some barriers to trade and to the movement of factors
of production began to emerge. Manu has argued that several attempts to form a
pan-francophone body in the region failed largely because France opposed the
formation of a strong federation in the region over which it had little influence.20
In the view of Uche, it was “not surprising that all the regional bodies that
emerged in the post-independence francophone zone of the 1960s were either
loose affiliations or simply non-functional.”21 These included the political asso-
ciation called Union Africaine et Malgache (UAM), which was established in
1961, and later became the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache
(OCAM). Membership was open to all French-speaking African countries that
had signed cooperation agreements with France. Uche also describes the Union
Douaniere des Etats de l’Afrique Occidentale (UDAO) as ineffective.22 This
customs union comprised Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal,
Mali, and Mauritania. Their objective was to redistribute the customs duties
that the coastal states collected on transit trade with landlocked members.23
Uche, and also Honohan and Lane, have argued that France was not particu-
larly interested in promoting intraregional trade among French-speaking West
African countries, and therefore did nothing to facilitate it: “It was more inter-
ested in promoting its own trade with the various francophone countries in the
region.”24 And this is seen as having motivated France to support the establish-
ment of the Central Bank of West African States (Banque Central des Etats de
19. Boughton (1991, pp. 1–2).
20. See Manu (1989).
21. Uche (2001, p. 10).
22. Uche (1999).
23. See Bach (1983).
24. Uche (2001, p. 10); see also Honohan and Lane (2000).
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l’Afrique de l’Ouest, BCEAO) in 1962. The creation of BCEAO eliminated
currency restrictions in the trade of French-speaking countries with France.
The regional central bank for the Central African Zone is the Bank for Central
African States (Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale, BEAC). It was established
in 1972 with the sole purpose of issuing currency. Like BCEAO (the central bank
for the eight West African countries), BEAC was to maintain a fixed exchange
rate with the French franc and manage monetary policy, consisting of credit
controls, while currency convertibility was, and still is, guaranteed through an
“operations account” with the French Treasury.
Strikingly, all three integration organizations in West Africa (English- and
French-speaking) have promoted quite similar projects to advance their objec-
tives, including the establishment of institutions for human development, agri-
cultural and industrial development, and monetary cooperation. Despite a
certain commonality of purpose—liberalizing intra-area trade and achieving
other forms of cooperation—there has been very little effective coordination
among them. Considering the significant overlap in both goals and activities, it is
surprising that member countries found it necessary to maintain a multiplicity of
institutions. Explanations include the “French factor” (that is, the desire of suc-
cessive Paris governments to support organizations that grouped their former
colonies in the region), as well as a lack of confidence by individual countries in
the capacity of such institutions to protect their interests.25 In a sense, it has
been a case of seeking double assurance without paying a higher premium.
In fact, recent developments in financial and monetary cooperation are an out-
come of recent trade integration experiences. In the 1980s, the survival of CEAO
as a regional trade body had come under serious threat, largely as a consequence
of the malfunctioning of existing trade arrangements. The institution of a prefer-
ential regional cooperation tax on manufactured exports from member countries
worked largely to the advantage of Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Since the compen-
sation mechanism did not work properly, the loss of revenue from member states
was considered to be a serious setback to the integration effort. The absence of
complementary industrial structures ensured that the number of industrial prod-
ucts registered under the regional cooperation tax hardly changed. The poor
functioning of the system of preferences and the inherent loss of revenue to sev-
eral members led to difficult fiscal situations in those states. By 1991, arrears to
the secretariat and to the compensation fund amounted to 45.5 billion CFA
francs, which was four times as much as the institutions’ combined budgets.26
25. Bundu (1997).
26. Bach (1997, p. 87).
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Governments used the banking system to finance these deficits. By the mid-
1980s, the banking system had almost ground to a halt owing to the nature of
its institutional mechanisms. Most of the banks were joint ventures between
national governments and one of four major banks based in France. Key senior
management was provided by French nationals seconded from the parent banks
in France. Although deposit mobilization has been low in the franc zone, funds
were secured from the two central banks, the Central Bank of West African
States and the Bank for Central African States. For years, governments in several
member states directly or indirectly pushed the banks into lending to state-
owned enterprises, or to regional and political groupings, or to some of the gov-
ernments’ own suppliers, who never paid. Although the central banks were freed
by statute from any fiscal pressure, they were forced to lend through commercial
banks to relieve fiscal needs. The two central banks acted as though they were
agents of the fiscal authorities and refinanced politically directed or govern-
ment-inspired bank lending that was never paid back. The majority of commer-
cial banks failed because they issued bad loans, although some were rescued
later. These and other problems contributed to the banking crises in the CFA
zone in the 1980s. Thus, by 1993 almost all of the countries in the zone were in
deep recession. Capital movements were blocked, and it became difficult to
effect current international payments.
The fiscal problems of member states continued, alongside growing pressure
from international financial institutions to carry out macroeconomic reforms in
the early 1990s and forge a joint program of activities to address the economic
crises without necessarily having to devalue the CFA franc. The resulting pro-
grams for budgetary and fiscal policy harmonization led to the institution of
several arrangements for regional banking commissions and the harmonization
of legislative and regulatory frameworks to govern economic and social activi-
ties, including social insurance and business law. The plan was to go further and
develop a single financial market, a regional stock exchange, and a free-trade
zone. Thus the preparatory work for launching WAEMU took place between
1991 and 1994. By 1994 a number of the institutions that had been agreed to
in Ouagadougou in 1991 had been established and had become operational, but
the idea of avoiding devaluation had to be abandoned in view of continuing
economic crises and increasing pressure from multilateral development agencies.
Thus, the 50 percent devaluation announcement was made on the eve of the
member states’ meeting, in Dakar in January 1994, to formalize into a treaty
institutional developments over the previous three years.
A regional financial market was created under the auspices of WAEMU to
comply with two main objectives: all actors in the regional financial market must
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have equal opportunities where they are located; and international standards
with respect to the settlement/delivery schedule, simultaneity of securities/cash
exchanges, and the distinction between operational, regulatory, and supervisory
functions must be complied with. To address these needs, the regional stock
exchange (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs Mobilières, BRVM) was established in
September 1998, and its eight regional branches were interconnected to the
headquarters and other institutions. Also, the Regional Savings and Capital Mar-
ket Board (Conseil Regional de l’Epargne Publique et des Marché Financiers)
was established and put in charge of supervising the regional stock exchange.
The regional stock exchange has two main components: a primary market that
deals with financial securities and a secondary market that deals with the liquidity
and mobility of securities already issued. The main products traded in the market
are bonds, debts, and negotiable debt instruments. The exchange is a private lim-
ited company with a capital base of U.S.$4.84 million, 87 percent of which is
owned by private businesspeople in the region and 13 percent by the member
states. The regional exchange has thirty-eight listed companies transferred from
the Abidjan stock exchange, with Ivorian companies dominating. The financial
market project was made possible in the WAEMU region because there was
already a highly integrated monetary and financial union built on harmonized
monetary and banking regulations, successful restructuring of the union’s finan-
cial sector, and a sustained effort to restructure the macroeconomic framework.
The formation of EMU was a significant factor in encouraging the CFA zone
countries to maintain their arrangement at the time of the 1994 devaluation.
The legacy of the French colonial system appears to have survived much longer
after independence than the British colonial system, and two franc-based mone-
tary unions in West Africa are still functioning, with most of the original mem-
bers remaining participants. Both BEAC and BCEAO are still in existence and
continue to develop their programs and instruments of monetary policy, finan-
cial sector integration, and capital market institutions. After the devaluation,
monetary policy moved from direct controls to market-based instruments, tak-
ing account of all relevant domestic and macroeconomic indicators. Direct
BEAC advances to governments were phased out in 2004, when the first Trea-
sury bills by governments were issued.27 So far, monetary policy has been effec-
tive in pushing inflation down in the subregion and interest rates are set by the
central bank.
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Financial and Monetary Cooperation in Eastern and Southern Africa
East Africa had a currency board very similar to the one in English-speaking
West Africa. In East Africa, the three core members retained the currency board
arrangement, with a common currency, until five years after independence. The
old monetary cooperation group (the East Africa Community, which existed
from 1960 to 1977) was made up of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. In the old
currency area, there was free circulation of the national currencies at par and
common external capital controls, as well as free movement of capital within the
union. However, the new East Africa Community was inaugurated in January
2001 to replace the one that collapsed in 1977, with the long-term objective of
forming a monetary union. Articles 94 and 97 of the treaty establishing the new
union relate to monetary cooperation and financial matters and maintaining the
convertibility of the various currencies. The new EAC is made up of the same
members as the old one, with the main objective being to establish a monetary
union and a unit of account for the community, known as the East African
Currency Unit.28
The Rand Monetary Area (RMA) dates back to 1910, when the South
African Customs Union (SACU) came into being. It was not established for-
mally until 1974, with South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland signing an agree-
ment on clearing arrangements, bank supervision, and the development of a
forward exchange market. Botswana withdrew from the rand zone in 1974
before the agreement was signed. The RMA was transformed into a common
monetary area in 1986.
Another cooperation arrangement worthy of note is the Southern African
Development Community (SADC). This regional cooperation group was formed
in the 1980s by nine countries in southern Africa, with the main objective of
making their economies less dependent on South Africa. Following indepen-
dence, Namibia joined the union in 1990, together with South Africa, after the
democratic election that led to the formation of a government of national unity
in 1994. SADC objectives include poverty alleviation and the maximum utiliza-
tion of regional resources.
The SADC financial and investment sector was formally established in 1995.
This common currency area includes South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia, and
Swaziland. South Africa was given responsibility for the management and devel-
opment of financial and investment protocol. There is a council of finance min-
isters under the chairmanship of the South African minister of finance, which
meets from time to time to give guidance to any program that will ensure closer
28. Ogunkola (2002).
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financial cooperation among the participating countries. There is also a com-
mittee of treasury officials and a committee of governors of central banks and
their officials with specific duties. A number of technical subcommittees and
working groups are also drawn from among the officials of SADC central banks
to work on specific projects. The committee of governors is required to encour-
age the establishment of sound and well-managed privately owned banking
institutions to provide financial services in a competitive environment.
The central banks’ responsibility has been restricted to the creation and
maintenance of a stable financial environment conducive to sustainable eco-
nomic growth and, in addition, they must protect the value of the currency.
The central bank governors are required to work jointly to develop interlinkable
national payments and clearing settlements systems for financial transactions
compatible with national systems, so as to provide more effective cross-border
settlement of interregional financial transactions. There is also a focus on capital
market development in the subregion.
A statistical database for essential economic time series from the twelve SADC
countries is now available at the South African Reserve Bank to help the gover-
nors gain a better understanding of the regional economic environment and
learn from one another’s experiences. A data bank has also been established to
provide information on issues relating to legislation, relationships with gover-
nors, functions and responsibilities of management, policy objectives, monetary
policy procedures and instruments, and administrative structures for each central
bank. To standardize bank regulation and supervision in the region, the central
banks have formed an eastern and southern African banking supervisors’ group
for this purpose.
Of the twelve SADC members, South Africa is the most advanced in the
region. In the rand zone, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland hold their curren-
cies at par with the South African rand, and the central banks in these countries
function as a currency board by issuing currencies that are backed by 100 percent
foreign assets. The rand circulates alongside local currencies, thus generating
seigniorage opportunities for South Africa.
The SADC cooperation system is judged to have benefited its member coun-
tries.29 There is relative macroeconomic stability in the region, reflected by low
inflation rates. In many countries, there is also clear evidence of convergence of
fiscal and monetary policies.
29. Uche (1999).
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An Assessment of Current Financial and Monetary 
Cooperation Arrangements
This section focuses on the experiences of the CFA zone and draws on those
experiences for lessons for the rest of the region.
The CFA Zone Experience and Its Relevance for the Rest of Africa
Honohan and Lane suggest that, even though the underlying structure estab-
lished for the franc zone in West and Central Africa appeared to be solid, it had
problems:
The underlying economic philosophy of the franc zone arrangements was
always that of an open and competitive market. . . . The institutional
arrangements are strikingly modern in appearance. In particular there have
been multinational central banks (which are thus independent of any one
national government), rules constraining monetary financing of fiscal
deficits, an open capital account, widespread presence of foreign-owned
banks and the lowest inflation rates in Africa. From some points of view the
regime has looked like a precursor to EMU with its single currency, its free-
dom of capital movements and its multinational central bank. However,
any attempt to draw conclusions for the prospects of wider African mone-
tary unions must pause to consider the 1980s crisis of the CFA zone.30
It is clear that, until the mid-1980s, the economic performance of the franc
zone countries was acceptable, and the fixed exchange rate with France appeared
to remove macroeconomic uncertainty and encourage external investment. The
relatively high growth rates that were achieved and stable CFA franc notes
ensured that the subregion outshone such unstable countries as Ghana and
Nigeria with inconvertible local currencies. And because some parts of the franc
zone banking system appeared to function properly, the zone received substan-
tial deposits of flight capital from its neighbors.
Honohan and Lane wrote that the inflexibility and brittle character of the
system’s institutional mechanisms proved to be its downfall, bringing the func-
tioning of the banking system almost to a halt in several of the countries from
the mid-1980s. This led to the deep recession that they experienced all the way
through 1993. A parallel market in the CFA franc developed, and capital move-
ments were blocked, while it became difficult to effect current international
payments. As we saw earlier, a large number of the banks failed, even though
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some were recapitalized: “Depositors in some banks had gone without access to
their funds for years. The banks that continued to function now tended to be
highly selective in their clientele, both on the deposit and on the lending side.
Interbank markets were operating on a very limited basis. Having lost heavily
from the collapse of debtor banks, the central banks were close to being unable
to cover their operating expenses.”31
It was these problems that eventually led to devaluation in 1994. However,
much of the blame for the situation is placed on the behavior of governments,
which used the banking system to finance projects in which they had an inter-
est, albeit indirectly. It is believed that the banks agreed to make the kinds of
loans that led to their collapse because of an unusual relationship that had devel-
oped between the governments and the French ownership of many of the banks:
Most were joint ventures between the national Governments and one of
four major French-based banks; sometimes the Government was the major-
ity shareholder, sometimes not. In either case, the key senior management
was provided by French nationals seconded from the parent banks in
France. However, the objective of the French shareholders is unlikely to
have been solely profit maximization. They had other interests, including
the commercial interests in Africa of their French customers. They will
not have been unaware of the wider political agenda of the French Gov-
ernment, which was owner of the French banks for at least part of the
period, and a strong influence at all times.32
In the end, even though the central banks were apparently freed by statute from
any fiscal pressure, they bowed to indirect pressure to lend through banks to
relieve fiscal needs. Recapitalizing them through the central bank led to the
eventual collapse of the system.
Honohan and Lane have argued that this particular rules-based system did
not guarantee sound policy since it encouraged a false sense of security. The
rules did not guarantee the correct incentives, and their rigidity induced a bank-
ing practice that subordinated both commercial and central banking to fiscal
pressures. The three rules that they judged to be problematic were:
—the exchange rate rule, which “could not cope with the procyclical public
sector wage policy and the optimistic policy of ratcheting official purchasing
prices for the all-important cash crops (especially coffee and cocoa) to the high-
est figures attained to date”;
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—the rule that the banking sector could not lend the government more than
a fraction of its annual revenue needs because it “merely diverted the pressures
into indirect borrowing through public enterprises and other associated bodies
and through government payments arrears”;
—The rule that each national government was responsible to the central
bank for the debts of any insolvent bank because it encouraged “insouciant
lending by the central bank to unsound banks.”33
It is apparent that the rules could not operate within a political environment
that was not being adapted quickly enough for the rigid arrangements. The
need to ensure consistency of macroeconomic and financial fundamentals with
a fixed exchange rate system was not given the appropriate importance: “This
sorry story of implosion of the CFA zone financial system, culminating in the
major devaluation of January 1994, serves as a cautionary tale for fans of mone-
tary unions and, indeed, of rules-based monetary systems in general. The limita-
tions of such rules must be recognized whether they be the specific rules adopted
in the CFA zone, or those of a currency board.”34
The CFA zone is reckoned to have recovered substantially from the troubles of
the 1980s, following the devaluation and a restructuring of the zone’s regulatory
arrangements. Following the banking crisis in the zone, some of the new institu-
tional arrangements adopted include the centralization of responsibility for
bank supervision in two regional banking control commissions. This provides a
new multinational “agency of restraint” that fills a gap in the previous institu-
tional arrangements, in contrast to European Monetary Union, where national
central banks are still responsible for regulating commercial banks.
The CFA is now pegged to the euro, and this is seen as providing greater
nominal and real exchange rate stability. Honohan and Lane are not certain that
there are obvious lessons to be drawn from the current arrangements for other
African countries. They query whether EMU, together with the new focus on
the use of a common currency as an insulator against contagious or correlated
capital movements and on the use of regional financial authorities as a quasi-
external discipline on national financial policy, points to any increased likeli-
hood of additional cooperative arrangements.
Scope for Developing African Monetary Unions
There is no doubt that EMU has inspired a lot of discussion concerning the cre-
ation of monetary unions among groups of African countries. What is not yet
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clear is the extent to which they will seek to develop external agencies of restraint,
as the current CFA franc zone has done. Honohan and Lane suggest that mone-
tary union may be viewed in a number of ways: as an agency of restraint on gov-
ernments; as a bulwark against contagious speculation; as a way of achieving
economies of scale in the financial sector; and, finally, in a traditional role as an
optimum currency area (OCA), involving arguments relating to the pattern of
trade and to the degree of factor mobility.
Monetary union as an external agency of restraint. There are two elements to
this issue: political considerations and seigniorage. While, for many years, there
has been little interest in delegating the conduct of monetary policy to an exter-
nal agency, there is a clear indication from West Africa that countries are now
more willing to entrust that role to a supranational body.
The creation of the second monetary zone and the agreement on convergence
criteria both point to renewed interest in developing an external agency of
restraint. However, Ogunkola does not consider the various elements for success-
ful optimal currency areas to be present, particularly in view of wide divergences
in production outcomes and potential. There is presumed to be little inter-
dependence among the nations, and they face large common and idiosyncratic
shocks. And it is this that will make it difficult for individual countries to entrust
the preparation of monetary and exchange rate policies to external agencies, par-
ticularly in the face of mounting adverse shocks to their economies. Ogunkola
sees the fact that countries are struggling to attain the convergence criteria as
evidence of that difficulty.35
However, Honohan and Lane suggest that “the record of macroeconomic
mismanagement in many African countries means that there is a strong case for
delegation of monetary policy, if a suitable supranational monetary authority
exists. Put differently, since policymaking resources are scarce in Africa, it may
make sense to ‘outsource’ monetary policy as one possible resolution to the
search for ‘agencies of restraint.’ ”36
The major problem remains that a supranational monetary authority may
require some degree of political integration if it is to be accepted as democrati-
cally accountable. Political integration may also be desirable to minimize the
“hold-up” problem in setting monetary policy. And that is missing in the region
at present, making it difficult to be very optimistic about the outcomes. The
current initiative is to use monetary union to spearhead regional economic coop-
eration within a region where economic cooperation has so far been limited.
35. Ogunkola (2002).
36. Honohan and Lane (2000, p. 11).
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Honohan and Lane suggest that, if there were enough resources to support
monetary union, it might lead slowly to greater political integration: “This
political and administrative process would likely be a more potent force for eco-
nomic integration than the direct effect of achieving exchange rate stability
across African borders.”37
On the question of seigniorage, it is the fear of loss of seigniorage revenue
that might deter countries from abdicating responsibility for monetary policy.
And many African countries rely extensively on seigniorage, amounting to an
average of around 1.5 percent of the region’s GDP. It is obvious that the coun-
tries will have to work out appropriate alternatives to high seigniorage and find
ways of distributing these equitably.
Deepening financial sectors and fighting contagion. There are opportunities for
improving the poorly developed banking and financial sectors. A fundamental
concern for countries contemplating membership of a monetary union or a cur-
rency area is whether it leads to greater financial resources for development. This
is linked to the extent to which it makes available the rest of the world’s resources,
namely the benefits of globalization. As seen earlier, Africa has been left out of the
massive international capital that flowed to developing economies when the world
economy opened up in the 1980s. The good news is that it was also bypassed by
the global financial crisis associated with such massive capital flows. In its global
marginalization, Africa stands to lose out on the potential benefits of globaliza-
tion, although it is presumed to escape the risks of globalization.
Successful globalization is characterized by mutual gains for both global
investors and emerging economies in Africa. While benefiting from globalization,
Africa should also contribute to improving the global risk-reward ratio faced by
global investors. Those international investors must evaluate their investment
portfolios on the basis of the global risk-reward ratio. In this regard, the benefits
from globalization include the following:
—Diversification benefits: Africa’s competitiveness in attracting international
capital depends on its role in improving the global risk-reward ratio faced by
international investors. The potential benefits from international portfolio
diversification stem fundamentally from diversity in countries’ economic cycles.
For instance, a combined strategy of investment in both non–United States
equities and the U.S. market generally dominates investment in the U.S. market
alone. Can Africa contribute to the emerging markets portfolio, and ultimately
to the global portfolio? To the extent that Africa’s economies do not move in
tandem with those of the advanced economies, there are opportunities for inter-
37. Honohan and Lane (2000, p. 12).
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national investors to benefit from the inclusion of African financial markets in
the global portfolio.
—Bargains in Africa and stock return potential: Indicators point to gross
undercapitalization of Africa, suggesting potential bargains. Very low price-
earnings multiples are currently observed in African stock markets, suggesting
that there is significant undervaluation, given an acceptable range of emerging
market risks. Also, the recent performance of African stock markets is encourag-
ing and indicative of the potential for high returns.38
There are considerable benefits to Africa as a recipient of global capital, with
integration into the global economy, or both and these include the following:
—Access to a diversified source of external finance: Access to a diversified
source of external capital lessens heavy reliance on sovereign debt and its atten-
dant crisis, and on official flows, which are already shrinking.
—Reduction in the cost of capital: Globalization allows for local securities
market risks to be shared internationally. Global risk sharing leads to a reduc-
tion in the local cost of capital.39 In other words, greater risk sharing by inter-
national investors leads to a reduction in the cost of capital for local firms, since
risks of local shares are shared globally.
—Discipline and exposure to best practices: Globalization enhances the cred-
ibility of domestic capital market institutions, as foreign investors demand
world-class services. Governments will be under greater pressure to strengthen
the rule of law, enforce contracts, and increase the growth of available informa-
tion in response to international investor demands.
—Reversal of flight capital: Evidence from other regions, such as Latin
America and East Asia, suggests that globalization of local markets leads to
large reversals of flight capital. Given that Africa stands within the top tier of
regions in terms of flight capital stock per GDP, there is potential for a signifi-
cant reversal of flight capital if the region is sufficiently integrated into the
global economy.
The other side of the coin is that globalization engenders considerable risks,
with the associated crisis, as witnessed in East Asia. The global risks stemming
from volatility in global financial markets, the large unfavorable fluctuations in
international exchange rates, and large unfavorable swings in international inter-
est rates manifest themselves in large unfavorable swings in international capital
flows. For instance, countries that experienced large capital flows suffered com-
mensurately large and sudden outflows. The sudden and massive collapse of
38. Senbet (1998).
39. Errunza, Senbet, and Hogan (1998).
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capital inflows can be enormously costly. Not only will there be sudden with-
drawals of deposits, leading to a credit crunch in the economy; in addition,
creditors will be unwilling to supply short-term credit even for a liquidity crisis,
and there will be default and contagion of the type experienced in East Asia (and
earlier in Mexico). The damage associated with the financial crisis was evident
in the dramatic declines in the asset and currency values of East Asia.
Capital markets are relatively new to most of Africa. In West Africa, for
example, with the exception of Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire, other stock markets
were set up only in the past few years. They may be seen as a natural outgrowth
of the financial reforms that have taken place in these countries.40 International
investors have begun paying attention to Africa, and a total of eighteen special-
ized investment funds have been established since 1993, which are now trading
in New York and Europe. Regionalization is emerging as a way of addressing
the thinness and scarce liquidity problem of African capital markets. In particu-
lar, the Abidjan stock market has emerged as an anchor for the CFA countries,
with an increased potential to serve other countries in West Africa. This effort
has encouraged discussion between Ghana and Nigeria on setting up another
subregional exchange for English-speaking West Africa. The Nigerian Stock
Exchange and the Ghana Stock Exchange signed a memorandum of under-
standing in 1999 to ascertain the feasibility of a regionalized exchange. Ironi-
cally, however, while this discussion is taking place, a new effort is under way to
start a second Nigerian exchange in Abuja. The establishment of regional securi-
ties and exchange commissions, self-regulatory organizations, and committees
to promote harmonization of legal and regulatory schemes are among the mech-
anisms under discussion. The tax treatment of investments has to be harmo-
nized, since tax policy is an important incentive or disincentive for both issuers
and investors. Ultimately, regulations and accounting reporting systems, along
with clearance, settlement, and depository systems, should conform to inter-
national standards.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
There is no doubt that there is still a long way to go before financial and mone-
tary cooperation can be firmly established in Africa. Since the introduction of the
euro, the perceived pressure on African governments to set up similar arrange-
ments has increased, despite the fact that institutional and other structural con-
ditions are quite different. In parts of Africa, there is certainly a tendency to
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view financial and monetary integration as the best possibility for bringing
about faster political integration
The current struggles of the West African Monetary Zone to achieve conver-
gence give ample indication of the difficulties facing the region as it seeks to
achieve financial and monetary cooperation. On the other hand, the fact that
the CFA franc appears to have achieved some stability since the implementation
of reforms and pegging to the euro suggests that having an external anchor
might help. In any case, this experience raises question as to the prospects for
using an externally based peg to achieve financial cooperation among any group
of African countries.
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